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ABSTRACT
The Diffusion of Crisis Information: A Computer Simulation
of Soviet Mass Media Exposure During the Cuban Missile
Crisis and the Aftermath of President Kennedy's Assassination
by
Herbert L. Selesnick
Submitted to the Department of Political Science on
May 14, 1970 in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
During October of 1962 and again in November of the following
year, the world was plunged into crises by the Cuban missile confron-
tation and the assassination of President Kennedy. Sovietologists
and knowledgeable persons who have since left the USSR report that
Russian media delayed covering significant aspects of the Cuban crisis,
but that virtually all aspects of the Kennedy assassination received
prompt and heavy coverage. To assess the probable exposure con-
sequences of this reportage we have used a computerized simulation
model of the Soviet mass media system to postdict the frequency and
reach of Cuban crisis and Kennedy assassination messages in the
system from known facts about the population, its media habits, and
the content of the mass media.
Data about the population and its media habits were taken
from published Soviet census statistics and time budget studies,
and from a survey by American social scientists of how Soviet refugees
and visitors to West Europe used their leisure time while in the USSR.
Content analyses of (1) the Russian press, (2) FBIS monitoring
reports on Soviet domestic radio transmissions, and (3) VOA and
Radio Liberty news transcripts, provided a set of messages represent-
ative of the flow of media material. Soviet television messages
were postulated from the domestic radio messages, and incoming BBC
messages were postulated from-the content of contemporaneous issues
of the London Times. The messages thus identified by the content
analyses were aggregated in themes which served as input to the
simulation.
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For six Cuban crisis and four Kennedy assassination themes,
we described by sex, age, education, urban or rural residence, and
Party or nonParty membership, the growth and distribution of exposure,
the most and least exposed population subgroups, the duplication of
exposure across themes, and the most important types of media in
producing exposure to themes. The simulation results showed foreign
radio as having played a major role in bringing news of both events,
and especially the Western version, to the Russian population. They
also showed domestic radio as having provided the first (and an
early) source of mass media information for most of the population.
Comparing the two crises, we observed in the simulation outcomes
that the Kennedy assassination themes penetrated the population much
more rapidly and in greater depth. In both cases, however, the
simulation postdicted that the better educated, the young, and
(to a lesser extent) urbanites were more rapidly and heavily exposed
than others, especially by means of foreign radio and domestic
newspapers. Extending this analysis, we proposed a simple hypothesis,
which conformed to the simulation results, relating the variation
of exposure with education to the degree of complexity of a
communications situation. Finally, we attributed the declining
importance of domestic radio among urbanites, between the first and
second simulations, largely to the growth of the urban television
network between 1962 and 1963.
Thesis Supervisor: Ithiel de Sola Pool
Title: Professor of Political Science
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
This thesis is concerned with three distinct prob-
lems: It reports on a basic research effort in which the
author has participated for some time--the design and imple-
mentation of a computer-based model of communication sys-
tems. It also addresses the simulation problems of using
this model (1) to produce a static description of the
Soviet mass media system and (2) to produce a dynamic rep-
resentation of message flows within this system during two
crisis periods.
In developing the model we addressed ourselves to
the problem of ascertaining who attends to the flow of
*lThe development of this model has been a major ob-
jective of the Comcom Project--part of a research program on
problems of communication and international security con-
ducted by M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies. Under
the direction of Professor Ithiel de Sola Pool, the Comcom
Project has pursued two efforts: first, to acquire data on
the communication systems of the Soviet Union and Communist
China, and second, to design, program, and implement a com-
puter simulation model that can be used to test the likely
spread of information within these two countries in a variety
of future situations. The author and a colleague, John F.
Kramer, have developed most of the simulation programs.
- 1
2material in the mass media. For many countries, a variety
of secondary sources provide aggregate data on the popula-
tion's media use habits and on the media's coverage of
particular events. By simulation we can
--produce a coherent description of a hypothetical
mass media system which might have generated all
of the observed aggregate data, and
--reconstruct the way messages about specific
events might have flowed to the population of
this system as a result of the observed media
coverage.
Major conceptual problems dealt with in the model
include
--establishing, for each demographic and social
stratum of the audience, the distribution of
exposure probabilities over the major media;
--representing the time dependence of successive
new exposures to a given medium, or to a message
occurring in several media at different times,
i.e., the problem of cumulation;
--expressing the dependence of exposure probabil-
ities between media, i.e., the problem of
duplication of coverages among media;
--determining the selectivity of response by
members of the audience to different messages
within fixed media;
--summarizing the sequence of messages occurring
in the media. 1
All of these processes affect who gets exposed to
what media material.
The second problem with which this thesis is con-
cerned is that of using the model to simulate the structure
3of the Soviet mass media system. The specific problem is
to estimate a large number of Soviet audience parameters
when only partial data is available. Circulation figures
for most of the important print, media and data on the dis-
tribution of electronic media are available. However,
there are no good audience figures for print media, nor
are there any audience ratings for the electronic media.
Interviews covering media use have been conducted outside
the Soviet Union with former residents of the country and
with Soviet visitors to Western Europe. In addition,
there are studies describing people's time allocation to
reading, radio-listening, TV-viewing, etc. We have used
these two sources along with the Soviet-published data (and
a certain amount of speculation) in an attempt to derive
the parameter estimates needed for structuring the Soviet
mass media system.
The third problem to which we address ourselves is
that of simulating the flow of messages within this system.
Specifically, we have attempted to simulate the flow of
messages through the mass media to the Soviet population
during the period of the Cuban missile crisis and the
aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination. Data on
the media coverage of these two events is available in a
variety of sources. These include samplings of Soviet
press and radio coverage (published by the Social Science
4Research Council and the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service respectively), contemporaneous issues of the major
Soviet print media, and transcripts of foreign radio broad-
casts to the Soviet Union. However, there are no sources
which indicate how the lower level press treated these
events, monitoring reports cover only central radio, and
there are no data on television coverage. Published
studies of the Soviet press do provide a general picture of
how the content of lower level papers differs from that of
republic and central papers, and monographs on Soviet radio
and television broadcasting make similar comparisons for
central and local broadcasts. These studies also provide
publication frequencies and broadcast schedules. Jour-
nalistic accounts of the media coverage contain hints as
to how various subgroups in the Soviet population might
have responded to media material at the times in question.
By content analyzing the secondary sources and drawing
inferences from the descriptive material we have attempted
to reconstruct the sequence of messages which appeared in
the mass media and the ways in which audiences received
them during these two periods. We then confronted our
static representation of the Soviet mass media system
with these dynamic message flows in order to produce simu-
lated exposure histories.
The simulated exposure outcomes were interrogated
in several ways. We used them to answer (hypothetically)
the following kinds of questions:
1. What proportion of the Soviet population
heard about each event?
2. How did that proportion differ from city to
country, from Party member to nonParty member,
from the educated to the uneducated, from
young to old, from men to women?
3. Which people heard the Western version of
events?
4. How long did it take the majority to hear it?
5. How many heard it confirmed a second and
third time?2
Having described the principal areas of concern in
this thesis, we turn next to a brief discussion of their
significance. In the following paragraphs we identify
some of the reasons for studying mass media exposure. We
also discuss the advantages of simulating a communication
system on a computer and the practical value of being able
to simulate message flows within the Soviet system during
crisis periods.
Identifying audiences
A principal reason for studying mass media message
flows is that they are part of a universal social process.
6Together with face-to-face message flows they constitute
communication (in the social sense of the word), and com-
munication is a pervasive aspect of any society. Accord-
ingly, we can develop our understanding of a given society
as a system by learning how messages flow to its population
through its mass media.3
We study mass media communication because it, is an
increasingly important process. The world-wide network of
mass media has grown enormously in the past century and
its audiences have become larger and more heterogeneous.
Both of these developments have been associated with the
industrial and technological revolutions in general, and
with the spread of urbanization and literacy in particular.
Since the 1920's--when the ability of the mass media to
reach and influence large audiences first became the sub-
ject of systematic study--there have been three main
stimuli to the development of domestic communications re-
search: interest in the intra-nation use of propaganda
that; followed the First World War; generalized concern
over the cultural and moral effects of an expanding mass
media system; and commercial interest in the audiences of
the mass media.4 International communications research--
focusing on the strategic (inter-nation) use of shortwave
propaganda5 and the potential role of communications re-
search in the service of international organization 6 --
7began during the Second World War. Its development since
then has been stimulated by two major trends: the expanded
activities of governments in spreading their information
and propaganda throughout the world; and the spread of the
technological means of mass communication into the non-
industrialized areas of the world. 7 So in this century
mass media communication has been a growing concern of com-
mercial, cultural and political research.
The mass media have always been interested in the
audiences they reach because this is a key factor in their
competition for advertising revenue. The first commercially
sponsored studies conceived of audiences as homogeneous
masses of individuals and were primarily concerned with the
number of people reached. However, since the early 1940's
a growing body of research has shown that audiences are
highly structured and that individuals play important
roles in deflecting and/or spreading the influence of the
media.8 Responding to these findings, commercial audience
research has focused on finer and finer differentiations
and has developed numerous criteria--demographic, socio-
economic, psychological, social and communication--for
classifying audiences. The mass media are today as much
concerned with who they reach as with how many they reach.
They have developed increasingly precise measures of audi-
ence size and composition and, over the years, a vast number
8of differential exposure studies have accumulated for
each of the media.9
The advertising industry, its clients, and cometimes
the media themselves face a fundamental problem closely
related to the concerns of this thesis: the "media-mix"
problem. Generally formulated, this is the problem of al-
locating appropriations among message vehicles (particular
magazines, TV programs, etc.) in such a way as to obtain
the maximum possible impact. on a pertinent target within
a given budget. ° In the commercial sphere this involves
an advertising budget. and a marketing target, and the ob-
jective is to elicit a particular sales response. Although
there is no direct relationship between the number of ex-
posures to advertising and the sales response, most ap-
proaches to the media-mix problem attempt (quite reasonably)
to maximize the number of "effective" exposures (i.e., ex-
posures of likely consumers) that can be attained within the
advertising budget.. l This involves the establishment of
an optimum advertising schedule based on a knowledge of the
*lThere are five prior conditions that must be met
before an advertisement can have an effect, whatever that
effect may be: (1) media distribution; (2) exposure to
the message vehicle; (3) exposure to the particular adver-
tisement; (4) perception of the advertisement; (5) adver-
tising influence (see, e.g., Edwin B. Parker, Stewart A.
Smith, and John Scott Davenport, "Advertising Theory and
Measures of Perception," Journal of Advertising Research,
III, No. 4 [1963], 40-43).
9unduplicated audience in each of the target subgroups of a
population for each of several candidate message vehicles.
The optimization criterion is generally a combination of
reach objectives (highest net coverage at lowest cost) and
frequency objectives (n-repeated coverage at lowest cost).
Three systematic approaches to the media-mix problem
have emerged in recent years: mathematical formulas,
mathematical programming, and simulation. Formulas have
generally been used to estimate unduplicated audiences for
combinations of message vehicles. Their precision is
*lMost of these formulas are modifications of
formulas developed by Sainsbury and Agostini. The main
weakness of Sainsbury's approach is that it is based on a
random hypothesis, i.e., that the probability of exposure
to a message vehicle is independent of the probability of
exposure to any other message vehicle. Agostini's formula,
while more refined, has the practical limitation that it
requires knowledge of the pairwise duplications between
all combinations of message vehicles within each group
of the population for which net audience estimates are to
be computed. For examples of mathematical methods of
estimating net audiences, the reader is referred to J. M.
Agostini, "How to Estimate Unduplicated Audiences,"
Journal of Advertising Research, I, No. 3 (1961), 11-14;
John Bauer, Seven tests of Agostini's Formula," Journal
of Advertising Research, III, No. 1 (1963), 13-20; J. M.
Caffyn and M. Sagovsky, "A Comparison of the Agostini and
Sainsbury Methods," Journal of Advertising Research, III,
No. 1 (1963), 21-25; Marcel Marc, gostini's Formula
Applied to Special Markets," Journal of Advertising Re-
search, III, No. 1 (1963), 26-29; Walter Kuhn, "A New
Formula," Journal of Advertising Research, III, No. 1
(1963), 30-33; Ronald B. Kaatz, "Improving Agostini's
Formula for Net Audience," Journal of Advertising Research,
III, No. 3 (1963), 43-44; Richard B. Metheringham, "Measur-
ing the Net Cumulative Coverage of a Print Campaign, Journal
of Advertising Research, IV, No. 4 (1964), 23-28; Stig
10
unpredictable because they do not include the determinants
of cumulation or duplication. As a result, formulas de-
veloped for estimating audiences in one country have proved
inaccurate when used for estimating audiences in other
countries.
Mathematical programming solutions to the media-mix
problem have been widely discussed. Linear programming is
perhaps most representative of this approach. 1 Although
Marberg, "A Visual Aid to Estimating Net Audiences," Journal
of Advertising Research, VI, No. 3 (1966), 21-28; Pierre
Hofmans, "Measuring the Cumulative Net Coverage of any
Combination of Media," Journal of Marketing Research, III,
No. 3 (1966), 269-78.
*lLinear programming is an operations research tech-
nique that is uniquely applicable to problems where the
purpose is to maximize (or minimize) a given linear func-
tion (called the objective function) under constraining
conditions that can be represented by linear inequalities.
In the linear programming media-mix model, the objective
function expresses the contributions of particular adver-
tising units to total advertising effectiveness. The vari-
ables in the function are the dollars invested in individual
media, and for each such variable there is a multiplicative
constant which represents the number of prospective consum-
ers reached by the individual medium per dollar invested.
Linear inequalities are used to express restrictions imposed
on solution values of the variables by the budget, the
characteristics of the available media, and other environ-
mental conditions. There are also non-negativity require-
ments which prevent infeasible solutions involving negative
values of the variables. Solution of a correctly formulated
model (which has to be done on a computer) will indicate the
particular advertising units to be included in the media
schedule and the number of uses of each which will result in
reaching the greatest number of prospective consumers within
a given budget.
The first announcement of a serious effort by a U.S.
advertising agency to use linear programming in media
11
linear programming is a more sophisticated media selection
technique than the formula approach, it too has its limi-
tations, which may be summarized as follows: (1) It is
only applicable if all the relationships in the problem
can be regarded as linear. In reality, however, audience
response functions are seldom linear. For example,
multiple exposures may at. first produce increasing returns
(perception) and later produce diminishing returns (satura-
tion).ll (2) Linear programming models generally do not
account. for cumulation or duplication. 12 (3) Audience
data for various media are not always available on the con-
sistent basis required by linear programming models and,
selection was made in 1961. A series of papers dealing
with this subject was presented at the 1961 Eastern An-
nual Conference of the American Association of Advertis-
ing Agencies (American Association of Advertising
Agencies, Mathematical Programming for Better Media Selec-
tion, Papers from 1961 Region Conventions [New York:
American Association of Advertising Agencies, 1961]).
For additional applications of this technique the reader
is referred to Day, "Linear Programming"; James T. Engel
and Martin R. Warshaw, "Allocating Advertising Dollars
by Linear Programming," Journal of Advertising Research,
IV, No. 3 (1964), 42-48; Douglas B. Brown and Martin R.
Warshaw, "Media Selection by Linear Programming,"
Journal of Marketing Research, II, No. 1 (1965), 83-88.
Mathematical methods of media selection was the subject
of the sixth meeting of the Advertising Research Founda-
tion's Operations Research Discussion Group (Advertising
Research Foundation, Inc., Mathematical Methods of Media
Selection: A Report. of the Sixth Meeting of the ARF
Operations Research Discussion Group [New York: Adver-
tlising Research Foundation, Inc., 1966]).
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in any event, are seldom available for target subgroups.
The media-mix problem has been simulated on a com-
puter. A computer program developed by the Simulmatics
Corporation accounts for cumulation and duplication and
accepts audience data in various formats and levels of
specificity. 1 The Media-Mix simulation--a far more
sophisticated technique for media selection than any of
the other methods currently in use--has provided a point
of departure for the development of the Comcom simulation
which is reported on in this thesis.
Cultural concerns with mass media communication
have focused on its effects.1 3 One fear, voiced quite
"
1The Media-Mix simulation represents the flow of
messages through the mass media to the American population.
A population of a few thousand individuals--representing
a sample of the population of the U.S.--is symbolized in
the computer. Each individual has certain social and
demographic characteristics. In the static part of the
simulation, the computer performs a large data processing
operation on Nielsen ratings, ABC circulation figures and
various media surveys, to obtain the media habits of each
symbolic individual. In the dynamic part of the simula-
tion, a flow of messages is released to the population
through various media (the advertising schedule is input)
and the computer calculates the probability of a message
having been received by any given type of person after
any given period of time. Based on these probabilities
the computer then produces an estimate of how many people
have seen a particular advertisement and with what fre-
quency (Simulmatics Corporation, "Simulmatics' Media-Mix
I. General Description," New York, 1962. [Mimeographed.];
Simulmatics Corporation, "The Simu.lmatics' Media-Mix.
Technical Description," New York, 1962. [Mimeographed.]).
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often in the past,, was that the media were accelerating
America's conversion to a "mass society." This fear re-
flected an overestimation of the power of the mass media
coupled with a general ignorance of the role of face-to-
face communication in mediating their effects.14 As we
mentioned above, research findings have shown that media
attendance takes place in a social matrix. Additional
findings with regard to individual variability of response
to communications complicate the picture still further.
In most, systematic experimental studies of the effects of
communications, differential impact has been explained in
terms of differential characteristics of the target popula-
J'1
tion. Accordingly, any study of the impact of the mass
media (cultural or otherwise) must determine the relative
distribution of effects throughout the entire popula-
tion, and this will be a function of the distributions
lSome of the research findings which reflect re-
sponse variability and the fact. that content cannot be
simply equated with effect. are as follows: It is easier
to transmit information than to change'attitudes; Simpler
material is more readily comprehended when presented
orally, more complicated material when presented in written
form; Two-sided arguments make the audience more resistant
to counter-propaganda; People remember more of arguments
congruent with their values; If a communicator is not
trusted, the audience is less likely to accept his point.
of view; In cohesive small groups, communications are more
likely to be directed at those who deviate from the group
norm; In disintegrating small groups, persons who have had
their confidence in their opinions shaken are more likely
to talk with persons who agree with them in attempts t;o
restore their previous level of confidence.
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of relevant, characteristics across the population. Expo-
sure to media material is one such characteristic.
The first political studies of mass communication
were also preoccupied with the potential power of the media.
They focused on the social problems of controlling the
propagandist, concentrating on what was said and how it was
phrased (content analysis). 15 In the late 1930's atten-
tion shifted to who was doing the propagandizingl6 and,
subsequently, to the effect, of propaganda on public opinion.
More recent, research findings have highlighted the crucial
role exposure variables play in determining these effects.
Examples of such findings are as follows: (1) The more
personalized the message vehicle by which a person is
exposed to propaganda (television over newspapers, e.g.)
and the more specialized it is to his predispositions, the
more likely it is to alter his opinion; (2) Communication
content. is more effective in converting public opinion if
it. relates to new, unstructured or peripheral issues
rather than to issues highly correlated with existing at-
titude clusters; (3) The makeup of any medium's audience
(degree of heterogeneity, distribution of predispositions,
etc.) influences the net impact that messages in that
medium can have on public opinion; (4) Propaganda is more
effective in opinion conversion under monopolistic condi-
tions than under competitive conditions.17
15
A knowledge of how messages flow via the mass media
is important to at least three types of practitioners of
political research: evaluators of overseas information pro-
grams; political development theorists; and students of
comparative politics. In evaluating international broad-
casting programs the question of who is speaking is ordin-
arily omitted, because the evaluation has usually been
ordered by the speakers themselves. * The question of
what is said can be answered in considerable detail by
content analysis. Audience provides the major link between
specific content and observed or anticipated effects.
Audience size per se is not the yardstick of success, how-
ever. As in advertising, "effective" exposures are what
count. We have here another variant of the media-mix
problem, i.e., the problem of selecting a schedule that
*lSince the Second World War, national governments
have been the major sponsors of international communica-
tions research and the most successful developers of
methods for identifying the audiences actually reached by
international communications. The United States has in-
vested large amounts of money in efforts to "pre-test" or
"post-evaluate" particular aspects of its international
information program. For example, there have been large
research projects to measure the audiences for, and the
impact of, the Voice of America in different parts of the
world. Abroad, agencies of the British and French govern-
ments' overseas information programs have conducted simi-
lar research, and many governments have set up National
Institutes of Public Opinion Research.
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will efficiently reach predetermined target groups.1 To
the evaluator or the policy-maker, this might mean beaming
sophisticated political programs to elite groups who ap-
pear to exert most of the control over domestic and inter-
national policies of the target country. But international
broadcasters must also be concerned with the local communi-
cations to which the target audiences are exposed, so that
their broadcast strategies can take into account influences
on the target population by other media.
Mass media exposure is associated with change to-
ward modernization. While it is true that the media by
themselves cannot produce broad characterological changes
in individuals, both Lerner and McClelland have gathered
evidence in support of theses that the media, in conjunction
with secular trends and cultural influences, can contribute
to such changes.*2 Also, experimental and survey data
The vehicles of international mass communications
include, for these purposes, wire and wireless press dis-
patches, short-wave radio broadcasting, satellite television,
moving pictures, magazines and books.
2 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society:
Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958)
and David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (Princeton:
Van Nostrand, 1961). Mas-s media exposure affects, and is
in turn affected by, the secular trends common to most de-
veloping countries--the spread of urbanization and literacy,
increased political participation, economic integration, and
the growing penetration of the media. Studies of the media
habits of both peasants and urbanites in developing
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suggest that the mass media can produce direct; changes in
attention, information, tastes and images--cognitive vari-
ables that are known to be related to the processes of
social and political development. *1
Finally, mass media communication is important in
the study of comparative politics. If communication is a
good index of any society, then it is a good comparative
index. The role of the mass media varies from one
country to another, but in all countries it is a function
countries reveal a general pattern of overlapping audi-
ences for the mass media. Attributes such as cosmpolitan-
ness and functional literacy have been found conducive to
media participation while empathy, innovativeness, and
political knowledgeability are some of the consequent vari-
ables that have been identified. In addition to Lerner
and McClelland, see, e.g., Everett M. Rogers, "Mass Media
Exposure and Modernization Among Colombian Peasants,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX, No. 4 (1965), 614-25;
Frederick W. Frey, The Mass Media and Rural Development
in Turkey (Cambridge: Center for International Studies,
M.I.T., 1966); Orlando Fals-Borda, Subversion and Social
Change in Colombia (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969).
*lResearch findings suggest that the mass media
operate very directly on these variables. Changes toward
modernization in attention, information, tastes and images
have commonly been referred to as the "revolution of rising
expectations." Research findings also indicate that, the
media by themselves generally do not influence behavior,
skills, or attitudes. Changes toward modernization in these
variables usually require effective political organization
paralleling the media. For a discussion of this distinc-
tion see Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Mass Media and Politics
in the Modernization Process," in Communications and
Political Development, ed. by Lucian W. Pye (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963).
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of their accessibility and of the population's actual ex-
posure to media material. Existing records often give us
information about the number of radio and television sets
which have been sold or are in use and the circulation
figures for newspapers in a country, but they normally do
not provide data on whom the media reach and with what
frequency. Simulation may be able to help us answer these
important questions.
Can simulation help?
We have chosen to simulate a communication system
for two reasons: The advantages of simulating such a
*1A truly comparative approach must clarify the
role of the mass media,at different levels of specificity,
from one country to another. Within a country the role of
the media will vary for different subgroups in the popula-
tion; the role of one medium will differ from that of an-
other; and one segment of any medium will perform differ-
ent functions from another. Comparative research asks
several questions in this regard: How available and how
widely distributed are the media to different segments of
the population (the question of penetration)? What is the
relationship between accessibility and actual exposure (the
question of media use)? What are the restrictions on ac-
cessibility and the resistances to exposure (the questions
of literacy, censorship, political and social integration,
etc.)? The relevance of these questions varies with the
country being studied. In a country where most of the mass
media are accessible to everyone, such as the Soviet Union
questions of exposure and resistances to exposure require
primary attention. In a country where the distribution of
the mass media is limited, such as China, accessibility and
restrictions on accessibility are perhaps more crucial
problems.
19
system are sufficient to make the effort, worthwhile and
the nature of the problem is such that simulation is
feasible.
Simulation has enabled us to predict the behavior
of a communication system under hypothetical future cir-
cumstances when we could not otherwise have done so. It,
has similarly enabled us to reconstruct (postdict) the
historical though hitherto unknown behavior of a communi-
cation system under past-recorded circumstances. Until
now there have been two obstacles to these kinds of pre-
dictions: (1) A mathematical model embodying the complex
propositions about mass media communication is not
analytically solvable for the exposure outcomes in which
we are interested; (2) Even if it were, the memory capa-
city needed and the number of computations involved would
be prohibitive because of the vast amount of data required
for estimating parameters in such a model. However, by
expressing our model in a simulation program and by running
that program on a high-speed computer,, we have been able
to overcome both of these problems and produce verifiable
model outcomes.
A second advantage we have derived from simulation
is the acquisition of data important to our understanding
of mass media communication systems. Our simulation
utilizes such familiar problem-solving algorithms as
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probability theory, linear programming, matrix algebra
and analytic geometry."1 Simulating the interplay of
these algorithms not only produces a series of predictions
about ultimate exposures but also provides us with infor-
mation on such intermediate phenomena as vehicle audiences,
their buildup and overlap. By comparing these intermediate
outcomes with real world counterpart data, we have been
able to determine the extent to which our simulation
algorithms faithfully depict the workings as well as the
outcomes of a mass media system. The simulation thus
serves a heuristic function, because it allows us to use
familiar statistical mechanisms in explaining how qu.anti-
tative proportions of a population are exposed to material
in the mass media.
Simulating a communication system also has a num-
ber of practical advantages. Now that it has been con-
structed, the Comcom simulation constitutes an experimental
system which can be manipulated in a vast 'number of explor-
atory ways. Three features enhance these experimental
possibilities: (1) The body of propositions built into
the simulation is sufficiently powerful that it produces
interesting results even for countries on which very lit-
tle communications data is available; (2) The simulation
III.
*We describe these algorithms in Chapters II and
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programs are structured for easy factorization so that
incremental variations or new propositions can be readily
incorporated into the model and the entire model can it-
self be incorporated into larger simulations; (3) The
simulation is programmed to provide on-line user access.
As a result of these features, simulation runs can be
executed for a variety of experimental purposes, as for
example,
--to compare the diffusion of news events in
different countries (totalitarian vs.
nontotalitarian, developing vs. developed,
Western vs. Eastern, etc.),
--to compare exposure patterns among various
groups of the population within a single
country,
--to explore the implications of alternative
sets of assumptions that can be substituted
for or added to those already in the simula-
tion, and
--to perform sensitivity analyses, i.e., to
observe how manipulating given parameters
affects model outcomes.
These exploratory possibilities make the simulation
a valuable tool both for students of mass communication
and for practitioners of communication-related strategies.
1In Chapters II and III we also describe the
basic assumptions and propositions underlying the simula-
tion model. Currently in preparation are a programmers'
manual and a users' manual which cover, respectively,
the detailed structure of the simulation programs and
their operation on M.I.T.'s IBM 7094- and 360-based time-
sharing systems.
22
The simulation is a teaching machine. Area students
can use it to observe media exposure patterns for particular
countries in which they are interested. Students of commun-
ication theory can, by studying the simulation algorithms,
acquire a statistical understanding of mass media communi-
cation. They can broaden and refine this understanding by
observing the consequences of changing different parts of
the simulation model. Sensitivity analyses can be used to
help investigators decide whether or not to collect various
types of data on particular communication systems.18
The simulation can be used by communication strate-
gistas and policy makers--political or otherwise. The
relevant, question here is not how well our simulation per-
forms in some absolute sense, but whether it accounts for
exposure consequences better than they are presently being
accounted for in the calculations of policy makers. We
believe the answer is yes, primarily because the complexity
of a mass media system makes it, virtually impossible for
any one person to hold all the relevant details in his
mind. Every communicator wants to know whether his mes-
sage is getting through, to how many people, and with what
competition. Up to now he has only been able to guess
that "most people," or "almost everyone," or "just a few
people" have been or will be made aware of a particular
fact. Here, the advantage of the simulation is that it
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allows the policy maker to substitute rough numerical
estimates (like 10% or 20% or 60%) for his present, even
rougher, verbal estimates.19 A further advantage is that.
the practitioner can play out the consequences of alter-
native policy decisions without having to suffer the actual
consequences. For example, he can observe in a few hours
of real time the hypothetical exposure outcomes that would
result from several contemplated information campaigns.
If evaluation of these campaigns had required that they
actually be launched, the result might have been a sub-
stantially greater investment of time (waiting for the re-
sults of weeks and months of media exposure) and money
(purchasing the schedule).
Even though there are abundant reasons why communi-
cation simulation is desirable, we could not: have under-
taken the effort unless it. were also feasible. For a com-
puter simulation to be feasible, there must exist a complex
structure of propositions and/or data values related to
the problem under consideration.20 As we mentioned earlier,
we have developed just, such a structure of propositions--
in the form of statistical algorithms that reproduce several
kinds of aggregate communications data for-a mass media
system. We also referred earlier to the fact, that various
kinds of data are available on mass media systems through-
out the world. So two conditions exist, either one of
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which is necessary and sufficient for making simulation
feasible.
How do we know our theory of mass media communica-
tion is simulable? The essential questions which we have
had to resolve in this regard are the following:
--Can we represent the salient features of a
mass media system, i.e., are selection criteria
available?
--Can we state the variables and their relations
with sufficient precision to produce a deter-
minate solution to a closed system?*l
--Does the resulting model contain implications
of a non-obvious character, i.e., might new
consequences of the model be discovered by
simulating it?
The decision to simulate was based on an affirma-
tive answer to all three of these questions.*2
*lActually, because we opted for a stochastic
model, this question was phrased somewhat differently, as
follows: "Can we state the variables and their relations
with sufficient precision to produce a specific prediction
of the statistical distribution of a set; of exposure out-
comes?"
*2The computer facilities available to us at Proj-
ject MAC and at the M.I.T. Computation Center also weighed
heavily in the decision to undertake a computer simulation.
The time-sharing systems of these two installations
feature the IBM 7094 computer, a machine which has a
relatively high computing speed and a large storage ca-
pacity. Both time-sharing systems allow on-line user ac-
cess, a feature which speeds up design and debugging pro-
cesses considerably, and both systems accept, programs
coded in MAD, a well-known algebraic compiler language
(seep. 37 below, nLA ). This language is a relatively simple
and therefore desirable one to use from the standpoint of
social scientists who are "doubling" as programmers.
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There are numerous criteria for selecting the
salient aspects of a mass media. We know the important
basic units--audiences, media and messages. The proper-
ties of each of these units that need to be represented
in a model are largely determined by the kinds of data
available on various communication systems and by a num-
ber of well-known propositions about the determinants of
media use. Inputs and outputs stem from our substantive
concerns--message occurrences in the mass media and the
resulting exposure outcomes within a population. Finally,
the processes in the modeland their phasing have been
dictated by computer requirements, the nature of the
statistical packages used, and a number of arbitrary as-
sumptions.
An accurate simulation of the complete Soviet com-
munication system is not now attainable. There are both
theoretical and empirical problems which must be solved
before it will be possible to simulate such Soviet com-
munication networks as rumor, face-to-face contact, and
dissemination by Party channels. This thesis takes an
experimental approach to the simulation of only one (but
a major) component of the Soviet communication system--
mass media message flows. Even this much was not possible
until some intellectual and empirical problems had been
overcome.
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The success of the Media-Mix simulation, referred
to above, has strongly suggested from the outset, that, it is
possible to meet, the theoretical requirements of a Soviet
communication simulation. Several components of the Media-
Mix model have become building blocks in the more elaborately
structured Comcom simulation. (The major conceptual problems
encountered in the design of this model have been outlined
above.) The basic model which has been developed for the
Comcom simulation requires as an input, among other things,
a description of a representative sample of the Soviet pop-
ulation. Each individual must be characterized not only by
his demographic, social and political attributes, but also
by his media habits. All such empirical information must;
be represented in the sample computer population before al-
ternative media contents can be released to the population
and exposure histories simulated. Examples of the kind of
media-use data we are talking about are the distribution
of newspaper reading by paper, type of story, etc., among
rural persons, Party members, the uneducated, etc. Such
data was heretofore nonexistent for the time period of
interest: 1962-63. Thus, as the simulatiom model was
being designed and programmed, a major empirical task has
also been underway--the accumulation of data on the media
habits of different kinds of individuals in the Soviet
Union. Fortunately, it, has been possible to gather this
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data as well as the other kinds of information required by
the simulation model. Newspapers, broadcasts, and other
modes of disseminating information to a whole population
are by their very nature open to analysis. The successful
accomplishment. of this empirical task and the development
of an operational computer model of mass media exposure
mean that now, for the first time, experimental simula-
tions of Soviet, mass communication are feasible.
Soviet, communication
In this thesis we demonstrate how simulation can be
used to obtain various kinds of quantitative estimates of
the spread of information via the mass media in the Soviet
Union. (For example, we use simulation to determine ap-
proximately how many and what types of persons in the USSR
might have been reached by newspaper stories about the U.S.
naval quarantine during the first twenty-six hours of the
Cuban missile crisis.) Our objective is to show that a
computer model of Soviet, mass media communication has
promise of producing considerably more refined estimates
than are now possible of the rate at which information
about world events is diffused via the mass media through-
out the Soviet. Union. There are at. least. two reasons why
this kind of undertaking is worthwhile: (1) Media develop-
ment in the Soviet. Union, as in all societies, is intimately
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related to the broader processes of political, economic and
social development. A research tool which generates numer-
ous reliable indices of Soviet media development provides
data important to an understanding of the general develop-
ment process. (2) Communication is an increasingly sig-
nificant aspect; of international controversies. In a con-
frontation between the United States and the Soviet Union,
American decision-makers could use simulation to assess
the communication consequences of various actions which
they might be contemplating.
As the Soviet Union is changing from an under-
developed into an industrialized nation, its communication
system is changing from a word-of-mouth system into a mass
media system.2 1 This has affected message flows in two
ways. The Soviet Union is becoming increasingly open to
messages from the outside world. A number of factors are
responsible for this development: the vast increase in
the number of Soviets who have the physical possibility of
hearing foreign radio broadcasts; exhibits, dramatic per-
formances, filmed television programs and other such items
that are part of the growing number of cultural exchange
programs; increased contact with visitors from abroad as
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well as travel abroad by Soviet citizens; the growing
availability of printed matter from abroad; an increasing
amount of international information now available in
Soviet domestic media. These changes in access to foreign
information have been occurring in the context of a
broader change in the Soviet communication system--the
growth of domestic mass media. This growth involves not
only the increased availability of the media, but also
a major effort to lighten and diversify their contents
and to make them more timely. Soviet domestic media to-
day report; and comment on most. major events in the world
almost immediately.
With such changes underway, participation in the
Soviet mass media is growing. As the mass media become
an increasingly important institution in Soviet life, they
are taking over many of the functions of social mobiliza-
tion and control previously performed by primary organiz-
tions, such as the family and the local Party organization.
(Soviet leaders today face the question of how far they
should allow this process to go.) Many Westerners are
predicting that in the long run Russia will achieve a
more modern type of society with forms of social
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coordination that rely more heavily on freer mass media
instead of Party control.22
Whatever the course of evolution of Soviet society,
we cannot assume that the same pattern of communications
that existed in the past will continue to exist, say, ten
years from now. Fundamental transformations in Soviet
communication channels are changing the balance of informa-
tion in Soviet message flows. A simulation model of Soviet
mass media communication can be used to make longitudinal
comparisons in order to specify the nature and extent of
the changes which have already occurred. Questions which
might be investigated in this fashion include the following:
--How do patterns of information diffusion differ
from items which are given full coverage by the
domestic media and for items which are suppressed
by these media, and how are these differences
changing over time with the increased foreign
infusion of messages? Comparisons might be made
across the Stalin, post-Stalin, post-jamming,
and de-Stalinization periods.
--How different are the exposure patterns of rural
and urban people, educated and uneducated people,
and are these differences increasing or decreasing
over time?
--Which media are crucial in determining the nature
of the flow of messages to the Russian people,
what is the relative strength of their influence,
and how is it changing with the advent, of 'new
media and the growth of older ones?
--How do patterns of message flow differe in crisis
and non-crisis situations, in different, kinds of
crises, and how are these differences evolving
under the impact of increasingly sophisticated
Soviet techniques for crisis management?2 3
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Effective longitudinal comparisons of this sort
would have to be based on simulations of Soviet, message
flows during periods sufficiently removed in time to make
change observable. Before undertaking such a task, how-
ever, we must first test the reasonableness of simulation
outcomes. This requires that we control for the process
of media development by analyzing exposure histories simu-
lated for contemporaneous but otherwise different classes
of media content. Such is our objective in simulating
Soviet message flows during two crisis periods, one in
1962 and the other in 1963.
A simulation model of Soviet mass media communica-
tion can also be used to predict how information might
diffuse in the Soviet Union in a variety of future cir-
cumstances, under the impact of the continuing growth of
modern communication patterns. Long-range policy planners
concerned with the Soviet Union should be particularly
interested in this use of simulation. 24 In the short run,
simulation can be used to update and broaden the data base
so essential for effective decision-making in crises.25
This is particularly important when communication strategy
is being employed to enforce a posture of military deter-
rence, as is often the case in Soviet-American confronta-
tions. 1 Simulation can be used, in this regard, to
*lThe events of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962
demonstrated the key role which communication can play in
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answer the following kinds of questions:
--How long would it take for explanatory broad-
casts from the United States about a changed
weapon deployment to reach 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%
of the Soviet population under varying condi-
tions, such as with jamming, without jamming,
with a Presidential statement, without one,
etc.?26
--Could movement of U.S. troops to West German
bases in easy airlift distance of Czechoslo-
vakia become widely known among elite circles
in the Soviet Union and not among the broader
Soviet masses if referred to only in Party
publications?2 7
--During crises in which the Soviets stopped
civil radio, how effective would be the other
channels of communication that continued to
exist between the government and the popula-
tion? Between the West and the Soviet popula-
tion?2 8
--In a local crisis similar in character to the
Berlin crisis, what channels and facilities
exist whereby American or NATO communicators
could convey to the Soviet population an
awareness that the danger of war was imminent?
How rapidly and widely could alarming news of
Soviet troop movements and other provocative
acts be disseminated to the Soviet population
by foreign radio broadcasts?2 9
In order to improve Western ability to communicate
with the Soviet Union--under both crisis and normal condi-
tions--we must first develop a clearer understanding of
the course of international controversies and in the
avoidance of war. The heads of state of the Soviet Union
and the United States exchanged messages at that time through
the mass media because the channels of official communica-
tion had become overloaded. In other kinds of crises, it
might be equally important for the American president to
communicate directly with the Russian people as well as with
Soviet leaders.
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the Soviet communication system. By reconstructing the way
messages have actually flowed from the mass media to the
Soviet population in a variety of past situations, we hope
to enhance this understanding. Simulating Soviet exposure
to events surrounding the Cuban missile crisis and Presi-
dent Kennedy's assassination is a first step in this direc-
tion.
Having discussed the significance of the problems
to which this thesis is addressed we turn now to a review
of the pertinent literature. This thesis deals with three
distinct topics--computer simulation, the Soviet mass media,
and crisis communication--so we shall take up the relevant
literature on each in turn.
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Review of the Literature
Computer simulation in the behavioral sciences
The past decade has seen the rapid development of
computer simulation as a behavioral science technique.
The impetus for this development stems from the unique
adaptability of computers to the logical requirements for
understanding behavioral systems. Behavioral processes
are often complicated and highly repetitive, and, frequently,
vast amounts of data are required in order to construct and
test theories about such processes. Modern computers pro-
vide the flexible control options, the high speed compu-
tational facility, and the memory storage capacity to deal
with these problems. 30 The fullest study of a behavioral
system, or any complex part of that system, requires two
complementary activities: a taking apart (analysis) and a
putting together (synthesis).31 In the former case, com-
puters have typically been used for statistical analysis
of sample survey data, in order to identify relationships
and processes of which the system is composed. In the
latter case, computers have been used to play out or simu-
late the logical consequences of these relationships and
processes.
Behavioral science computer simulations are now so
many and varied that it is necessary to place our own
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effort, in perspective. We shall attempt to do so by sur-
veying a variety of applications of this technique within
the behavioral sciences.3 2 The purpose of the survey will
be (1) to construct and to illustrate a typology which re-
flects fundamental distinctions among kinds of computer
simulations, and (2) to locate the Comcom model within
this typology.
One basic distinction among types of simulations
is between mathematical or computer simulations (often re-
ferred to as all-machine simulations) and human simulations
(often called games). In the following survey we shall not
consider human games33 but. shall confine our attention to
computer-operated simulation models, i.e., to all-machine
simulations. 34
A typology of behavioral science computer simula-
tions can be developed by examining, seratim, the applica-
tion of this technique to increasingly complex behavioral
systems--idealized intelligences, abstract organizations,
individuals, and masses. There are two reasons for this
approach: (1) Any behavioral system is analyzable into
two components--st;ructure and process. Computer simula-
tions can be differentiated and classified according to the
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types of structures and processes which they have modelled,
and simulationsof particular behavioral systems can be
used to illustrate these various classifications.3 5
(2) The historical extension of computer simulation appli-
cations has roughly followed a progression from simpler to
more complex organisms, i.e., from more structured to less
structured behavioral contexts. Accordingly, the logical
development of a typology of computer simulations should
proceed stepwise, from simpler to more complex applications
of the technique. 36
Simulations of idealized intelligences
A major thrust of the discipline of cybernetics has
been the specification of ways of handling information
which are common to both human beings and computers. Some
of the basic information processing operations which these
two entities share are:
--remembering (storing) or forgetting (erasing)
symbols;
--associating symbols (organizing memories);
--communicating internally and externally by
reading, writing, and copying symbols;
--comparing symbols, perceiving relationships
between them, and acting in response to the 37
outcome of such comparisons and perceptions.
A number of early computer simulations of logical
thought processes utilized this human-computer analogy and
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a programming language, IPLV, developed by the RAND-Carnegie
Tech group."1 Programs written in this language were able
to process complex information through the use of hier-
archical list structures. Some thought processes that were
simulated in this manner included proving theories in
symbolic logic38 and geometry,39 verbal rote memorization,40
behavior in a binary choice situation,41 human concept
formation,4 2 verbal communication,4 3 and playing chess44
and checkers.45 These pioneering efforts were rapidly fol-
lowed by the development of more general models in which
behavioral processes were largely abstracted from the par-
ticular contexts where they had first been studied.
* 1Allen Newell, Fred M. Tonge, Edward A. Feigenbaum,
Bert. F. Green, Jr., and George A. Mealy, Information Pro-
cessing Language-V Manual (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1964). IPLV is one of several list-processing
languages, all of which are characterized by "dynamic stor-
age allocation." This feature allows programmers to struc-
ture data in lists (descriptive and associative) which can
vary in length during the course of program execution.
This kind of format is often required for simulations of
individual choice behavior (problem-solving, decision-
making, sociometric) when the maximum number of possible
choices is either not known in advance or varies over a
simulation run. Dynamic storage allocation is more effi-
cient than storing an entire choice universe in a huge
matrix (which, in some cases, may be impossible anyway).
When the data for a simulation falls entirely into
the form of arrays whose maximum size is known in advance,
algebraic compiler languages such as FORTRAN, MAD, or ALGOL
have generally been used. It. is much easier to write ex-
tensive programs in either algebraic compiler or list pro-
cessing language rather than in machine code (FAP, e.g.),
although a program written directly in the latter will
usually consume less running time.
38
Computer simulations at. this more general level included
models of logical processes such as trust investment:,46
problem-solving,47 musical composition,4 8 and assembly
line balancing,49 and models of nonrational processes
50
such as conflict-ridden thinking. Most of these simu-
lations were also programmed in IPLV; a computer study of
a nonrational thought process programmed in a different
language was Abelson's simulation of affect-laden congi-
tion 51
It should be noted that, in none of the foregoing
simulations did the entities symbolize human beings.
These simulations were not. intended to imitate the be-
havior of real individuals, but rather of idealized
(artificial) intelligences. Requiring little or no data,
they were used to follow out theoretical consequences by
linking together cognitive processes postulated for an
idealized system or class of systems. Thus,.they serve to
illustrate one half of a fundamental dichotomy among be-
havioral computer simulations--theoretical simulations.
Examples of applied simulations--the other half of the
dichotomy--are more frequent among computer studies of mass
behavior, so we reserve further comment on them for the
appropriate section.
Sources of data.--There are at least three ways in which
data may enter into computer simulations: as the basis
39
for models, as inputs for simulation runs, and as valida-
tion criteria.5 2 For individual cognitive processes, spe-
cial-purpose models have been based on protocols of sub-
jects' verbalized thought processes and, of course, on
introspection. More general models have been developed
from case studies. The inputs for these simulation runs
are usually derived from the structure of a particular
problem context. Four validation methods have been uti-
lized:53 response matching; sequential dependency tests;
Turing Tests (these three methods are based on individual
protocols, real and simulated); and experimental tests of
simulated predictions.
In Figure 1.1 we illustrate the typology con-
structed so far, as illustrated by computer simulations of
idealized intelligences.54
Simulations of abstract organizations
Simulations of organizational behavior share an
important feature with models of indiviual cognitive
processes. Both simulate the behavior of abstract systems
rather than real individuals. Cognitive models concentrate
on problem-solving in the formally unambiguous context of
logic; they simulate idealized thought processes. Models
of the firm focus on decision-making in the clearly defined
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context of micro-economics; they simulate abstract alloca-
tion procedures. 1 Thus, behavioral simulations of the firm
are also theoretical in nature.
Models of organizational decision-making--developed
by Cyert, March, and others--focus on the process of setting
price and output levels.55 Various intra-organizational
departments revise their goals (aspiration levels) upward
when they are exceeded and downward when they cannot be at-
tained. Problems are dealt with only as they appear and con-
flicting goals are attended to sequentially. These postu-
*2lated processes have been termed "satisficing" behavior. 2
Theories of organizational decision-making have frequently
been simulated with the help of special-purpose programming
languages such as IPLV (see n. *1, p. 37 above),
56 57 58Simscript,56 GPSS II, and SLIP. For particular types
of problems, these languages make more efficient use of
computer time than do algebraic compilers such as FORTRAN
and MAD.
*lcognitive models and models of the firm postulate
adaptive processes which make theoretical outcomes uncertain,
despite the formal specificity of their logic or economic
"sets." In the one case, these processes are subsumed under
learning behavior, and in the other case under satisficing
behavior. Both'are mechanisms for narrowing a choice/
attention matrix for problem-solving/decision-making.
*22This type of behavior was first observed in
studies of cognitive activity and was first conceptualized
in the models of artificial intelligence discussed in the
previous section.
42
Other types of computer simulations have also been
performed in organizational settings (business, industrial,
and military). They include some of the tactical studies
of classical operations research,59 such as aerial bombard-
ment, tank or naval maneuvering, queueing theory, traffic
flow, and job shop scheduling. These normative computer
studies are used to identify strategies for optimizing the
performance of man-machine work and weapon systems.60 They
differ from descriptive computer simulations, most of which
are used to describe processes and/or predict outcomes
that characterize the regular functioning of all-man be-
havioral systems.
Sources of data.--Simulation models of large firms making
decisions in imperfect markets have been based on case
studies of various organizations and on selected features
of information theory. Inputs generally consist of
postulated economic or market contexts and organizational
objectives. Case studies and natural experiments have been
used for validation purposes. In Figure 1.2 we portray
computer simulations of abstract organizations in the
framework of our partially developed typology.
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Simulations of individual behavior
In this and the following section we discuss ex-
amples of "social simulation," i.e., computer simulations
in which some of the entities represent human beings and
the programs express behavioral science propositions about
how these persons act and interact.61
Computer simulations of individual behavior focus
on single individuals or on groups of individuals. Simu-
lations of individual behavior--for purposes of theory
development and verification--inclu de Cobly's study of
psycho-therapy,62 a computer simulation of response to
frustration,63 and a simulation study of socialization. 64
Theoretical simulations of group behavior include Coleman's
study of triadic interactions, 6 5 Gullahorn's simulation of
Homan's interaction theory,66 and a computer study of the
response of workers to management incentive systems.6 7
Information processing theories of cognition and
organizational decision-making hare a basic attribute with
computer programs. The latter are organized sequentially
under the control of a main program or "executive." Infor-
mation theory similarly postulates a centralized control
mechanism in cognitive structures, and this makes it rather
natural to map cognitive models into computer memories.
The mapping is more difficult, however, with models of
social behavior because groups of individuals can have many
45
and shifting centers of initiative. This means that, simu-
lation models of social behavior cannot locate program
control in a single individual-symbolizing entity. Two
approaches have emerged from the various attempts to
compensate for this basic difference between social pro-
cesses and computer programs. One has been described as
the aggregative and the other as the systemic approach. 1
Aggregative simulations emphasize the qualitative details
of several interacting persons. Highly articulated pro-
cesses are postulated as operative within individuals whose
actions and interactions are aggregated to determine group
behavior. While these "micro-processes" may operate within
larger "macro-processes," program control alternates among
individuals. (In simulations of cognitive activity and
organizational decision-making, program control resides
permanently in an external monitor.)
An example of the aggregative approach is Poofsand
Kessler's simulation of the interactions among national
decision-makers confronting each other in a crisis.6 8
Each decision-maker receives and incorporates information
*lAbelson, "Simulation of Social Behavior." This
distinction has been drawn b many others. See, e.g.,
Coleman, "Social Simulation," p. 9. The difference between
aggregative and systemic simulations is often described in
terms of "micro" versus "macro" processes. In such cases,
the comparison is made between simulations based on pro-
cesses at; the individual level and simulations based on
processes at the level of the system itself.
46
about his environment, in ways which are dependent on his
own cognitive structure and on sociopsychological pro-
cesses. Decision makers in turn output new information
from their cognitive structures into the environment.
Other examples of the aggregative approach include a simu-
lation of the process by which children are socialized,6 9
a study of the effects of leadership, 70 and a simulated
case of restriction-of-output.71
Simulations of the behavior of individuals within
relatively small social units (individuals, dyads, triads,
families, work groups, etc.) are generally aggregative.
As the number of individuals in a simulation becomes
larger, however, it grows increasingly difficult to pro-
vide each person with detailed socio-psychological pro-
cesses. Not only does the simulation become time-consuming
and cumbersome, but the complexities of formulating and
phasing the various micro-processes within each macro-
process rapidly multiply. For this reason systemic simu-
lations are generally used to characterize large social
systems. Systemic simulations usually express statistical
models of social systems (although the cognitive and
decision-making models discussed earlier are also systemic).
Micro-processes acting within individuals are either ex-
tremly crude or are absent altogether. Typically, macro-
processes or universal forces act on or between individuals,
47
on groups of individuals, or on the system as a whole. The
implication in such models is that all individuals are
simultaneoulsy subjected to each macro-process. (In actu-
ality, computers cannot perform "parallel processing," so
the effect. of simultaneity is achieved by "serial process-
ing"; each individual in turn is subjected to the macro-
process.) Executive control resides permanently in an ex-
ternal monitor--a main program or a "chain" of main pro-
grams--which acts on a passive system.
Examples of the systemic approach are simulations of
reference group behavior by Coleman and Waldorf72 and, gen-
erally speaking, simulations of mathematical models which
cannot be solved analytically. The systemic or macro-
analytic approach is more characteristic of simulations of
large social aggregates, so we reserve further illustrative
examples for the section on mass behavioral simulations.
Sources of data.--Parameters for simulations of individual
behavior have typically been estimated from surveys of
social groups (high school students, e.g.) and case studies
of interacting individuals (elite decision-makers, e.g.).
Inputs generally consist of postulated dynamic processes
(e.g., changes over time in attitudes, attention, friend-
ships, etc.). Validation may involve the comparison of
simulated distributions of summary properties (over indi-
viduals or groups) with their theoretical or empirical
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counterparts.
In Figure 1.3 we present an expanded typology, as
illustrated by computer simulations of individual behavior.
Simmulations of mass behavior
In the preceding section we discussed social simu-
lations which focus on individuals or groups. We turn now
to some examples of social simulations which focus on large
systems--i.e., simulations of demographic, social, economic,
electoral and communications systems.74 Before doing so,
however, it will be useful to add another dimension to our
present typology.
Simulations that are carried out for purposes of
applied research are generally data-rich and theory-poor,
i.e., they process a large body of data according to a
relatively small set of propositions. 7 5 Their function is
to provide specific answers--in many cases quantitative--
to question about the behavior of concrete systems. They
often require the estimation of values for a great, number
of input parameters, and, when they are used to provide
precise predictions of system outputs, this estimation pro-
cedure becomes critical. In short, applied simulations are
typically prognostic, i.e., they simulate outcomes (pur-
chase decisions, votes, exposures, etc.) 76 On the other
hand, most, simulations that are carried out. for purposes
50
of developing and testing theories are theory-rich and
data-poor. They focus on a well-defined, highly complex
body of propositions, and the relatively few parameter
estimates that they require can be "guestimated." In
short, theoretical simulations are typically process
simulations.
The computer simulations of artificial intelligence
and abstract organizations mentioned earlier are, for the
most. part, process simulations. The Crisiscom study of
elite communication,68 described above, also is a process
simulation. Parameter values for the elite communicators
are set arbitrarily, and the simulation focuses on a number
of sociopsychological processes rather than on measures of
real world parameter values.
Computer studies of large systems generally simu-
late aggregatively observable behavior, as for example
population growth,77 the diffusion of innovations,78'79
market response,80 voting, 81 8384,85 and mass media
exposure.86 '87 A theoretical, process-oriented simulation
of mass behavior is McPhee's simulation of voting systems.82
Each sample voter is characterized by party disposition,
socio-economic group memberships, sociometric ties with
other sample voters, and past voting history. Voter
preferences are determined by combinations of stimuli
from and dispositions for a party, mediated by these voter
51
attributes. The outputs of the model can include informa-
tion about the effect of the processes of the model on
individual voters as well as data on the outcome of the
election.
Prognostic simulations of mass behavior, for pur-
poses of applied research, includes Beshers' study of
population growth,7 7 Amstutz's simulation model of
80
market response, a computer study of voting in Presi-
dential elections by Pool, Abelson, and Popkin,8 5 and
computer simulations of mass media exposure carried out
by the Simulmatics Corporation8 6 and by the author and
his colleagues at M.I.T.87 Beshers' simulation projects
population growth by taking into account fertility limits,
family planning, and changes over time in population char-
acteristics affecting these factors. Amstutz's model of
market response synthesizes the behavior of retailers,
distributors, salesmen, consumers and industrial pur-
chasers to predict brand shares resulting from different
marketing strategies. In their simulations of the 1960
and 1964 Presidential elections, Pool, Abelson and Popkin
used a model which estimated the summary impact of specific
campaign issues on particular blocs of voters. These
impacts were aggregated over all voter types and the total
gain or loss for each candidate was predicted assuming
simplified one- or two-issue campaigns.
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Both the Comcom model (which we shall discuss in
detail in the next two chapters) and the Media-Mix are
simulation models of mass media exposure. The Media-Mix
has been used to represent the flow of messages through the
mass media to the American population. The Comcom model--
a more sophisticated version of the Media Mix--has been
used by the author to represent, the flow of messages
through the mass media to the population of the Soviet,
Union. Both simulations have macro-analytic operating
characteristics (see p. 45 above), as do all the mass be-
havioral simulations discussed in this section. In every
time period, a main program cycles through each individual,
pairing him with each message event; occurring in a medium.
The main program accesses subroutines (1) to look up or
calculate factors effecting message exposure probabilities
and (2) to construct a historical record (based on these
probabilities) of the populations' exposure to the message
flow. The Media-Mix and the Comcom model are both prog-
nostic simulations. Individuals are not endowed with the
detailed sociopsychological processes that, actually de-
termine their media behavior. Instead, aggregate exposure
histories are developed using empirical estimates of audi-
ence parameters and message formats.
There are, of course, simulations of mass behavior
which depart from the usual association of theory with
53
process and applications with prognoses. Stokes and
Iverson's simulation of election vote fluctuations,8 1 which
postulates processes and outcomes at the level of the sys-
tem itself, is a theory-based, prognostic simulation.
Coleman's voting simulation8 3 and a computer study of com-
munity referendum controversies by Abelson and Bernstein8 4
are both examples of process simulations that were used
for purposes of applied research. Coleman's model of
voting (which, unlike McPhee's, was designed from the
start to simulate a single campaign) specifies detailed po-
litical, psychological, social and mass media phenomena.
Voter preferences for candidates are affected by stimuli
from the mass media, discussions with associates, and
issue orientations. Abelson's andBernstein's model simu-
lates the results of a referendum to fluoridate the water
system in a given community, under varying campaign
strategies. The simulation expresses a number of social
and psychological processes involved in a community's re-
sponse to a fluoridation campaign.
This survey would not be complete without some dis-
cussion of one other fundamental distinction among be-
havioral computer simulations, a distinction which most com-
monly manifests itself in studies of large social aggre-
gates. Any model of behavior, in order to be simulable,
must represent a closed system, i.e., there must be no
54
undefined circumstances in the theoretical construct. The
model-builder generally meets this requirement in one of
two ways:
--He chooses a simple, deterministic model,
which excludes complicated variables. The
model is generally constructed in a form so
that additional variables can be added later,
as needed. No matter how many times the
simulation is run, if the inputs and the in-
itial conditions are the same, the outcomes
will be the same.
--He chooses a complicated, stochastic model,
which summarizes ignorance about other vari-
ables by including probabilistic events. The
model selectively allows a degree of random-
ness to enter the sequence of events by using
Monte Carlo techniques.* 1 Each time the
simulation is run, with the same inputs and
initial conditions, the outcomes will vary.
Examples of stochastic simulations include studies
of the diffusion of innovations by Hgerstrand 78 and
Pitts79 and a study of social interaction by Rainio.8 8
In a computer simulation, the program embodies
a set of rules that specify when and how to change certain
stored symbols which represent real-world entities. A
deterministic transformation rule states the following:
"If real-world A changes to real-world B under real-world
condition X, then change stored symbol A' to stored
symbol B', whenever X' is found in storage." A stochastic
transformation rule states the following: "If real-world
A changes to real-world B under real-world condition X,
with a probability of , then whenever X' is found in
storage, change stored symbol A' to stored symbol B' by a
Monte Carlo process on ' ." In a Monte Carlo process, a
random-number generator is used. If the number generated
lies between O and ', A' changes to B'. If the number
lies between ' and 1.0, it does not. Simulations with
Monte Carlo routines are generally stochastic and simula-
tions without them are generally deterministic.
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Stokes and Iverson's simulation of election vote fluctua-
tions applies a stochastic technique at the level of the
electoral system, and the Media-Mix simulation applies
Monte Carlo techniques at the individual level. Media-Mix
outputs consist of tabulations and statistical analyses of
the stochastic outcomes (exposures or non-exposures) which
occur at each opportunity for exposure in the program.
The Comcom simulation is also stochastic. Although it
uses no Monte Carlo routines, its outputs consist of
tabulations and statistical analyses of expected value out-
comes (average numbersof exposures and persons exposed)
*1which result from one complete run of the program.
Sources of data.--Process simulations of social behavior
are only feasible when the data which can be obtained re-
late to individuals rather than aggregates (such as voter
types or audience types). One must be able to identify the
details of the social and communication networks in which
the individuals are located. Thus, process simulations
of mass behavior usually require special-purpose studies,
*lStochastic computer techniques are used- in some
of the Comcom simulation programs, in order to map the
structure of a mass media system into the computer's
memory. However, no Monte Carlo processes are used in
the dynamic simulation programs, i.e., in the message ex-
posure routines, and it is these routines which produce
the final simulation outputs.
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as for example panel and sociometric surveys and systematic
surveys of the mass media. When process simulations are used
to predict the behavior of a real population, these surveys pro-
vide information on the initial values of the variables in the
model. They also provide validational data on an actual stream
of behavior (which can be compared with the simulation output)
and on the processes that. are postulated by the model.
Parameter values for prognostic simulation models are
usually derived from secondary analyses of large compilations
of data, such as opinion surveys, census data, time-budget
studies, and audience ratings. Validation methods for prognos-
tic simulations generally involve the analysis of distributions
of properties over individual units. When the number of simu-
lated units (individuals, voting blocs, audience types) is suf-
ficiently large, statistical distributions of simulated proper-
ties can be calculated and compared with their empirical coun-
t erparts.
In Figure 1.4 we illustrate the final two dimensions of
our typology with computer simulations of mass behavior, and in
Figure 1.5 we use the completed typology to cross-classify some
of the simulations discussed in this review. Having thus out-
lined the fundamental distinctions among different kinds of
computer simulations, and having characterized the Comcom simu-
lation model in terms of these distinctions, we turn next to a
description of the system which the Comcom model was designed
to simulate--the Soviet. mass media system.
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The Soviet mass media system
We undertake the following discussion of the
Soviet mass media system with several purposes in mind.
First;, we seek to acknowledge the work done by others,
work on which our own effort has in large measure depended.
Our second objective is to paint a broad-brush picture of
the Soviet mass media system by emphasizing features
which stand out in bold relief. These are precisely the
features which must be accounted for in a "first-cut"
simulation of Soviet media exposure if the simulation is
to have any chance of being realistic. By drawing a pro-
file of the Soviet mass media system in terms of the
literature on that system we hope
--to convince the reader that, on the fact of
it, sufficient data is available to conduct
an experimental simulation;
--to lay the groundwork for a more extended
discussion of the choices we have made with
regard to the media structure, the message
scenarios, and the audience parameter values
input to the simulation;
--to introduce general guidelines and criteria
for assessing the reasonableness of the sim-
ulation outputs.
The amount of existing literature on the Soviet
mass media system is comparatively small. We shall first.
discuss some background readings which, while they do not
bear directly on the quantitative estimation of exposure
patterns, are important to a balanced picture of Soviet
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mass media communication. These readings focus on the so-
cial functions served by the Soviet media and on their con-
trol by the political elite. We shall then review material
directly relevant to the problem at hand, viz., literature
on the structure and distribution of the media, on the
timing and format of the messages they convey, and on the
'nature of their audiences.
Social functions
Soviet media development and the ways in which the
media have come tobe used by the Soviet political elite
reflect some basic tenets of Communist doctrine. These
have been codified by Inkeles, Bauer and others, and may
be summarized as follows:
--Media provide both an activity around which to
build organizations and an instrument for cen-
tral direction of these organizations;
--Media provide an important means for inducing
characterological changes, both in the com-
municators (by enforcing verbal discipline) and
in the audience (when combined with direct per-
sonal contact);
--The legitimacy of a medium depends on the func-
tional value of its existence as an institution
and of the statements in it.8 9
A fundamental part of Lenin's revolutionary
strategy was the establishment and coordination of local
organizations by means of communications activities. He
once wrote, "To train a network of agents for the rigid and
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correct distribution of literature, leaflets, proclama-
tions, etc., is to perform the greater half of the work of
preparation for an eventual demonstration, uprising."90
In his famous pamphlet on tactics he defended the estab-
lishment of a national newspaper on the grounds of its
potential role in building and directing these organiza-
tions:
a network of agents that would automatically be
created in the course of establishing and distribut-
ing a common newspaper would . . . carry on the
regular work that would guarantee the highest prob-
ability of success in the event of rebellion. . . .
It is precisely such work that would train all
local organizations to respond simulataneousl to
the same political questions, incidents and events
that excite the whole of Russia, to react to these
events in the most vigorous, most uniform and most
expedient manner possible . . . such work would train
all revolutionary organizations all over Russia to
maintain the most continuous and at the same time
the most secret contact with each other, which will
create real Party unity, . .91
In the years since the October Revolution, Lenin's
initial conception of the social role of communication has
shaped the development of Soviet foreign propaganda. The
Soviets have utilized communication activities to build
and direct revolutionary organizations abroad. Students
of their foreign propaganda strategy such as Lasswell and
Selznick have observed in it the organizational imprint
of Leninist theory; Barghoorn has attributed the congruence
between Soviet policy and foreign propaganda to their
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centralized control of that activity. Lenin's ideas have
also profoundly influenced the development of Soviet do-
mestic media. Perhaps the most convincing and well-
documented account of this influence is Inkeles' classic
study, in which he describes how the means of public com-
munication have been elaborated and extended to the limits
of the nation's physical resources, and how the "agitprop
*lHarold D. Lasswell discusses this aspect of
Soviet propaganda in "The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda,"
The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, ed. by
Wilbur Schramm (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1955), pp. 545-46:
"The secret channel can be . . . entrusted with the
mission of controlling the policy of organizations
which are nominally independent of party control.
Hence the vast network of . . . organizations which
are used by the party to permeate every national
community. . . . Through these organizational net-
works a great number of special environments are
made available for the restamping of minds, and for
expanding the material facilities within reach of
the Russian leadership."
Philip Selznick, commenting on the same subject in
The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy
and Tactics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 7, says the
fo1 owing:
"Bolshevism has never been content to propagandize
for its program; it has sought directly to control
the arena of conflict. . . . This has required . . .
the development of an organizational strategy to maxi-
mize accessibility and neutralize opposition."
Barghoorn, discussing the techniques used by the
Soviets in their foreign propaganda activities, describes
how they have combined face-to-face communication with cen-
tralized control to attract the attention of, and exercise
persuasion on, a number of diverse audiences (see Frederick
C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda [Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1964]).
63
units"--located high in the Party structure--have come to
embrace every form of organized activity that might pos-
sibly affect public opinion.
The importance of using the media for character-
ological change arose from Lenin's conviction that the
Party would require various degrees of mass support at
different stages of the revolutionary struggle, that this
support would depend upon the emergence of class conscious-
ness among the "toiling masses," and that the media (linked
with personal contact) could play a vital role in evoking
*-2
and sustaining this consciousness. Both Lenin and Stalin
lAlex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950):
"Agitprop" is a mnemonic for the "Department of
Agitation and Propaganda." G. B. Plekhanov was the
first to differentiate between agitation and prop-
aganda in Sochmenuya (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
Izdatel'stvo, 1927). He defines an agitator as one
who presents one or a few ideas to a mass of people
and a propagandist as one who presents many ideas to
one or a few people. Soviet newspaper editorials
and long analytical articles probably function as
propaganda vehicles, attracting a relatively small
but elite audience interested in, and capable of
absorbing, their rather more abstract material.
Factory and wall newspapers and, of course, the net-
work of oral agitators are examples of communication
channels that serve more agitational functions, con-
veying a relatively small number of concrete, action-
oriented items to mass audiences. Similar functional
distinctions also prevail within and across the
electronic media.
*2Lenin argued in Left Wing Communism, An Infantile
Disorder (New York: International Publishers, 1940) that
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attributed to the Party the responsibility of teacher and
guide in this regard, and this responsibility led the Party
to develop personalized channels of communication which in-
clude an extensive network of oral agitators. It has also
influenced the operation of the Party's agitprop units
which not only interpret and disseminate Central Committee
decisions affecting mass communications but also report to
the Central Committee on the state of mass attitudes and
feelings. The assumed critical importance of these atti-
tudes compels the Party to screen and carefully control
the messages and interpretations that. reach the public
through the media. This has resulted in two important.
characteristics of Soviet, mass media communication: (1) a
multiplicity of media tailored to specific audiences, each
carrying themes adapted to the vocabulary, experiences, and
aspirations of their audiences; (2) the banning of all op-
positional themes from message flows to the public.
The main purpose and effect of Soviet censorship
has been to prevent the formation of public opinion, except,
for the official opinion imposed on the public by the Party
monopoly of mass communications media.9 2 This state of
it was only by participating in action for immediate goals
that the masses would have their attitudes transformed.
The role of the media in evoking social consciousness was
to organize groups of people for, and exhort them to en-
gage in, this activity.
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affairs clearly reflects the Communist view that the media's
social function is to articulate what public opinion ought
to be or, in other words, to express only statements which
(the Party decides) will advance the system. The Soviet
media, unlike their Western counterparts, thus serve as a
guide to "correct" positions on issues rather than as a
resource to be drawn on in formulating opinions.93
From what we have said so far, it can be seen that
the influence of Communist doctrine on Soviet media develop-
ment has manifested itself in three forms: the media are an
important adjunct of the ubiquitous Party organization;
they exercise a continual and consistent influence on char-
acter formation among the Soviet masses; and they are used
to saturate public message flows with Party-approved themes
in order to preempt the formation of dysfunctional public
opinion. These communication characteristics are, of
course, part of the sociological model of totalitarian
systems, a model to which Soviet society conforms in many
respects. The U.S.S.R. can equally well be viewed, however,
as a developing country and, along some dimensions, as a
*1
mature industrial state. The forces of development and
lAlex Inkeles makes this point in "Models and
Issues in the Analysis of Soviet Society," Survey, No. 60
(July, 1966), 3-17. He bases his argument on the data
from a study he conducted with Raymond A. Bauer, the
analysis of which is presented in The Soviet Citizen:
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industrialization as well as those of political doctrine
are reflected in the configuration of the Soviet mass media
system.
In its preoccupation with growth the Soviet Union
has had to cope with many of the problems common to de-
veloping countries. For example, the organizing function
of their media can be viewed not, only as an extension of
Leninist theory but. also as part. of the country's effort
to construct a flexible administrative system responsive
Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1959). In this volume the authors
demonstrate that social science prognostications about
categories of people in Western industrial societies can
often be used to predict the attitudes and values of cor-
responding types of people in the Soviet. system.
Two major changes that have occurred in the
geographic distribution of the Soviet population since
the 1920's--migrations from West to East and from rural
to urban areas--are also characteristics which the
country shares with other industrializing nations. The
impact of these developments on the Soviet population is
discussed by Frank Lorimer and John Kantner. See, e.g.,
Lorimer's article on "Trends in Soviet Population
History" and Kantner's article "A Comparison of the Cur-
rent, Population in the USSR and USA," both of which ap-
pear in Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, ed. by
Alex Inkeles and Kent. Geiger (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
1961), pp. 12-15 and pp. 15-27. Totalitarian, develop-
ment and industrial models are not. the only ones relevant
for an analysis of Soviet society. Daniel Bell describes
ten different approaches to the study of the Soviet Union
in "Ten Theories in Search of Reality: The Prediction
of Soviet Behavior," The End of Ideology; On the Exhaus-
tion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1960).
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to central authority. Their persistent. use of the media
for character formation and political orientation can
partly be understood as a developing country's effort, to
organize loyalties around a national image and, particu-
larly, to integrate diverse ethnic and religious groups
into the national system. Finally, Soviet agitation
campaigns--with their hortatory emphasis on "'production"
--certainly mu.st be considered in the context of an in-
dustrializing country's effort to establish distribution
and allocation systems that include planning and evalua-
tion.
Insofar as the Soviet, Union has become a mature
industrial state, neither politics nor development is the
sole force operating in the realm of public communication.
A large and complex system of mass communications media--
not unique to the Soviet Union, but equally characteris-
tic of other industrialized states--is bound to have an
effect on Soviet society independently of the political
structure and the growth dynamics of the system.
Barghoorn and others have concluded, for example, that, the
more varied content of Soviet, communications media after
Stalin's death reflects a partial emergence of pluralist,
tendencies in Soviet political life.94 According to
these writers, the political style and life experiences
of the technocrats who have succeeded Stalin impel them
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to rule more by consensus and less by coercion. As part
of this effort, they have had to introduce some freedom of
exposition and interpretation into mass communication prac-
tices, with the result that the Soviet people now have
access to a greater range of official and unofficial in-
formation and opinion than ever before. (Some of the
more sophisticated Soviet readers have even been able to
infer policy differences and power rivalries among top
political leaders from oblique references to them appear-
ing in different publications.) Another result of the
more flexible communications policy is that, for the
first time, influential members of bureaucratic and occupa-
tional interest groups have been able to express some of
their needs and preferences in communication channels to
which they have access. Finally, a significant innova-
tion in post-Stalin communications behavior has been the
Soviet leaders' heightened concern for, and more sophisti-
cated awareness of, public opinion. This is reflected in
their efforts to utilize opinion polls, surveys and other
empirical techniques to analyze group attitudes and be-
havior.95
These, then, are some of the major forces which have
shaped the general character and development of Soviet
media since the Revolution. We turn now to a discussion
of some distinguishing features of Soviet mass media
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communication--features which must be accounted for in a
realistic simulation.
The media
Major outlines of the Soviet media--their structure
and distribution patterns--are well documented in a number
of primary and secondary sources.96 We shall briefly de-
scribe in this section some of the system's dominant char-
acteristics, relying heavily on two chapters from a Ph.D.
thesis by Dr. Rosemarie Str'ussnig Rogers96 and also draw-
ing on a chapter in Barghoorn's country study,94 two mono-
graphs on Soviet radio and television by Durham,96 and
Inkeles' book on Soviet public opinion (see n. *1, p. 63
above).
Penetration.--During the past half century the Soviet news-
paper system has expanded enormously. By the early 1960's
--our simulation time period--newspaper circulation and
the number of newspaper titles had reached an all time
high. The country could truly be considered "saturated"
1 1
with newspapers.l While Soviet radio dates back to the
*lBy this is meant the fact that everyone had physi-
cal access to newspapers. Whether and how a literate Soviet
person read a newspaper, under these circumstances, depended
not on his access but rather on his motivation or interest
in the contents of the paper, i.e., on what function the
newspaper served for him.
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1920's, rapid growth in that medium has occurred chiefly
since the Second World War. By the early 1960's Soviet,
society had been completely penetrated by the radio dif-
fusion network, although some sections of the country
still lacked adequate reception facilities. Soviet
television broadcasting began in the early 1950's and,
a decade later, only about half of the Soviet population
lived in areas covered by television centers and relay
stations. Many sections of the country still lacked ade-
*2quate reception facilities. Finally, in addition to
the print and electronic media, a nationwide network of
oral agitators--usually consisting of about two million
*lEven though the total number of both wave and
wired radio sets had been increasing faster than the-
Soviet population since 1955, wave sets were still dispro-
portionately located in urban areas in the early 1960's.
Urban and rural areas had, at; that. time, approximately
the same ratios of people per wired set. Rogers points
out that the increased number of both wired and wave sets
in the countryside meant that a greater number of rural
people had regular or at, least occasional access to
radio in the early 1960's than ever before, while in the
cities the increased number of wave sets served more to
broaden the program choice of urbanites and--many of the
new wave sets being able to receive short wave--to afford
them greater access to foreign radio than ever before
(see Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 97-102).
2 Even though the number of television sets had
been increasing faster than the Soviet population since
1955, they were still proportionately located in urban
areas in the early 1960's. Lack of a television set
still constituted an obstacle to exposure for many people,
in urban as well as rural areas, although more so in the
latter (see Rogers, "The Soviet, Audience," p. 102).
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persons--was distributed throughout the country, with a
slightly higher per capita concentration in urban than in
*1
rural areas.
*lThe Soviet use of this oral agitation network is
discussed at length by Inkeles in Public Opinion in Soviet.
Russia. For a more recent discussion of the recruitment,
training, organization and uses of agitators see Barghoorn,
"The Shaping of Public Opinion," pp. 164-68. For our pur-
poses it, suffices to note the following: An agitator's
audience usually consisted of a group of workers to whom he
had been assigned. Personal oral agitation, according to
Barghoorn, reached its peacetime peaks during elections to
the Soviet, on various administrative levels, when the net:-
work increased to more than 3,000,000 agitators. The Soviet;
press supplied much of the material used by agitators in
their work, a traditional form of which included reading
from or summarizing newspapers. More recently, this practice
has been discouraged.
Comcom respondents mentioned oral agitation meetings
as one, though not; the main, source of information during
most crisis periods or periods of important news. The fol-
lowing table, adapted from Pool's paper, indicates each of
the events they mentioned and whether they attended any
meeting at. the time regarding it:
No. of re- No. who at- Total no. of
spondents tended a meetings they
Year Event mentioning it meeting attended
1956 Twentieth Cong-
ress CPSU de-
Stalinization
Speech 2 1 1
1956 Hungarian Revo-
lution 3 1 1
1957 Sputnik launching 9 6 15+
1960 U-2 incident 11 10 15+
1961 Berlin wall 11 2 2
*1962 Cuban missile crisis 28 14 18
*1963 Assassination of
President. Kennedy 30 3 3
1964 Khruhschev's ouster 25 7 17
1965 Vietnam 11 5 5
*(One of the scenarios we wished to simulate.)
(Footnote continued on p. 72.)
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Structure.--Soviet newspapers in the early 1960's were
published on the cntral administrative level, on the
republic level, and on six regional levels. 1 Newspapers
published on the central and republic levels, and on the
next two administrative levels, were divided into general
papers and specialized papers for particular audiences de-
fined by age, sex, occupation or interest. Pravda (Truth),
the most important Soviet newspaper,was published by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party, and Izvestia
(News), the next most important paper, was published by
the Council of Ministers (the government) of the U.S.S.R.
Each of the fifteen republics of the U.S.S.R. had a news-
paper published jointly by the Central Committee of the
Party in the republic and the Council of Ministers of the
republican government. These papers were published both
Clearly, agitational meetings still played some
role in Soviet crisis communication during the two
scenarios we wished to simulate. However, it seemed
reasonable to assume that the mass media played a far more
important role than did the face-to-face machine (see Pool,
"Opportunities for Change," pp. 21-22 and 29). For these
and other reasons we have included only one "oral agitation"
medium in the simulation.
*1In descending order these levels were the autono-
mous republic or autonomous oblast; the krai, oblast or
okrug; the city; the raion; "House" and Kolkthoz. The krai,
the oblast, and the okrug, were administrative territories
equivalent to provinces. The raion was an administrative
territory equivalent to a district. House organs per-
tained to newspapers of factories, educational institutions,
etc. Kolkhoz newspapers were collective farm newspapers.
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in Russian-language editions and in the local languages.
Other important central newspapers included the youth
paper Komsomolskaya pravda (Komsomol Truth), the trade union
paper Trud (Labor), the writers' paper Literaturnaya gazeta
(Literary Gazette), the scientific and technical paper
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta (Economic Gazette), the rural
paper Selskaya zhizn (Country Life), the armed forces
paper Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), and a weekly supplement
to Izvestia entitled Nedelya ( ) 1 Important
national magazines published in Moscow included the illus-
trated magazine Ogonyok (Small Fire) and the satirical
*lWe have not included Pionerskaya pravda (Pioneer
Truth) in the simulation because this paper is published
for, and read mainly by, members of the All-Union Pioneer
Organization, all of whom are under the minimum age group
(sixteen) in the simulation population. Other important
central newspapers not included in the simulation as indi-
vidual media, either because of low circulation or little
news content, include the railworkers' paper Gudok (Whistle),
the trade workers' paper Sovetskaya Torgovlya, the cul-
tural workers' paper Sovietskaya Kultura, and its weekly
supplement Sovetskoye Kino, the Teachers' papers Uchitelskaya
Gazeta, the medical paper, Meditsinskaya Gazeta, the water
transport workers' paper Vodniy Transport, the construction
industry paper Stroitelnaya Gazeta, and its semi-monthly
supplement Architektura, and the forestry paper Lesnaya
Rhomishlennost. All of these papers (and others) were
aggregated into two media in the simulation, published two
and three times a week, respectively. The all-Union sports
paper Sovetskii Sport was excluded from the simulation on
the grounds that it most likely would never carry general
news items.
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magazine Krokodil (Crokodile).' Soviet radio programs
originated in the early 1960's on four administrative
levels: central radio, republic level radio, wireless
broadcasting below the republic level, and the radio dif-
fusion exchanges. The latter mainly supplied systems of
wired radio with broadcasts from the central and regional
levels.*2 In the early 1960's central radio broadcast an
all-Union program (the First Program), a program designed
for the European part of the RSFSR (the Second Program),
a cultural program (the Third Program), a program beamed
to Central Asia, Siberia and the Soviet Far East (the
Fourth Program), and a program of special broadcasts for
persons at sea, emigres, etc. (the Fifth Program). Wire-
less broadcasting at the regional levels was gathered into
zonal networks, all of which received programs from Central
Radio in Moscow as well as originating programs of their
*1Important national magazines published in Moscow
that we have not represented as media in the simulation in-
clude the Central Committee's theoretical journal Kommunist
(Communist), and its organizational journal Partinaya zizn
(Party Life), both of which appear twice a month, and a
number of periodicals with specialized interests in such
fields as literature, economics, history, philosophy, and
the natural sciences, etc.
*2With the exception of the RSFSR, "republic level
ratio" was aimed primarily at the population of the entire
republic. Wireless broadcasting below the republic level
included radio in autonomous republics and oblasts and
broadcasts for individual krays and oblasts within the
republic.
75
own. The radio diffusion exchanges also originated some
programs for their wired broadcast schedules. Soviet tele-
vision broadcasts during the simulation time period emanated
from Moscow (Central Television) and from the capitals of
the Union republics and other krai and oblast centers.
Central Television was broadcasting three programs at that
time and local broadcasts followed a pattern similar to
local (wireless) radio broadcasts."l
Functions.--Central newspapers played a leading role among
the Soviet print media. 2 In addition to having a higher
*lThe word "program" is used here in a sense com-
parable to that of the Western word "station." In the
simulation we have included only programs I, II and IV
as segments of the radio media, assuming that the cultural
program (III) seldom carried news items such as those we
are simulating and that the overseas program (V) had a
negligible audience in the early 1960's. We have only
included programs I and II in the simulation as segments
of the television media assuming that program III, added
to the broadcast schedule in the fall of 1963, was not yet
an important vehicle at. the time of the events we are simu-
lating.
*2Rogers cites the following figures in support of
this statement:
Total Average Per Issue
Per Issue Circulation of
Circulation One Newspaper
(in thousands) (in thousands)
Central level 36,821 1,600.9
Regional levels
Republic 17,441 117.8
Autonomous republic or
autonomous oblast 2,096 22.1
(Foonote continued on p. 76)
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periodicity than newspapers on other administrative levels,
they accounted for a major share of the total per issue,
average per issue and annual circulation of all newspapers
in the U.S.S.R. They served the Party, the Government,
and the public organizations as the authoritative channel
of communication to the Soviet population and, for this
reason, were more likely to contain material of national
and international importance than were the press on lower
administrative levels. The latter looked to the central
press for the general line in Party, Governmental and
other matters. Central Radio and Television broadcasts
played this same leading role among the Soviet electronic
(n. '*1 continued from p. 75)
Total Average Per issue
Per Issue Circulation of
Circulation One Newspaper
(in thousands) (in thousands)
Krai, oblast, okrug 12,535 49.0
City 4,387 17.4
Raion 10,119 6.1
House organs 4,622 1.8
Kolkhoz newspapers 1,073 .7
(Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," p. 28, citing Pechat' 1965,
pp. 74-75.)
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media. They provided not only a model for, but in fact
made up part of, the local broadcasts. The evidence also
indicates that Soviet republic level print and electronic
media were, depending on the language and education of the
audience, functionally equivalent to corresponding all-
Union media.*2
Distribution.--Exposure at places of work, via institu-
tional subscriptions, played a significant role in the
pattern of Soviet print media consumption. In the early
1960's approximately 75-85 per cent of the total Soviet
newspaper and magazine circulation was sold by subscrip-
tion (either to individuals or to institutions) and the
*On this point we quote Durham:
"In volume of broadcasting time, Central (Radio)
Broadcasting in Moscow holds first place in the country.
As the core of the broadcasting system, it prepares
broadcasts which form the basis, if not the overwhelm-
ing bulk, of broadcasting schedules in localities. . . .
The programming of local television is not so dependent
in content and thematics on the central television
broadcasting apparatus as is the case with radio broad-
casting. The Central Television studio is, however,
the core of the Soviet television network, both ad-
ministratively and technically .. ."
(Durham, Radio and Television, pp. 54 and 57.)
*While estimating, for the different Union repub-
lics, the ratio of central to regional newspapers available
per capita, Rogers noted the following: the less Russian
was used in a republic, the more opportunity there was for
regional newspapers to be used instead of central news-
papers; the more Russian was used, the less opportunity
there was for such substitution; and the lower, therefore,
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rest by retail outlets. Rogers has estimated that perhaps
ten per cent of the total subscription to most Soviet papers
was made up of subscriptionsby institutions. With regard
to the geographic distribution of print media, it seems
that newspapers and magazines printed in one republic
were distributed for the most part only in that republic.
Thus, a resident in a given Soviet republic had access to
the central press and the press published in the republic
in which he lived but not to the other regional press.
The distribution of the electronic media in the early
1960's was characterized by the fact that wave radio sets
and television sets were still disproportionately located
in urban areas; wired radio sets were about evenly dis-
tributed (on a per capita basis) between urban and rural
areas.
Foreign radio.--By the early 1960's over a third of the
people in the Soviet Union had the physical possibility
of listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Chief among
the radio stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union from
was the number of regional newspapers available per
capita. Based on her analysis of circulation and popu.la-
tion figures she concluded that most, although not all,
of the substitution of central by regional newspapers
probably occurred on the republic and autonomous republic
levels (see Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 32-49).
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abroad at that time--both in terms of broadcast hours and
audience size--were the Voice of America, the British
Broadcasting Corporation and Radio Liberty. In 1962-63
VOA was broadcasting six to eight hours a day, in
Russian and in three of the basic nationality languages;
BBC was broadcasting about three hours a day--in 10, 90
and 110 minute formats; and Radio Liberty was broadcasting
twenty-four hours a day--in seventeen languages of the
U.S.S.R.--to eight different regions covering a large
amount of the country. All three media concentrated the
bulk of their broadcasts during the evening and early
morning hours. Foreign radio broadcasts formed (along with
rumor and personal conversation) an "unofficial" network
of communication used by the Soviet people to revise and
supplement information they obtained through the official
*2
media. Because wave radio sets were still dispropor-
tionately concentrated in the urban centers in the early
*lOther foreign radio broadcasts that were acces-
sible in the Soviet Union emanated from such stations as
Deutsche Welle, Radio Peiping, Voice of Canada, and RTF
(French Radio), as well as stations located in Madrid, the
Vatican and Tokyo. These broadcasts were not included as
media in the simulation because of their small Soviet
audiences and the low proportion of total foreign broad-
cast hours they comprised.
*2Many researchers have observed,in Soviet au.di-
ence behavior, two reactions to the regime's monopolistic
mass communications policy: (1) Soviet citizens attempt
to gain information through unofficial communication
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1960's, foreign radio broadcasts were accessible to a
greater percentage of urban, educated Russians than to
others, and probably to a majority of these people. It
should be noted also that, among the various foreign media
circulating in the Soviet Union in the early 1960's,
foreign radio was by far the most effective in bringing in
news from the outside world.'
channels which exist in spite of official attempts at
suppression; (2) Soviet citizens apply interpretive
principles to the content of official media, i.e., they
read between the lines in efforts to uncover officially-
concealed information. Inkeles and Bauer, discussing
this dual system of communication in Chapter VII of The
Soviet Citizen, include among the official media news-
papers, magazines, Soviet radio, books, lectures, agita-
tion meetings, movies, and theatre. Among the unofficial
media they list discussion with friends, rumor and
foreign radio. (To the list of official media we would,
of course, have to add television in the early 1960's.)
*lAccording to a Radio Liberty Committee annual
report dated November 30, 1964,the Soviet audience for
their broadcasts was composed of young people from the
higher socio-economic strata who lived in nearly every
part of the country. Barghoorn has described the effec-
tiveness of Voice of America and British Broadcasting
Corporation broadcasts to the Soviet Union in Chapter
XII of The Soviet Image of the United States (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1950). He recalls the instance in 1948
when Madame Kasenkina leaped to freedom from a window of
the Soviet Consulate in New York. News of this event
was beamed almost immediately to the U.S.S.R., was re-
ported to have become common knowledge in Moscow within
minutes, and was known by people throughout the Soviet
Union within forty-eight hours. Pool has claimed that
international radio is the most important communication
channel by which Western ideas and information enter the
Soviet Union (See "Opportunities for Change," p. 5).
The printed word from abroad was increasingly,
but still sparsely, available in the Soviet Union during
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The messages
Timing.--Periodicity of newspaper publication generally
diminished as one went from the central level (where the
largest part o'f the circulation was accounted for by
daily newspapers) down the administrative hierarchy,
until at the district level the majority of newspapers
appeared three times, and at the lower levels once per
week. By the early 1960's Central Radio was broadcasting
the news almost every hour of the day, the Fourth Program
transmitting selected material three hours earlier than
it was to be heard on the First and Second Programs because
of the time differential in the Far East target area.
Central Television, on the other hand, was broadcasting
the news only about two or three times a day and daytime
television was still a rarity.
Format.--During the time period of interest Russian was
essentially the only language used in all-Union newspapers
and Central Radio and Television broadcasts. Print and
electronic media on the other administrative levels used
both Russian and the official language of the republic
the early part of this decade, so we have chosen not to
include foreign print media (as for example, the magazine
Amerika) in the simulation. Nor have we included in the
simulation Soviet publications which reprint foreign
materials, such as Inostrannaya Literatura (Foreign Liter-
ature) and Za Rubezom (Abroad).
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in which the publication or broadcast originated. (In some
of the republicsseveral other languages were also used.)
Soviet newspapers, like other newspapers, conveyed their
material in various formats, such as editorials, short
news items, long articles, commentaries, speeches, com-
munique's, slogans, cartoons, etc. A variety of forms were
also used in radio and television news transmissions.
Examples were reviews of the press, commentaries, inter-
views, international surveys, and broadcasts explicitly
labeled "news broadcasts." Different forms of news pre-
sentation in the Soviet print and electronic media, of
course, attracted different types of audiences and char-
acteristically were used to convey different kinds of
material.
The audience
Three major types of studies contain findings
relevant to a simulation of Soviet audience behavior:
American behavioral science research on how the Soviet
people use the mass media; time budget studies and opinion
polls conducted by the Soviets themselves; studies of
audience behavior in countries other than the Soviet
Union. 97 (The latter can be used to estimate Soviet
audience parameters when directly relevant data is
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unavailable.) We turn first to an American study of the
Soviet Union.
The simulation input required that we estimate a
number of parameters of Soviet media use, and we have based
our estimates for the most part on
--a secondary analysis, by the author, of data
collected under the supervision of Professor
Pool for the purposes of the simulation, 9 8
--an independent codification and analysis of
this data performed by Dr. Rlers, in part for
the needs of the simulation, and
--available documentary material on (1) the
demographic attributes of the Soviet population
and (2) the volume ad distribution of the
Soviet mass media.l
The results of our secondary analysis are presented
in Chapters IV and V and much of the documentary material
has been summarized above, so here we simply summarize
Rogers' findings.
Chapters II, III and VI of Rogers' thesis contain
an analysis of Soviet audience behavior identifying the
main demographic attributes which the data suggest account
for differences in exposure to newspapers, magazines, radio
and television. The results of this analysis, briefly
stated, are as follows: .Data from the Comcom Leisure Study
indicate that in the early 1960's exposure to Soviet print
media was structured largely along educational and
occupational lines. Frequency of exposure to newspapers
and magazines and the number and variety of print media
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titles regularly consumed were found to increase with in-
creasing education and also with occupational standing.1
There were, however, no observable differences in exposure
to newspapers and magazines among urban and rural persons,
nor among different age groups in the sample. Men were
found to be consistently (though slightly) more exposed
to print media than women, but this difference generally
worked within the frameowrk of education. 2 Frequency of
exposure to radio was about the same in all educational
groups, but for television it increased with education.
Peak listening times for radio were found to be early
morning, mid-day and late afternoon-evening, while the peak
*3television viewing time was during the evening. Most of
those who had obtained a newspaper or magazine by subscrip-
tion or at their place of work turned out to be regular
readers of the medium. Group radio listening was found to
be of some importance for the less educated and the rural
segments of the Soviet population, but of negligible
Occupational roles, in ascending order, were the
following: Housewives, unskilled workers and collective
farmers, skilled workers, semi-professionals and white
collar employees, students (secondary and higher), and pro-
fessionals (including artists).
*2For example, highly educated females were found
to be more exposed to the media than less educated males.
*3To a large extent this reflects the limits on
television programming timeswhich, in the early 1960's,
were concentrated for the most part in the evening hours.
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proportions among the more urban, more educated strata.
Group attendance was considerably less frequent for radio
than for television, across all segments of the population.
The highly educated and the politically involved were most
exposed to authoritative material appearing in the news-
papers, with attendance dropping off in the less educated,
less politically involved groups. 1 The types of news-
paper articles typically read were also found to vary with
education and political involvement. There were no major
and consistent differences across these two attributes,
however, with regard to the types of radio and television
programs to which people were exposed. Russian clearly
dominated the other fourteen Soviet republic languages in
media exposure, and higher education appeared to be posi-
tively correlated with exposure to newspapers on higher
administrative levels. Finally, magazines more than news-
papers were found to be the media of the educational elite,
both in terms of numbers reached and the variety of publi-
cations to which exposure took place. Television appeared
to serve as the chief entertainment medium of the lower
educational groups, while the most widespread use of radio
was as a news medium.
*l"High political involvement" was definitely as
membership in the Communist Party or (in the case of non-
Party members) membership in occupational roles in which
the individual was particularly expected to be a high media
consumer.
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The foregoing results may be tested against, and in
some cases modified according to, the findings contained in
another American study and two Soviet sources, viz.,
--the mass communication se-gment of the Harvard
Study of Soviet society,l 1
--a series of time budget studies undertaken in
the Soviet Union since the late 1950's,1 0 2 and
--a poll conducted in the Soviet Union by the
Public Opinion Institute attached to the news-
paper Komsomolskaya pravda.'L
The data from the Harvard study refer mainly to a
period before the Second World War while the Comcom Leisure
Study covered the post-War period. Nevertheless, compari-
sons between both sets of findings can be used (1) to de-
tect changes in audience behavior between these two peri-
ods and (2) to extrapolate features of this behavior which
were only observable in the first study. The Komsomolskaya
pravda poll investigated, among other things, frequency of
attendance to newspapers, magazines, radio and television.
Both of the samples on which this poll was based were much
*lB. Grushin, "Kak vy provoditye svobodnoye vremya"
("How You. Spend Your Free Time'), Komsomolskaya pravda,
Feb. 24-26, 1966, cited in Rogers, "The Soviet Audience,"
p. 8. This poll was part of a series conducted by the
paper, beginning in May, 1960. Nine polls had been com-
pleted by May of 1963, the first two dealing with peace
and living standards, the third with the younger genera-
tion's self-image. Subsequent polls covered the older
generation's view of Soviet youth, problems of young mar-
ried couples, and what we should send to Mars to represent
our earthly accomplishments (see White, "Social Science
Research," p. 22).
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larger than the Leisure Study sample and one was consider-
ably more representative of the Soviet population. This--
taken. together with the fact, that, the poll and the Comcom
Leisure Study covered comparable time periods--suggests
that the findings of the latter be checked against; the find-
ings of the former. Close correspondences between the two
can serve to establish a degree of confidence in parameter
estimates derived from the Leisure Study data.
Corroborative evidence derived in the foregoing
manner may be summarized as follows: Data from the Harvard
study, like that from the Comcom Leisure Study, indicate
that educational and occupational factors were the most
powerful determinants of media consumption, even before the
War. Results of the Komsomolskaya pravda poll also support
Comcom findings that education is positively correlated
with exposure to newspapers, magazines and television.103
In contrast, with the pre-War study, however, the poll
indicates that by the beginning of this decade radio-
listening had become about the same in all educational
groups. Both the Harvard study and the Soviet poll lend
support to the Leisure Study findings that correlations
between sex or age and communications behavior worked
within the educational framework and that men had slightly
higher exposure than women. Supplementary data obtained
from these two studies indicated the following: In
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addition to education and occupational standing two attri-
butes positively correlated with media consumption were
(1) a favorable attitude toward the Communist regime and
(2) a willingness to be politically involved. 1 Another
implication of comparisons with the Harvard study was that,
while the improved distribution of newspapers and magazines
over the last quarter century had probably lessened the
influence of residence on exposure to these media, in the
early 1960's exposure to magazines still increased with
urbanism. Finally, in contrast with the findings of the
Comcom Leisure Study, it appeared that exposure differences
by sex were smaller than corresponding differences by age.
What these comparisons seem to indicate is the fol-
lowing: The increased education of the Soviet population
since the War, the spread of electrification and hence
radio into the country side, and the advent of television
have combined to increase the communications activity of
the workers and collective farmers. These changes have
somewhat narrowed the media-consumption gap between the
better educated and the laboring classes, but they have
not eliminated it. (We should not be too surprised at
this, since neither widespread education nor the easy
*lResults of the Harvard study indicated, however,
that education and occupation were more powerful predictors
of media exposure than attitude toward the regime or polit-
ical involvement.
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avaiability of the mass media has closed this gap in more
fully urbanized countries, such as England and the United
States.)
A series of time budget studies undertaken in the
Soviet Union since the late 1950's analyze the amounts of
free time respondents spend on various types of activity.
They thus provide a somewhat different means of identify-
ing major demographic determinants of media use. (They
can also be used, when compared with similar Soviet studies
from the inter-War period, to identify secular changes in
audience behavior.) A number of problems, which Rogers
has discussed in some detail, prevented the straightforward
recasting of findings from these studies in the form re-
quired for simulation parameter estimates.l Bearing these
problems in mind, however, the following conclusions can be
drawn from the Soviet time budget studies: Even though
they stress the attributes of age and sex above those of
education and occupation as predictors of communications
behavior, the evidence they present with respect to the.
relative influence of these variables is either inconsistent
lThe Soviet studies focus on expenditure of time
as the basic unit of measurement, rather than on frequency
of exposure. For a discussion of other difficulties in
translating results of these studies into the framework
of the Comcom inquiry see Rogers, "The Soviet Audience,"
pp. 290-95.
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crisis and the aftermath of President Kennedy's assassina-
tion. In each of these instances, the response of the
Soviet mass media system depended not, only on its permanent
attributes but also on certain crisis-related features we
have not yet discussed: the flow of media material and
the departures from normal media-use habits triggered by
each event. It is to these two "dynamics" that we now
turn our attention.
Soviet crisis communication
Our reasons for simulating Soviet media exposure
during the Cuban missile crisis and the aftermath of Presi-
dent Kennedy's assassination may be summarized as follows:
--Domestic mass media and foreign radio were im-
portant. sources of information for the Soviet
people during both these periods;
--The thematic treatment of each event in the
Soviet media was overt rather than esoteric,
thus simplifying the problem of content, analy-
sis and magnifying the volume of simulable
exposures;
--The early stages of the Cuban crisis represented
a good example of Soviet domestic suppression of
the news, while information about the Kennedy
assassination was broadly propagated by the
domestic media, affording some interesting
comparisons between the two simulations;
--The amount of data available on media coverage
and audience behavior during these crisis
periods was sufficient to construct message
schedules and response routines for each
period.
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The Soviet domestic communication system consists
of several subsystems each characterized by particular
kinds of information media. Among these subsystems are
the communication structure of the local community, per-
sonal contact with foreigners, Party and State channels,
people's courts, the military network (short wave radio,
telephone, telegraph, brigades, etc.), the mass media, and
rumor nets. Each of these subsystems takes on a different
saliency (1) for the Soviet population as a whole under
changing exogenous conditions and (2) across subgroups of
the population during any given period. Studies such as
that of Inkeles and Bauer and their associates, for ex-
ample, describe the use of oral rumor and the mass media
in various strata of Soviet society and how this pattern
has been changing over time.10 1 Our simulation programs,
because they constitute an initial effort, represent only
one kind of communications model--that of mass media
exposure. 1 We therefore had to select, for these first
experimental simulations, periods during which the mass
media were one of the principal communication subsystems
circulating relevant messages in the Soviet Union. The
Cuban missile crisis and the aftermath of President
*lIn the future it is planned to graft a face-to-
face communications model onto the "one-to-many" mass
media communications model currently expressed in our
simulation programs.
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Kennedy's assassination were such periods. The following
two well-known propositions about totalitarian communica-
tions support this conclusion: (1) In a totalitarian com-
munication system (such as the Soviet: Union's) stimuli
repeated in the media without letup (i.e., everyday themes)
gradually become devalued and, in a sense, meaningless.
The individual dismisses them from his attention and is
instead attracted by what. is new and significant, by any
departure from the norm which alters the regular pattern
of media materia.105 (2) Citizens in a totalitarian com-
munication system can hardly afford to ignore references
in the media to salient issues of the day, because the
media are one of the sources they must rely on for the
"official line" with regard to these issues.106
Our content analyses identified new and obviously
salient: themes in the flow of Soviet and external media
material during the two simulation periods, themes which
must have attracted the attention of large segments of
the Soviet population because of their departure from
normal media content. Once a Soviet citizen had become
aware of either event--whether through the mass media or
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by word-of-mouth--it seems reasonable to assume that he
would have paid attention (1) to the mass of relevant ma-
terial we know was carried by the domestic media, in order
to obtain an authoritative view of events, and (2) to
foreign radio broadcasts in order to supplement and per-
haps revise this view. So we may assume that the message
vehicles in our simulation--Soviet mass media and foreign
radio--were among the major sources from which the Soviet
population learned about each of these internationally
important events.
In simulating the spread of news in the U.S.S.R.
about the Cuban crisis and the Kennedy assassination we
are dealing with cases of overt communication in crisis
situations. They can be contrasted with another kind of
communication situation, an example of which is the spread
of news in the U.S.S.R. about the Sino-Soviet dispute
during its early stages. The two events we are simulating
broke upon the world scene very suddenly and their cover-
age in the media reflected this. Appearances of relevant
material built up rapidly and abundantly. Soviet media
coverage of the dispute with China, on the other hand, re-
flected the -gradual development of this controversy. Dur-
ing the period when the Soviet people probably first
learned about the dispute (1960-61), its expression in
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probably representative of the actual balance of informa-
tion carried by the Soviet media during these periods.
Finally, one additional circumstance makes these two events
interesting choices for simulation. Although the Soviets
reported on the Cuban crisis heavily, they did not refer
to certain aspects of it (e.g., the United States' claim
that the Soviets had missiles in Cuba) until the fourth day
after Kennedy's speech. On the other hand, they reported
virtually all aspects of the President's assassination as
the story developed. This difference provided an experi-
mental framework (1) for exploring in the simulation the
effectiveness of foreign radio (which covered all phases
of the Cuban crisis) as a supplementary information medium,
and (2) for comparing the proportions of the Soviet popula-
tion exposed to news under conditions of propagation and
(temporary) suppression in the domestic media.
The Cuban crisis and the Kennedy assassination are
feasible candidates for simulation because the kind of
data available on Soviet media coverage is sufficient to
construct likely message scenarios for these periods. We
have obtained data on Soviet Central Radio broadcasts dur-
ing the two time periods from Foreign Broadcase Information
Service monitoring reports.107 The Current. Digest of the Soviet,
Press and copies of central and republic newspapers of the
period provided the main sources of data on press
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coverage.108 Message scenarios for foreign radio were con-
structed from program transcripts and schedules supplied us
by the Voice of America, the Radio Liberty Committee and
109the British Broadcasting Corporation. Finally, a few
descriptive works were used as general sources of informa-
tion on Soviet media coverage of international news. We
summarize these works briefly, insofar as they relate to
our own effort.
Detailed analyses of the occurrence and treatment
of themes in the Soviet media are almost non-existent.
Barghoorn has undertaken a brief analysis of several
themes in the Soviet press in 1956 and 1964--dates which
bracket the two simulation time periods--and Cantril has
110
analyzed Soviet newspaper themes in 1956. Both writers
studied Soviet coverage of the Hungarian revolt, Barghoorn
devoting most of his attention to the issue of Pravda pub-
lished on Friday, November 2, 1956. This issue was also
included in Schramm's comparative study of fourteen major
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world newspapers which appeared on that day. Both
Schramm and Barghoorn describe how, while most of the
world press was focusing on the Hungarian uprising, the
news of British, French and Israeli military operations
against Egypt overshadowed everything else in this issue
of Pravda. Although Hungary was the other main theme of
this issue, the subject was not treated directly except
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in a brief TASS statement from Budapest reporting "in-
stances of bandit raids." Items from other Communist
countries reported support for a declaration issued by the
U.S. S.R. government regarding relations among 'socialist"
countries. Cantril has also dealt with controlled Soviet
reporting of news of the Hungarian revolt. He describes
Soviet leaders' efforts to distort the true events system-
atically and to hide the facts. The revolt was described
in the Soviet media very much like the more recent
Czechoslovakian reform movement as "counterrevolutionary,"
contributed to by the United States, with the Soviet army
coming to the rescue of the Hungarian people.
Another example of Soviet news dissemination in
1956 which Cantril discusses is the reporting of de-
Stalinization to the Soviet people. While Khruhshev's
speech at the Twentieth Congress occurred in February of
that year, the first news most of the world had of it and
of Stalin's downgrading was on June 5th and 6th when the
full text was published in the Western press. Stalin was
blamed for the adverse effects of the cult of personality
in Pravda during March, but he was not personally blamed
for specific crimes, Not until July 2, 1956, nearly a
month after the publication of Khruhschev's speech in the
rest of the world and five months after the original
speech, was the resolution of the Party's Central Committee,
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entitled "On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and Its
Consequences' published in the Soviet Union. Cantril
speculates that this was probably a concession the Party
leadership had to make when discussions and criticisms
from the outside world could no longer be ignored. He
describes how, during the rest of July, there was great dis-
cussion in Pravda of the reactions of the people to the
resolution indicating the enthusiastic approval of the
masses, etc. Finally, with regard to the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, Barghoorn has analyzed the issue of Pravda for
April 3, 1964. The dominant item in this issue was the
text of an important speech given by M. A. Suslov earlier
that year at a Central Committee plenum. This speech and
an editorial defended the Soviet position and criticized
the Chinese Communist position in the dispute. As Barg-
hoorn has noted, the appearance of this issue marked the
first time one could assume it had become clear to all po-
litically aware Soviet citizens that their country was en-
gaged in a dispute with China, a fact well known in the
West long before 1964.
The muted and distorted coverage of the Hungarian
uprising and the long delays in publishing Khruhschev's and
Suslov's speeches are typical examples of the careful
preparation and timing of news disclosure in Soviet po-
litical communication. Barghoorn contrasts this with the
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commitment of the commercial, competitive Western press
to promptness in reporting. Cantril includes among the
Soviet techniques for controlling media content the use of
de-emphasis, half-truths, oversimplification and myth-
creation. Keckskemeti has also concluded that, within the
limits of unavoidable aspects of reality, a broad scope
for manipulating media content is open to totalitarian
leaders. Among the techniques he mentions are the con-
cealment, de-emphasis and obfuscation of unfavorable facts
and the exaggeration and embellishment of favorable facts.112
All these characteristics--the deliberate preparation and
timing of news disclosures, the control and manipulation
of media content--were very much present in Soviet media
coverage of the Cuban crisis and the death of Kennedy. By
simulation we are seeking to explore some of the exposure
consequences of these tactics.
We chose to simulate Soviet information flows dur-
ing the Cuban crisis and after the Kennedy assassination
because the data available on audience behavior during
these and similar periods was sufficient to estimate likely
response parameters. Before describing this data we should
first explain what we mean by "response parameters'." As
we mentioned above, the first pass through the simulation
involves storing a description of a representative sample
of the Soviet population. Each individual is described by
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his demographic characteristics and media-use habits. At
the end of the first pass through the computer we thus
have a description of Soviet media use during a particular
period, i.e., a description of the population which uses
the media and the basic probability of each person being
exposed to each medium. The second pass through the com-
puter makes the analysis dynamic. In this phase we could
simply have calculated what would happen on the average
as each medium with a message of interest was made avail-
able to each person. If, e.g., the pass I probability
of exposure of a particular person to a particular medium
were 0.2 then, using this probability, the computer pro-
gram would have generated the expected value--one-fifth
of an exposure--for this person. This would imply that a
person who uses that. particular medium with a probability
p will note any news story in it with a probability 1.0.
In reality we know the latter "conditional" probability
need not. be unitary, nor need it, be constant. (The same
may be said for the pass I probability of exposure to the
medium.) Therefore, the second pass does not mechanically
grind out. probabilities in this fashion. Instead, it fol-
lows a scenario which the analyst. writes (1) to generate,
for each type of person, the conditional probability of
being exposed to each kind of news story in each medium,
and (2) to represent: the kinds of changes in message and
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media exposure probabilities which typically take place
during any series of events such as a crisis. These con-
ditional exposure probabilities and the changes they undergo
are what we have been referring to as "response parameters."
The simulation model becomes interesting when we
take account of the differences between normal and crisis
behavior. For example, we have assumed that at the begin-
ning of the Cuban crisis period, when the saliency of
events was low, Soviet citizens paid normal attention to
the mass media. We have further assumed that as soon as
they heard about Kennedy's speech, the American charges,
or the Soviet-American confrontation, Soviet citizens be-
came more aware of and concerned about the crisis, and,
in seeking additional information about it, they paid in-
creased attention to news in general and to foreign radio
in particular. In the simulation we wereable to reflect
hypothesized circumstances such as these by raising indi-
vidual exposure probabilities for crisis-related messages,
either as a function of prior exposure to key messages or
as a function of the stage of the scenario. Pass II sub-
routines permit a variety of historical assumptions. As
another example, one may wish to assume that, unless a
message is reinforced within a certain length of time, it
becomes forgotten. Under such circumstances, individual
exposure probabilities for relevant material might first
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be raised as a function of exposure to one or more key mes-
sages, or as a function of the stage of the scenario, and
then returned to their initial values after a hypothesized
period of non-exposure, i.e., at a later stage of the
scenario.
Data for estimating Soviet audience response param-
eters came from several sources. Answers to the Comcom
Leisure Study questionnaire gave us some information on how
much and in what ways Soviet citizens increase their infor-
mation-seeking during a crisis. The results of a second
set, of interviews, conducted by Dr. Rogers with a subset
of the Leisure Study sample, provided data which we were
able to use to estimate, for various subgroups in the
Soviet population, the relative probabilities of exposure
to different kinds of newspaper stories.1 13 Other results
of the Leisure Study questionnaire, together with documented
periodicities for Soviet, print media and published broadcast
schedules for Soviet electronic media and foreign radio,
provided the basis for estimating the audiences of news
items appearing in different segments of these media.
Finally, the author was able to obtain important, qualita-
tive data on Soviet media treatment of, and audience re-
sponse to, these two crises from a conversation with the
former editor of a major Soviet science magazine. 1
Having discussed the nature of the problems to which
this thesis is addressed and having reviewed the pertinent
literature on them, we conclude this introductory chapter
with a description of the research procedures that were
followed and an outline of each chapter's contents.
*lMr. Leonid Finkelstein, former editor of a Soviet.
scientific monthly magazine, who now resides in England,
was kind enough to give us an hour of his time for this
purpose.
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Outline and Procedure
The first step of the procedure followed for this
thesis was the specification of a mathematical model of
mass media communication, a task in which this author
participated with other members of the Comcom Project
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staff. Once the model had been completed the next step
was to express it in a series of simulation computer pro-
grams that could be run on the M.I.T. compatible time-
sharing systems.1 15 The author collaborated with a col-
league, John F. Kramer, in the design, coding, debugging
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and testing of these simulation programs. In Chapters
II and III we describe the Comcom model of mass media
exposure and the structure and phasing of the simulation
programs in which we have expressed it. These two chap-
ters should be of special interest to behavioral scientists
concerned with simulation and modelling, as should the
sections of this introduction in which we discussed the
advantages of simulating media exposure (pp. 18-27 above)
and reviewed some important behavioral science applications
of the simulation technique (pp. 34-58 above).
The next major step we undertook was to assemble
all the data required in order to use the programmed model
to simulate the spread of news in the U.S.S.R. during the
two crisis periods referred to above. The data that were
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gathered for this purpose included (1) statistics on the
volume and distribution of the Soviet mass media, much of
which were drawn from material compiled by the Comcom
Project staff (in part for the simulation and in part
for the production of descriptive monographs); (2) data on
the Soviet population, and data on its patterns of media
use and message response, drawn largely from Soviet census
figures and from the Comcom Leisure Study interviews re-
spectively; 117 (3) a content analysis of Soviet. media
material and foreign radio broadcasts based on sources
described in the previous section. Students of Soviet mass
communication will be especially interested in Chapters IV
and V of this thesis in which we describe at, length the
kinds of data on the Soviet. media system which were re-
quired for the simulation, the secondary analyses which we
had to perform on this data in order to estimate various
model parameters, and the resulting media, audience, and
audience-response structures that were mapped into com-
puter storage. The sections of this introduction in
which we discussed the general significance of media ex-
posure (pp. 5-18 above) and catalogued some salient, fea-
tures of the Soviet: mass media system (pp. 59-92 above)
should also be of interest to specialists in Soviet, mass
communication.
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The final step of the procedure we followed for
this thesis was to allow our computer-stored model of the
Soviet mass media system to interact, via the simulation
programs, with message schedules for two different
scenarios--the Cuban missile crisis, and the assassination
of President Kennedy. A simulated history of the Soviet
population's exposure to specific themes in the Cuban crisis
media coverage is analyzed in Chapter VI, and Chapter VII
presents the same type of analysis for the Kennedy
assassination. Chapters VI and VII should be of general
interest to anyone conderned with the communications aspects
of crisis management, as should the section of this intro-
duction in which we speculated on the potential research
and policy uses of communications simulations in general
and a Soviet communications simulation in particular
(pp. 27-33 above), and the section in which we described
some of the dynamics of crisis behavior that can be
represented in the Comcom simulation (pp. 92-104 above).
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14-18. We have used these sources to determine, approxi-
mately, how the Soviet population was distributed along
various demographic variables in 1962-63.
10 1 Inkeles and Bauer report these results in their
chapter "Keeping up with the News," in The Soviet Citizen;
see also Peter H. Rossi and Raymond A. Bauer, "Some Pat-
terns of Soviet Communications Behavior," Public Opinion
Quarterly, XVI, No. 4 (1953), 653-670; Raymond A. Bauer
and David B. Gleicher, "Word-of-Mouth Communication in the
Soviet Union," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII, No. 3 (1964),
297-310.
102Rogers cites a number of these studies which ap-
peared in Soviet books or chapters of books, Soviet, journal
articles, and Soviet monographs (see "The Soviet; Audience,"
pp. 282-84).
10 3Compare, e.g., the following frequencies of
regular exposure found in the Leisure Study and in the
Komsomolskaya Pravda poll:
Newspapers Magazines Television
Education Comcom Poll Comcom Poll Comcom Poll
Higher 91% 94.7% 79% 90.5% 40% 46.4%
Secondary 83% 94.6% 71% 75.9% 36% 39.3%
Less than
Secondary 81% 82.8% 60% 61.1% 32% 31.8%
These data are taken from tables presented in Rogers, "The
Soviet Audience," pp. 55 and 110. Comcom respondents were
not questioned about the frequency of their radio listen-
ing, so no comparison could be made for this medium.
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10 4Audits & Surveys Company, Inc., A National Stud
of Newspaper Reading, vol. I: The Functions of Newspapers
for Their Readers (2 vols.; New York: Audits & Surveys
Company, Inc., 1961); Alfred Polity Research, Inc., A Study
of Duplication (New York: Time, Inc., 1954); Bo W: Son Schy-
berger, Methods of Readership Research, Lund Business
Studies (Lund, Sweden: University of Lund, 1965).
105 S105 ee, e.g., Paul Kecskemeti, "Totalitarian Com-
munications as a Means of Control," Public Opinion Quarterly,
XIV, No. 2 (1950), 224-34.
Ibid.
1 0 7Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily
Report, Foreign Radio Broadcast, Nos. 207-214 and
ana 229-232 (Washington, D.C.:
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1962-63). The
Daily Report presents material from foreign radio broad-
casts, press transmissions, and selected newspapers.
Items are processed from the first or best available source
and therefore represent only a sampling of the material
transmitted.
10 8Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, Current
Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, Nos. 43 and 44 and
Vol. XV , Nos. 46-49 (Ann Arbor: Joint Committee on
Slavic Studies, 1962-63). The contents of the two most
important Soviet newspapers, Pravda and Izvestia, are
utilized in the Current Digest approximately on e month
after the date of their publication in Moscow. The Cur-
rent Digest also contains selections from approximatel-
sixty other Soviet newspapers and magazines. Important
items are given in full while others are condensed or are
represented by headline.
10 9The Voice of America supplied us with transcripts
of their broadcasts to the Soviet Union during the Cuban
crisis and after President Kennedy's assassination and their
broadcast schedules for various regions of the U.S.S.R. The
Radio Liberty Committee provided microfilms of their Russian
language broadcasts during these two periods as well as
their broadcast schedules for various parts of the U.S.S.R.
The British Broadcasting Corporation was not able to supply
actual transcripts of broadcasts but they did send us
schedules of their news broadcasts during these two
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periods. The likely content of these broadcasts was re-
constructed from a content analysis of the London Times
editionspublished during the two periods in question.
110 Barghoorn, "The Shaping of Public Opinion,"
pp. 149-81; Cantril, The Soviet Leaders, pp. 108-109.
1 1 Wilbur Schramm, ed., One Day in the World's
Press (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).
112Kecskemeti, "Totalitarian Communications,"
p. 226.
113Dr. Rogers has completed a monograph based on
an analysis of this data, entitled "How Russians Read Their
Press: Patterns of Selection in Pravda and Izvestia,"
which is being published by the Center for International
Studies at M.I.T.
114Professor Pool is responsible for the basic out-
lines of the model and the various aspects of media ex-
posure which it emphasizes. He specified these features in
the mimeographed memoranda Communications Simulation,
Comcom Project, Simulation Memo #1, July 10, 1963 and
ComCom Simulation Pass I, Comcom Project, Simulation Memo
#3, Fall, 1963, and in a series of conversations with this
author and with John F. Kramer. Ernest Heau is also re-
sponsible for some features of the simulation model; his
contribution may be found principally in the mimeographed
memorandum Comcom Simulation: Pass II, Comcom Project,
Simulation Memo #12, July, 1963. Samuel Popkin contributed
materially to the development of the model, and many of his
ideas can be found in the article "A Model of a Communica-
tion System,' cited above.
1 15These systems use the IBM 7094 computers at
Project Mac and at the MIT Computation Center.
116Others who worked on earlier efforts at program-
ming the simulation included Ernest Heau, Stephen Sachs and
David Levine. Important work on the current simulation
programs was done by Dr. John Nagle and by John Klensin.
We are also indebted to Tom Van Vleck and Noel Morris,
systems programmers at Project Mac, whose advice and
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cooperation helped us cope with the complexities of the
time-sharing system and with our own formidable program-
ming task.
117e shall discuss the problems associated with
the Comcom Leisure Study data in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER II
A STATISTICAL MODEL OF MEDIA EXPOSURE
CHAPTER II
A STATISTICAL MODEL OF MEDIA EXPOSURE
I. Overview 1
In this chapter we present a detailed description
of the first part of the Comcom model, viz., the part that
deals with exposure to the media. Our description is not
couched in formal mathematical terms but rather in a number
of simple numerical examples.2 Each of these is designed
to illustrate, for the layman as well as the statistician,
an important algorithm or simulation procedure employed in
the media exposure part of the model. The last three sec-
tions of the chapter catalogue, in tu.rn, the kinds of
1
In this chapter, and in the one which follows it,
we depart from the standard method for labelling sections
and subsections employed in the rest of this thesis. Be-
cause of the scope and complexity of the material covered
in Chapters II and III, we use outline form headings and
subheadings to structure the presentation.
2Readers interested in the quantitative details of
the Comcom model are referred to the formal mathematical
description which appears in John F. Kramer's unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, "Simulating the U.N. Information Campaign in
Cincinnati, 1948" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1969).
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empirical data required as inputs for this part, of the
model, the output statistics that, it, produces, and the
basic assumptions which underlie it;. Hopefully, a concise
exposition of these important features will be helpful to
anyone seeking to ascertain whether the Comcom model of me-
dia exposure is a relevant one for his own work.
II. The Comcom model
The Comcom model is designed to simulate the flow
of various kinds of messages in a nation. In its present,
state of development the model can be used to identify who
in a nation is reached by the flow of mass media messages.
This operation is carried out in what, may be thought of as
two "passes" through the computer.l The first pass (which
we describe in this chapter) estimates each individual's
probable exposure to the various media of communication
represented in the simulation, and the second pass (which
we describe in the next chapter) estimates each individual's
likely exposure to different messages occurring in these
media. Future plans call for a third pass through the
1The present; version of the simulation consists of
seven main programs. The first, five programs are designed
to perform a task distinctly different from that; performed
by the last; two programs. We call attention to this dif-
ference by labelling the two groups of programs "pass I"
and "pass II" respectively.
129
computer to modify this history by permitting word-of-mouth
communication among individuals. The second and third
passes will operate alternatively, allowing messages to dif-
fuse through the media and then to be picked up by word of
mouth, changing the conditions under which the next round
of messages will be received. A fourth pass, currently
under design, will produce graphical plots of time series
statistics from simulated exposure records. At present,we
have working models of passes I and II which have been de-
veloped on the IBM 7094-based time-sharing systems at M.I.T.'s
Project MAC and Computation Center. The simulation programs
--coded in MAD and FAP--have been designed for foreground
operation on the digital computers at these installations
so that we might take advantage of on-line user access
features. In this thesis we test the first two passes of
the simulation on the communications system of the Soviet
Union during the Cuban missile crisis period and the after-
math of President Kennedy's assassination. Specifically,
we use the simulation to assess what, information about
these two events reached various strata of the Soviet popu-
lation through their own controlled mass media, through
radio beamed from abroad, and through the Communist Party's
agitational apparatus.
We now proceed to describe the major data handling
techniques and computer procedures employed in the first
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pass of the simulation.
III. Pass I: Simulating media exposure
Pass I of the simulation combines all relevant
aggregate information available on a real population to
produce in the computer a couple of thousand hypothetical
individuals that constitute as representative a sample
population as possible. Simulated persons are assigned
various demographic, social, and media-use attributes in
such a way as to conform with the following information
where is is known:
--the distribution of demographic and social
traits over the population;
--the distribution of these same traits over
the media's audiences;
--the distribution of individual frequencies of
media exposure over the media's audiences and
sub-audiences;
--the distribution of joint frequencies of multi-
media exposure over the media s audiences and
sub-audiences.
The end product of the first pass is a representa-
tive hypothetical population with habits of media use
comparable to those discovered in the empirical research.
These media-use habits are summarized for each person in
the form of an estimate of his basic probability of expo-
sure to an average issue of each simulated medium.
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A. Distributing demographic and social
traits over a sample computer population
A variety of characteristics can be represented in
the simulation population. Ideally, after a researcher
has decided which population characteristics are of inter-
est to him, he would input for a simulation run census
data or data from a panel survey giving the joing distribu-
tion of these characteristics over the population. But
original source data of this kind, relating all the sig-
nificant population variables to each other, is seldom
available for a country and almost never available for
closed societies like the Soviet Union. Generally, one
of the following conditions prevails:
1. Data collected along the dimensions of inter-
est to the researcher, either in a census or
a representative survey, are published in
tables of lesser dimensionality than the re-
searcher desires for his simulation population.
Because he does not have access to the original
census or survey tapes, the researcher must
construct the population from these tables
of lesser dimensionality.
2. There is no one survey or census of the popula-
tion along all the dimensions of interest to
the researcher. He must therefore construct
the simulation population from tables of lesser
dimensionality published in several different
sources. Each of these sources is based on
a representative sample of the population.
3. Data collected along the dimensions of inter-
est to the researcher, in a survey based on
a representative sample, are such that cells
in the table of dimensionality he desires are
132
too sparsely populated to provide accurate
estimates of the underlying population. As
a result, the researcher must collapse the
full survey table to more densely populated
subtables and construct the simulation popu-
lation from these tables of lesser dimen-
sionality.
4. There is no one survey or census of the pop-
ulation along all the dimensions of interest
to the researcher. He must: therefore con-
struct: the simulation population from the
tables of lesser dimensionality published
in several different, sources. At. least one
of these sources is not based on a repre-
sentative sample of the population and con-
tains an interaction not. specified in the
sources that. are based on representative
samples of the population.
Regardless of which condition above obtains, the
simulation problem is to establish appropriate dependences
among the traits of interest in the sample computer popula-
tion. For example, if we know from the Soviet census that
4 per cent of Russian adults have had more than 10 years
of education, then the simulation must assign over 10 years
of education to 4 per cent of the hypothetical persons in
the sample computer population. It would not be difficult
to assign such traits one at a time, but the problem becomes
more complex when we attempt. to account, for interactions
among traits. For example, suppose we know that. as of Jan-
uary 1965 there were in the Soviet, Union 11 million Party
members and 6 million persons with more than 10 years of
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education. In this case not only must the simulation as-
sign each of these two attributes to appropriate numbers
of hypothetical persons in the sample computer population;
it. must do so in such a way as to produce a realistic
joint assignment of these two attributes, i.e., a real-
istic estimate of how many Party members had over 10
years of education (and perhaps further, how many of
those were males, urbanites, over 50 years of age, etc.).
Under conditions one through three above, the
problem is to assign traits to simulated persons in a
way that, reproduces in the sample computer population
all interactions, and no other interactions. Under
condition four above, the problem is to assign traits
to simulated persons in a way that reproduces in the
sample computer population all interactions estimated
from census data and surveys over representative samples,
at. the same time reproducing as much as possible any
other interactions estimated from surveys over unrepre-
sentative samples, while producing no additional inter-
actions. We first illustrate the simulation procedure
developed for dealing with conditions one through
three.
1When we have no data on the other possible inter-
actions, and no reliable basis for estimating them, we are
forced to this null hypothesis.
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1. Estimating interactions from representative
samples
a) Independent assignment of traits
Generally, we know the distribution of the popula-
tion over each individual variable of interest. For ex-
ample, suppose we know from the Soviet census that 50 per
cent of Russian adults are male, 6 per cent are members of
the Communist Party, and those in the 16 to 29 and the 50
plus age groups constitute one half and one fifth of the
adult population respectively. If there were no interactions
among these population traits, we could easily assign them
one at a time, i.e., independently, to simulated persons in
conformity with the known population distribution over
each trait. The expected value of the population in any
particular cell would then be just the relevant cross-
product for that cell. Figure 2.1 shows the resulting per-
centages of the sample population which the computer would
assign to each of twelve macro-types (male, Communist, over
fifty years of age; female, Communist, over fifty years of
age; etc.) in this way. But we know that there are inter-
actions among socially significant population traits, inter-
actions which an independent assignment procedure of this
kind ignores. Fortunately, we often have data on these
interactions, linking as many as three or four of the
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important population characteristics at a time. We return
to our example in order to illustrate the method developed
for using this added information.
b) Iterative assignment of traits
Suppose that, in addition to Soviet census data
describing the population's distribution over each variable
of interest, we also have data on the interaction between
two of these variables, sex" and "political involvement,"
telling us that male Party members outnumber female Party
members two to one. Depending on which of the first three
conditions above obtain, this information could have come
from the same census, from an independent source, or it.
may have been collapsed from a multi-dimensional sample
survey in which the desired three-dimensional table was
too sparsely populated to be usable. In any event, we do
not have the multi-dimensional breakdown and the simulation
problem is to assign population proportions to each of the
twelve cells in a way that reflects the known population
distributions over "sex," "age," and "political involve-
ment.," the known interaction between "sex" and "politi-
cal involvement," and no other interactions. The method we
use to estimate cell frequencies in the resulting three-
dimensional table is based on a procedure developed by
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Professor Frederick Mosteller and others. First, we
initialize the cells with the values implied by assuming
there are no second-order or higher level interactions
among the population traits, i.e., we calculate cross-
products. Then, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, we multi-
plicatively adjust cell entries so that each row sum equals
the value implied by the known second-order interaction.
This, then, is an oversimplified example of a basic pro-
cedure employed at several points in the simulation which
we hereafter refer to as the Mosteller technique. (The
example is an oversimplified one because it usually re-
quires at least several iterative applications of the
multiplicative adjustment to rows and columns before a
solution is obtained.) We are now ready to describe the
application of this technique under condition four out-
lined above.
1 See, e.g., W. Edwards Deming and Frederick F.
Stephan, "On a Leas Squares Adjustment of a Sampled Fre-
quency table when the Expected Marginal totals are known,"
The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, XI (1940), 427-44;
Frederick F. Stephan, "An Iterative Method of Adjusting
Sample Frequency Tables When Expected Marginal totals are
known," The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, XIII (1942),
166-78; David T. Brown, "A Note on Approximations to
Discrete Probability Distributions," Information and Con-
trol, II (1959), 386-92; Frederick Mosteller, "Association
and Estimation in Contingency Tables," Journal of the
American Statistical Association, LXIII, No. 321 (1968),
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2. Estimating interactions from biased
samples
Suppose that, in addition to Soviet census data
describing the population's distribution over each vari-
able of interest, we again have data on the interaction
between two of these variables, this time "sex" and "age."
Assume that these data come from a survey in which the age
distribution of the sample differs from the age distribu-
tion of the overall population. The simulation problem,
then,is to assign population proportions to each of the
twelve cells in a way that exactly reproduces the popula-
tion's known distributions over "sex," "age," and "polit-
ical involvement," that reproduces as much as possible the
interaction between "sex" and "age" implied in the biased
sample, and that produces no other interactions.l We again
IJohn Kramer first pointed out to me a case in
which this particular use of the Mosteller technique might
be required. We have census reports describing the break-
down of the population in mainland China along several
dimensions of interest. This data, more accurate than any
other we have, is seldom published in tables of dimension-
ality greater than two or three, however, and is never pub-
lished in some of the tables at these levels. We do have
additional data, from interviews with Chinese refugees in
Hong Kong, which measure some of the higher order interactions
not displayed in Chinese census data. These measures are
probably not completely accurate, however, because the in-
terview sample has different marginal values along the traits
of interest than does the Chinese population as a whole.
If we were to do a Communist Chinese mass media simulation,
our problem would be to assign proportions of the sample
population to each of the simulation macro-types in a way
that exactly reproduced the known census marginals for
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use the Mosteller technique to estimate cell frequencies
in the three dimensional table, but in a somewhat differ-
ent fashion than before. This time we initialize the
cells with the values implied by the interaction estimated
from the biased sample, rather than with the cross-product
values implied by the known population marginals. Then,
as illustrated in Figure 2.3, we multiplicatively adjust
cell entries until colum sums exactly equal the values
implied by the known "age" marginals and row sums exactly
reproduce the known "political involvement" and "sex"
marginals. (Here again, because only two iterative applica-
tions of the multiplicative adjustment were required to
obtain a solution in the example, it represents a somewhat
oversimplified illustration of the way in which the
Mosteller technique is used under condition four.) We are
'now ready to describe the technique in a more general
fashion.
3. A generalized statement of how the
Mosteller technique is applied
Suppose we wish to structure a simulation popula-
tion alone n dimensions. The first step in the Mosteller
China, that reproduced as much as possible the higher
order interactions present in the refugee sample, and
that produced no other interactions.
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technique is to assign initial values to the cells of the
n-dimensional table. If all our interaction data come
either from a census or from samples representative of
the real population (conditions one through three), we
initialize the cells with cross-product values implied
by the highest level complete set of known interactions.
In the first case discussed above, for example, we knew
all the first-order interactions--i.e., the population's
distribution over each individual trait--so we initialized
the twelve cells with cross-product values implies by
these interactions. Had we known all the second-order
interactions--i.e., "sex" x "age," "sex" x '1 politcal
involvement.," "age" x "political involvement"--we would
have initialized cells with cross-product values implied
by these interactions instead. On the other hand, if the
highest. order interactions on which we have data are those
that have been estimated from a biased sample (condition
four), we initialize cells with the cross-product values
implied by these interactions and the highest level com-
plete set of interactions that have been estimated from
a census or from representative samples. In the second
case discussed above, for example, we could estimate from
a biased sample a second-order interaction--"sex" x "age"
--on which we had no other data, so we initialized the
twelve cells with the cross-product values implied by
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this interaction and the known "political involvement"
marginals.
After we have initialized cells of the n-dimensional
table in the appropriate way, the remainder of the Mosteller
technique is the same for each of the four conditions out-
lined above. We perform multiplicative adjustments on the
cell entries until they simultaneously reproduce all inter-
actions estimated from representative population samples.
Suppose, for example, that in addition to knowing all such
interactions on a given level, say all the mth-order inter-
actions (where m is less than n), we also know some of the
interactions on the (m+l)th level. Each (m+l)th-order
interaction specifies a set of values to which a correspond-
ing set of linear arrays in n-space must sum. But we know
that, at this point, all such sets of arrays sum either to
the values implies by assuming no interactions on the (m+l)th
level or to values obtained from a biased sample. There-
fore, the next step in the simulation procedure is to mul-
tiplicatively adjust cross-product cell entries in the
n-dimensional table until each array associated with an
(m+l) th-order interaction sums to the value specified by
that interaction, at the same time preserving all the known
mth-order interactions. In the simple examples discussed
above, we only had to perform this multiplicative adjust-
ment once or twice. However, in more general cases we
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perform the adjustment procedure several times, iteratively.
First, we apply it once to all the arrays associated with
(m+l) th-order interactions. But on this initial round
of adjustments one of two things generally happens. Either
array sums that. have been corrected by applying the pro-
cedure for a given (m+l)th-order interaction are perturbed
by subsequent applications of the procedure for other
(mI)th-order interactions, or array sums associated with
the pre-set mth-order interactions are perturbed. There-
fore, the first round of adjustments generally guarantees
correct sums only over the arrays associated with the
last (m+l)th-order interaction for which the procedure is
applied. As a result, multiplicative adjustments usually
have to be applied iteratively to the set of arrays asso-
ciated with all (m+l)th order interactions until cell
entries in the n-dimensional table converge on values that
simultaneously satisfy all known mth- and (m+l)th-order
interactions.1 This iterative adjustment, procedure is
1A proof that they will always converge, if con-
sistent subtables are being combined, is developed by
Brown in "A Note on Approximations to Discrete Probabil-
ity Distributions." Tables may be inconsistent in two
different ways. An obvious inconsistency arises if two
subtables are not identical, cell by cell, when they are
collapsed along any dimension which they have in common.
Consider the following two tables, for example:
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then repeated for the known interactions on each succeed-
ing level (m+2, m+3,...,n-1) until cell values in the
Party member
Urban
Male
Female
NonParty member
Rural
48
52
When they are collapsed along their common dimension, "sex,"
the resulting marginals are inconsistent. They are 50-50 in
one case, 48-52 in the other. Whenever the Mosteller tech-
nique is applied in the present version of the simulation,
all subtables are tested for this kind of contradiction.
Inconsistent tables are called to the researcher's attention.
In the course of testing the simulation we dis-
covered that. another, more complex, type of inconsistency
can also arise among tables.
below, for example:
Party member
Consider the three tables
NonParty member
6 44
0 50
6 94
50
50
Male
Female
4 46
2 48
50
50
3 45
3 49
Male
Female
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final n-dimensional table exactly reproduce all interactions
estimated from representative
Urban
population samples. Accordingly,
Rural
Male
Female
Party member
NonParty member
0 50 50
50 0 50
50 50
Urban Rural
3 3 6
47 47 94
50 50
Although these tables are obviously consistent in the first
sense (i.e., on any common dimension of a pair of tables,
corresponding marginals are equal), they are inconsistent
in a more subtle way, as illustrated below:
Urban Rural
NonParty
member
Male
Party member
Male
NonParty
member
Female
Party member
Female
NonParty
member
6
44
0
50
The three two-dimensional tables imply two possible
sets of values in the nonParty member, urban, female and the
Male
Female
Party
member
0 6
0 44
O 0
50,47 0,3
-SO 50
__
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the Mosteller technique may be thought of as an iteration
within an iteration. In Figure 2.4 we present a flow
diagram of the technique so that the reader may verify his
understanding of this important simulation procedure.
4. Distributing Soviet demographic and
social traits over a sample computer
population
In the case of the Soviet, simulation, some of the
traits that we considered representing in the sample com-
puter population included age, sex, nationality, language
of media consumption, republic of residence, community size,
nonParty member, rural, female cells, either of which
violates one of the tables. In our simulation runs, this
kind of inconsistency arose only when the tables we input
to the Mosteller procedure completely "enclosed" the
final n-dimensional table. In the case described above,
for example, the three two-dimensional tables completely
enclose the space of the cube. More generally, we found
this type of inconsistency arose only when each of the
n dimensions in the final table appeared at. least, once in
the subtables we were synthesizing. In the present; ver-
sion of the simulation we test all the subtables on a
given level for this type of inconsistency by determining
whether or not. there is a feasible solution to the set. of
linear equations relating the cell values of the n-dimen-
sional table to the values in the subtables. When there
is no feasible solution, i.e., when subtables contradict
each other in this more complex sense, the inconsistent
subtables are called to the researcher's attention. He
must then discard one or more subtables until the remain-
ing set are consistent. We have not. yet discovered a
systematic method for eliminating such inconsistencies,
as for example, one that would allow the researcher to
discard as few subtables as possible. A more extended
discussion of this question of convergence of the
Mosteller technique can be found in Kramer's Ph.D. thesis.
Start with the highest level on which If 
alln nterac tions are nown: level i
If i imax
Are there any biased sample estimates of E
interactions on evels higher than i? I
Yes
Initialize cells of the imax)-dimensional table
with cross-product values specified by this
interaction and the known interactions on level i
Initialize cells of the (imax'-dimensional
table with cross-product values specified
by the known interactions on level i
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Fig. 2.4.--A flow diagram of the Mosteller technique
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urban or rural residence, education, occupation, income,
social stratum, political involvement, attitude toward
t.he regime, and trustfulness or distrustfulness regard-
ing media material. We had to rule out the use of many
of these traits, in some cases because we lacked data
on the distribution of a particular characteristic over
the population or over audiences, in other cases because
the particular characteristic was not considered to be
one of the more significant correlates of communications
behavior. But, even if we had the requisite data on all
these traits and did not want. to pre-judge their relative
influence on habits of media use, an important limitation
of the simulation programs would have prevented us from
representing such a large number of variables in the
sample computer population.
The objective of pass I is to estimate each simu-
lated individual's probability of being exposed to an
average issue of each simulated medium. However, the
fixed storage capacity which characterizes digital com-
puters puts practical limitations on the number of media
exposure probabilities which can be processed by the
simulation programs in any given run. Since the number
of media exposure probabilities that must be estimated
and stored is a direct product of the number of persons
and the number of media in the simulation, we are forced
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to assign a maximum allowable value to each of these
parameters. As a result., the programs for pass I have been
designed in such a way that they can process up to 3,000
simulated individuals' probabilities of being exposed to
an average issue of each of up to 64 simulated media. But,
as we shall soon show, one pre-condition for the calcula-
tion of any hypothetical person's media exposure prob-
abilities is the accurate estimation of average media
exposure probabilities for all persons of that type in
the sample computer population. The average media expo-
sure probabilities for a given type of person serve as
guides to the appropriate assignment of individual media
exposure probabilities to each person of that type. How-
ever, the stochastic assignment procedures which we use
are not valid for a given type of person unless there
exist. a reasonable number of individuals of that type in
the sample computer population. For this reason we have de-
signed the simulation in such a way that it can distribute
simulated persons over a maximum of 500 types or cells.
With an upper limit of 3,000 persons, a larger allowable
number of types would result. in such a small number of
persons of any given type in the sample computer population
that the stochastic assignment of individual media ex-
posure probabilities to persons of that type, based on
the average media exposure probabilities for persons of
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that type, would have little validity.
The number of types of individuals represented in
any population, i.e., the number of cells across which the
population must, be distributed, is just the product of the
number of levels on each trait or dimension represented in
the population. For the Soviet simulation, even if we had
been satisfied to use only two levels on each trait of
interest, we could not, have represented more than eight of
them in the sample computer population (2 9512) without
exceeding the maximum allowable number of cells. Thus,
for a combination of reasons--data availability, intrinsic
interest, and computer storage requirements--we finally
decided to represent, the following five attributes in the
sample computer population: "age," "sex," "education,"
"political involvement.," and "urban or rural residence."
As a result, our sample computer population contained 96
different types of persons, each of whom was (1) either
between the ages of 16 and 29, 30 and 49, or over 49;
(2) either male or female; (3) either more than 10,
between 7 and 10, between 4 and 7, or less than 4 years
in school; (4) either a Party or nonParty member; and
1(5) either an urbanite or a ruralite.
1We could not, have 3,000 individuals in the sample
computer population for the following reason: One of the
simulation programs is designed in such a way that, for
some combinations of less than 64 media and less than 500
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In the Soviet simulation we were not working from
original source data on the distribution of these five
traits over the population. We had to reproduce it from
available summaries of marginal distributions in order to
construct a reasonable sample computer population. The
prevailing circumstances were similar to those described
in condition two above. We found that census data were
collected by "sex,' "age," "urban or rural residence" and
"education," but not by "political involvement." However,
other data from a representative sample were available on
the breakdown of Party members and nonParty members by
"sex," "age," and "education." Ou.r specific problem was
to combine a four-dimensional table estimated from census
data--"sex" x "urban or rural residence" x "age" x "edu.ca-
tion"--with three two-dimensional tables estimated from
another source--"political involvement" x "sex," "political
types or cells, it constrains the maximum simulation popu-
lation to a size of less than 3,000. In our case (56 media
and 96 cells), this constraint meant that we could only
have 1,200 individuals in the sample computer population.
But, because we had defined "political involvement" as
membership in the Communist Party, this variable was very
unevenly distributed over the Soviet population (and,
therefore, over the sample computer population). As a
result, 20 of the 48 cells representing Party members con-
tained no simulated individuals at all. Because the 1,200
simulated individuals were distributed over 76 nonzero
cells, the average cell population in these was 16. There-
fore, a stochastic assignment procedure based on average
cell probabilities probably was valid in most of the non-
zero cells.
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involvement" x "age," and "political involvement x "educa-
tion"--in such a way as to construct a five-dimensional
table--"sex" x "age" x "urban or rural residence" x "edu-
cation" x "political involvement"--that reproduced the
known distribution of each variable over the population,
the interactions expressed in the four subtables, and no
other interactions. We used the Mosteller technique to
distribute a simulation population of 1,200 persons ap-
propriately across the 96 cells of this five-dimensional
table.1 Thus, by employing aggregate statistical data
and the iterative procedure described above, we were able
to map important, structural aspects of the Soviet, popula-
tion into a sample computer population. The result was a
possible distribution of traits over the simulation popu-
lation compatible which reported statistics on those
traits.
B. Distributing the media's audiences across
demographic and social strata of the sample
compu.ter population
Having distributed simulated individuals across the
cells defined by important, demographic and social traits
(i.e., across population macro-types), our next task is to
1These 96 cells were just, the cartesian products
of the five dimensions.
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distribute the media's audiences across these cells. For
any medium this means that we must assign an appropriate
audience figure to each cell. The overall population
mean, which is just, the average single-issue audience for
a medium, can usually be obtained by some kind of trans-
formation of an empirical statistic--a circulation figure
in the case of print media, a set estimate in the case of
electronic media. But simply assigning this overall popu-
lation mean to each cell, without regard to other delimit-
ing information about the composition of the media's
audiences, would produce a uniform and therefore demon-
strably incorrect distribution of probabilities across
cells.I This kind of distortion can be reduced substan-
tially by using whatever empirical audience breakdowns are
available as additional criteria for assigning cell means.
1. Independent assignment of traits
Original source data on the composition of the
media's audiences, relating all the significant population
variables to each other, is seldom available. The informa-
tion we generally have on the breakdown of audiences by
demographic and social traits is of a summary nature at
lit would be equivalent to saying, for example,
that illiterates read magazines as often as the well-
educated.
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best, indicating for the most. part breakdowns by one vari-
able at a time.l For example, suppose we estimate from
survey data that half the average single-issue audience
of a particular Soviet medium are male, 6 per cent are
members of the Communist Party, and those in the 16 to 29
and 50-plus age groups each constitute one quarter of the
audience. Suppose further that, based on a circulation
figure, we estimate this audience comprises about 20 per
cent of the adult Soviet population. If we assumed there
were no interactions in the medium's audience among these
population traits, then we could easily assign them one
at a time, i.e., independently, to members of the simu-
lated audience in conformity with the known distribution
of each trait over the audience. The expected value of
the audience figure for any particular cell would then be
just the relevant cross-product for that cell. Figure 2.5
shows the resulting audience size with the computer would
assign to each of the twelve cells in this way, assuming a
simulation population of 1,000. But we know that there
are interactions among socially significant population
1For example, it is possible to get data on the
circulation of a magazine by region in the U.S.S.R., and
it is also possible to assume something about the dis-
tribution of its circulation as between literates and
illiterates. Data on circulation by literacy by region,
however, is virtually non-existent.
Simulation population = 1,000
Estimated average single-issue audience - 20% x 1,000 200
Male
Sex: 50%
Age: 16-29
25%
Political involvement:
Female
50%
30-49
50%
Party member
6%
16-29
Party member
NonParty member
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
emale
Male
Female
1.V'
1.5
23.5
50+
25%
NonParty member
94%
30-49
3
3
47
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Survey data on the breakdown
of the medium's audiene by
individual traits.
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resulting from the independent
assignment of traits to members
of the sample computer audience,
i.e. assuming no interactions
among the traits.
No interaction in the sample
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result of this independent
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Fig. 2,5,--Assigning audience traits independently
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traits in the media's audiences, just as there are in the
overall population. Generally speaking, however, we have
better data on population interactions than we have on cor-
responding audience interactions. Therefore, unless we
have data on a particular interaction in a medium's audi-
ence, we would like to have it. approach, as closely as pos-
sible, the corresponding population interaction. We return
to our example in order to illustrate how the Mosteller
technique is applied for this purpose.
2. Iterative assignment of traits
Suppose that we are using the same simulation popu-
lation described in Figures 2.1 through 2.3 above. Com-
paring this population with the audience described in
Figure 2.5, we see that they break down identically by
"sex" and "political involvement" but differently by "age."
Although we have no survey data on second-order or higher
level interactions in the medium's audience, we do have
census data (Figure 2.2) indicating the existence of a
second-order interaction in the population as a whole,
between "sex" and "political involvement." But the inde-
pendent assignment procedure illustrated in Figure 2.5
reflects only estimated first-order interactions in the
medium's audience and, in fact, produces no interaction
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in the audience between "sex" and "political involvement."
The simulation problem,then,is to establish a more realis-
tic dependence between these two traits in the medium's
audience. We have here a situation equivalent to condition
number four described above. We wish to assign audience
members to each of the twelve cells in a way that produces
an interaction in the medium's audience between "sex" and
"political involvement" as close as possible to that which
we know exists in the overall population. At the same
time, this assignment must exactly reproduce the audience
size estimated from circulation data, the audience distri-
bu.tions over sex,t "age," and "political involvement"
estimated from survey data, and no other interactions. As
illustrated in Figure 2.6, we begin by initializing the
cells with audience sizes that equal the values of the
simulation population. Thus, our initial audience distri-
bution contains the same interaction between "sex" and "po-
litical involvement" as does the simulation population.
Because the simulation population breaks down by "sex"
and "political involvement" in the same way as the medium's
audience, the audience figures in each cell also reproduce
these two first-order interactions. But we know that the
medium's audience comprises only one-fifth of the popula-
tion and that it breaks down by "age" differently than
the simulation population. Therefore, as illustrated in
16-29 30-49 50+
Party member
NonParty member
Male
Female
Male
Female
20
10
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16
138
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96
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the overall population in these
two respects.
Party member
NonParty member
16-29
Male 20
Female 10
Male 230
Female 240
=500
30-49
12
6
138
14 AA
300
50 100
50+
I
8 40 Column auml do not reflect the
4 20 a e timated from survey data,
nor do they reflect the sise of
92 460 the medium's audience estimated
from circulation data.
96
200 000
50 200
_:_:: :
Multiply each entry in the first column by 50/500
, , " " second " " 100/300
" " " " " third " " 50/200
Perform a multiplicative
adjustment.
Party member
NonParty member
Male
Female
Male
Female
16-29 30-49 50+
2 4 2 8
1 2 1 4
23 46 23 92
_ _F248 24 96
50 100 50 200
Cell values now reflect the
estimated second-order inter-
action in the population, the
estimated first-order interactions
in the audience, the estimated
audience size, and no other
interactions. (Typically, a
solution of this kind is obtained
only after the multiplicative
adjustment has been applied at
least several times, iteratively,
to rows and columns.)
Fig. 2.6.--Assigning audience
to exist in the population
traits to reproduce, as-much as possible, an interaction known
---
_ L I 
_
I-
--. _ 
_
I
I
160
Figure 2.6, we multiplicatively adjust cell entries so
that, each column sum equals the value implied by the esti-
mated age distribution of the audience and all column sums
total to the estimated audience size. In this simplified
example, one application of the adjustment, procedure is
sufficient to produ.ce cell values that satisfy these two
requirements withou.t perturbing the interaction in the
audience between "sex" and "political involvement." We
now proceed to describe this application of the Mosteller
technique in a more general fashion.
3. A generalized statement of how the
Mosteller technique is applied
Suppose we have structured our sample computer pop-
ulation along n dimensions. For any medium, then, the
simulation problem is to establish realistic dependences
among these n traits in its sample computer audience. To
do this we distribute the sample audience across population
cells in a way that. reflects all interactions known to ex-
ist among cell-defining traits in the real audience, any
additional interactions known to exist in the overall popu.-
lation, and no other interactions. When the data-we have
on the composition of the population related to higher
order interactions oraremore reliable than the data we have
on the composition of the medium's audience (which is
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generally the case), we initialize cells of the n-dimensional
audience table with the values of the simulation population.
Then, we apply the multiplicative adjustment procedure to
these cell entries in a manner similar to that. described
above (pp. 143-47), until they simultaneously satisfy all
known interactions in the medium's audience. The resulting
audience figures assigned to each cell thus reproduce all
known interactions in the medium's audience, reproduce as
much as possible all other known interactions in the popu.-
lation, and produce no additional interactions. When the
da.ta we have on the composition of the population relates,
for some reason, to lower order interactions or is less
reliable than the data we have on the composition of a
medium's audience, we initialize cells of the n-dimensional
audience table with the cross-product values implied by
the highest order complete set of interactions known for
the medium's audience. We then apply the multiplicative
adjustment procedure to those values until they also re-
flect, any higher order interactions that may have been
estimated for that medium's audience.
1In the simple case illustrated in Figure 2.6,
the final cell entries exactly reproduce all these inter-
actions. In a more general case, however, they would
exactly reproduce only the known audience interactions.
Any other interaction created in the sample computer audi-
ence would be biased away from zero toward the correspond-
ing interaction in the sample computer population.
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4. Distributing Soviet audiences across
demographic and social strata of a
sample computer population
In the Soviet simulation institutional facts de-
termined how we defined the concepts of "issue" and "aver-
age single-issue audience" for each type of medium. For
discontinuous media, such as newspapers and magazines, it
was relatively simple to define the concept of issue. For
example, if one of the messages of interest were part of
an article in a particular edition of Pravda, then that
message appeared in all copies of that edition. Therefore,
we defined each edition of a newspaper or magazine as an
issue of that publication, and we defined the average
readership of any edition--i.e., some multiplicative func-
tion of a circulation estimate--as the average single-
issue audience of that publication. However, it was more
difficult to define the concept of issue for continuous
media such as radio and television. In such media, one of
the messages of interest might have been part. of a program
that, had been presented unbrokenly for many hours, or part
of a program that had been presented in discrete five
minute newscasts. Nevertheless, in the Soviet simulation
we also used a discrete definition of the concept of issue
for continuous media, although in this case it was far
more difficult to estimate the sizes of average single-
issue audiences. For example, we defined all radio or
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television broadcasts presented during a particular period
of the day (say, 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon) as an "issue"
of that "station," and we defined the total listenership
or viewership during that period of a typical day--i.e.,
some multiplicative function of a set estimate--as the
average "single-issue" audience of that, "station."
We defined the concept of issue for different types
of Soviet media this way with one overriding objective in
mind: to be able to represent in the simulation all the
audiences of the Soviet, mass media and the bulk of the
audiences of externally-originated radiocasts, using no
more than the sixty-four media allowed by the simulation
programs. As it turned out, we were able to achieve
this objective using fifty-six communications media in
the Soviet simulation. They included eleven newspapers
published on the central administrative level: Pravda,
Izvestia, Tru.d, Komsomolskaya pravda, Literaturnaya gazeta,
Ekonomischeskaya gazeta, Selskaya zhizn, Nedelya, Krasnaya
zvezda, an aggregate newspaper representing all other
papers on this level published three times a week, and one
representing all others published twice a week; twelve
newspapers published on the republic level: Sovetskaya
Rossia, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, four aggregate papers rep-
resenting, respectively, all Party-Government organs in
the Central Asian, Transcaucasian, Baltic, and European
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republics, an aggregate newspaper for all republic level
Kbmsomol papers published five times a week and one for
all republic level Komsomol papers published three times
a week, and four aggregate newspapers representing, re-
spectively, all other republic level papers published
five times, three times, twice, and once a week; seven
newspapers on administrative levels below the republic
level: one aggregate newspaper representing all Komsomol
papers published on these levels and six aggregate news-
papers representing, respectively, all other newspapers
published on these levels in periodicities ranging from
one to six days a week; two magazines: Ogonyok and
Krokodil; four central radiocasts representing, respec-
tively, all broadcasts emanating from Moscow Central Radio
between the hours of 5:30 and 8:30 A.M., noon and 3 P.M.,
6:00 and 9:30 P.M., and 9:30 P.M and 5:30 A.M.; four radio-
casts emanating from administrative levels below the cen-
tral level representing, respectively, all broadcasts
emanating from these levels between the four time inter-
vals just mentioned; two radiocasts representing, respec-
tively, all domestic broadcasts between 8:30 A.M. and noon
and between 3:00 and 6:00 P.M.; two central telecasts
representing, respectively, all broadcasts emanating from
Moscow Central Television between the hours of 11:00 A.M.
and 6:00 P.M. and between 6:00 P.M. and midnight; two
telecasts emanating from administrative levels below the
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central level representing, respectively, all broadcasts
emanating from these levels between the two time intervals
just mentioned; nine externally-originated radiocasts rep-
resenting, respectively, all VOA transmissions to the
Soviet Union between the hours of 4:00 and 8:00 A.M.,
8:00 A.M. and 8:00 P.M., and 8:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M., all
BBC transmissions to the Soviet, Union between these same
time intervals, and all Radio Liberty transmissions to the
Soviet. Union between these time intervals; and finally,
one medium representing the Soviet oral agitation network.
In the Soviet simulation we were working from
secondary source data which summarized the distribution
of demographic and social traits over the domestic and
external media's audiences. We wished to use these data
to produce reasonable population marginals and interac-
tions in each simulated medium's audience. The prevail-
ing circumstances were similar to those outlined in condi-
tion number four above. We knew the total daily circula-
tion figures for most. major Soviet. newspapers and the
approximate numbers of radio and television sets in vari-
ous parts of the country. These figures provided a basis
for estimating the total size of each medium's average
single-issue audience. We also had data from the Comcom
Leisure Study on the breakdown of various media's audiences
by the individual dimensions of interest. However, these
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data were based on a biased and sparse sample of only a
little over one hundred persons--Soviet refugees and
visitors to Western Europe.l As a result, most cells of
the five-dimensional table in which we had distributed
our simulation population (see p. 151 above) contained
too few members of any given medium's audience to provide
a valid and reliable estimate of the actual audience com-
position. Therefore, we were forced to weight the sample
and to collapse the five-dimensional survey table to five
one-dimensional tables, each of which corresponded to a
population trait. The cells in these collapsed subtables
contained enough weighted audience members to provide
fair estimates of the actual audience breakdowns on each
trait.. For any medium, then, we had an estimate of the
size of its total audience and of its audience marginals
by "sex," "age," "education,' "urban or rural residence,"
and "political involvement." But we also had data, from
the census and other sources, on higher order interactions
in the Soviet population--interactions which we had already
established in the sample computer population. We did not
want, to ignore this information in structuring the media's
sample computer audiences. For any medium, then, our
IProblems of sample bias in the Comcom Leisure
Study are discussed in Chapter IV.
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problem was to distribute an audience, whose size had been
estimated from circulation data, across cells in a way that:
exactly reproduced the audience marginals estimated from
sparse Comcom Leisure Study data, that, reproduced as much
as possible the higher order interactions already present,
in the simulation population, and that. produced no other
interactions. For any medium, then, we initialized the
cells of a five-dimensional audience table with the cor-
responding values of the sample computer population, and
we used the Mosteller technique to adjust these values
iteratively until they reproduced the estimated audience
marginals for that medium. In this way we were able to
map important structural aspects of the Soviet population
into each medium's sample computer audience, at the same
time mapping any known structural features of the medium's
real world audience into its sample computer audience.
The result was a possible distribution of traits over the
simulated media's audiences compatible with reported popu-
lation and audience breakdowns on those traits.
C. Distributing the media's audiences within
demographic and social strata of the sample
computer population (the problem of cumula-
tion)
By distributing simulated individuals across all
the cells in the sample computer population we have
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specified the cell sizes, i.e., the number of exposure
probabilities that are to be assigned to each cell for any
simulated medium. By distributing average audiences across
all the cells in the sample computer population we have
specified the cell means, i.e., the mean of the exposure
probabilities that. are to be assigned to each cell for any
simulated medium. Each cell mean denotes the size of a
medium's average single-issue audience among a group of
people identically defined, such as young, educated, urban,
male Party members. For any medium,then, cell means de-
termine the distribution of exposure probabilities across
cells and first moments for the eventual distributions
of exposure probabilities within cells, but they do not
specify the shapes of these within-cell distributions.
However, for simulation purposes it, is important to
specify the shapes of the probability distributions in
any cell because they determine the rate at which the
media's audiences cumulate in that. cell. The following
example will bear this out.
Suppose that a particular cell mean for a medium
is 0.22, i.e., that, 22 per cent of the individuals in that
cell are exposed to an average issue of the medium. Assume
that the distribution of exposure probabilities in that
cell forms a "spike" at the value 0.22. Then, all individu-
als in the cell have the same probability of being exposed
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to an average issue of the medium and the cumulative audi-
ences, i.e., the number of individuals exposed at least
once over one, two, and three issues comprise 22, 39, and
53 per cent of the cell population respectively. Now, as-
sume instead that the probability distribution in the cell
forms two "spikes," one at, 0.0 and the other at 1.0. Then,
79 per cent of the cell population is never exposed to an
issue of the medium and 22 per cent are exposed to every
issue, so the cumulative audience remains constant at 22
per cent of the cell population over any number of issues.
Thus, the cumulation curve we obtain differs markedly de-
pending on the shape we assume for the within-cell prob-
ability distribution. However, neither of the two assump-
tions we have made produces a realistic cumulation curve.
It can be shown that the first; assumption--that all indi-
viduals in a cell have an exposure probability equal to the
cell mean--tends to overstate the rate of audience cumula-
tion in that cell for most. media.2 The second assumption--
1Assuming an individual's probability of expsoure
is the same for every issue, we make this computation as
follows:
1 issue: 0.22 x 100 = 22%
2 issues: (0.22 + 0.78 x 0.22)100 = 39%
3 issues: (0.39 + 0.78 x 0.78 x 0.22)100 = 53%
2For example, consider these two simple cases:
(1) Each individual in a cell has an average exposure
170
that all those in a cell who are exposed to the medium at
all are exposed to every issue--does not allow for any
audience cumulation in that cell. The simulation problem
then is to specify, in each cell and in the overall popu-
lation, probability distributions that produce realistic
cumulation curves for each of the various media.
1. Estimating probability distributions
for the population as a whole
The shape of the probability distribution in a cell
for any medium determines the rate at which its audience
cumulates in that cell. In fact, it is mathematically
related to the shape of this cumulation curve. The nature
of this relationship is such that we can estimate the shape
of the within-cell probability distribution for any medium
from a knowledge of two "points" on its cumulation curve--
the average sizes of its one- and two-issue audiences in
probability of 0.5 for a particular medium; (2) Half the
individuals in a cell have an average exposure probability
of 0.3 and half an average exposure probability of 0.7 for a
particular medium. The following table summarizes the
audience cumulations one would obtain with each of these
formulations.
Using the cell mean Using a distribution
1 issue 50% 50%
2 issues 75% 71%
3 issues 87.5% 81.5%
lIn the calculus, any point on a cumulation curve
can be obtained by integrating its probability distribution
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that cell. Unfortunately, while we know the average size
of the one-issue audience for a medium in any cell (i.e.,
the specified mean), we seldom know the average size of
its two-issue audience in that cell. Therefore, we cannot
often use the mathematical relationship between a prob-
ability distribution and its cumulation curve as a basis
for estimating the shapes of within-cell probability dis-
tributions. But we can use it to estimate the shapes of
probability distributions that encompass the entire popu-
lation, because we can usually estimate the sizes of the
overall one- and two-issue audiences for a medium. There-
fore, we have developed the following procedure for esti-
mating the shape of an overall probability distribution
for any medium: We use the one- and two-issue cumulation
figures for a medium and the mathematical relationship
mentioned above to estimate the two parameters of a beta
function, and then we use the beta function to model a
discrete probability distribution for the medium.1 The
(i.e., its density function) over a corresponding prob-
ability interval. In the discrete case, any point on a
cumulation curve can be obtained by taking the summation
of its probability distribution over an appropriate number
of probability values.
1At least: four explicit ways of modelling distribu-
tions of exposure probabilities have been suggested in the
literature. Alfred Politz proposed a third-degree poly-
nomial (three parameters) in Life Study of Consumer Ex-
penditures, Vol. II (New York: Alfred Politz Research,
Inc., 957). J. M. Agostini proposed weights at three or
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shape of the distribution obtained for any medium this way
is such as to reproduce the sizes of the one- and two-issue
audiences for that medium and to reproduce, approximately,
higher order cumulation figures for that medium.l
At, this point we could assign individual exposure
probabilities to each cell from an overall distribution
estimated for each medium from cumulation data. It would
four discrete probability values (up to seven parameters)
in "Les questions Directes sur les Habitudes des Lecteurs:
Sont-Elles Vraiment si Mauvaises?" XV ESOMAR Conference,
1962. L. R. Frankel proposed weights at five discrete
Probability values fixed in advance (four parameters) in
Some Recent Developments in Market Research Methods," XV
ESOMAR Conference, 1962. The use of a beta function
(two parameters) to model distributions of exposure prob-
abilities was first suggested by G. P. Hyett in "The
Measurement of Readership," a paper which he read to a
statistics seminar at the London School of Economics in
1958. Metheringham has applied Hyett's technique to the
estimation of duplication between media in "Measuring the
Net Cumulative Coverage of a Print Campaign." We have
found the beta function quite useful for modelling prob-
ability distributions because it can assume a variety of
shapes over a probability interval of 0.0 to 1.0. These
shapes depend on the values specified for the two parameters
of the beta function, a choice which the simulation leaves
to the researcher.
IUsing only the average and two-issue cumulative
audiences to estimate parameters of a beta function does
not, in general, produce the probability distribution that
most closely fits higher order cumulation figures. In his
thesis Kramer tests this use of the beta function model
on Swedish and American magazine data. He finds that for
many of the magazines a judicious choice of the two
parameter values for the beta functions produces overall
cumulation and frequency curves closely approximating the
empirical curves.
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be a relatively simple matter to make this assignment in
such a fashion that each resulting within-cell distribution
had the specified size and mean. Moreover, by assigning
individual exposure probabilities to the various cells this
way, we would combine two sets of constraining data for
any medium--the cell means which reflect interactions among
population traits in the medium's audience, and the overall
probability distribution which fits cumulation data for the
medium. As a result, the shape of the probability distribu-
tion created for a given medium in any cell would be such
as to produce reasonable average and two-issue audiences
for the medium in that cell. Nevertheless, we have chosen
not to proceed in this fashion. Instead, we have developed
a more complex method of assignment which incorporates an
additional set of constraining data for any medium--three
"constituent" probability distributions, each of which
fits cumulation data for the medium within a particular
class of its consumers.
2. Estimating probability distributions
for classes of media consumers
The probability distribution that we estimate for
any medium from cumulation data is a discrete distribution,
i.e., it consists of probabilities located at finite
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probability intervals in varying densities. Therefore,
it represents the distribution of the medium's audience
across various exposure frequencies. As such, it reflects
the fact that different individuals in a medium's audience
have different habits of exposure with regard to that medium.
Moreover, empirical data suggest that these differences are
systematic, i.e., that the audience of a medium really con-
sists of sub-audiences whose exposure processes are very
different. For any medium these sub-audiences may form as
many as three definable classes of consumers: a large
group of essentially nonconsumers and another group which
may or may not be divided between occasional and regular
consumers. As a result, the overall distribution of ex-
posure probabilities for a medium generally is not a
single normal one or even a single skewed normal one.
Instead, it is three constituent distributions, each rep-
resenting one of these consumer classes and each very dif-
ferent in shape.l
In the United States, for example, the probability
distributions for a great number of media appear to take
the form of relatively smooth distributions, but with large
spikes very near 0.0 and, in some cases, similar spikes
very near 1.0. The reason for this is that there are at
least two, and sometimes three, distinct classes of con-
sumers for these media. All media have a large group near
0.0 who are only exposed on the most random basis and a
general class of consumers who are more systematically ex-
posed. The latter can frequently be divided between
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The mix of consumer classes varies greatly from
one medium's audience to another and it is a criterion by
which media are evaluated for various communications ob-
jectives.l In order to map this important structural
feature into any simulated medium's audience, we must
estimate the shapes of three probability distributions:
one for nonconsumers, another for occasional consumers,
and still another for regular consumers.2 We need to
irregular or occasional consumers who are exposed to only
some issues and regular or loyal consumers who are ex-
posed to every or nearly every issue. In the most gen-
eral case, then, the probability distribution for a
medium is U-shaped, i.e., it is low for probability values
near one-half and rises to peaks near 0.0 and 1.0. For
some media, for example daily newspapers, these peaks are
sharp and there is comparatively little of the distribu-
tion in the center; for others, e.g., monthly magazines,
the curve is flatter. There is every reason to believe
that similar structural patterns exist within the media's
audiences in other countries as well.
1The mix of consumer types in a medium's audience
is an important criterion for media planners. For some
purposes the planner might want to construct a high fre-
quency schedule, i.e., he might want to insert messages
only in those media whose audiences contained large num-
bers or proportions of regular consumers, on whom a cumu-
lative impression would be built. For other purposes the
media planner might want to construct a high cumulative
audience ("reach ) schedule, i.e., he might want to insert
messages only in those media whose audiences contained
large numbers or proportions of occasional consumers.
2The three distributions can be employed not only
to separate light, medium and heavy consumers of a medium
but also to indicate their modes of acquiring the medium,
as for example by distinguishing subscribers, newsstand
buyers, and pass-along readers of magazines. This latter
feature would be useful, for example, if conditions in a
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substructure the audience of any medium this way at the
population level because the mix of these consumer classes
in a population determines the shape of the overall prob-
ability distribution and hence the rate of cumulative audi-
ence exposure in that population. We also need to sub-
structure the audience of any medium this way at the cell
level because cell-defining variables affect individual
predispositions toward being a regular, occasional, or non-
consumer of that medium, and the mix of these consumer
classes in a cell determines the shape of the within-cell
probability distribution and hence the rate of cumulative
audience exposure in that cell.l
particular communications scenario were to imply curtail-
ment of newsstand buying or pass-along readership of maga-
zines.
lAs an example of the effect which the mix of con-
sumer classes has on overall cumulation, consider a news-
paper read by 1 million people each day. It might con-
ceivably be read by the same 1 million people 365 times a
year or by 365 million different people once a year. In
one case the population is composed almost entirely of
nonreaders and only a small part of it is ever exposed.
In the other case the population consists solely of oc-
casional readers; this time, even though the mean single-
issue audience is the same, cumulative exposure increases
linearly with successive issues until the entire population
is exposed. (The actual mix of distributions in a popula-
tion would, of course, lie somewhere between these ex-
tremes.) As an example of the effect which the mix of
consumer classes has on cumulation in cells, consider a
two-person cell in which each member has anO.5 probability
of reading an average issue of the newspaper. The cell
thus contains only occasional readers and, after a rela-
tively few issues of the newspaper, both would be exposed.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the probabilities for
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We can often estimate one- and two-issue exposure
within the three sub-audiences of a medium as well as in
its overall audience. For each medium, then, we use
these estimates with beta functions to model a total dis-
tribution and three constituent distributions. Each of
these distributions consists of a number of discrete
probabilities located at intervals from 0.0 to 1.0 in ap-
proximately the density of a beta function. The parameters
of the beta function used to represent any one of the dis-
tributions are computed as a function of the size of the
simulation population and of the cumulation estimates
(average one- and two-issue exposure) for the correspond-
ing audience or sub-audience.l The modelling procedure
specifies probabilities in such a way that for any medium
--the proportion of all the exposure probabilities
in any constituent distribution equals the
the two individuals were 1.0 and 0.0. The cell is then
split evenly between regular readers and nonreaders. Only
half the cell would ever be exposed even though it had the
same mean single-issue audience.
1There is an important limitation on the values of
the one- and two-issue audiences which can be reproduced
in a probability distribution modelled by the beta function.
The mean proportion of the population exposed after two
issues of a medium must be less than the difference between
twice the mean single-issue audience and the square of the
mean single-issue audience. In other words, a distribution
in the form of a spike, located at the mean exposure prob-
ability for members of the audience or sub-audience, is the
limiting shape which can be modelled by the beta distribu-
tion.
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proportion of the real population in the cor-
responding sub-audience, and
--the shapes of the resulting distributions are
such as to reproduce empirical cumulation
estimates for each sub-audience and for the
medium's overall audience.
For each of the four distributions we construct in
this fashion (an overall distribution and its three con-
stituent distributions) the beta function model requires
--the population proportion to which the distribu-
tion pertains,
--the averageone-issue audience which the distribu-
tion must reproduce, and
--the average two-issue audience which the distribu-
tion must reproduce.
However, because of the constituent relationship among the
four distributions, the researcher does not have to estimate
all four sets of values. As illustrated in Figure 2.7,
parameter values for any one of the distributions are a
residual function of the parameter values for the other
three. Given that 50 per cent of the population are non-
consumers and 10 per cent are regular consumers of a hypo-
thetical medium, then the remaining 40 per cent must fall
into the residual category of occasional consumers. Simi-
larly, the data table in Figure 2.7 implies that the aver-
age number of occasional consumers in the one- and two-
issue audiences of the medium constitute 8 and 9.61 per
cent of the population respectively. Figure 2.7 is a
Empirical as a ercentae of the tota Population 
estimates average average
Audi ece size of one-issue two-issue
category category audience audience
I onconsumers 50%' 3.5% 6.650,
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All _ 100% l 20.0% 27.06C%
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Fig. 2.7.--Generating discrete probability distributions to fit culumation data
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representative case because, typically, the researcher's
most reliable empirical values will apply to the overall
distribution and he will generally be able to estimate
(or guess at;) parameter values for sub-audience cate-
gories at the extremums.l It is easy to verify the fact
that; each distribution generated in our example fits the
appropriate cumulation data, assuming a simulation popu.-
lation of 1,000. In the case of the regular consumer
distribution, for example, there are a total of
10 + 40 + 40 + 10 100 probabilities or 10 per cent of
all the probabilities generated. The average single-
issue audience implied by the distribution is just
10 x 0.7 + 40 x 0.8 + 40 x 0.9 + 10 x 1.0 or 8.5 per cent
of the sample computer population. The average two-issue
audience implied by the distribution is just &5 + 10 x 0.3
x 0.7 + 40 x 0.2 x 0.8 + 40 x 0.1 x 0.9 + 10 x 0.0 x 1.0
or 11.6 per cent. of the sample computer population. The
reader may verify for himself that. each of the other
distributions also fits the required cumulation data.
1For the case of a magazine, regular consumers
might be the subscribers and their families. Nonconsumers
might, consist of persons outside the distribution area of
the magazine, those choosing not. to read the magazine,
illiterates, etc. These two population groupings are what,
we refer to as subaudience categories at the extremums.
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3. Assigning individual exposure probabil-
ities to cells: the two-distribution
case
The next task of the simulation is to assign indi-
vidual exposure probabilities to cells, i.e., to deter-
mine how many and which probabilities should be assigned
to each cell from each of the constituent distributions we
have generated for a medium. These probabilities must be
assigned to cells in such a way as to preserve two other
assignments that have already been made: cell sizes and
cell means. Nevertheless, if there were only two constitu.-
ent distributions from which to draw probabilities for a
medium, the solution to this problem would be quite simple.
Suppose, for example, that we have distributed a simulation
population of 100 persons across three cells so that there
are 50, 30, and 20 persons in each cell and that, for a
hypothetical medium, the mean exposure probability in each
of these cells is 0.2, 0.4, and 0.3 respectively. Suppose
further that one probability distribution for this medium
consists of 70 occasional consumers with a mean of 0.1 and
the other distribution consists of 30 regular consumers
with a mean-of 0.7. If we draw probabilities randomly
without replacement from each of the distributions and
are satisfied to reproduce cell means only in an expected
value sense, then Figure 2.8 shows how, using two equations
1 2 3
population
mean exposure probability
50 30 20
.2 .4 .3
Two prior assignments
which must be preserved
occasional regular
consumers consumers
population
mean exposure probability
70
.1
30
.7
Two constituent dis-
tributions for a hypothetical
medium
For each cell we can specify the number
of probabilities to be drawn from each
of two distributions to satisfy each
of two constraints, using two equations
in two unknowns as follows:
.lx1 + .7x2 = 10
x1 + X2 = 50
.lx1 + .7x2 = 12
x1 + x2 = 30
.lx1 + .7x2 = 6
x1 + x2 = 20
x1 = 41 2/3
x1 = 8 1/3
x1 = 15
X2 = 15
x1 = 13 1/3
X2 = 6 2/3
These are the number of
probabilities that would
be assigned to each cell
from each distribution,
drawing randomly without
replacement in order to
present cell populations
and reproduce cell means
in an expected value
sense.
where x = the number of probabilities
to be alsigned to a cell from the dis-
tribution of occasional consumers, and
= the number of probabilities to be
assigned to a cell from the distribution
of regular consumers.
50x.2 + 30x.4 + 20x.3 = 70x.1 + 30x.7 = 28
Fig. 2.8,--Assigning individual exposure probabilities
constituent distributions to reproduce cell sizes and cell
medium
The resulting assignment
also reproduces the expected
value of the medium's
overall audience.
to cells from two
means for a hypothetical
Distribution
cell 1
cell 2
cell 3
Cell
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in two unknowns, we can always specify for a cell the ex-
act number of probabilities to be drawn randomly from each
distribution. 1 It, can be shown that the number of prob-
abilities to be drawn from each distribution, as specified
by the two equations, will always be positive if the mean
exposure probability for the cell in question lies between
the means of the high and low distributions. It can also
be shown that the assignments across all cells resulting
from this procedure will always use up the exact number of
probabilities in each distribution.2 Therefore, this as-
signment procedure also reproduces, in an expected value
sense, the medium's overall audience, since that statistic
is just the sum of products of the distribution sizes times
the distribution means, or, equivalently, the sum of
products of the cell sizes times the cell means.
lIn principle, the result of this procedure would
be that the expected value (over many draws) of the aver-
age of the probabilities assigned to any cell would equal
the cell mean. In practice, however, the simulation must
assign whole numbers of probabilities to each cell, so the
fractional assignment values in Figure 2.8 would have to
be rounded. As a result, this assingment procedure can
only approximately reproduce most cell means, in an ex-
pected value sense.
2For these proofs the reader is referred to John F.
Kramer, "The Three Distribution Case: How to Choose the
Proper Number of Probabilities from Each Distribution When
There Are Three Distributions," Comcom Simulation Memo-
randum No. 33 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
January 27, 1966). (Mimeographed.)
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4. Assigning individual exposure probabil-
ities to cells: the three distribution
case
When there are three constituent distributions from
which to draw probabilities for a medium, the assignment
problem is no longer straightforward. Suppose we are still
working with the simulation population described above,
but that we split the distribution of 70 occasional con-
sumers into two distributions--50 nonconsumers with a mean
exposure probability of .02 and 20 occasional consumers
with a mean exposure probability of Q3. As illustrated in
Figure 2.9, we can never specify for a cell the exact num-
ber of probabilities to be drawn from each of three dis-
tributions to satisfy each of two constraints. In the
absence of a third constraint, we obtain two equations in
three unknowns for each cell. There are, of course, an
infinite number of solutions to each such set of equations.
In seeking a way around this problem we were, in fact,
able to specify a third constraint, one which related the
cell size, the cell mean, and the average of the prob-
abilities in each of the three distributions. However,
the resulting assignment procedure, while it closely re-
produced the mean exposure probability in cells having a
1For the derivation of this constraint see Kramer,
"The Three Distribution Case."
1 2 3
50 30 20
mean exposure probability .2
Two prior assignments
which must be preserved
.4 .3
Distribution nonconsumers
occasional regular
consumers consumers
population 50
mean exposure probability .02
20
.3
30
.7
Three constituent
distributions for a
hypothetical medium
We can never specify for a cell the
exact number of probabilities to be
drawn from each of three distributions
to satisfy each of two constraints,
because the latter imply two equations
in three unknowns, as follows:
.02x + .3x2 + .7x3 = 10
x1 + x2 + x3 = 50
.02x1 + .3x2 + .7x3 = 12
x1 + x2 + x3 = 30
Each set of two
equations in three
unknowns has an
infinite number of
solutions.
.02x1 + .3x2 + .7x3 = 6
x1 + x2 + X3 = 20
where x1 = the number of
cell from the
probabilities to be assigned to a
distribution of nonconsumers
X2 = the number of probabilities to be assigned to a
cell from the distribution of occasional consumers
x3 = the number of probabilities to be assigned to a
cell from the distribution of regular consumers
Fig. 2.9.--Assigning individual exposure probabilities to cells from three
distributions to reproduce cell sizes and cell means for a hypothetical medium
population
Cell
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large number of individual probabilities, failed badly in
this regard with smaller cells. Therefore, since we wished
to incorporate three distributions for each medium in the
simulation, we were forced to develop a different method
of assigning individual exposure probabilities to cells--
one which did not depend on the canonical forms described
above.
We have developed the following simulation procedure
for assigning individual exposure probabilities to cells
from each of three constituent distributions: In assign-
ing the first probability to the first cell, we draw ran-
domly without replacement from the probability list (i.e.,
the discrete constituent distribution) whose mean is near-
est the specified cell mean.1 The required average of the
1Even though the three constituent distributions
associated with a medium can (and usually do) overlap, we
arbitrarily define boundaries between these distributions
in the following way: the boundary between the low and
middle distributions is the average of the mean probabil-
ity of the low distribution and the mean probability of
the middle distribution; the boundary between the middle
and high distributions is the average of the mean prob-
ability of the middle distribution and the mean probability
of the high distribution. The mean exposure probability
for any cell thus falls in the range of one of the three
distributions as defined by these boundaries. For ex-
ample, if the boundary between the low and middle distri-
butions were .20 and the mean of a cell were .15, then the
cell mean would fall in the range of the low distribution.
Therefore, we would draw randomly from the probabilities of
the low distribution in assigning the first probability to
this cell. At the same time, we would eliminate this
probability from the list of low probabilities.
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remaining probabilities that. are to be assigned to this
cell then is no longer equal to the original cell mean.
It is lower if the first probability assigned to the cell
happens to exceed the original cell mean; it is higher if
the first probability assigned to the cell is less than
the original cell mean. As a result, we assign the second
probability to this cell from the constituent distribution
whose mean is closest to the new average required for the
yet-to-be assigned probabilities, again drawing randomly
without replacement from the probability list for the
distribution. This procedure is repeated until the number
of individual exposure probabilities assigned to the first
cell exactly equals the number of persons already assigned
to that cell. The entire procedure is then repeated
iteratively until all the individual exposure probabil-
ities for a medium have been assigned to all the cells in
the simulation. In the course of these assignments, one
of the three probability lists for a medium may be ex-
hausted. When this happens, subsequent probabilities are
assigned to cells from whichever of the two remaining dis-
tributions has its mean nearest the required average of
the yet-to-be assigned probabilities. (When two of the
probability lists are exhausted, all subsequent probabil-
ities are assigned from the one remaining distribution.)
The simulation procedure we have been describing assigns
188
exactly the right number of exposure probabilities to each
cell and, in so doing, uses up the exact number of prob-
abilities in each constituent distribution. In practice,
we have found that the procedure also very nearly repro-
duces the specified means (1) in larger cells and (2) over
groups of smaller cells. Although it does not generally
reproduce the means of individual smaller cells, it does
much better with them than the canonical method referred
to above. 2
1The assignment procedure used in the present
version of the simulation does fairly well in reproducing
the means of larger cells for the following reason: Any
probability assigned to a cell from a given distribution
may range in value from 0.0 to 1.0; however, because of
the kinds of distributions generated by the beta function
model, the probability generally will have a value near
the mean exposure probability of the distribution from
which it is drawn. Since that distribution was chosen
because its mean lay nearest the desired cell mean, a
large number of draws of this kind reproduces the cell
mean fairly well. Nevertheless, we could improve the ac-
curacy of this procedure if we altered the present version
of the simulation so that. (1) boundaries between distribu-
tions were defined by weighted averages of the distribu-
tion means and (2) the mean exposure probability for a
distribution was re-calculated, and the appropriate
boundaries re-defined, each time a probability was drawn
from it. Then the new distribution mean, as well as the
new cell mean, would govern the choice of the distribution
from which the next probability were to be drawn.
2The fact that the method does not faithfully re-
produce the mean exposure probability in smaller cells is
not too important. First, we are not likely to analyze the
simulation output for individual small cells, but rather
for groups of them and possibly for some individual large
cells. The assignment process reproduces mean exposure
probabilities in these two categories fairly well. Secondly,
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5. Distributing Soviet audiences within
demographic and social strata of a
sample computer population
In the Soviet simulation we lacked sufficient data
on the structure and cumulation of the media's audiences
with which to test the accuracy of the beta function model
against empirical measures. For each medium we had a fair
estimate of the average single-issue audience, either from
circulation data, set estimates, or the refugee interviews.
From the latter we were also able to obtain, for each
medium, estimates of the sizes of the regular consumer and
non-consumer classes and the size of the average single-
issue audience in each. But we could only make a very rough
estimate of the size of the two-issue audience in each of
these consumer classes and in the overall population.
(These estimates were based on the sizes of single-issue
audiences and on cumulation data for nonSoviet media.)
Using the beta function model with sparse cumulation data,
we generated an overall probability distribution and
three constituent distributions for each medium in the
Soviet. simulation. We then assigned individual exposure
probabilities to the various cells from the constituent
distributions for each medium, in the manner described
we obtained the means for individual cells using the
Mosteller technique. As a result, they are only estimates,
consistent with available audience breakdowns.
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above. Thus, we were able, in an approximate fashion, to
map two important kinds of media data into computer storage.
First, we mapped the frequency distribution in each Soviet
or external medium's audience into a corresponding sample
computer audience. This resulted in a possible distribu.-
tion of exposure frequencies over each simulated medium's
audience compatible with reported audience breakdowns for
that medium. Secondly, we mapped the consumer class struc-
ture of each Soviet or external medium's audience into a
corresponding sample computer audience. This resulted in
a possible joint. distribution of cell-defining traits (and
one noncell-defining trait.) over each simulated medium's
audience compatible with reported audience breakdowns for
that medium.
By creating within-cell probability distributions
for each simulated medium in the manner described above,
we were able to link cell-defining variables with individual
media consumption traits in a realistic way. For example,
suppose that we had specified only two cell-defining vari-
ables, "education" and "urban or rural residence," and
that. the cell mean for Soviet listenership to the Voice of
America had been 0.8 among urban intellectuals and 0.2
among rural illiterates. Under the assignment procedure we
used, some rural illiterates could still have been assigned
their exposure probabilities from the high distribution for
VOA--the distribution of regular listeners. This might have
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been done, for example, to preserve the 0.2 mean in the
rural illiterate cell if previous assignments, drawn from
the nonlistener or occasional listener distribution, had
left probabilities in this cell which averaged to less
than 0.2. If a situation such as this had arisen, any
rural illiterate designated a regular VOA listener would
have been assigned his exposure probability from the same
distribution as all urban intellectuals so classified.
6. The problem of noncell-defining
variables
One other point ought to be made about within-cell
probability distributions before we leave this section.
For the Soviet simulation, as we have already mentioned, our
cell-defining variables were f"sex," "age," "education," 'po-
litical involvement" and "urban or rural residence." We
chose to define macro-types in the sample computer popula-
tion by these dimensions because we were interested in their
relative influence on communications behavior. However, two
other attributes whose communications effects also inter-
ested us were "language of media consumption" and "republic
of residence," and we would also have liked to distribute
these attributes over our sample computer population. One
way of doing this would have been to include them as cell-
defining variables, but for two reasons we could not.
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The principal reason was that the number of levels on
either attribute (fifteen major nationality languages,
fifteen union republics) when combined with the number of
levels on each of the cell-defining attributes (2 sexes,
3 age intervals, 4 educational levels, 2 degrees of polit-
ical involvement., 2 places of residence), would have pro-
duced 1,440 cells or population macro-types, and a data
structure with this many cells would have far exceeded the
computer storage capacity. The second reason why we could
'not include either of these attributes as cell-defining var-
iables was that we lacked audience breakdowns on each for
most of the media in the simulation. As a result, the only
way we could have distributed our sample computer audiences
across "language of media consumption" and "republic of
residence" would have been to link our cell-defining vari-
ables with those two noncell-defining variables in an ap-
propriate fashion. The technique for doing this in the
present version of the simulation is the device of exposure
probability distributions. We have already described how
probabilities from these distributions are assigned to
cells in such a way as to link cell-defining variables
with one particular noncell-defining variable--"class of
media consumer." As it, happened, in order to distribute
the attributes "language of media consumption" and "re-
public of residence" over our sample computer population
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in this fashion, we would have had to treat each of the
levels on these two attributes as an additional medium
in the simulation. But, with fifteen levels on each attri-
bute and fifty-six real media already in the simulation,
this approach would quickly have exhausted the maximum
number of media allowed by the simulation programs. As a
result, we were unable to incorporate "language of media
consumption" and "republic of residence" in the Soviet simu-
lation, even as noncell-defining variables. However, if it
becomes possible to re-design the simulation programs so
that they are able to process a much larger number of media
in a single run than they can at present, it would appear
that the device of exposure probability distributions could
be used to link cell-defining variables not just with
individual media consumption traits but with any noncell-
defining trait. We now proceed to show how this might be
done.
Consider, for example, the attribute "republic of
residence." In order to link this noncell-defining attri-
bute with cell-defining attributes, we would treat each of
its fifteen levels as we currently treat each medium in the
simulation. First, we would distribute the population of
each republic across cells just as we distribute each
medium's audience across cells. For any republic, census
figures would be used with the Mosteller technique to
194
specify what; proportion of the individuals in each cell
live in that, republic. Then, for each republic we would
establish three probability distributions in the sample
computer population, much as we do for each medium. Only in
this case the probabilities would refer to "being present in
the republic" rather than "being exposed to the medium."
Corresponding to distributions associated with noncon-
sumers, occasional consumers, and regular consumers of a
medium there might be distributions associated with those
who never enter, those who occasionally visit, and those
who permanently reside in a republic. However, the shapes
of these distributions would not be related to anything
like cumulation data. Instead, the nonvisitor and visitor
distributions for any republic might be in the shapes of
spikes at probability values of 0.00000001 and 0.1 respec-
tively.l The proportions of the sample computer popula-
tion assigned to the visitor and nonvisitor distributions
for any republic would be a function of the time frame
involved, and these two proportions would sum to the known
proportion of the Soviet population residing outside that
republic. The permanent resident distribution for any
republic might be in the shape of a spike at. 1.0, and the
1The simulation procedure developed for modelling
probability distribution with beta functions cannot be
used to model a distribution with a mean of 0.0.
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proportion of the sample computer population assigned to it
would just equal the known proportion of the Soviet popula-
tion residing within that. republic. Finally, in the same
manner that we assigned individual exposure probabilities
to cells from the three distributions for any medium, we
would assign individual "presence probabilities" to cells
from the three distributions for any republic. The result-
ing assignment. would exactly reproduce the cell sizes and
it. would reproduce, as closely as possible, the cell means
for any republic. In this way we could map the geographic
distribution of the Soviet population into the sample com-
puter population. The result would be a possible distribu-
tion of cell-defining traits over any republic's sample
computer population compatible with all reported break-
downs of the republic's real world population.
D. Establishing joint distributions of the
media's audiences across and within demo-
graphic and social strata of the sample
computer population (the problem of duplica-
tion)
For every medium in the simulation we have allo-
cated stable individual exposure probabilities to popula-
tion cells such that within each cell they form a desired
distribution around the specified mean. In doing so we
employed
--aggregate data on population traits to deter-
mine how many exposure probabilities should
be allocated to each cell,
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--empirical breakdowns of the media's audiences
by these population traits to specify appropri-
ate means for the exposure probabilities allo-
cated to each cell, and
--available information on the structure and cumu-
lation of the media's audiences to ascertain the
shapes of the probability distributions in each
cell and in the overall population.
The remaining task in pass I of the simulation is
to create "persons" in each cell by linking individual
exposure probabilities allocated to a cell for one medium
with individual exposure probabilities allocated to that
cell for other media. For example, if there were only three
media in the simulation, Figure 2.10 illustrates four dif-
ferent ways that we could synthesize "persons" in a two-
person cell. As the number of media in the simulation in-
creases and as cell sizes become larger, the number of pos-
sible ways to perform this synthesis in any cell rapidly
multiplies. In order to choose from these alternatives the
linkages which establish realistic dependences among within-
cell probability distributions, we need to consider an addi-
tional body of empirical information--the audience duplica-
tions among average issues of different media.l
1The simulation cannot accurately reproduce
unduplicated audiences and cumulative net. unduplicated
audiences unless it can first reproduce accurately the
duplication, or overlap, among average issues of pairs
of media. This is because the net unduplicated audi-
ence reached by any group of media is a function of the
pairwise audience duplications among them.
1, 2
1_ n- _ - 1£11
D_~ _ 
- ±3
:21 22 X23
pij = the i-th exposure probability for
medium j in a given cell
Fig. 2.10.--Four ways of linking exposure probabilities
across three media to synthesize "persons" in a two-person
cell
I- - -1 _-1__
- L 4
n__ - n -
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1. Nonrandom audience duplications
Generally speaking, the size of the audience
shared by average issues of two or more media is nonrandom
at the population level, i.e., it is something other than
the product of the population means. For example, if
medium A and medium B each reach 10 per cent of the popu-
lation, a random model would imply that 1 per cent are
reached by both, 18 per cent by one or the other, and 81
per cent by neither. In fact, however, the two media may
each be reaching the same 10 per cent, leaving 90 per cent
unreached, or there may be no duplication between them, so
that, 20 per cent are reached. Whatever the case may be,
the data structure we have already built into the simula-
tion assures that. duplications which are nonrandom at. the
population level can often be accounted for by duplications
which are random at the cell level. The following example
will serve to illustrate this point,.
Suppose that average issues of the Soviet women's
magazines Rabotnica (Woman Worker) and Krestyanka (Peasant
Woman) each reach about 1 per cent of the Russian popula-
tion. Then, the expected value of the duplicated audience
between both magazines is just 0.0100 per cent of the popu-
lation if it is random at. the population level. But, if we
divide our simulation population only along the "sex"
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variable, and if duplicated audiences between the two maga-
zines are random at the cell level, then we may easily ob-
tain an overall duplicated audience that. is nonrandom at
the population level. Figure 2.11 below shows how cell
means alone can account for this:
Cell means Men Women All
Rabo tnica 0.001 0.019 0.010
Krestyanka 0.002 0.018 0.010
Fig. 2.11--Audience duplications that. are random
at the cell level can produce an overall audience duplica-
tion that is nonrandom at the population level.
Readership of both magazines is rather small among
Russian men. Therefore, the mean exposure probability for
each medium in the "male" population cell is low and the
variance arising in the three within-cell distributions for
each medium also is fairly low. But both magazine audiences
comepredominantly from the "female" population cell which
contains largely persons from the highest. readership dis-
tribution for each medium. As a result, the product of
the relatively large means in this cell (i.e., the expected
random value of the duplicated audience in the cell) exceeds
the product. of the overall population means for the two
magazines. Since the "female" cell contains about half
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the population, the expected random value of the duplicated
audience in this cell alone exceeds the expected value of
an overall audience duplication that is random at the popu-
lation level. Assuming as many men as women in weighting
the cells, the expected value of the overall duplicated
audience that the simulation would produce between the two
magazines by linking their cell-assigned probabilities
randomly is just x(0.001 x 0002 +0.019 x 0018)-0172 per
cent of the population. If "sex" were the only variable
significantly correlated with an individual's propensity
to consume both Rabotnica and Krestyanka, then the sizes
of the audiences shared by the two media in the male and
the female cells separately would each, in fact, equal the
expected random value. By linking cell-assigned prob-
abilities for the two magazines randomly, the simulation
would not only produce an overall duplicated audience
between them that was nonrandom at the population level;
it would also, in the expected value sense, produce the
correct nonrandom duplication between them.1
The foregoing example shows how, when the media's
audiences are decomposed into cells defined by many of the
1However, the titles of the two magazines suggest
that "urban or rural residence" probably would be another
variable that has some influence on an individual's propen-
sity to consume both Rabotnica and Krestyanka.
201
variables significantly related to multi-media consumption,
nonrandom duplications among them can be accounted for to a
large extent by cell means.l However, we seldom operate on
a population that has been cross-classified by all the vari-
ables significantly related to multi-media consumption. It
may be that we lack data on the breakdown of the population
by one or more of these variables. It may also be that
some duplications cannot be fully explained by factors
whose effects on individual exposure habits are independent
from one medium to the next. In either event, when some of
1If all duplications can be explained by inde-
pendent factors, and if a population is analyzed with re-
spect to all these determining factors, then the following
hypothesis can be framed: "Audiences overlap randomly
within homogeneous population groups." The validity of
this hypothesis is supported in England by the work of
E. J. Sainsbury, who used it with satisfactory results to
estimate the net audiences of different media, and in
Sweden by the results of the Vectu study, in which the
hypothesis seemed to give good estimates of the net audi-
ences of magazines, although based on limited empirical
evidence and unsatisfactory population breakdowns. See,
e.g., Caffyn and Sagovsky, "A Comparison of the Agostini
and Sainsbury Methods," and Vectu, Lasekretsunderslkningen
(Stockholm, 1960). In the latter study differences between
randomly added net audiences and empirical net audiences
were found to diminish substantially with more refined
population breakdowns.
2When a truly dependent relationship exists among
consumers of one medium in combination with consumers of
another, the strength of this dependence is that part
which cannot be explained by random factors. In practice,
it is difficult to find reasonable causes for such expo-
sure dependencies. Hypothetically, an editor could stipu-
late that one might subscribe to one of his magazines only
under the condition that one subscribes to another of his
publications. An individual's reading of the two
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the interactions among media are associated with other than
cell-defining variables, means and variances of their
within-cell probability distributions do not, by themselves,
account completely for the nonrandom audience duplications
among those media. Shared audiences are no longer random
at the cell level and there arise among the media what we
shall hereafter refer to as "residual" nonrandom audience
duplications. The magnitude of this residual interaction
between any pair of media, for example, is just the abso-
lute value of the difference between (1) the pairwise
empirical duplication and (2) the expected value of the
pairwise duplication that would result if their cell-
assigned exposure probabilities were linked randomly.
From this definition it is obvious that any simulation pro-
cedure which links cell-assigned probabilities for one
medium with cell-assigned probabilities for other media in
a purely random fashion is valid only when there are no
residual nonrandom audience duplications among them.
magazines can become dependent this way. As a somewhat
less hypothetical example, there may exist a truly dependent
relationship among readers of the three Party periodicals
Kommunist, Partinaya zhizn, and Agitator, because saturation
effects may dictate that people rarely, if ever, subscribe
to more than two of them. But such irregular dependencies
probably are rare. Many researchers consider it reasonable
to assume that an individual is fully independent in his
choice of various media and that only his own interests in
a given medium determine whether or not he will be a con-
sumer of that medium. See, e.g., Marberg, "A Visual Aid to
Estimating Net Audiences."
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To recapitulate, we have discussed the four logical
possibilities summarized in Figure 2.12. It. should be
noted that, regardless of whether audience duplications are
random or nonrandom at the population level, when some of
the interactions among media are associated with other than
cell-defining variables, the simulation cannot reproduce
them in an expected value sense by randomly linking cell-
assigned probabilities for the media involved. As a result,
we have had to develop a more general technique for synthe-
sizing persons in each population cell, one which is valid
both when there are these residual interactions among
media and when there are none.
a) Two media
The simulation problem is to link individual expo-
sure probabilities assigned to any cell for one medium
with individual exposure probabilities assigned to that
cell for other media in such a way that all audience dupli-
cations known to exist among them are reproduced. Some of
these audience duplications may be nonrandom--at the popu.-
lation level, the cell level, or both. Nevertheless, the
solution to this problem is relatively straightforward for
a. pair of media. Suppose that we know the real world
audience duplication between average issues of Pravda
ical audience
cation is. . .
0o
Random at the
cell level
Nonrandom at
the cell leve
Random at the
pop. level
Random linkage of
within-cell
probabilities is
:ufdYcijt t.
Nonrandom linkage
of within-cell
probabilities is
requr ed.
Nonrandom at
the pop. level
Random linkage
of within-cell
probabilities is
bAuff ai ept.
Nonrandom linkage
of within-cell
probabilities is
required.
Interactions
among media
are associated
with .
cell-defining
variables only
other than
cell-defining
variables
Fig. 2.12.--The correct linkage of within-cell exposure
probabilities, as a function of the variables associated
with interactions among the media
I 
-~~~~~~~~~~
-
I I·
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and Rabotnica, and that. we have synthesized "persons" in
each cell by randomly linking individual exposure prob-
abilities for these two publications. We may now discover
that the simulated audience duplication between the two
media--the duplication accounted for, in an expected value
sense, by cell-defining variables alone--differs from the
lempirical duplication. In other words, there may exist
]between the two media a residual nonrandom audience dupli-
cation, one which, by definition, is nonrandom at the
cell level. Perhaps our simulated duplication is too low.
We then have to resort to some after-the-fact improvisation
in order to re-synthesize "persons" across the two media
appropriately. The obvious procedure is to draw from each
cell those persons making minimal contributions to dupli-
cation and to shift their across-media probability assign-
ments in such a way that this contribution is augmented.
In Figure 2.13 below we illustrate how this might be done
within a two-person cell:
Before adjustment After adjustment
Medium Pravda Rabo tnica Pravda Rabotnica
PE'ers on
1 0.9* 0.2 0.9 0.9
2 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.2
'*Person #1 has been assigned an 0.9 probability of exposure
to an average issue of Pravda
Fig. 2.13--Re-synthesizing persons to correct; a
pairwise audience duplication
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The initial contribution to duplication from persons in the
cell has an expected value of x (0.9 x 0.2 + 0.2 x 0.9)
= 0.180 and their new contribution after re-synthesis has
an expected value of x (0.9 x 0.9 + 0.2 x 0.2) 0.425.
We can perform a similar adjustment, cell by cell, until
the sum of the audience duplications over all cells has
been increased (or decreased) to the point where it equals
the audience duplication known to exist between the two
media at the population level.
b) Several media
In a more general case, however, when we attempt
to deal with several media at a time, the solution to the
duplication problem is not so straightforward. For example,
suppose that in addition to knowing the real world audience
duplication between average issues of Pravda and Rabotnica,
we also know the corresponding figures for Pravda and
Krestyanka, and for Rabotnica and Krestyanka. After cor-
recting the simulated audience duplication between Pravda
and Rabotnica in the manner described above, we would have
to check the simulated 'audience duplications between
Pravda and Krestyanka and between Rabotnica and Krestyanka
resulting from this procedure. If they were correct at
the outset, there is no a priori reason why they should
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remain so after the adjustment procedure. If they were
incorrect originally, again there is no a priori reason
why the duplication adjustment between Pravda and
Rabotnica should have corrected them. More than likely,
the adjustment procedure would have to be carried out
iteratively over all three media pairs. At best this
would be a very time-consuming process, and at worst the
three simulated audience duplications would never converge
simultaneously on the three empirical duplications. In
fact, we have found that working with individual probabil-
ities this way it is virtually impossible to reproduce, at
one and the same time, all the residual nonrandom pairwise
audience duplications known to exist among any sizable
group of media. As a result, we were finally forced to
adopt a procedure for synthesizing "persons" in each cell
which departs in two ways from an ideal solution to the
duplication problem. In the present version of the simula-
tion we perform this synthesis
-- not across all media at once, but rather across
no more than five media at a time,
--not by systematically linking individual within-
cell exposure probabilities for these media,but rather by systematically linking their
within-cell probability distributions.
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2. Grouping the media in fivefold sets
The first step in this procedure is to group the
media in the simulation into appropriate sets of five.
For this purpose we produce a matrix of all the residual
interactions known to exist among these media. For ex-
ample, if there were ten media in the simulation, this
matrix would have ten rows and ten columns. The number
in, say, the second row and third column of the matrix
would just be the square of the difference between (1) the
actual audience shared by media 2 and 3 and (2) the expected
value of the duplication that would result between these
two media if their cell-assigned probabilities were linked
randomly.l We use the values in this matrix as criteria
for grouping all the media into fivefold sets, employing
in the process a special-purpose clustering algorithm.2
1The same number would, of course, be in the third
row and second column of this matrix, and all the diagonal
values would be unity. We fill the matrix with squared
values because we wish to group the media in sets of five
according to the absolute values of their pairwise inter-
actions (duplications) with other media. These interactions
may be positive or negative. In producing this matrix we
assume that any pair of media for which we lack empirical
duplication data--either explicit information or implicit
notions--have an audience duplication that is completely
accounted for by cell-defining variables. This, of course,
results in a zero entry in each of the two cells of the ma-
trix corresponding to that media pair.
2Letter from Robert P. Abelson, Professor of Psy-
chology, Yale University, New Haven, July 25, 1964.
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The algorithm selects as the first four media in the first
set, those four having the largest combined interaction
(i.e., the greatest amount of residual nonrandom pairwise
audience duplication) with the rest of the media in the
matrix. The reason for this is as follows: Our ultimate
objective is to link, in an appropriate nonrandom fashion,
the within-cell probability distributions associated with
those media, and only those media, appearing together in
a fivefold set. But some media among which there exist
residual nonrandom pairwise audience duplications will not
appear together in any fivefold set. Since we shall not
be linking their within-cell probability distributions in
a nonrandom fashion, the expected values of the simulated
pairwise duplications resulting among them will all be
random at the cell level and will thus be different from
their corresponding empirical duplications. In fact, a
greater amount of this incorrect pairwise duplication would
be produced by randomly linking within-cell distributions
associated with those four media having the largest combined
interaction with all the rest than by randomly linking within-
cell distributions associated with any other four media.l
1Linking within-cell probability distributions for
the four most "externally-bound" media randomly instead of
in the appropriate nonrandom fashion increases, on the
average, the amount of incorrect pairwise duplication pro-
duced between them and other media with which they are
empirically "bound" but with which they also become randomly
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That is why we include the four most "externally-bound"
media in this first fivefold set.
The fifth medium which the clustering algorithm
puts into the first fivefold set is the one having the
largest interaction with the first four. To form the next
group of five, the algoritm finds which of the remaining
media in the matrix has the largest interaction with the
media in the first group. It then removes from the group
the medium having the smallest interaction with this
newly identified medium and replaces it with the latter,
forming a new group of five. The following rationale
underlies this procedure: In linking within-cell prob-
ability distributions associated with the media in any
given fivefold set, we shall be establishing constraints
that may prevent us from linking media in subsequent five-
1fold sets in precisely the fashion we might desire.
Therefore, we want each new synthesis to be across those
five media whose correct (or approximately correct)
linkage will reproduce as much new residual nonrandom
linked. This increase exceeds the corresponding increase
for any other four media that might be randomly linked
by the simulation.
1Linkages between distributions established for
prior fivefold sets may preclude (i.e., contradict) the
linkages implied by pairwise duplication data for media in
the current fivefold set. This may be due to inconsistent
duplication data or to a restrictively small number of
probabilities in a cell.
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pairwise duplication as possible. That is why, in complet-
ing the first fivefold set and in forming subsequent sets,
we incorporate the remaining media in descending order of
their interaction with the media in the current set.
The clustering algorithm proceeds iteratively in
the manner described above to form new groups until all
the media among which residual nonrandom duplications are
known to exist have been included in a fivefold set. Four
of the media in each new fivefold set, are thus carried over
from the-preceding set. In Figure 2.14 we show how this
clustering algorithm would group ten media among which all
t,he residual nonrandom pairwise audience duplications
were known.
3. Establishing appropriate mixes of joint
probability distributions across cells
Rather than synthesizing persons in each cell
across all media in the simulation at once, we are now
faced with the somewhat more manageable task of performing
this synthesis across only the media in a fivefold group.
For each such group we would like the resulting probabil-
ity linkages to reproduce all known pairwise duplications
among its five media, in an expected value sense.l The
1We may not have data on which to base estimates
of all these pairwise duplications. Recall that., in the
Matrix of squared differences between empirical pairwise duplication
and expected values of corresponding random-at-the-cell-level duplications
5.9
3.8
6.0
3.9
5.8
3.8
6.2
3.8
5.7
3.9
5.9 3.8 6.0 3.9 5.8 3.8 6.2 3.8 5.7 3.9 48.8
Media
7 3 1 5 4
3 1 5 9
3 5 9 6*
3 5 9 2
Fivefold media sets produced by
the clustering algorithm on the
basis of these residual nonrandom
pairwise audience duplications
5 7 3 5 9 10
6 7 3 5 9 8
* In case of a "tie", the first medium to satisfy the algorithm
is put in a new fivefold group. The same principle is used
in removing a medium from an old fivefold group.
Fig. 2.14.--Grouping media in fivefold sets on the basis of the residual
nonrandom pairwise audience duplications among them
Medium 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Medium
1 // .6 .7 .8 .5 .5 .7 .7 .6 .8
2 .6 // .6 .1 .6 .1 .8 .1 .7 .2
3 .7 .6 // .7 .8 .6 .5 .7 .8 .6
4 .8 .1 .7 // .7 .1 .7 .2 .5 .1
5 .5 .6 .8 .7 // .8 .5 .6 .6 .7
6 .5 .1 .6 .1 .8 // .9 .1 .6 .1
7 .7 .8 .5 .7 .5 .9 // .8 .7 .6
8 .7 .1 .7 .2 .6 .1 .8 // .5 .1
9 .6 .7 .8 .5 .6 .6 .7 .5 // .7
10 .8 .2 .6 .1 .7 .1 .6 .1 .7 //
............ j~~~~~~~~~
Group
1
2
3
4
7
7
7
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empirical duplication between any pair of these media is,
of course, determined by their joint probability distribu-
tion. Therefore, one way that the simulation can repro-
duce this duplication is by linking each exposure prob-
ability for one medium with an exposure probability for
the other medium in such a way as to produce the appropri-
ate joint probability distribution. For example, in
Figure 2.15 we link individual exposure probabilities for
two media in such a way as to construct a distribution of
joint exposure probabilities that reproduces the known
duplication between the media, in an expected value sense.
But we wish to avoid this task in the simulation. A means
of doing so lies in the fact that the empirical duplication
between any pair of media is not describable solely in
terms of the dependence between their overall distributions,
as a function of their joint probability distribution. It
can equally well be described in terms of the dependences
among their constituent distributions, as a function of
several joint probability distributions.
We mentioned earlier that empirical studies sug-
gest the audience of any medium is structured in distinct
sub-audiences--regular, occasional, and nonconsumers--each
absence of data on any given pairwise audience duplication,
we assume it just equals the expected value of the cor-
responding random-at-the-cell-level audience duplication.
Distribution for
medium A
Distribution for
medium B
Pairwise empirical duplication = 20% of the population
Desired size of simulated audience duplication = 1 person 
Medium A
probability pairs
that establish the
correct joint probAbility
distribution for
media A and B
.8
.4
.4
.2
.2
Medium B
.8
.5
.1
.5
.1
Joint exposure pro bii
.64
.20
.04
.10
.02
Expected value of the simulated duplication produced
by the joint distribution 1.00 "person"
Fig. 2.15.--Linking individual exposure probabilitiesfor two media to establish a joint distribution that reproduces
their pairwise empirical duplication, in an expected value
sense
Number of probabilities 2 2 1 2 2 1
alue of probabilities 
.1 .5 .8 .2 4 . 8
... 
. .
. .-- 
_
__ __-·
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of which can be thought of as a separate distribution of
exposure probabilities. Cumulation data, or data on the
audience overlap between successive issues of the same
medium, then reflect the mix of these distributions--both
in the population as a whole and in various cells of the
population. We have already assured realism with respect
to the audience shared by successive issues of any given
medium in the simulation by (1) specifying three distribu-
tions of exposure probabilities having means and variances
compatible with cumulation data for that medium, and
(2) allocating individual probabilities to each cell from
these distributions in such a way that the means of the
resulting within-cell distributions are compatible with
the known audience breakdowns for that medium. But empir-
ical studies also suggest that the audience of various
groups of media is similarly structured in distinguishable
sub-audiences--persons regularly exposed to all media in
the group, persons regularly exposed to all but one medium
in the group to which they are occasionally exposed, . .
persons rarely exposed to any medium in the group.I Each
1Audience studies have turned up high media con-
sumption types--people highly exposed to a wide range of
vehicles--and low media consumption types--people who have
very low probabilities of exposure to any and all of the
mass media. One of the less surprising findings, for
example, is that people who do not read magazines also do
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of these sub-audiences can be thought of as a distribution
of joint exposure probabilities. Duplication data, i.e.,
not read books, because reading skill is required in both
activities. But even when education and similar factors
are held constant, interrelations between various kinds
of audience behavior are observed. Paul F. Lazarsfeld,
enumerating some of these relationships in an article en-
titled. "Audience Research: which appears in Reader in
Public Opinion and Communication, edited by Berelson and
Janowitz, pp. 337-46, cites the following: (1) People who
listen to news commentators on the radio are also more
likely to read news magazines and in smaller towns to
subscribe to the Sunday edition of metropolitan newspapers;
(2) People who read the more serious type of magazine are
more likely to listen to the more serious type of radio
program; (3) Women who listen a great deal to the radio
during the day also listen more during the evening;
(4) Women who are interested in the "true fiction type
of magazine are also more interested in daytime serials
and prefer the romantic type of movies; (5) People who
never go to the movies at all are also less likely to listen
to the radio; (6) If a book has been turned into a movie
the people who have read the book are more likely to see
the movie and vice versa. Studies on the interrelations
between television viewing and other kinds of audience be-
havior indicate that television viewers are more likely to
read the popular press with its lighter, shorter material
and less likely to read the more serious papers. They are
also more likely to read items actually dealt with in TV
programs and to read a greater range and variety of press
items. It appears that in the long term, television viewing
increases slightly the reading of daily and Sunday papers
at the expense of weekly and monthly magazines. See, e.g.,
William A. Belson, "The Effects of Television on the Read-
ing and Buying of Newspapers and Magazines," Public Opinion
Quarterly, XXV, No. 3 (1961), 366-81. The results of numer-
ous studies indicate that television viewing decreases the
number of books read by both children and adults. See, e.g.
Himmelweit, Oppenheim, and Vince, Television and the Child;
Schramm, Lyle, and Parker, Television in the Lives of Our
Children; Bogart, The Age of Television; Belson, "Effects
of Television on Interests"; Furu, Television and Children's
Life; Parker, "The Effects of Television." Finally, re-
search in the U. S., Chile, Turkey, and Colombia indicate
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data on the audience overlap among average issues of dif-
ferent media, then reflect the mix of these joint probabil-
ity distributions--both in the overall population and
within various substrata of the population. Therefore, in
order to assure realism with respect to the audiences
shared by average issues of the different media in a five-
fold group, we must (1) specify a mix of joint probability
distributions in the overall population that is compatible
with the known pairwise duplications among these media, and
(2) link within-cell distributions for the media in such a
way as to reproduce this mix, as closely as possible, in
each cell.
a) Two media: The two-distribution case
The first problem is to specify a mix of joint.
probability distributions in the overall population that
is compatible with the known pairwise duplications among
that the general pattern of overlapping audiences for the
mass media is worldwide. This pattern, in which exposure
to one medium is positively related to exposure to other
media, generally produces high intercorrelations in expo-
sure to the five mass media--newspapers, magazines, films,
radio, and television. See, e.g., Roy E. Carter, Jr. and
Orlando Sepulveda, "Some Patterns of Mass Media Use in
Santiago de Chile," Journalism Quarterly, LVI (1964), 216-
24; Daniel Lerner, "Literacy and Initiative in Village
Development," in Rural Development Research Report (Cam-
bridge: M.I.T. Center for International Studies, 1964);
Rogers, "Mass Media Exposure."
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the media in a fivefold group. We begin with any pair of
these media. The empirical duplication between them can be
expressed as a function of several joint probability dis-
tributions. Each of these is just a statistical represen-
tation of one of the sub-audiences for the media pair, such
as persons regularly exposed to both media, persons regu-
larly exposed to one medium but only occasionally exposed
to the other, etc. By establishing an appropriate mix of
these joint probability distributions in the overall popu-
lation, the simulation can reproduce the empirical duplica-
tion between the two media, in an expected value sense.
Moreover, the simulation can almost always obtain this mix
by randomly pairing an appropriate number of exposure
probabilities from each of the possible combinations of
constituent distributions associated with the media. We
now proceed to show how this is done.
The simulation problem is to establish a mix of
joint probability distributions in the overall population,
for a given pair of media, such that (1) the size of
each constituent distribution is preserved and (2) the
expected values of the duplications produced by these
joint distributions sum to the value of the empirical
duplication between the two media. When there are only
two constituent distributions associated with each medium,
the solution is quite simple. For example, suppose that
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14.6 per cent of the real world population are in the
average audience shared by two hypothetical media, that
the overall probability distribution for one medium contains
70 occasional consumers with a mean exposure probability of
0.10 and 30 regular consumers with a mean of 0.70, and that
the overall distribution for the other medium contains 60
occasional consumers with a mean of 0.15 and 40 regular con-
sumers with a mean of 0.80. If we pair probabilities from
each of the four possible combinations of constituent dis-
tributions randomly and are satisfied to reproduce the
empirical duplication only in an expected value sense,
then Figure 2.16 shows how, using four equations in four
unknowns, we can specify an appropriate mix of four joint
probability distributions in the overall population. We
immediately obtain three independent equations based on a
knowledge of the size of each constituent distribution for
each medium. We then form a fourth independent equation
which expresses the duplication constraint.. Solving these
four equations in four unknowns, we obtain values of 50, 20,
1This equation is based on two statistical principles:
(1) Randomly linked probability-pairs from any two constitu-
ent distributions form a joint distribution whose mean is,
in an expected value sense, the product, of the means of those
two distributions; (2) The contribution to duplication made
by the persons represented in a joint probability distribu-
tion has an expected value which is just the product of the
size and mean of that. joint distribution.
Simulation population = 100
Pairwise empirical duplication =.14G x 100 = 14.6,'
Medium 1
Distribution
population
mean exposure
probability
Occasional
consumers
70
.10
Regular
consumers
30
Simulation parameters
that must be preserveI
Medium 2
Occasional Regular Constituent distribution
consumers consumers for te hypothetical media
60
.15.70
Real world duplication between the two audiences
Medium 2
lot in thne
average audience 
Not in the In the
average audience_ average audience
45.6% | 26.4% 172.0%
Medium 1 I I
In the13.4% 14.6% 280%
average audience 13.4% 1 1416% 28.0%
59.0% 41.0% LOO.0%
40
.BO
Iml ied duplication bm te diatributlon
Medium 2
Occasional Regular
consumers cnauI ra
Occasions
consumers xl xx2
Regular
consumers 3 x
60 40
70
30
100
For each of four pairs of distributions we can specify the number of probabilities (x1)satisfy each of four constraints, using four equations in four unknowns as follows:
X1 +
x3 +
x3x1 +
70
x4 30
= 60
(.10)(.15)x1 + (.10)(.80)x2 + (.70)(.15)x 3 + (.70)(.80)x 4 14.6
X 1 = 50 X2 20 x3 10
to be linked randomly to
Solving for the number
of probabilities from
each pair of distributions
that must be linked
randomly to preserve thedistribution sizes and
reproduce the pairwise
empirical duplication
4 20
Fig. 2.16.--Linking two constituent distributions for one medium with two constituent distributions for another
medium to reproduce their pairwise empirical duplication
-- · · · ·
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10-, and 20, which are just the sizes of four joint. prob-
ability distributions that, between them, reproduce the
empirical duplication, in an expected value sense, with-
out violating the sizes of the constituent distributions.
It can happen that there is no solution to a par-
ticular set of the four equations in four unknowns. This
occurs when, and only when, a pairwise empirical duplica-
tion lies outside the range of duplications that are re-
producible in an expected value sense, given the means
and sizes of the constituent distributions for two media.
In practice, if we were to find that the empirical dupli-
cation between two media fell outside this range, we would
set the sizes of the four joint distributions equal to
those values which came closest to reproducing this empir-
ical duplication. For example, the maximum duplication
that could be reproduced, in an expected value sense, by
the distributions in our example would be that obtained by
randomly linking all 30 probabilities from the regular con-
sumer distribution for medium 1 with 30 of the
1In principle, the expected value of the duplica-
tion produced by probabilities from pairs of constituent
distributions this way would equal the empirical duplica-
tion between the media. In practice, however, the simula-
tion must link whole numbers of probabilities when syn-
thesizing "persons" in each cell, but the equations in
Figure 2.16 often produce fractional linkage values which
then have to be rounded. As a result, this procedure for
synthesizing "persons" can only approximately reproduce
pairwise empirical duplications, in an expected value sense.
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probabilities in the corresponding distribution for medium
2, by randomly linking the 10 remaining probabilities in
the regular consumer distribution for medium 2 with 10 of
the occasional consumer probabilities for medium 1, and
by randomly linking the 60 remaining probabilities in the
occasional consumer distribution for medium 1 with the 60
probabilities in the occasional consumer distribution for
medium 2. Thus, the expected value of the maximum repro-
ducible duplication would be 30 x 0.7 x 0.8 + 10 x 0.18
x 0.80 + 60 x 0.1 x 0.15 18.5% of the population. We
can compute the expected value of the minimum reproducible
duplication in a similar fashion.l If the empirical dupli-
cation had fallen outside the range of these two figures,
say it, had been 20 per cent of the population rather than
14.6 per cent, we would have set the sizes of the four
joint distributions equal to 60, 10, 0 and 30 respectively.
b) Two media: The three-distribu.tion case
When there are three constituent distributions
associated with each medium, the duplication problem be-
comes more complex. Now, in order to reproduce a given
lIn order to compute the expected values of maximum
and minimum reproducible duplications, we use a theorem on
maximizing or minimizing a sum of pairwise products that is
formed from any two sets of numbers. This theorem and its
proof may be found in Kramer's thesis.
223
empirical duplication we must establish the correct mix of
nine joint probability distributions in the overall popu-
lation. (From this point on, we shall frequently refer to
the sizes of these joint distributions as probability-pair
values.) The nine probability-pair values that we seek for
any pair of media are pictured in Figure 2.17. We return
to our original example to illustrate the method developed
for computing them. Suppose we are still working with a
simulation population of 100, but that from the two occa-
sional consumer distributions we have split off two non-
consumer distributions with sizes of 50 and 40 and with
means of 0.02 and 0.05 respectively. The problem we now
face is illustrated in Figure 2.18. From a knowledge of
the number of probabilities in each constituent distribu.-
tion we can obtain five independent equations. We can
form a sixth independent equation by relating the duplica-
tion· constraint to the distribution means. But we are
unable to derive any other independent equations, and
there are an infinite number of possible solutions to
these six equations in nine unknowns. A linear program-
ming algorithm can be used to ascertain one of these
solutions, which is then termed a "feasible" solution.l
1For a description of linear programming algorithms,
see n. *1, p. 10 above.
Medium 2
nonconsumers
oauasional
consumers
regular
consumers
nonconsumers
occasional
consumers
regular
consumers
X i = the probability-pair values
Fig. 2.17.--Nine probability-pair valuesthat must specify a mix of
joint distributions which reproduces the empirical duplication
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There may be no feasible solution to a particular
set of the six equations in nine unknowns. As in the two-
distribution case, this occurs when a pairwise empirical
duplication lies outside the range of duplications that
can be reproduced, in an expected value sense, by the
constituent distributions associated with two media. When
this happens, we set the nine probability-pair values equal
to those values that reproduce either the lowest or the
highest possible duplication, whichever is closer to the
empirical duplication. In the present version of the simu-
lation, we utilize three constituent distributions for each
medium, so for each pair of media in each fivefold group,
either we arbitrarily set nine probability-pair values or
we use a linear programming algorithm to compute them in
the manner described above. The probability-pair values
obtained in this way for any two media represent the sizes
of nine joint probability distributions which, between them,
reproduce the empirical duplication, as closely as possible,
in an expected value sense.
c) Five media: The three-distribution case
For each pair of media in a fivefold group we have
derived nine probability-pair values that specify a mix of
joint distributions compatible with the known pairwise
227
duplication. These nine probability-pair values correspond
to the combinations formed by the three constituent dis-
tributions associated with each of the two media. However,
the simulation problem is not to specify a separate mix of
joint distributions for each pair of media in a fivefold
group, but rather to specify one mix of joint distributions
appropriate for all media pairs in that group, i.e., one
that is simultaneously compatible with all the known pair-
wise duplications in the group. This requires the deriva-
tion of 35 or 243 appropriate probability-quintet values
corresponding to the combinations formed by the three con-
stituent distributions associated with each of the five
media. We describe these probability-quintets in Figure
2.19.
It would appear that the 243 probability-quintet
values for any fivefold media group could be computed by
means of the Mosteller technique. For this purpose we
would regard the probability-quintet values as entries in
a five-dimensional table, each dimension corresponding to
a medium in the group. The sizes of the constituent dis-
tributions would be marginal values on these dimensions,
and'the 10 sets of probability-pair values for the group
would comprise 10 two-dimensional subtables. The
Mosteller technique would then be used to construct a
five-dimensional table of probability-quintet values
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from 10 two-dimensional subtables of probability-pair val-
ues. There is one problem with this approach, however.
The probability-pair values for any two media in a five-
fold group may be inconsistent with the probability-pair
values for other media pairs in that group. Such contra-
dictions can arise either because duplication data are
inconsistent or because feasible solutions generated by
the linear programming algorithm are inconsistent. In
either event, when there are inconsistencies among the 10
sets of probability-pair values associated with a fivefold
media group, there is no set of 243 probability-quintet.
values compatible with all of them. As a result, the
Mosteller technique cannot converge on a set of probability-
quintet values compatible with all 10 sets of probability
pair values.l However, the technique can be used to obtain
1The reason for this can best be understood in
terms of a concrete example. Assume that the three sets
of probability-pair values in the diagram below were ob-
tained for each of three hypothetical media pairs by the
method described above. Then each set of values reproduces
the empirical duplication between a pair of media and is
compatible with the sizes of their constituent distributions.
But in order for the three sets of probability-pair values
to be consistent among themselves, there must exist at least
one set of 27 probability-triplet values compatible with all
of them. These 27 values correspond to the combinations
formed by the three constituent distributions associated
with each of the three media. In the diagram below, the
probability-triplet values are pictured as entries in the
interior cells of a cube whose face entries are just the
three sets of probability-pair values. From this diagram
it can be seen that the three sets of probability-pair
230
a set of 243 probability-quintet values that are compat-
ible with as many of the 10 sets or probability pair
values are inconsistent among themselves because they
imply two cconflicting entries in at least one of the in-
terior cells, i.e., two contradictory values for a par-
ticular probability-triplet.
Medium 2 Medium 3 Medium 3
I
nonusers
occasional
dium 1 users
regular
I. users
V, 1 TF .-I4U b
20 6
0 18
60 30
4 30 Medium 1
2 20
10 40 40 20 40 40 20
Picturing these three sets of probability-pair
values as the face entries on a cube,
Medium 1
7 30/3
40 6 4
20 8 42
° 18 2
Medium 3
Medium 2
, i , m i i1
it becomes evident that they imply two
contradictory entries in at least one
interior cell. This can be seen by
unfolding the cube as follows:
Medium 3
Medium 2
Medium 2
Medium 2
40
6
4
20
6
4
0
18
2
..
4 1 U
- I
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values as possible. We can do this by giving a researcher
the option of omitting from consideration as many sets of
probability-pair values as necessary for the technique to
converge. In the present version of the simulation the
Mosteller technique is used this way to compute a set of
243 probability-quintet. values for each five-fold group of
media. The resulting set of values obtained for any group
specifies a mix of joint distributions which reproduce, as
closely as possible, all pairwise empirical duplications
in the group except those associated with rejected sets
of probability-pair values. As an example of this approach,
we outline in Figure 2.20 the manner in which the Mosteller
technique would be applied to a fivefold group of media for
which there were four consistent sets of probability-pair
values.
4. Establishing appropriate mixes of
joint probability distributions
within cells
For each fivefold media group we have computed 243
probability-quintet values that specify a mix of joint.
distributions compatible with many, if not all, of the
known pairwise duplications in that group. Our objective
now is to establish these mixes in the sample computer
population. The way to do this for the five media in any
Distribution nonconsumers occasional regular
consumers consumers
50
40
60
50
60
30
20
30
40
20
20
40
10
10
20
Marginal on each of five
dimensions.
medium 1 x medium 2 x medium 3 x medium 4 x medium 5
Initialil the 243 cells with
values impled by these lt-order
interections, assning no saond- ler
or higher level interactions mnq
the media.
Nedium 1
nonconesu
occasion
consumer
regular
consumer
Mediu 3
noncones
occasior
consumm
regular
consumer
Medium 2
Non- Occaeional Regular
consumers consumers consumers
mors 20 12 18
10 4 16
10 4 6
40 20 40
Medium 4
Non- Occasional Regular
.ohis consume rs consumers
werm 25 25 10
20 10 0
5 5 0
50 40 10
Medium 2
50 nonconsumers
30 occasional
consumers
20 regularconsumers
Medium 4
60 nonconsumers
30 oeo"s"_
10 regularconsumers
Non- Ocaional Regular
20 16 4 40
15 4 1- 20
25 10 5 40
60 30 10
Medium 5
lon- Occasional Regular
consumers con r onMEr
25 9 16 50
28 8 4 40
7 3 0 10
60 20 20
Perform multiplicative adjustments iteratively until the 243 cell values reflect
these second-order interactions as well as the known first-order interactions.
Fig. 2.20--Using the Moteller technique to compute probability quintet values that reproduce four
pairwise empirical duplications in a fivefold media group
Medium
1
2
3
4
5
233
group is by randomly linking exposure probabilities from
each of its 243 combinations of constituent distributions
in amounts specified by the corresponding probability-
quintet values. But these random linkages must also pre-
serve an assignment that has already been made by the
simulation, viz., the assignment of individual exposure
probabilities to various population cells. We cannot link
exposure probabilities for one medium with exposure prob-
abilities for another medium unless these probabilities
have already been assigned to the same cell. Otherwise,
the persons we synthesize will not be distributed real-
istically over the cell-defining variables, even though the
exposure probabilities for individual media are. In order
to assure that the only exposure probabilities we do link
are those which have been assigned to the same cell, we
have adopted the following procedure for establishing speci-
fied~mixes of joint distributions in the sample computer
population: We attempt to reproduce these mixes as closely
as possible in each cell by appropriately linking within-
cell probability distributions already established for the
various media. We now proceed to describe how this is done.
First, exposure probabilities for those media
which are not in any of the fivefold groups are randomly
linked with one another in each cell.1 They are also
lRecall that we only group in sets of five those
media on which we have empirical data indicating that, their
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linked randomly, cell by cell, with exposure probabilities
for the first medium in the first group of five. We then
obtain a set of 9 probability-pair values for the first
two media in this group by summing its 243 probability-
quintet values over the other three media.l The simulation
problem is to establish,as closely as possible in each
cell, the mix of joint distributions specified for the
first two media by this set of probability-pair values.2
In order to do this in any cell we once again use the
Mosteller technique. Each of the two media represents a
dimension, the number of probabilities in a cell from
each of their constituent distributions represent marginal
duplication with at least one other medium is nonrandom at
the cell level.
1The resulting set of probability-pair values will
approximately equal the set originally computed for the
first two media if, and only if, the original set was not
one of those that had to be rejected for the Mosteller
technique to converge.
Unfortunately, two factors prevent us from doing
this in anything but a very imprecise fashion: First,
there may be fewer than 9 probabilities in a cell for each
medium. When this happens we can approximate only in the
roughest way a mix of joint distributions specified by 9
probability-pair values. Secondly, the distribution of
exposure probabilities for a medium at the individual cell
level generally differs from its distribution at the popu-
lation level. The result is that a mix of joint distribu-
tions which is reproducible at, the population level, given
the sizes of the constituent distributions for the two
media, may not be reproducible at the cell level, given
the number of probabilities that have been assigned to the
cell from each of these distributions.
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values on these dimensions, and the set of 9 probability-
pair values for the two media represent initial values in
a two-dimensional table. We use the Mosteller technique
to bias these initial values in such a way that the 9 new
probability-pair values are consistent with the two
marginal distributions, i.e., with the number of probabil-
ities in the cell from each medium's constituent distribu-
tions.1 For the first two media in the first fivefold
group the Mosteller technique is used this way to compute
9 probability-pair values for each cell in the simulation.
In any cell, exposure probabilities from each combination
of constituent distributions for the two media are then
linked randomly in amounts corresponding to the set of
probability-pair values obtained for that cell. This en-
tire procedure is then repeated iteratively in order to
link exposure probabilities for the first two media with
exposure probabilities for the third medium in the set
of five, to link exposure probabilities for the first three
media with exposure probabilities for the fourth medium in
the set of five, etc., until exposure probabilities for
1This procedure generally produces nonintegral
probability-pair values for a cell, but we can only link
probabilities from the various combinations of constituent
distributions in integral amounts. Therefore, we use a
Monte Carlo rounding procedure which converts these frac-
tions to whole numbers while keeping them consistent with
the sizes of the constituent distributions in the cell.
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all the media appearing in fivefold groups have been linked.
By synthesizing persons across each fivefold media group
this way we establish, in the overall population and (to a
lesser extent) in individual cells, mixes of joint prob-
ability distributions that reproduce, as closely as pos-
sible, many of the known pairwise duplications among the
media in the simulation. Figure 2.21 outlines the manner
in which the procedure would be applied to a given cell
for a pair of media.
E. Establishing joint distributions of Soviet
audiences across and within demographic
and social strata of a sample computer
population
In the Soviet simulation we had very little data
on the audience duplications among most media, other than
the general knowledge that people highly exposed to one
medium, and to specific kinds of news in that medium,
were likely to be highly exposed to other media, and to
the same kinds of news in those media. However, as we
explained above, it seemed reasonable to expect that. this
type of duplication effect. would be rather well accounted
for by the dimensions of the simulation population, i.e.,
the demographic and social characteristics of audiences,
rather than by other factors. Therefore, we did not
attempt to derive empirical estimates of these audience
a)
a) H
uzm edU~ u a,·C 4
o 4-i C
a) a 0 U
Q) c0 0 Z a)
o )o0  ao 
· 02
4 0 O -- 44o o a4 ri) -It 
01 *,1 0 a ^ 4
.flu ^ I::
d C J ,D r- U )0 k * -a C >.*H
co nc I IaI=C)
bo > > * o -iP-4H c * 4 Ca N H H
CN CZ 0 ) ( H 1
a o la C ba C -H
CY)
co uz(n U )cr P
P ) L) P 1
oo 0a
sU G
co 0 .,
0
C.)
0000oa) x
0 o~~~~~~~~~~~~x
4-J 
1 D-1
:I) a 
-o
u JH HNc *,10 2a -d
*H a a)
P 
to 0
a) o
r-40
o rl 
U03
N 0
·ic
a
a O
r 3
O 0 o
O o o
CN cH
o oo
o 0
d o d o a)
0 O Q0 O
o o
03
0
cq4-
.r44-i
0
0
*,-
CD a)
"-4
0arH.
!
m
a)0
,io a)
a)
02
ca
o
*r
4-J
sk r4
O- ) I U (3.
,N r- 0H 
n H 4~ 4 u HI
. E; .1-) · Ht Ia) con 0 r coI : H t-4 ' 
· - 4r ..J ) H
· H (U U -, ,l
co )o 
,--I 4 4- a) 
O co H 4-
C C ) o 1D
1 . U 4 1 U
P f 0 H cH
4
d O
Q)0
P 0ro°
*H OC CO
o
0o
00 r- Lr)
00 r% Lt)
I( - t
r-q rl I r-
~~~~~~~~C>~~~~~~~~~~~~~
llA lo n
d)0)
o0r.
HO3Cd
O0
.ri
(1)CoCd
U
0
o
C3
O0Ui
I N 
H 03 .0
C l Uo
o ,.-I 4O 
H 0 .10
· 4 - ,-
P P- r-I
-H ., r l
4 ,n u ,--IH n ) UaO CO U H
-:4 -I H 0
·4'O > O0H 0 
~ 4
59 I 3
a) 0
k4 U
c
r -
oC14 00
o
bo 
a) o0 )
CoP
a)
0
CoEn
0
U
0ulr.0ur.
0:
U)
o
o
U
00101
O
.r
U
C
0t
*HI
rri
.,1
0)
4-
4-aU
*,
.>
(J
r1
U4-J
q~H
01
ai)
r4
a)
U)
co
rC
Hl H 0
,N 1 -- 
L(I Lr) -1
-ItH-
Co
(1)0
0
U
co
P (L
r i
U)5-4to 0
a) o
P V
,l
0
.H
NN
oo4-0
0
r--q
238
duplications. But for a few media we did know that certain
noncell-defining variables had significant effects on joint
exposure. From this knowledge we were able to estimate
the magnitude of the empirical duplication between selected
pairs of these media. For example, saturation effects
formed the basis for one such set of estimates. We men-
tioned in the previous chapter that Comcom data indicate
the average Russian-reading Soviet citizen rarely sub-
scribes both to a central and to a Russian language repub-
lic paper of the same type. Such publications appear to
be functionally equivalent among Russian-reading persons.
Based on these data and the large proportion of the Soviet
population that, reads Russian, we assumed in the simulation
that the empirical duplication between central and republic
newspapers of the same type was less than would be expected
on a chance basis, i.e., less than the product of their
population means, by an arbitrary amount. Based on analo-
gous data for Soviet electronic media, we made similar
assumptions about the empirical duplication between central
and local radio braodcasts and between central and local
television broadcasts occurring in the same time slot.
Another piece of data on the Soviet mass media system that
was discussed in the previous chapter also formed the
basis of some duplication estimates. Soviet newspapers
below the central administrative level are seldom
239
distributed outside the republic in which they are published,
so persons from other republics rarely have access to them.
Based on these data we assumed in the simulation that the
empirical duplication between any two newspapers published
in different republics was virtually zero.
We did not know, in advance, how much of each
empirical duplication estimated in the manner described
above would be accounted for by cell-defining variables
and how much of it would be solely attributable to fac-
tors ("language of media consumption," "republic of
residence") that had not been included among the dimen-
sions of the simulation population. But the simulation
itself helped us to identify and account for those cases
in which noncell-defining but exposure-influencing vari-
ables had significant effects on duplication. For each
pair of media for which we had input an empirical duplica-
t.iopestimate, the simulation measured the difference be-
tween this estimate and the expected value of the random-
at-the cell-level duplication. Whenever the magnitude of
this residual nonrandom duplication was found to be sig-
nificant, the simulation accounted for it in synthesizing
"persons" across the two media by establishing appropriate
nonrandom dependences between their within-cell probabil-
ity distributions. Whenever the magnitude of this residual
nonrandom duplication was found to be insignificant, the
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simulation synthesized "persons" across the two media in
the same way that it did across those media for which
we had not input empirical duplication estimates, i.e.,
by linking their within-cell probability distributions
randomly. In this way we assigned to each simulated indi-
vidual an average probability of being exposed to each
simulated medium so that the resulting probabilities of
joint exposure reflected our empirical duplication esti-
mates for the Soviet mass media system.
IV. Summary of pass I
At this point it would be useful to review the
major steps ndertaken in pass one of the simulation. We
do this by means of the following outline:
A. Distribute demographic and social traits over
the simulation population.
1. Use the Mosteller technique to create a
sample computer population over which
demographic and social traits are dis-
tributed in a manner compatible with all
reported statistics on those traits.
2. Obtain from this procedure the number of
simulated persons to be assigned to each
of the cells formed by cross-classifying
these traits, i.e., the number of indi-
vidual exposure probabilities to be
assigned to each cell for any simulated
medium.
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B. Distribute the media's audiences across demo-
graphic and social strata of the simulation
population.
1. Use the Mosteller technique to create
sample computer audiences over which
demographic and social traits are dis-
tributed in a manner that reflects the
composition of the sample computer popu-
lation and is compatible with all re-
ported audience breakdowns on those traits.
2. Obtain from this procedure the sizes of
the simulated media's audiences to be as-
signed to each cell, i.e., the mean exposure
probability in each cell for each simulated
medium.
C. Distribute the media's audiences within demo-
graphic and social strata of the simulation
population.
1. For each simulated medium use a beta func-
tion to model an overall distribution of
exposure probabilities whose size and shape
reflect the sizes of the overall population
and the one- and two-issue audiences of the
medium within that, population; use beta
functions also to model three constituent
distributions whose sizes and shapes reflect
not only the size and shape of the overall
distribution but also the sizes of three
distinct classes of consumers of the medium
and the one- and two-issue audiences within
each of these classes.
2. From this procedure obtain for each simu.-
lated medium three constituent distributions,
each of which consists of various numbers of
individual exposure probabilities located at
discrete intervals from 0.0 to 1.0.
3. Assign individual -exposure probabilities to
cells by drawing them randomly without
replacement from the three constituent dis-
tributions associated with each simulated
medium.
4. From this procedure obtain for each simu-
lated medium a distribution of exposure
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probabilities within each cell that, is com-
patible with the number of probabilities
specified in that cell for any medium and
that reproduces, as closely as possible in
an expected value sense, the mean exposure
probability specified in that cell for that.
medium.
D. Establish joint distributions of the media's
audiences across and within demographic and
social strata of the simulation population
1. Use a special-purpose clustering algorithm
to group, in overlapping sets of five, all
simulated media among which there exist
empirical duplications not wholly accounted
for by cell-defining variables.
2. Obtain from this procedure fivefold media
groups which, by their sequence and the
media they contain, specify the order in
which the media's audiences should be
jointly distributed to account for as much
residual nonrandom duplication as possible.
3. For each pair of media in a fivefold group
use a linear programming algorithm to
compute a mix of joint probability dis-
tributions which reproduces their pairwise
empirical duplication as closely as pos-
sible.
4. From this procedure obtain the sizes of nine
joint probability distributions for each
pair of media in a fivefold group.
5. For each fivefold group use the Mosteller
technique to obtain a mix of joint prob-
ability distributions which is consistent.
with as many of the mixes computed for
media pairs in that group as possible and
which, therefore, reproduces as many of the
pairwise empirical duplications in' that
group as possible.
6. From this procedure obtain the sizes of 243
joint probability distributions for each
fivefold media group.
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7. In each cell use the Mosteller technique
for each fivefold media group to bias its
243 joint distribution sizes so that they
are consistent with the sizes of each
medium's constituent distributions in
that cell; synthesize "persons" across the
media in any fivefold group by establish-
ing, in each cell, the mix of joint distribu-
tions obtained by this application of the
Mosteller technique; synthesize persons across
those media that are not, in any fivefold group
by randomly linking their within-cell exposure
probabilities.
8. From this procedure obtain for each simulated
individual an average probability of being
exposed to each simulated medium.
A. Pass I and the availability of media data
In reviewing the major steps undertaken in pass I
of the simulation we should emphasize two points that were
not made explicit in our description of the model. The
first point is that the simulation techniques employed in
pass I reflect the relative availability of various kinds
of data on mass media systems. Pass I estimates each
simulated individual's average probability of being exposed
to each simulated medium by using whatever data are avail-
able on a mass media system. For example, it is difficult
to imagine a case in which we would attempt to conduct a
communications simulation without having any information
on the composition of the target population. In fact, we
almost always have census figures which give a fairly
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accurate picture of how various demographic and social
traits are distributed over the population. As a consequence,
pass I has been designed so that it, requires this kind of
data and it will not, proceed without it. But the simulation
is programmed to work with varying amounts of this kind of
information. It can construct a population from its marginal
distribution on each individual dimension of interest, from
a complete n-dimensional table when there are n dimensions
of interest, or from partial tables of intermediate dimen-
sionality. Regardless of whether these tables come from a
census or from representative, biased, or sparse samples,
the simulation can use them to construct a realistic sample
computer population. In addition to population data we
would also have to possess at. least some information about
the composition of the media's audiences in order to carry
out, a successful communications simulation. In fact, we
frequently do have a good deal of firm knowledge about the
demographic and social breakdown of the media's audiences.
Therefore, pass I has been designed so that. it also re-
quires this kind of data. But here again it. will accept
varying amounts of information. It can distribute the
traits of interest over a medium's audience by using simple
marginal distributions of the audience on each trait or by
using data on the interactions in the audience between
various combination of traits. Regardless of whether
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available audience breakdowns are from representative,
biased or sparse samples, the simulation can use them to
construct reasonable sample computer audiences.
The simulation techniques for handling data on
the structure and cumulation of the media's audiences re-
flect the typical availability of this kind of information.
Frequently, we have some explicit, information about the
audience overlap between successive issues of a given
medium and about the likely mix of different classes of
consumers of that medium in the overall population. But
even in the absence of explicit information we can almost
always estimate these parameters, either from secondary
source data or from cross-national comparisons. Accordingly,
pass I has been designed so that it, requires this kind of
data. In the present version of the simulation the re-
searcher must provide estimates of the sizes of the overall
one- and two-issue audiences for each medium. He must also
provide estimates of the sizes of two consumer classes--
those regularly exposed and those rarely exposed to the
medium--and the sizes of the one- and two-issue audiences
within each of these classes. The simulation then computes
these parameters for an intermediate class of consumers by
subtraction. This arrangement reflects the fact that cumu-
lation and structural data are more likely to be available
for the regular and rare consumers of a medium than for the
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intermediate class. However, if data on the latter does
happen to be available and the researcher has no informa-
tion on one of the other two classes, he can use this
data to derive the missing estimates by subtraction.1
As a final example of how the simulation tech-
niques in pass I reflect the availability of different
kinds of mass media data we cite the simulation treatment.
of duplication. Occasionally, we have some data on the
audience overlap between average issues of different
media. If such data are input to pass I, the simulation
computes mixes of joint probability distributions which,
when they are established in the sample computer popula-
tion, reproduce as many of these duplications as possible.
The simulation accepts as many of these empirical duplica-
tion estimates as the researcher is able to provide, but
it can also proceed when no such estimates are available.
If no empirical duplication estimate has been input to
pass I for a given pair of media, the simulation simply
establishes between them a duplication that is random at
the cell level, i.e., the duplication accounted for by the
Some researchers may have data on or wish to
employ only two classes of consumers for each simulated
medium. Therefore, the present version of the simulation
should be modified so that it. can handle the case of two
consumer classes for each medium as well as the case of
three consumer classes for each medium.
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dimensions of the sample computer population alone.
B. Pass I and the reliability of media data
The second point, we wish to emphasize in reviewing
pass I is that; its simulation techniques also reflect the
relative reliability of various kinds of data on mass media
systems. Pass I estimates each simulated individual's
average probability of being exposed to each simulated
medium in such a way as to reproduce accurately those data
which are generally available in abundant and reliable
form and to reproduce somewhat less accurately those data
which are generally available in sparser and less reliable
form. For example, available census data on a population
generally covers more traits of interest. and higher order
interactions than available audience breakdowns for that.
population. Therefore, pass I has been designed so that
it reproduces, in sample computer audiences, interactions
known to exist in the population but for which we lack
corresponding audience breakdowns. However, a situation
might arise in which available audience breakdowns are
more complete and more reliable than available population
data. In such cases, the simulation can be used in the
opposite fashion, i.e., to reproduce in the sample computer
population interactions known to exist in the media's
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audiences but, for which we lack corresponding population
breakdowns.
The simulation technique for assigning individual
exposure probabilities to cells from constituent distribu-
tions also reflects the relative reliability of different
kinds of mass media data. Rather than attempting to estab-
lish these constituent distributions in each cell, the sim-
ulation makes the assignment in such a way as to preserve
cell sizes and to reproduce cell means as closely as pos-
sible, in an expected value sense. Cell sizes and cell
means are preserved because they are derived from census
figures and audience surveys respectively, and these two
kinds of data are almost always more reliable than data
on the structure and cumulation of the media's audiences,
from which the constituent distributions are derived.
As a final example of how the simulation techniques
in pass I reflect the relative reliability of various kinds
of mass media data we again cite the simulation treatment
of duplication. Pass I computes mixes of joint probability
distributions which, when they are established in the sample
computer population, reproduce as many empirical duplica-
tions as possible. These mixes are computed in such a way
that; they reproduce empirical duplications only in an ex-
pected value sense, so the constituent distributions which
are used to form them enter the computation only in terms of
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their sizes and means. The latter are derived from data
on the size and structure of the media's audiences, data
which is generally more reliable than the information we
are likely to have about interactions between audiences.
That is why the simulation preserves distribution sizes
and means in the process of attempting to reproduce
empirical duplications. When the simulation attempts to
establish in the sample computer population the mixes of
joint distributions computed this way, it only links ex-
exposure probabilities that have already been assigned
to the same cell. Thus, in attempting to reproduce em-
pirical duplications, the simulation also preserves the
the distributions of traits over individual audiences
that were derived from empirical audience breakdowns,
again because the latter are generally more reliable than
the available data on interactions between audiences.
C. Inputs required
The following kinds of data are required as inputs
for pass I of the simulation:
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--Census or survey data which give breakdowns of
the population of interest along the dimensions
of interest;
--Circulation figures, set estimates, ratings, and
surveys which indicate the size of each medium's
average single-issue audience;
--Survey data which give breakdowns of the media's
average single-issue audiences along the dimen-
sions of interest;
--Cumulation data which indicate the net size of
each medium's average two-issue audience;
--Structural data which indicate (1) the proportion
of the population that are frequent consumers of
each medium and the proportion that are essen-
tially nonconsumers of each medium, (2) the
amounts of each medium's average single-issue
audience in the frequent consumer class and in
the nonconsumer class, and (3) the amounts of
each medium's average two-issue audience in the
frequent consumer and nonconsumer classes;
--Duplication data which indicate the size of the
audience overlap between average issues of various
media (optional).
D. Outputs produced
The following output statistics are produced by
pass I of the simulation:
--The number of computer persons assigned to each
cell on the basis of the population breakdowns
that were read in;
--For each medium, the number of computer persons
assigned to its audience and the mean exposure
probability assigned to each cell on the basis
of the size and breakdowns of the medium's
single-issue audience that were read in;
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--For each medium, the number of computer persons
assigned to each individual exposure probability
and the number of computer persons assigned to
the average one- and two-issue audiences of the
medium as a result of the shape of the probability
distribution estimated for the medium on the
basis of the cumulation figures they were read
in;
--For each medium, (1) the number of computer
persons assigned to each of three probability
distributions, (2) the number assigned to each
individual exposure probability in each distribu.-
tion, and (3) the number of computer persons from
each distribution assigned to the average one-
and two-issue audiences of the medium, as a re-
sult of the sizes and shapes of three constitu-
ent probability distributions estimated for the
medium on the basis of cumulation and structural
data that were read in;
--For each medium, a comparison of (1) the mean
exposure probability assigned to each cell on
the basis of the size and breakdowns of the
medium's audience and (2) the mean of the
individual exposure probabilities allocated
to each cell from the three probability dis-
tributions estimated for the medium on the
basis of cumulation and structural data;
--A listing of each pair of media for which the
empirical duplication estimate that was read
in is not, wholly accounted for by cell-defining
variables;
--A listing of each pair of media between which
the audience duplication is other than random at
the cell level but which the simulation is
unable to account for in the multi-media assign-
ment of within-cell exposure probabilities.
E. Basic assumptions
Some of the more important assumptions which under-
lie pass I of the Comcom simulation model include the
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following:
1. If a sample population is distributed over
demographic and social traits in such a way
that the resulting cell frequencies reproduce
reported interactions in the population among
those traits, then the more such interactions
accounted for in this process, the more likely
the resulting cell frequencies are to repro-
duce all the correct interactions between
demographic and social traits in the sample
population.
2. If a sample of a medium's audience is dis-
tributed over demographic and social traits
in such a way that. the resulting cell fre-
quencies reproduce reported interactions in
the real audience among those traits, then the
more such interactions accounted for in this
process, the more likely the resulting cell
frequencies are to reproduce all the correct
interactions between demographic and social
traits in the sample audience.
3. Each individual in a population has a
(temporarily) fixed personal probability of
being exposed to each issue of each medium,
and his exposure to any one issue of a given
medium is independent of his exposure to any
other issue of that medium. In other words,
his exposures to various issues of a given
medium are independent random events and his
exposure to any one of these issues is a
Bernoulli process.
4. The distribution of exposure probabilities
for any medium can be modelled by three beta
functions whose parameter values are esti-
mated from the sizes of that medium's one-
and two-issue cumulative audiences, the sizes
of any two (out of three) distinct classes
of consumers of the medium, and the sizes of
the one- and two-issue audiences in each of
those classes. The "expected" cumulation curve
produced by the three resulting distributions
will lie reasonably close to the medium's
empirical cumulation curve.
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5. If the exposure probabilities for a medium
are allocated to cells in such a way that
the expected value (over many allocations)
of the average of the probabilities allo-
cated to any cell equals the empirical cell
mean, then the larger the number of prob-
abilities that need to be allocated to a cell
or group of cells, the more likely is any
individual allocation to reproduce closely
their empirical mean.
6. The distributions of demographic and social
traits over the media's audiences account for
most of the nonrandom audience duplication
among them.
7. If the exposure probabilities for a pair of
media are nonrandomly assigned to individuals
in such a way that the expected value (over
many such assignments) of the proportion of
the population assigned to the average audi-
ence of both media equals their empirical
duplication, then any individual nonrandom
assignment produces a population proportion
in the audience of both that is closer to
their empirical duplication than the propor-
tion that would be produced by a random as-
signment.
Upon completion of pass I of the simulation each
individual has been assigned not only an average probability
of being exposed to each medium but also an identification
or sequence number and a cell number, i.e., a level on each
of the population dimensions. Also, each individual expo-
sure probability carries a tag telling from which constitu-
ent distribution it came, so in effect, every simulated
individual has also been assigned to a particular class of
consumers for each medium. We are now ready to describe
what happens when this computer-stored base population is
confronted with a simulated schedule of mass media messages.
CHAPTER III
A STATISTICAL MODEL OF EXPOSURE TO
MEDIA MESSAGES
CHAPTER III
A STATISTICAL MODEL OF EXPOSURE TO
MEDIA MESSAGES
I. Overview
In this chapter we present a detailed description
of the second part of the Comcom model, viz. the part that
deals with exposure to messages appearing in the media. As
in the preceding chapter, our description is not a formal
mathematical one but rather is organized around a number of
concrete examples. At the end of the chapter we catalogue,
in turn, the kinds of empirical data required as inputs for
this second part of the model, the output statistics that
it produces, and the basic assumptions which underlie it.
By carefully examining these features a potential user of
the Comcom simulation should be able to determine whether
the model of exposure to media messages on which it is
based is applicable to his own research problem.
We now proceed to describe the major data-handling
techniques and computer procedures employed in the second
pass of the simulation.
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II. Pass II: Simulating exposure to media messages
Pass I uses aggregate data on a population's demo-
graphic, social and media-consumption traits to assign
each member of a sample computer population stable and
realistic predispositions of exposing himself to average
issues of various media. The output of pass I is therefore
a static representation of a real population, in the form
of a statistically-described base population.
The first part of pass II adds another layer of
statistical description to this base population. Using
aggregate data on the message-response characteristics
of the media's audience members, pass II assigns each per-
son in the base population stable and realistic predisposi-
tions of exposing himself to various types of messages
that appear within the media. This assignment is made in
such a way as to reproduce or to approximate the independent
effects of a message's theme and format on the response to
it by a medium's audience members. Each simulated person's
message-response characteristics are summarized by his
average probability of being exposed to each type of mes-
sage in each simulated medium, given that he is exposed to
the medium itself.
The second part of pass II makes the simulation
dynamic. First, it reads in content analysis data which
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summarize a pattern of message appearances in the media
over time. Hereafter, we shall refer to this stream of
media messages as a "scenario." Then, using data which
describe likely departures from normal habits of media use
and message response during the period covered by the
scenario, pass II assigns each member of the sample com-
puter population an appropriate pattern of deviation from
his usual exposure predispositions during this period. The
assignment is made in such a way as to reproduce or to ap-
proximate any changes in habits of media use and message
response that are a function of an individual's exposure
history or of the stage of the scenario. Departures from
normal media-use and message-response behavior are summar-
ized for each simulated individual in the form of a "change
factor," i.e., a factor by which his normal exposure
probability for each message in the scenario is to be
multiplicatively transformed.
In the final part of pass II the base population
is confronted with a scenario. Cycling through time
periods, the simulation pairs each media message in the
scenario with each person in the sample computer population,
looks up or calculates all the factors that affect the ex-
posure probability for the pair, and calculates the prob-
ability as a multiplicative function of these factors.
They include (1) the individual's media habits, as
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summarized by his pass I probability of exposure to the
medium, (2) the individual's response characteristics,
as summarized by his pass II conditional probability of
exposure to the message's theme, (3) the message's format,,
as summarized by its format factor, and (4) the amount, if
any, by which the individual is deviating from his normal
media-consumption and message-response habits, as summar-
ized by his pass II change factor. At the end of each
time period the simulation uses the exposure probabilities
obtained for all message-individual pairs through that
time period to compute the expected values of current and
cumulative exposure statistics. These statistics are
printed out for purposes of analysis. At, the end of the
simulation they form hypothetical time series data de-
scribing the likely exposure of the sample computer popu-
lation to media messages in the scenario.
A. Distributing message-response characteristics
over sample computer audiences
1. Approaches that were rejected
In pass I we created a statistical description
of a population assigning each member stable and real-
istic predispositions of exposing himself to average
issue of various media. The object of the first part of
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pass II is to assign each member of this sample computer
population stable and realistic predispositions of expos-
ing himself to various types of messages in the media.
In constructing this part of the model we have considered
and rejected two possible approaches. The first would
have been to replicate the statistical procedures employed
in pass I, treating messages the way we treated media.
Using this approach we would attempt to estimate each
simulated individual's probability of being exposed to
each simulated message in the following manner: For any
message appearing in any given medium we would assemble
data on the size and composition of that. segment of the
medium's audience normally attracted to messages with
the theme and format. of that message. Using the data on
its size and composition together with the Mosteller
technique, we would distribute the message's audience
over population cells, thereby obtaining a mean exposure
probability for the message in each cell. Then we would
assemble data on the structure and cumulation of the audi-
ence for media messages of this type (i.e., messages ap-
pearing in the given medium with the theme and format of
the given message) and use it to distribute the message's
audience over consumer classes and exposure frequencies
appropriately, both in the overall population and within
each cell. Finally, we would assemble any data there was
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on residual interactions between the audience for messages
of this type and the audiences for other types of messages,
and use it to establish appropriate joint, distributions of
various types of message's audiences over multi-message
consumer classes, both in the overall population and within
each cell.
Aside from the obvious empirical problems with this
approach, there are two other factors which rule it out.
For any given message we would obtain up to 500 cell means
and as many as 3,000 exposure probabilities. A data
structure of this kind for each of up to 64 media is manage-
able, but when it is repeated for each of the large number
of messages that can appear in a scenario, it clearly ex-
ceeds the limits of computer storage capacity. Moreover,
it would be far more difficult to derive cell means and
exposure probabilities for a media message from aggregate
data on the audience for that type of message than it was
to derive these parameters for a medium from aggregate data
on the medium's audience. Each cell mean or exposure
probability for an individual-message pair would be a very
complicated function of the theme of the message, the
medium and format in which it appears, the stage of the
scenario at. which it. appears, and the attributes of the
individual--both cell-defining and noncell-defining. So
lThere can be up to 1,800 messages for any theme
in the scenario.
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even if there were sufficient computer storage capacity
for this approach, the magnitude of the statistical prob-
lem it would pose and the cost of the computer time it
would require are both prohibitive. For these reasons
it was clear that, in order to arrive at a simulable
model of exposure, we had to develop a simpler method of
computing message exposure probabilities, one which would
undoubtedly ignore some of the possible interactions
within and between the audiences of various types of
media messages.
The second approach which we considered and re-
jected lay at an opposite extreme from the first, because
it was the simplest possible approach. We would simply
have assumed that each simulated individual's pass I prob-
ability of exposure to any given medium was also his pass
II conditional probability of exposure to any message
appearing in that medium. But this assumption is demon-
strably false. It. implies that any person in the audience
of a given medium notes any message appearing in an aver-
age issue of that medium with a probability of 1.0. In
reality we know that this conditional exposure probabil-
ity generally is not, 1.0 and that often it is not even a
constant. As a result, we have rejected this approach as
well.
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The pass I description of a population in terms of
its media-consumption habits is only a pre-condition for
simulating exposure when that population is confronted
with a scenario of media messages. Before we can simulate
exposure to these messages we must also assign message-
response characteristics to each member of the base popu-
lation. In other words, we must estimate each simulated
individual's average probability of being exposed to each
different type of message in the scenario, given that he
is exposed to the medium in which that message appears. In
every case this conditional exposure probability will be a
function of the message's theme and its format. Accord-
ingly, the first part of pass II has been designed to
estimate each simulated individual's conditional prob-
ability of exposure to each type of media message in a
scenario, in a way that reflects the independent influ-
ences of these two factors. We now proceed to describe
the model for this approach which, in terms of its com-
plexity, lies somewhere between the two approaches de-
scribed above.
2. Audience response as a function
of the message's theme
Generally, we have only aggregate data describing
how various types of individuals respond to specific
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classes of content or themes appearing in the mass media.
A simple example will serve to illustrate the kind of in-
formation we normally have and how we use it in the simu-
lation. Frequently, our information enables us to make
statements like the following: "On the average, 25 per
cent, of all Soviet newspaper readers are exposed to an
article about Communist Party affairs."1 Although we can
seldom estimate the actual likelihood of a given type of
newspaper reader being exposed to an article on Party
affairs, often we can make the following kind of statement
about the relative likelihood of different types of read-
ers being exposed: "Among Soviet newspaper readers, a
member of the Communist Party is two and one-half times
as likely as a nonParty member to read an article about
Party affairs." In designing pass II we have made
several assumptions about these two kinds of theme-response
data. We have assumed that they represent the average
readership response to a large number of articles on Party
affairs appearing in a large number of Soviet newspapers
in every possible format, that the set of formats in which
articles on Party affairs can appear is substantially
the same in each newspaper, and that the articles sampled
1We assume that this statistic represents an aver-
age over all types of newspaper readers and all types of
articles on Party affairs.
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from each paper in order to obtain these data were repre-
sentative with regard to their distribution over the vari-
ous formats. Under these assumptions, the two pieces of
theme-response data represent something intrinsic to the
theme "Party affairs," viz., its effect on the response
of newspaper readers independent of the type of article
or format in which it is conveyed. Stated another way,
the 25 per cent figure and the 2.5 to 1 ratio represent
the effect of the theme "Party affairs" on the response
of newspaper readers when that theme is conveyed in a
newspaper article whose format has "average attractive-
ness." Before proceeding further, however, it is important
that we define this concept of a theme's average attractive-
ness more clearly.
a) Definition of a theme's average
attractiveness
Suppose there are only three formats in which
articles on Party affairs ever appear in Soviet newspapers
--short news items (50%), long articles (40%), and editor-
ials (10%). Suppose also that, on the average, 20 per cent
of all Soviet newspaper readers are exposed to any short
news item about Party affairs, 25 per cent are exposed to
any long article, and 50 per cent are exposed to any
editorial. Then, in terms of these format-response data,
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Figure 3.1 defines the concept of a theme's average at-
tractiveness.
In this hypothetical example long articles on
Party affairs have average attractiveness because the
average percentage of Soviet newspaper readers exposed to
any one of them is the same as the average percentage ex-
posed to all types of articles on Party affairs. The ex-
ample shows one of the possible ways that the relative
attractiveness of a given type of article on Party affairs
can be numerically expressed, i.e., as the quotient of two
aggregate statistics: the average percentage of Soviet
newspaper readers exposed to that type of article and the
average percentage exposed to all types of articles on
Party affairs. Hereafter, we shall refer to this index
as a "format factor." It can be applied not only to news-
paper articles but to the various possible formats in any
kind of medium.l
b) The case of one cell-defining
attribute
We can now proceed with our description of how the
lFor print media it might reflect column inches or
type of article (editorial, short news item, etc.). For
electronic media it might reflect broadcast hours or type
of program (newscast, commentary, etc.). However, the
format factor may also reflect the time and/or place limits
of the availability of an issue.
Format-response data for the theme "Party affairs"
Format of Article Short News Item Long Article Editorial
% of All Articles
on Party Affairs 50 40 10
Average % of Newspaper
Readers Exposed 20 25 50
Weighted % 10 10 5
Format Factor 20/25=.8 25/25=1.0 50/25=2.0
Attractiveness Less than Average Greater than
Average Average
Fig. 3.1--A hypothetical example illustrating the concept of a
theme's average attractiveness.
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simulation uses aggregate theme-response data to account
for the responses of various types of audience members to
media messages conveying a given theme. Recall that in
our example we have information specifying that (1) on the
average, 25 per cent of all Soviet newspaper readers are
exposed to the theme "Party affairs" when it appears in a
newspaper article having average attractiveness and (2) among
Soviet newspaper readers, a member of the Communist party is
two and one-half times as likely as a nonParty member to
read an article about Party affairs. From format-response
data (Figure 3.1) we know that this theme's most attractive
newspaper format is an editorial, its average format is a
long news article, and its least attractive format is a
short news item. (The present version of the simulation
is designed in such a way that it would apply these aggregate
theme- and format-response data uniformly to individual
Soviet newspapers and newspaper articles, as follows: it
would assign 50 per cent of the average readership of any
newspaper to the readership of any editorial on Party af-
fairs in that paper; the percentage of Party members in any
newspaper's average readership that it would assign to the
readership of any type of article on Party affairs in that
paper would be just 2.5 times the percentage of nonParty
members in that paper's readership that it would assign to
the article's readership; it would assign format factors
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of 2.0, 1.0, and 0.8, respectively, to all editorials,
long news articles, and short news items on Party affairs,
regardless of the particular newspaper in which these
articles appeared or the particular type of person who
was being confronted with these articles.)
Suppose now that pass I has assigned 120 computer
persons to the average single-issue readership of Pravda
and that it, has distributed this readership across cells
in such a way that one out of every six readers of Pravda
is a member of the Communist Party. In the simulation we
wish to account for the effect of the theme "Party affairs"
on the responses of Pravda readers to articles conveying
that theme independent of type of article in which it is
conveyed, i.e., we wish to account for whatever effect is
implied in the aggregate theme-response data alone. We
do this by estimating each different type of Pravda reader's
average probability of being exposed to the theme "Party
affairs" in its most attractive newspaper format, viz.,
an editorial on the subject. If we assume, for the moment,
that "political involvement" is the only cell-defining
attribute in the simulation, then Figure 3.2 shows how the
simulation would make this estimate for Party members and
for nonParty members.
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20p + 100P2 - 50% x (120)
and P1/P2 = 2.5
so Pi 1.0 and P2 0.4
where Pi = the mean conditional theme-exposure
probability for Party members;
P2 = the mean conditional theme-exposureprobability for nonParty members.
Fig. 3.2--Computing,for the members of a medium's
audience, average probabilities of exposure to a theme in
its most attractive format.
The first equation expresses the fact that the
product of the number of Party members in the single-issue
readership of Pravda and their mean probability of reading
an editorial on Party affairs, when added to the correspond-
ing product for nonParty members in the single-issue reader-
ship, must sum to the average percentage of a newspaper's
readership exposed to editorials on Party affairs. The
second equation simply expresses the relative likelihood
of Party and nonParty members being exposed to an article
on Party affairs. By solving the two equations in two
unknowns we find that Party members in the single-issue
readership of Pravda are exposed to virtually every edi-
torial on Party affairs appearing in that paper, and that
nonParty members are exposed to only about 40 per cent of
these editorials. We are also able to determine that the
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average audience of a Pravda editorial on Party affairs
consists of 1.0 x 20 . 20 Party members and 0.4 x 100 = 40
nonParty members.l
'The simulation computes the percentage of a medi-
um's audience exposed to any theme in its most attractive
format, by taking the product of (1) the largest format
factor and (2) the average percentage of a medium's audi-
ence exposed to that theme, both of which are specified
by the researcher. If this maximum possible theme audi-
ence is not, appropriately related to the ratios of aver-
age theme-exposure probabilities on adjacent dimension
levels, also specified by the researcher, then, by solv-
ing equations such as those in Figure 3.2, the simulation
can obtain average theme-exposure probabilities greater
than 1.0 for some audience types. For example, if the
researcher had specified that, on the average, 75 per
cent of a Soviet, newspaper's readers were exposed to an
editorial on Party affairs (rather than 50 per cent) in
the case we have been discussing, then, by solving the
equations in Figure 3.2, the simulation would have obtained
1.5 as the average probability of exposure to editorials on
Party affairs among Pravda readers who are Party members.
The present. version of the simulation is programmed so that,
whenever a situation of this kind arises, it reduces each
conditional theme-exposure probability which has been com-
puted as greater than 1.0 to a fraction slightly less than
1.0, and it informs the researcher of the net; reduction in
the size of the maximum possible theme audience resulting
from this procedure. If the researcher finds this new
maximum theme audience unrealistically small for the format
in question, then he has two alternatives: In the example
discussed above, he could reduce the ratio of average
theme-exposure probabilities that he initially specified
on the "political involvement" dimension (to some value
less than or equal to 10/7 if he desires no reduction at
all in the maximum theme audience), or he could maintain
the initial set of ratios and restrict all newspaper arti-
cles in his scenario to short news items and long articles.
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c) The case of two cell-defining
attributes
Assume now that pass I has distributed sample com-
puter audiences across cells defined by two variables in-
stead of one, say "political involvement" and "sex."
Generally, we will have data on, or be able to estimate,
the ratio of conditional theme-exposure probabilities for
men and women as well as for Party members and nonParty
members. For example, suppose that among the single-issue
readership of Pravda, men are twice as likely as women to
read an article on Party affairs, and that pass I has
distributed the single-issue readership of Pravda across
cells in such a way that it is equally divided between
men and women. This time, before we can compute the
average conditional exposure probability in each cell
for Pravda editorials on Party affairs, we must first com-
pute it separately for men, women, Party members and
nonParty members. Let us assume that Party members and
nonParty members have the average conditional theme-
exposure probabilities that. were computed above. Then,
solving two equations in two unknowns the same way that
we did in Figure 3.2, we obtain average conditional theme-
exposure probabilities of .667 and .333 for men and women
respectively. The next step is to compute the readership
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marginals on each dimension for Pravda editorials on Party
affairs. Multiplying each "sex" marginal in the readership
of Pravda by its corresponding average theme-exposure prob-
ability, we obtain marginals of 60 x0.667 = 40 men and
60 x 33 = 20 women for the readership of any Pravda edi-
torial on Party affairs. We have already computed the
corresponding marginals for Party members and nonParty
members. The problem now is to distribute the readership
of this theme in its most, attractive format across the
four cells (formed by cross-classifying the two dimensions)
in a way that is compatible with the marginals computed on
each dimension. In the present version of the simulation
we do this by assuming no interactions in the theme's
readership between cell-defining attributes, i.e., we
simply assign the cross-product value to each cell, as il-
lustrated in Figure 3.3.
It is now an easy matter to compute the average
conditional exposure probability in any cell for a Pravda
editorial in Party affairs. We simply divide the theme's
readership in that cell by the average single-issue Pravda
readership assigned to that cell in pass I.1
1Here again, it is possible to obtain average
theme-exposure probabilities greater than 1.0 for some
audience types, but for a reason different from that
discussed in n. 1 on p. 269. In the present version of the
Party members
NonParty members
400 x60
20 20
UU x -GU
40 x
60
20
60- 
60
Fig. 3.3--Distributing the audience of a theme
in its most attractive-format across population cells
in such a way as to preserve the theme's known audience
marginals on each population dimension.
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27
40
Women
7
13
20
= 13
20
40
60
20
60
x 60
x 60
x 60
x 60
40
60
20
60
= 7
= 27
= 13
. _
. 40
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d) The general case
By extending the example discussed above we can
convey a more general picture of how the simulation accounts
for the relationship between the theme of any media message
and the response which that message evokes from various
types of persons in the medium's audience. Assume that
pass I of the simulation has distributed sample Soviet
newspaper readerships across several cell-defining attrib-
utes, and that, for each theme in a scenario, pass II has
obtained from the researcher (1) the ratios of average
theme-exposure probabilities for Soviet newspaper readers
on adjacent levels of the cell-defining dimensions and
(2) the average percentage of Soviet newspaper readers
exposed to the theme in its most attractive newspaper
simulation, for any medium, we distribute the maximum
possible theme audience across cells by taking cross-
product: values implied by the theme's audience marginals.
Because we then obtain the mean conditional exposure
probability in any cell by dividing the theme's audience
in that cell by the medium's audience in that cell, it is
entirely possible that this method of distributing theme
audiences can produce average theme-exposure probabilities
greater than 1.0. (Whenever this happens, the simulation
follows the same procedure described in n. 1 on p. 269.)
An alternative method of distributing theme audiences
across cells, and one which would decrease the likelihood
of obtaining average theme-exposure probabilities greater
than 1.0, would be to initialize the cells with a medium's
audience marginals and to use the Mosteller technique to
bias them until they exactly reproduce the theme's audi-
ence marginals for that medium.
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format. For any theme in the scenario and for each Soviet
newspaper in which that theme appears, pass II of the simu-
lation would use these aggregate theme-response data and
the paper's pass I readership marginals to compute, for the
paper's readership on each dimension level, an average
probability of exposure to that theme in its most attractive
newspaper format. (For dimensions having more than two
levels, more than two conditional exposure probabilities
would be computed, but the procedure remains straightfor-
ward. An additional ratio is specified for each addi-
tional level, so for any n-level dimension there are always
n equations in n unknowns of the kind illustrated in
Figure 3.2 above.) Then, the simulation would multiply
the average theme-exposure probability computed for the
paper's readership on each dimension level by the paper's
readership marginal on that level to obtain the theme's
readership marginal on that level, and, as illustrated in
Figure 3.3 above, it would distribute the readership of
the theme in its most attractive format across the various
population cells by taking the cross-product values of its
readership marginals. Finally, the simulation would com-
pute an average probability of exposure to the theme in its
most attractive format, for the paper's readership in each
cell, by dividing the theme's readership in that cell by
the paper's readership in that cell. Because the
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newspaper readership marginals established on any cell-
defining dimension by pass I will generally vary from one
paper to another, the average probabilities of theme ex-
posure calculated for newspaper readers on each dimension
level and in each cell also will vary from one paper to
another.
e) User options with regard to
theme-response data
Since there are a large number of options available
to the researcher in pass II of the simulation, perhaps it
would be useful to enumerate those which have been developed
so far. For any given theme in a scenario, the researcher
has the option of aggregating individual media into as many
as six different types and of specifying, for the audience
of each type of medium, a different set of ratios of theme-
exposure probabilities on adjacent levels of various cell-
defining dimensions. The media types specified for any
theme need not contain the same individual media as the
media types specified for any other theme. Thus, for one
theme a researcher can specify a set of ratios for print
media and a different set of ratios for electronic media,
while for another theme he can specify different sets of
ratios for newspapers, radio, and television. But even if
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the researcher uses the same media types for each theme in
a scenario, the ratios he specifies for one theme on a given
cell-defining dimension, for a particular type of medium,
need not be the same as the ratios he specifies for any
other theme on that dimension, for the same type of medium.
For example, a researcher can specify that male newspaper
readers are twice as likely as female newspaper readers to
read an article on Party affairs, and, at the same time,
specify that female newspaper readers are twice as likely
as male newspaper readers to read a human interest story.
Finally, for any given theme and any particular type of
medium, ratios need not be specified on-all the cell-
defining dimensions. If they are specified on only a sub-
set of these dimensions, then for any medium the simulation
will compute average probabilities of theme exposure for
member's of the medium's audience in cell-aggregates de-
fined by this subset of dimensions rather than for members
of the medium's audience in individual cells. The average
theme-exposure probability computed for the audience mem-
bers in any cell-aggregate will be the probability that is
used for the audience members in each individual cell con-
tained in that aggregate.
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3. Audience response as a function
of the message's format
For any medium in which a given theme appears we
have described how pass II of the simulation uses aggre-
gate theme-response data and that medium's pass I audience
marginals to compute, for the medium's audience members in
each cell, an average probability of exposure to the theme
in its most attractive format. We now proceed to describe
how pass II accounts for the responses of a medium's audi-
ence members to messages in the medium conveying a given
theme in a variety of formats.
3) Normalizing format factors
linearly
Unlike pass I the second pass of the simulation
does not use the mean probability of theme exposure com-
puted for a cell to distribute individual probabilities of
theme exposure within that cell. To do this it. would re-
quire data on the structure and cumulation of the media's
audiences for given themes, and, as we mentioned above,
this kind of data is not. normally available. As a result,
,when the simulation finally confronts the base population
with a scenario, i.e., when it cycles through time periods
for every theme in a scenario, pairing each message in a
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medium with each individual member of that medium's audi-
ence, it has the following two numbers to work with in
computing the conditional exposure probability for any
message-individual pair: the media message's format
factor and, for the individual audience member's cell, the
average probability of exposure to the theme in its most
attractive format. However, the format factors assigned
by a researcher to the media messages conveying a given
theme generally will not be normalized with respect to
the theme's most attractive format, but rather, with re-
spect to its average format. (We assume that a researcher
generally will adopt the format index described in Figure
3.1 above, assigning format factors greater than 1.0 to
media messages conveying a given theme in formats having
greater than average attractiveness and assigning format
factors less than 1.0 to media messages conveying a given
theme in formats having less than average attractiveness.)
As a result, the product of a media message's format factor
and, for an individual audience member's cell, the average
probability of exposure to that theme in its most attrac-
tive format will not produce the correct conditional ex-
posure probability for a message-individual pair. This
can be demonstrated in terms of our original example.
Assume that the distribution of Pravda's average
single-issue readership by "political involvement" and
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i'sex" is that shown in Figure 3.4. From Figure 3.3 we pro-
duce the readership distribution computed for a Pravda
editorial on Party affairs, and from Figure 3.1 we repro-
duce the average percentages of Soviet newspaper readers
that were assumed to be exposed to short news items, long
articles, and editorials on Party affairs and the format
factors that were assumed for these three types of news-
paper articles. Confronting the hypothetical Pravda
readers with each type of article in turn, we compute the
conditional exposure probability for each article-reader
pair as the product of the article's format factor and,
for the Pravda reader's cell, the average probability of
exposure to the most attractive type of newspaper article
on Party affairs, in this case an editorial. It can be
seen that using this method the simulation would expose
40, 50, and 100 per cent of the hypothetical Pravda
readers to a short news item, a long article, and an edi-
torial on Party affairs, respectively. These excessively
high theme audiences (twice the corresponding empirical
percentages) are due to the fact that the average theme-
exposure probabilities computed by the simulation for the
four types of Pravda readers (13/13, 7/7, 27/47, 13/53)
are normalized with respect to a Pravda editorial on Party
affairs, while the format factors assigned by the researcher
to the three articles (0.8, 1.0, 2.0) are normalized with
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respect to a somewhat less attractive type of Pravda
article on Party affairs, viz., a long article on that
subj ect.
Because the cell means calculated by the simulation
from theme-response data are normalized with respect to a
theme's most attractive format, the format factors assigned
by a researcher to the media messages conveying that theme
have to be adjusted by the simulation so that they too are
normalized with respect to the theme's most attractive
format. The procedure we have developed for doing this is
illustrated by the hypothetical example in Figure 3.5. For
any theme in a given scenario we obtain each new format
factor by multiplying the corresponding old format factor
by the following quotient: the average percentage of a
medium's audience exposed to the theme (20%) divided by
the average percentage of a medium's audience exposed to
the theme in its most attractive format (90%). We choose
this multiplier because, as the inverse of the format
factor which the researcher will have assigned to any
message conveying the theme in its most attractive format,
it insures that the new format factors will be normalized
with respect to this format. We choose a linear function
for the normalization in order to maintain the same ratios
among the new format factors that existed among the old.
Average percentage of a medium's audience exposed to
the theme = 20%
Data specified for
Percentage of a medium's audience exposed to the a given theme by a
theme in its most attractive format = 90% a given theme by a
Original format factor: 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.5 hypothetical
Implied percentage of a medium's audience researcher
exposed to the theme = 10%, 20%, 40%, 90%
Problem: The original format factors are normalized with respect to
the theme's average attractiveness. How can we adjust them so that
they are normalized with respect to the theme's most attractive
format, and, at the same time, maintain the ratios among the new
format factors that existed among the old?
Solution: Let the new format factors equal (20%/90%) of the
original ones.
(New Format Factor)
F'
1.0
20%/90% 20% F
90%
Original format factors:
New format factors:
0.5, 1.0, 2.0 ,5 4. 5 (Original Format Factor)
0.111, 0.222, 0.444, 1.000
Fig. 3.5--Normalizing format factors linearly.
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Suppose that in our original example we carry out
the normalization procedure described above, multiplying
the original format factors of 0.8, 1.0, and 2.0 by
(25%/50%) to obtain new format factors of 0.4, 0.5, and
1.0 respectively. Suppose, then, that we again confront
the hypothetical Pravda readers with each type of article
in turn (Fig. 3.6), this time computing the conditional
exposure probability for each article-reader pair as the
product of the article's adjusted format factor and, for
the Pravda reader's cell, the average probability of ex-
posure to an editorial on Party affairs. The adjusted
format factors have been normalized with respect to an
editorial on Party affairs, so each is half of its original
value. As a result, each weighted sum of cell means is half
of its original value, and we obtain correct Pravda reader-
ships of 20, 25, and 50 per cent for a short news item, a
long article, and an editorial respectively.
b) Normalizing format factors
quadratically to account for
ceiling effects
There is an important case in which the simulation
follows a procedure slightly different from the one de-
scribed above. Suppose that in our original example the
format factor which the researcher had assigned to
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editorials on Party affairs was 5.0 instead of 2.0. Com-
bined with the researcher's theme-response data, this would
have implied that 5.0 x 25% = 125% of Pravda's readers were
exposed to an editorial on Party affairs.1 If a situation
of this kind had arisen in our example, the present version
of the simulation has been designed so that it would have
asked the researcher what percentage of a newspaper's reader-
ship he really wished to be exposed to an editorial on Party
affairs, to which the researcher might have responded: "50
per cent." The simulation would then have used this figure
(instead of 125 per cent;) to compute, for the Pravda readers
in each cell, an average probability'of exposure to an edi-
torial on Party affairs. Of course, these cell means would
still have been computed by the method illustrated in
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 above. However, the simulation would
not have been able to use the simple linear adjustment pro-
cedure described above to normalize the researcher's format
factors with respect to an editorial on Party affairs. Mul-
tiplying each of these format factors by (25%/50%), it would
1An apparent contradiction of this kind can arise
when a researcher has obtained his format-response data from
a different source than his theme-response data. It gener-
ally signifies that a "ceiling effect' is associated with
larger format factors. This term is frequently used to re-
fer to a well-known phenomenon which can be described as fol-
lows: The greater an individual's likelihood of exposure,
the smaller the percentage increase in that likelihood caused
by an exposure-increasing factor. An analogous floor effect
is sometimes associated with exposure-decreasing factors.
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have obtained new format factors of 0.4, 0.5, and 2.5 re-
spectively. Not only would the adjusted format factor for
editorials on Party affairs still have exceeded 1.0, but, be-
cause of the relationship between the researcher's theme- and
format-response data, the simple linear adjustment procedure
also would have failed to normalize any format factor greater
than 2.0 which the researcher might have specified. There-
:fore, in order to normalize a researcher's format factors
with respect to a theme's most attractive format when some of
these format factors are excessively large, we have developed
the special adjustment procedure illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Among the format factors assigned by a hypothetical
researcher to the media messages conveying a given theme are
three (6.0, 8.0, or 10.0), any one of which, when multiplied
Iby the average percentage of a medium's audience specified
by the researcher as exposed to the theme (20%), produces a
theme audience (1.2, 1.6, or 2.0 times) greater than the
medium's audience. When- the hypothetical researcher is con-
fronted with this apparent, contradiction, he specifies that,
'90 per cent of a medium's audience is exposed to the theme in
its most. attractive format. Under circumstances such as these
the simulation uses the linear function described above to
normalize any format factor whose original value is below a
certain cutoff point, and it uses a quadratic function to
normalize any format factor whose original value is above
Average percentage of medium's audience exposed to
the theme = 20%
Percentage of medium's audience exposed to the theme
in its most attractive format = 90% Data specified for
Original format factor: 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0, a given theme by a
8.0, 10.0 |hypothetical
researcherImplied percentages of a medium's audience exposed
to the theme: 10%, 20%, 40%, 80%, 120%, 160%, 200
Problem: The original format factors are normalized with respect to
the theme's average attractiveness, and three of the original format
factors (6.0, 8.0, and 10.0) produce theme audiences greater than
90% of a medium's audience. How can we adjust the original format
factors so that the three largest are normalized in the form of a
ceiling effect with respect to the theme's most attractive format
and, at the same time, maintain among the other new format factors
the ratios that existed among the old format factors?
Solution: For values of the original format factors less than the
midpoint of 1.0 and 4.5, i.e., less than 2.75, let the new format
factors equal (20%/90%) of the original ones; for values of the original
format factors greater than 2.75, let the new format factors be a quad-
ratic function of the original ones, viz., that function described by
the parabola whose slope is (20%/90%) at F=2.75, F'=0.55/0.9 and 0.0 at
F=10.0, F'=1.0. 0 
(New Format Factor)
F'
1(
0.55/0. 
0.2/0.'
0!/
of If we used the
,' linear adjustment
' 2 +bF+
-F = aF + bF + c I,
1.0 2.75 4.5 6.0 F
1.0 = a(10.0) + b(10.0) + c a = -0.0124
0.0 = 2a(10.0) + b b = 0.2480
(20%/90%) = 2a(2.75) + b c = -0.2400
Original format factors: 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 6.0, 8.0, 10.0
New format factors: 0.111, 0.222, 0.444, 0.554, 0.802, 0.950, 1.000
(Original Format Factor
Fig. 3.7--Normalizing format factors quadratically to account for ceiling
effects.
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this cutoff point. The shape of this quadratic function is
modelled by a parabola whose slope at, the cutoff point
(F = 2.75, F' - 0.55/0.9) equals that. of the linear function
(20%/90%) and equals 0.0 at the point. where the old and new
format factors have their maximum values (F = 10.0, F' = 1.0).
As can be seen from the diagram, the cutoff point for these
two types of adjustments is always a value halfway between
that of the original format factor assigned to the theme's
average format (1.0) and that of the largest original format
factor for which a linear adjustment would have worked (in
this case, 4.5). While this choice is somewhat arbitrary,
it does insure that, beyond a certain point, a ceiling effect
is modelled into the rate at which increasingly attractive
formats raise an individual audience member's likelihood of
exposure to a media message. 
c) User options with regard to
format-response data
Let us now enlarge upon our original example by
lIn practice we have found that, when we set the
cutoff point (i.e., the value of the initial format factor)
between the linear and quadratic adjustment procedures too
high, there exists no parabola which can fit such a sharply
bending ceiling effect. We encounter the same problem when
the maximum format factor initially specified by a researcher
is too high, i.e., when it produces a theme audience in any
medium significantly greater than the maximum possible theme
audience specified by the researcher.
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assuming that the hypothetical researcher wishes to define
two different: types of media in his simulation--Soviet news-
papers and Soviet magazines. In a situation of this kind
the simulation, as we mentioned above, could accept one set
of relative likelihoods of men versus women and Party mem-
bers versus nonParty members being exposed to newspaper
articles on Party affairs and it could accept a different
set, of these relative likelihoods for magazine articles on
Party affairs. But the present version of the simulation
has been designed in such a way that it. could not simi-
larly accept one estimate of the average attractiveness
of newspaper articles on Party affairs, along with the cor-
responding set of format factors for the various types of
newspaper articles on that subject, and, at the same time,
accept a different estimate of the average attractiveness
of magazine articles on Party affairs, along with the cor-
responding set. of format factors for the various types of
magazine articles on that. subject. Our hypothetical re-
searcher would have to specify one average attractiveness
figure for newspaper and magazine articles on Party af-
fairs, along with the corresponding set of format factors
for the various types of newspaper and magazine articles
on that. subject. The present version of the simulation
would give him the option of specifying these theme- and
format-response data in one of two ways: (1) He could
specify the average percentage of Soviet, newspaper and
magazine readers exposed to an article on Party affairs
and define the format factors for various types of news-
paper and magazine articles on this subject in the standard
fashion, i.e., so that they were normalized with respect to
an article having this average attractiveness; (2) If the
researcher were unable to estimate the average percentage
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of Soviet newspaper and magazine readers exposed to an
article on Party affairs, then he could artificially set.
this figure at 100 per cent and define the format factors
for various types of newspaper and magazine articles on
this subject so that they were normalized with respect to
an article having this artificially set average attractive-
ness. As the numerical example in Figure 3.8 suggests,
using a set of format factors specified in either of these
two ways the present version of the simulation would com-
pute the correct probability of theme exposure for any
type of Soviet newspaper or magazine reader confronted
with any type of article on Party affairs. 1
1Nevertheless, the fact. that the simulation can
only accept one estimate of the average percentage of a
medium's audience exposed to a given theme does put an
inconvenient; restriction on the input data. It may happen
that the researcher has assigned some messages format
factors that are much higher than any others in the scenario,
but, that. these messages appear in only one type of medium.
The simulation is designed to compute conditional exposure
probabilities in cells on the basis of the largest of these
format factors, and it will do this for every medium in the
scenario. But we have already seen how, for the audiences
of some types of media, a relatively high format factor can
constrain the allowable ratios of average theme-exposure
probabilities on adjacent levels of any dimension. Thus,
because the present. version of the simulation can only
accept one estimate of the average percentage of a medium's
Method #1: Used when the researcher is able to specify a theme's
average attractiveness over all formats in both media types.
Average % of Soviet newspaper and magazine readers exposed to an
article on Party affairs = 25%
Type of Article Short News Item Long Article Editorial
Format Factor 0.8 1.0 2.0
Normalization Multiplier = (25%) . (2.0 x 25%) = 1/2
Normalized Format Factor 0.4 0.5 1.0
For the various types of readers of any individual newspaper or magazine
average probabilities of theme exposure will be computed such that their
weighted sum reproduces the percentage of that newspaper's or magazine's
readership exposed to the most attractive type of article on Party
affairs, i.e., 2.0 x 25% = 50% of that newspaper's or magazine's
readership.
Method #2: Used when the researcher is unable to specify a theme's
average attractiveness over all formats in both media
types
Average % of Soviet newspaper and magazine readers exposed to an
article on Party affairs is set equal to 100%
Type of Article Short News Item Long Article Editorial
Format Factor 0.20 0.25 0.50
Normalization Multiplier = (100%) (0.50 x 100%) = 2
Normalized Format Factor 0.4 0.5 1.0
For the various types of readers of any individual newspaper or magazine
average probabilities of theme exposure will be computed such that their
weighted sum reproduces the percentage of that newspaper's or magazine's
readership exposed to the most attractive type of article on Party
affairs, i.e., 0.50 x 100% = 50% of that newspaper's or magazine's
readership.
Fig. 3.8--Two equivalent ways of defining format factors in the present
version of the simulation.
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4. Distributing Soviet message-response
characteristics over sample computer
audiences
In the Soviet simulation we computed conditional
probabilities of theme exposure using theme- and format-
response data of the kind just described. We are unable
to estimate an international news story's average attrac-
tiveness over all formats in all five types of media used
in the Soviet simulation. But we were able to estimate,
for each type of medium, the average percentages of the
audience attracted to differently formatted international
news stories, and we assumed that these aggregate format-
response data applied to each of the individual themes in
the scenarios for the Cuban crisis and the Kennedy
assassination. The data were obtained in the following
way:
audience exposed to a given theme, it can happen that
(1) a researcher has to specify unrealistic ratios of
average theme-exposure probabilities on adjacent levels
of some dimensions for one type of medium in his scenario
because he wants to use rather large format factors for
messages appearing in a different type of medium in the
scenario, or (2) a researcher has to eliminate all mes-
sages with large format factors from one type of medium
in his scenario because, for the audience of another type
of medium in the scenario, he wishes to use a particular
set of ratios of average theme-exposure probabilities on
adjacent dimension levels.
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From the results of a newspaper-reading experiment
conducted with some of the refugees who comprised the
Comcom Leisure Study sample we obtained estimates of the
relative attractiveness of different types of newspaper
articles containing international news. For electronic
media, on the other hand, our format factors related more
to the time and place limits of availability of the media
than to the actual nature of individual broadcasts. From
a knowledge of the geographical distribution of the Soviet
population and the geographical coverage of each of the
news-carrying Soviet radio and television "programs"
(counterparts of Western stations or networks), we were
able to estimate the percentage of the total listenership
or viewership during various periods of the day likely to
have listened to or watched each of these programs. From
broadcast schedules we obtained the likely number of news-
casts over the various programs during each of these peri-
ods and, making some assumptions about the duplicated audi-
ences between newscasts, we were able to allocate the
estimated total listenership or viewership of any program
during a given part of the day to each of the individual
newscasts on that program during that period. In this man-
ner we estimated format factors for international news
items carried by the Soviet electronic media, and, in a
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similar fashion, we did the same for radio broadcasts beamed
to the Soviet Union from abroad. Finally, from the results
of the reading experiment we were able to estimate,for
Soviet newspaper and magazine readers, ratios of average
theme-exposure probabilities on adjacent levels of all five
population dimensions, and from the results of the Leisure
Study interviews we estimated these ratios, again on all
the population dimensions, for the audiences of Soviet
electronic media and for the audiences of radio beamed
from abroad.
B. Summarizing the pattern of message
appearances in the media
For each theme in the scenario pass II computes a
conditional probability of theme exposure and a normalized
format factor for every message-individual pair. In other
words, pass II assigns message-response characteristics to
a base population which, heretofore, had been described
only in terms of its media-consumption traits. At this
point, if the researcher has no data indicating the possi-
bility of any departures from normal habits of media use
and message response during the period covered by the scenario,
then pass II can proceed directly to the computation of mes-
sage exposure probabilities. However, if the researcher
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does have some information on, or wishes to speculate
about, likely departures from normal media-use and
message-response behavior during the relevant period, then
pass II has the facility for incorporating these dynamics
into an otherwise static representation of a real popula-
tion. But, before we proceed to describe how this is done,
we must first discuss the scenario of media messages with
which the base population is ultimately confronted. For
it, is the nature of these messages themselves which fre-
quently dictates whether there are any deviations from
regular habits of media use and message response in the
base population.
1. Constructing a scenario of
media messages
The device that we use to describe and summarize
a stream of media messages over time is what. we refer to
as a scenario. In the present version of the simulation
the scenario is just a long list of messages, each one of
which is described by (1) its theme, (2) the time at which
it appears, (3) the medium in which it: appears, and (4) its
format.. The researcher divides the period of time en-
compassed by this stream of messages into a number of
intervals or time periods.l The scenario must list the
1Each of these may be an hour, a day, a week, a
month, etc., and the intervals need not be of equal dura-
tion.
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number of themes which it contains, the number of
time periods which it covers, and, for any theme,
the number of messages which convey that theme during
each time period. The list of messages in the scenario
is organized so that all messages conveying the first
theme appear first, all messages conveying the second
theme appear next, etc., and within-theme messages
are ordered chronologically. Each message in the
scenario is represented by two numbers. The first;,
an integer, is the identification number of the medi-
um in which the message appears. It may be the same
sequence number that was assigned to that medium in
pass I, or, if the researcher has decided to use some
subset of these media in the scenario, it will be the
new sequence number which he has assigned to that
medium in pass II. The second number associated with
each message is a positive fraction which represents
the relative attractiveness of that message's format
for the audience of the medium in which it appears.
We have been referring to this number as the mes-
sage's format factor. In order to illustrate how a
stream of media messages is summarized for simulation
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purposes, we present in Figure 3.9 a hypothetical scenario
of 23 messages conveying 3 themes over 5 time periods in
5 different media, with format factors ranging from 0.1 to
0.5.
2. Storage constraints
In describing pass I of the simulation we mentioned
the fact that a fixed storage capacity put practical limi-
tations on the number of media exposure probabilities which
could be processed by the computer in any given run. Since
the number of media exposure probabilities that have to be
estimated and stored is a direct product of the number of
persons and the number of media in the simulation, we were
forced to assign a maximum allowable value to each of these
parameters. As a result, pass I has been designed in such
a way that it can estimate each of up to 3,000 simulated
individuals' probabilities of being exposed to an average
issue of each of up to 64 simulated media. In pass II of
the simulation, however, a fixed storage capacity does not
put a direct limitation on the number of message exposure
probabilities which can be processed by the computer in any
given run, because all of these probabilities do not have
to be stored for the entirety of the run. Pass II computes
message exposure probabilities for one theme at a time,
There are 3 the
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cycling through all the simulated time periods before pro-
ceeding to the next theme in the scenario. Therefore, in
order to produce cumulative exposure statistics for any
theme at the end of each time period, the simulation need
only store, by time periods, the message exposure prob-
abilities for that theme.l So, in pass II, a fixed
storage capacity puts practical limitations on (1) the
number of message exposure probabilities that can be pro-
cessed by the computer for any given theme, and (2) the
number of simulated time periods over which they can be
processed. The number of message exposure probabilities
1Actually, the simulation has to store somewhat
more than this because it computes duplicated exposure to
the current theme and each of up to three other themes in
the scenario. These others must always be the first
themes in the scenario, so, in addition to storing the
message exposure probabilities for the current theme for
each time period, the simulation also has to store, for
the duration of the scenario, each individual's level of
exposure to each of the first three themes in the scenario
at the end of each time period. Nevertheless, the bulk of
the storage requirement is for the current theme's message
exposure probabilities.
2Although a fixed storage capacity imposes no con-
straints on the maximum number of themes that can be in-
cluded in any given run, the cost of computer processing
time can be a limiting factor here. When there are a
relatively large number of messages conveying any theme,.
say upwards of 1,000, we have found in practice that the
cost of including more than a few such themes in one run
is prohibitive. On the other hand, where there are only a
small number of messages conveying each theme, say less
than 100, many such themes can be included in one run at
a reasonable cost.
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that must be computed and stored for any given theme is a
direct product of the number of persons in the simulation
and the number of messages conveying that theme over the
period covered by the scenario. We have already assigned
a maximum allowable value to the former in pass I, so in
pass II we must assign a maximum allowable value to the
latter. We must also assign a maximum allowable value to
the number of simulated time periods which can be included
in any given run. Accordingly, pass II has been designed
in such a way that, for any given theme, it can estimate
each of up to 3,000 simulated individuals probabilities of
being exposed to each of up to 1,800 simulated messages
conveying that theme over as many as 60 simulated time
periods in any of up to 64 simulated media.
3. Summarizing patterns of message
appearance in Soviet media and in
radio broadcasts beamed to the
Soviet Union from abroad
In the Soviet case we made two... simulation runs
of pass II. In each run we assigned different message-
response characteristics to a computer-stored sample of
the Soviet population that had been produced by pass I, and
in each run we confronted the resulting base population
with a different scenario.
PAGES (S) MISSING FROM ORIGINAL
PAGES 301 AND 302 ARE MISSING
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The first run of pass II was made for the purpose
of simulating Soviet exposure to mass media messages dur-
ing the period of the Cuban missile crisis. We confronted
the sample computer population generated by pass I with a
scenario which summarized the results of a content
analysis of Soviet media material and of externally
originated radio broadcasts transmitted to the Soviet
Union during this period. The resulting scenario included
the following seven themes:
--The U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba
--Reports of pro-Soviet reactions
--Reports of pro-U.S. reactions
--U.S,. hostility towards Cuba
--Soviet agreement to remove their missiles
from Cuba
--U.S. threats directed at the Soviets
--Soviet threats directed at the U.S.
The second run of pass II was made for the purpose
of simulating Soviet exposure to mass media messages
during the aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination.
The scenario for this run summarized the results of a con-
tent analysis of the sources described above for the rele-
vant period. It included the following four themes:
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--The assassination of President Kennedy
--The swearing in of Johnson as President
--The assassination of Oswald
--The establishment of the Warren Commission
Each of these scenarios covered 10 time periods,
each one of which corresponded to 24 hours of Moscow Central
time. Specifically, they covered the periods running from
4:00 A.M. on October 23d to 4:00 A.M. on November 2d, 1962
and from 4:00 A.M. on November 22d to 4:00 A.M. on December
2d, 1963, respectively. Each scenario contained messages
in all 56 of the media from pass I and, in each, the aver-
age percentage of a medium's audience exposed to any theme
was set equal to 100 per cent, and all format factors and
ratios were assigned the realistic values that had been
estimated in the manner already described. Dynamic
factors were incorporated in the Cuban crisis simulation
to reflect the heightened rate of media consumption and the
increased attentiveness to crisis-related items which we
know to have occurred among the Soviet population between
the third and fifth days of that crisis. In the simula-
tion of Kennedy's assassination we used dynamic factors
to reflect an immediate and sizable upsurge in rates of
media consumption and an increased attentiveness to event-
related items, followed by a gradual return to normalcy in
both over succeeding days. We summarize both of these
scenarios in Figure 3.10.
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C. Modifying media-consumption traits
and message-response characteristics
We have described how media-consumption traits
and message-response characteristics are assigned to the
sample computer population, and we have also described the
nature of the message scenario with which that population
is ultimately confronted. There is one other task which
the simulation performs before this confrontation actually
takes place, and that is the superimposition of dynamic
potentialities on the base population's stable habits of
media use and message response. We now proceed to describe
just how this is done.
1. As a function of exposure
Often, in order to account for heightened or lowered
interest in a theme, the researcher may wish to increase or
In the present version of the simulation there are
two noncell-defining attributes: "class of consumer for
a given medium," which is assigned to individuals in pass I,
and "exposure history," which is built up for each simulated
-individual in pass II. We have designed the simulation so
that it can systematically modify an individual's media-
consumption traits and message-response characteristics on
the basis of his exposure history. But, because of the
complexity of pass II and the limitations of a fixed
storage capacity, we were unable to incorporate this same
feature as a function of the individual's consumer class
for a medium.
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decrease individual exposure probabilities depending upon
such matters as whether a person has been previously ex-
posed to the theme, his exposure to other themes, etc.
For example, we might have postulated that at the begin-
ning of the Cuban missile crisis Soviet citizens just
paid normal attention to the mass media, but that as soon
as they heard about Kennedy's speech, the American charges,
or the Soviet-American confrontation they became more
alert, paid more attention to news, and in particular
turned on foreign radio more. Thus, in the simulation,
as soon as people were first exposed to these key themes,
we would have wanted to raise their probabilities of
further exposure. The present version of the simulation
allows the researcher to make such modifications, i.e.,
to account for the kinds of changes in communications be-
havior which take place during any series of events such
as a crisis. For this purpose, when the sample computer
population is confronted with a scenario, we retain an
index of each person's level of exposure to a limited
number of themes which we shall hereafter refer to as
"trigger themes." The researcher is given the option of
modifying a person's probability of exposure to any theme
in the scenario as a function of the person's level of
previous exposure to that theme or to one or more of the
trigger themes.
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In the simulation we cannot retain each individual's
exact number of exposures for every theme and time period
because this would require an enormous computer storage
capacity. Therefore, we have restricted trigger themes to
(at most) the first three themes in a scenario, and we
have used exposure classes rather than exact numbers of
exposures to index each person's level of theme exposure.
In order to simulate triggering based on the person's ex-
posure class, the researcher must specify three levels of
exposure which define the boundaries of four exposure
classes. The lower boundary of the first exposure class
is taken as zero exposures and the upper boundary of the
fourth exposure class is taken as the total number of
messages conveying the particular trigger theme. For
example, if the researcher specifies 1, 2, and 3 exposures
as the boundaries of four exposure classes, the latter would
consist of 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, and 3-10 exposures, respectively,
for a theme conveyed by 10 messages. For each trigger theme
the researcher must also specify the exposure level (1, 2,
3, or 4) at which he wishes triggering to begin. The next
step is to specify the different kinds of trigger modifica-
tions, of which there-may be several. Each modification is
identified by (1) its direction and magnitude, (2) the
types of media for which it applies, (3) the subset of
population types or cells over which it acts, and (4) one
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or more probability types to which it is applied. We shall
discuss each of these in turn.
a) Specifying the direction of magnitude
of a modification
If the researcher wishes to increase probabilities
on the basis of a person's exposure class, he specifies
the direction and the magnitude of this increase as a func-
tion of the current probability level by indicating what
he desires to be the new values of the 0.5 and 0.0 prob-
abilities. If he wishes to decrease probabilities on the
basis of a person's exposure class, he specifies the new
values of the 0.5 and 1.0 probabilities. By fitting a
parabolic curve to these two parameters the simulation
computes the new values of all probabilities between 0.0
and 1.0 in such a way as to approximate a ceiling or floor
effect. An example of how this would be done is shown in
Figure 3.11.
b) Specifying the types of media
for which a modification applies
For triggering purposes the-researcher may define
as many as six different types of media and each trigger
modification may apply to any number of these media types.
(New probability)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I
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Fig. 3.11--Modifying exposure probabilities quadratically to account for
ceiling or floor effects.
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It is important to note here that the media types defined
for trigger modifications need not be coterminous with
any of the media types that were defined for the purpose
of specifying ratios of average theme-exposure probabilities
on adjacent dimension levels. However, the media types
specified for triggering purposes are the types by which
the simulation ultimately prints out exposure statistics
after the sample computer population has been confronted
with the scenario. 
c) Specifying the types of persons
for which a modification applies
The population cells over which any trigger modifi-
cation acts are specified by first listing all the popula-
tion dimensions involved in any modification and then
listing the sequence numbers for the cells involved in
each individual modification. The overall sequence is
established on the basis of the order in which the dimen-
sions were first listed, varying the levels of the last-
named dimension most rapidly, etc. For example, if "sex"
(male, female) and 'political involvement" (Communist,
1At, the outset of pass II the researcher specifies
the cells or cell-aggregates (e.g., "age" x "sex," "sex" x
"education," and "age" x "sex" x "political involvement")
and the media types (e.g., "newspapers" or media 1-32,
"radio" or media 33-42, and "television" or media 43-46) by
which he wishes exposure statistics printed out.
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nonCommunist) were the only two dimensions affected by a
particular trigger modification, then the sequence of
cells would be as follows: (1) male, Communist; (2) male
nonCommunist; (3) female Communist; (4) female nonCommunist.
d) Specifying the types of probabilities
for which a modification applies
There are three types of exposure probabilities
for which any trigger modification can apply: (1) the
individual's pass I probability of exposure to a medium;
(2) the individual's pass II conditional probability of
exposure to a theme in its most attractive format; (3) the
triple product of (1) and (2) and the message's format
factor. A given trigger modification may apply to any one
of these three probabilities, to any two of them, or to all
three.
Finally, it is important to note that, when more
than one trigger theme is specified, probabilities are
modified on an "or" basis. If a person is above the ex-
posure threshhold for trigger theme 1 or 2 or 3, his
probability is modified.
2. As a function of time
Frequently, a researcher may wish to account for
increased or decreased interest in a theme by modifying
313
exposure probabilities as a function of time, i.e., as a
function of the stage of the scenario, rather than on the
basis of individual exposure histories. In this case he
simply specifies any number greater than four as the ex-
posure class at which probability modifications begin for
each trigger theme. Because only four exposure classes
are allowed in the simulation, this signals no modifications
of exposure probabilities on the basis of individual expo-
sure histories. He also specifies a number of time periods,
which we shall hereafter refer to as "trigger times," in
such a way as to identify the time at which each modifica-
tion begins, its duration, and the time at which it ends.
In the present version of the simulation three trigger
"pulses" can be used. Each pulse requires the specifica-
tion of four trigger times. The first specifies when all
trigger modifications will be initiated, the second defines
the time period by which all probabilities being modified
will have reached their new values, as specified by the
type of quadratic function described in Figure 3.11 above.
The third trigger time determines when the simulation will
begin to return these probabilities to their original
values, and the fourth determines when they will have re-
turned to their original values. In Figure 3.12 we illus-
trate how three trigger pulses can be established this way
in the simulation.
Trigger times specified: 1 2 3 4
pulse 1
4 6 7 9
pulse 2
9 10 11 12
pulse 3
% of the Full
Modification
100 -
50 - t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Time Period
Fig. 3.12--Modifying exposure probabilities as a function of time.
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When a pulse takes more than one time period to
reach the full extent of its effect on probabilities, the
amount of change which the simulation produces in prob-
abilities is linear with time periods. In the second
pulse appearing in Figure 3.12, for example, probabilities
are raised one-half the specified amount in time period
five and lowered one-half the specified amount in time
period eight. Time-dependent probability modifications are
associated with media types, population cells, and prob-
ability types in the same fashion as exposure-dependent
modifications.
3. As a function of exposure and time
It may be that a researcher wishes to modify ex-
posure probabilities both as a function of the individual's
exposure history and of the stage of the scenario. Each
such modification can have only one magnitude and direc-
tion that, applies to exposure- and time-dependent changes
alike. During the beginning phase of a trigger pulse (i.e.,
on the upslope) all individuals who reach one of the thresh-
hold exposure classes hav.,e their probabilities fully trans-
formed to the new values, regardless of what part of the
way they may have already been triggered as a function of
time. During this phase any individuals who have not had
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their exposure probabilities modified as a function of
exposure class when a trigger time is at hand have their
probabilities modified at that time by an amount which
is some proportion of the full magnitude of the trigger
modification. This proportion is a linear function of
time, as we mentioned above. During the return phase of
a trigger pulse (i.e., on the downslope) probabilities
are modified only as a function of time. Figure 3.13
illustrates some patterns that can result under this set
of decision rules. The dashed lines represent modifica-
tions of exposure probabilities as a function of exposure
class and the solid lines represent modifications as a
function of time.
D. Computing message exposure probabilities
In the final part of pass II the base population
is confronted with the scenario. For each theme in the
scenario the simulation cycles through simulated time
periods, pairing each message which carries the theme with
each person in the sample computer population. For any
message-individual pair the simulation looks up or
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calculates all the factors that affect the exposure prob-
ability for the pair. It does this in the following way:
Using the individual's identification number, the simula-
tion obtains his pass I probability of being exposed to
the medium in which the message appears. Using the
individual's cell number, the simulation obtains his
pass II probability of being exposed to the theme in its
most, attractive format, given that he is exposed to the
medium in which it appears. Then, the simulation uses the
identification number of the medium in which the message
appears, the individual's cell number, his exposure class
with regard to any and all trigger themes, and the time
period to determine (1) whether there is any trigger
modification for the message-individual pair, and (2) if
there is, what the magnitude of the change factor is and
to which probability types it applies. If there is a
trigger modification for the pair, then the simulation
applies the appropriate change factor, either to the
individual's pass I exposure probability for the medium,
to his pass II conditional probability of exposure to
the theme in its most attractive format, to the triple
product of these two probabilities and the message's
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normalized format factor, or to any combination of these
three probabilities. The simulation then stores, as the
exposure probability for the message-individual pair,
the resulting triple product of the pass I media exposure
probability, the pass II conditional message exposure
probability, and the normalized format factor. If there
is no trigger modification for a message-individual pair,
then the simulation stores, as the exposure probability
for the pair, the triple product of the pass I prob-
ability, the pass II probability, and the normalized
format factor which it initially obtained for the pair.
The simulation follows this same basic procedure to com-
pute, for each theme in the scenario, the exposure prob-
ability for every message-individual pair. In Figure 3.14
we illustrate the method by means of a flow diagram.
III. Summary of pass II
At this point it seems appropriate to review the
principal tasks undertaken in pass II of the simulation.
We do this by means of the following outline:
Pick theme i|
Pick time J
t 
Pick message k 
(in medium m)
I Pick individual 
Compute PI (k) 
Record outcomefc'me
If < max I = + 1
If k < max k
If j < max j
If i < max i
Fig. 3.14--Computing exposure probabilities for each
individual pairs.
theme's message-
(1) Get individual Z's pass I exposure probability
for the medium (m) in which message k appears: P (m)
(2) Get individual 's pass II conditional exposure
probability for the most attractive message
format (k') of theme i in the medium where
message k appears: Pg(k'lm)
(3) Get message k's normalized format factor: Fk
(4) Get any change factor for individual , for
the type of medium in which message k
appears, for time period j, for theme i: Cijkkm
(5) P (k) = P(m) x P (k' m) x Fk{Cijkm
I j=j+l 
i =i+ 1 
7
_
tk =k + 
tto
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A. Distribute message-response characteristics
over each simulated medium's audience.
1. Use the cross-product technique to create
a sample computer audience of each theme in
its most attractive format in each medium,
an audience over which demographic and so-
cial traits are distributed in a manner
that is compatible with all reported theme-
response data on those traits.
2. Obtain from this procedure the sizes of the
simulated media's audiences of each theme
(in its most attractive format) to be
assigned to each cell, i.e., the mean theme-
exposure probabilities in each cell for the
members of each simulated medium's audience.
3. Normalize the format factors for each theme
with respect to its largest format--linearly
if the largest format factor does not produce
a theme audience greater than a medium's
audience, quadratically (with ceiling effects)
if the largest format, factor does produce a
theme audience greater than a medium's audi-
ence--in a manner compatible with all reported
format-response data.
4. Obtain from this procedure a normalized
format factor for every format for each
theme in the scenario.
B. Summarize a pattern of message appearances in
the media.
1. Read in the summary properties of a scenario
of messages in the media and read in the
messages ordered by theme, and, for each
theme, ordered by time period, in accordance
with the results of a content analysis.
2. Obtain from this procedure a scenario of
media messages, each of which is identified
by the theme it conveys, the time period
during which it appears, the medium in which
it appears, and its format.
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C. Modify the sample computer population's stable
media-consumption traits and message-response
characteristics.
1. For each theme in the scenario read in
(1) the exposure classes for any other
theme to which exposure triggers modifica-
tions in this theme's exposure probabilities,
(2) the magnitude and direction of each such
modification, (3) the types of media to
which each applies, (4) the types of persons
to which each applies, and (5) the probabil-
ity types to which each applies.
2. For each theme in the scenario obtain from
this procedure a change factor for each
probability modification based on exposure
level.
3. For each theme in the scenario read in the
trigger times which describe the shape of
each trigger pulse (the same for all themes)
based on time period.
4. For each theme in the scenario obtain from
this procedure a change factor for each
probability modification based on time.
D. Compute message exposure probabilities
1. Confront the sample computer population with
the scenario, i.e., for each theme (1) cycle
through simulated time periods, pairing each
message with each individual, (2) look up
the individual's pass I probability of ex-
posure to the medium, the individual's pass
II conditional probability of exposure to
the theme in its most attractive format, the
message's normalized format factor, and any
change factor, and (3) compute the exposure
probability for the pair as the triple
product of the pass I probability, the pass
II probability, and the format factor, after
they have been suitably modified by the change
factor.
2. For every theme in the scenario obtain from
this procedure the exposure probability for
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every message-individual pair in each simu-
lated time period.
A. Pass II and the availability of content analysis
and audience response data
In reviewing the principal tasks undertaken in
pass II we should emphasize that;, like pass I, the second
pass of the simulation is also designed to work with
varying amounts of data, i.e., to operate in data-rich and
data-poor situations. Pass II estimates each simulated
individual's probability of being exposed to each message
in a simulated medium by using whatever data are available
(1) on the behavior of the media's audience members and
(2) on the pattern of message appearances in the media.
For example, pass II requires information on the response
of the media's audience members to each type of theme in
the scenario, but it can accept this data in varying
amounts and forms. For each theme the user may specify
the average percentage of a medium's audience exposed
and, for the media's audience members, ratios of average
theme-exposure probabilities on adjacent levels of every
population dimension, or he may beg the question of a
theme's average attractiveness (i.e., set it. equal to
100 per cent of a medium's audience and have format. fac-
tors reflect the influence of the theme as well as its
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format, as explained above) and specify ratios of average
theme-exposure probabilities on as little as one popula-
tion dimension. Regardless of how little or how much
response data is specified for a given theme, the simula-
tion will use it to distribute the media's audiences of
the theme in its most attractive format; across cells in
such a way that the resulting conditional exposure prob-
abilities in each cell are compatible with whatever re-
sponse data havebeen specified for the theme.
The simulation's technique for summarizing the
pattern of message appearances in media is another example
of its ability to work with data in varying amounts and
forms. Each message in the scenario is identified by its
content, the time at which it appears, the medium in which
it appears, and its format. Thus, depending on the number
of messages in which the researcher is interested and on
the comprehensiveness of his content analysis and format-
response data, each individual message in the scenario may
represent (1) a distinct "message event," such as a
Khruhschev speech broadcast on Moscow Central Radio, program
I, between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M., October 25, 1962, or (2) many
message events which are treated as essentially the same,
such as an editorial in any republic level Komsomol paper
telling of the Soviet agreement to remove their missiles
from Cuba.
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Finally, the way in which the simulation super-
imposes dynamic factors on stable habits of media use and
message response is a good example of its capacity to deal
with varying kinds and amounts of information. If the
researcher has no information about these dynamics during
the period covered by the scenario, the simulation can
estimate exposure outcomes purely on the basis of the
parent population's stable predispositions that have al-
ready been assigned to members of the sample computer popu-
lation. But if the researcher does have some idea of how
exposure probabilities may have changed during the relevant,
period, the simulation can accept this kind of data in forms
ranging from the sketchiest to the most detailed. For ex-
ample, the researcher can specify as little as one trigger
modification (say, by level of exposure to one trigger
theme) which applies to one type of medium, one type of
person, and one type of exposure probability. Or he can
specify a large number of trigger modifications, some by
exposure level, others by time period. The exposure-level
modifications can each be triggered by different. trigger
themes and exposure thresholds, and the time period modifi-
cations can each have different magnitudes. Each modifica-
tion can be associated with a different type of medium and
can apply to different types of persons and exposure prob-
abilities.
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B. Inputs required
The following kinds of data are required as inputs
for pass II of the simulation:
--For each theme in the scenario, audience-
response data which indicate the average
proportion of a medium's audience exposed
to the theme (optional);
--For each theme in the scenario, audience-
response data which indicate, for one or
more types of media, the relative likelihood
of audience members on each pair of adjacent
levels of each population dimension being ex-
posed to a given appearance of the theme;
--For each theme in the scenario, format-
response data which, for any format in any
medium, indicate either (1) the average per-
centage of that medium's audience exposed
to the theme in that format divided by the
average percentage of that medium's audience
exposed to the theme, or (2) the average per-
centage of that medium's audience exposed to
the theme in that format;
--A scenario of messages derived from content
analysis data in such a way that each message
is described by the theme it conveys, its
time of appearance, the medium in which it
appears, and its format;
--For each theme in the scenario, data on, or
hypotheses about, departures from normal
habits of media use and message response
during the period covered by the scenario;
these data or hypotheses must specify the
magnitudes and directions of all such changes,
the themes and exposure levels by which these
changes are triggered, and the types of media,
persons, and exposure probabilities for which
each such modification applies (optional).
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C. Outputs produced
The following output statistics are produced by
pass II of the simulation:
--For each theme in the scenario, the percentage
of a medium's audience attracted to the theme
in its most attractive format;, as implied by
the largest format factor and the size of the
average theme audience read in;
--For each theme in the scenario, the mean con-
ditional exposure probability assigned to
each cell for each medium, on the basis of the
percentage of the medium's audience exposed to
the theme in its most attractive format and
the ratios of conditional theme-exposure
probabilities on adjacent dimension levels
read in for that type of medium.
The final set of output statistics produced by
pass II are the most important ones in the simulation be-
cause they describe the actual exposure consequences of
confronting the sample computer population with the
scenario. They therefore merit some discussion.
The simulation program can generate an enormous
number of exposure probabilities if we ask for them. For
example, in a simulation which uses the maximum allowable
parameter values for the number of persons and the number
of messages, the program can print out, for each theme in
the scenario, each -of 3,000 individuals' exposure prob-
abilities for 1,800 messages, which amounts to 5,400,000
individual exposure probabilities. This much data is
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clearly unassimilable, but even if it somehow could be
assimilated, it would not be very useful in the form of
exposure probabilities. As a result, we were faced with
two problems in designing the portion of pass II which
produces exposure-related output statistics. The first
problem was to limit the maximum number of raw figures
that would be printed out for any given analysis, and the
second was to design an output routine which would not
simply produce the exposure probabilities for message-
individual pairs but would instead produce functions of
those probabilities which provided a more macroscopic
description of exposure outcomes.
Clearly, the most general solution to these prob-
lems would have been to store the exposure probabilities
computed for all message-individual pairs, either on the
disc or on tapes, and to design an all-purpose "output
analyzer" which could provide the researcher with any
exposure statistic he desired, as long as it was some
mathematical function of the individual exposure probabil-
ities. Unfortunately, the pressures of our research schedule
prevented us from undertaking this important (but time-
consuming) task. As a result, the present version of pass
II is designed to print out the same basic set of exposure
statistics on every run. We now proceed to describe how
this set was chosen.
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We have limited the number of raw figures that
can be printed out at, the end of pass II by decreasing the
person and message multipliers in the following ways:
(1) Instead of printing out the exposure statistics for
each theme by individual persons,we print them out by
types of persons, i.e., by cells or cell-aggregates.
(2) Instead of printing out the exposure statistics for
each theme by individual messages, we print them out by
types of messages, i.e., by message-aggregates in a given
medium or type of medium. We have insured that the output
of pass II is a macroscopic description of exposure out-
comes for any theme by computing the expected values of
various exposure statistics for that theme from the ex-
posure probabilities for all its message-individual pairs
and by printing out these statistics instead of the ex-
posure probabilities at the end of pass II. But even with
the adoption of these techniques for reducing the universe
of possible output statistics, the number of alternatives
from which we had to choose was enormous. This can be
seen from a simple substructuring of what may be thought of
as the property space of "exposure to media messages," as
illustrated in Figure 3.15. From this figure the reader
can generate (as we did) most of the possible kinds of
exposure statistics and compare them with the subset we
have chosen to print out in the present version of the
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simulation. The latter are, for each theme and every time
period, as follows:
--the number of exposures by medium (i.e., during
the time period);
--the cumulative number of exposures by medium
(i.e., through the time period);
--the number of exposures by type of medium;
--the cumulative number of exposures by type of
medium;
--the number in, and percentage of, each cell or
cell-aggregate exposed;
--the cumulative number in, and percentage of,
each cell or cell aggregate exposed;
--the number in, and percentage of, each cell or
cell-aggregate exposed, by type of medium;
--the cumulative number in, and percentage of,
each cell or cell-aggregate exposed, by type
of medium;
--the average and total number of exposures in
each cell or cell-aggregate, by type of medium;
--the cumulative average and total number of ex-
posures in each cell or cell-aggregate, by type
of medium;
--the cumulative number in, and percentage of,
each cell or cell-aggregate exposed to the
current theme and theme (1,2,3).
D. Basic assumptions
Some of the more important assumptions which under-
lie pass II of the Comcom simulation model include the fol-
lowing:
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1. For any theme, the typically reported
empirical percentage of the audience of a
given type of medium exposed to that theme
is an average over all types of messages
conveying that theme in all media of that
type.
2. For any theme, the typically obtainable
empirical ratios of conditional theme-
exposure probabilities on adjacent levels
of any dimension for a given appearance of
that. theme in a particular type of medium
are roughly constant over all types of
messages conveying that theme in all media
of that type.
3. When the individual probabilities of each
person in a population being exposed to
each message in a scenario are used to
compute the expected values of aggregate
exposure statistics within various popula-
tion groupings, the resulting figures ap-
proximately equal the maximum likelihood
estimates of the empirical values.
In this chapter and in the one which preceded it
we have focused our attention on the various statistical
algorithms and computer procedures which make up the
Comcom simulation model. We are now ready to describe
how this model was used to simulate Soviet mass media
exposure.
CHAPTER IV
DISTRIBUTING SOVIET DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL, AND MEDIA-CONSUMPTION
TRAITS OVER A SAMPLE COMPUTER POPULATION
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CHAPTER IV
DISTRIBUTING SOVIET DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL, AND MEDIA-CONSUMPTION
TRAITS OVER A SAMPLE COMPUTER POPULATION
Introduction
In this chapter we will describe how the first pass of the
simulation was applied to available data on the Soviet media system--
data on the population, the media which circulated among them, and
the audiences of those media--to produce a computer-stored sample
of the 1962-63 Soviet population. From our discussion in Chapter II
the reader will recall that the first step of this procedure was to
distribute exposure-related demographic and social traits over a
sample computer population in the same way that they were distributed
over the 1962-63 Russian population. We now proceed to describe how
that was done.
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Distributing Soviet Demographic and Social
Traits Over A Sample Computer Population
Choosing a population base
Our initial objective was to construct a simulation population
consisting of a number of hypothetical individuals distributed across
all the "types" or "cells" formed by cross-classifying Soviet
attributes that had been identified as relevant to the process of
mass media exposure. Any cell would then contain a group of people
identically defined, such as young, college-educated, urban, male
members of the Communist Party.
The best available description of the 1962-63 Soviet population
1
was the 1959 all-Union census. Table 4.1 shows the marginal percent-
age breakdowns, on five attributes, of the adult (sixteen or more
1The Comcom Leisure Study interview lasted between two and two
and one-half hours and was based on a schedule containing mainly closed
questions. Professor Pool and members of the Comcom staff devised the
questionnaire, which placed most of its emphasis on communications
behavior. Between 1964 and 1967 a total of fifteen interviewers ad-
ministered 112 of these schedules, in four languages, to Soviet
emigres and visitors to Western Europe. For her Ph.D. thesis Dr.
Rosemarie Rogers performed a secondary analysis of 107 of these inter-
views, eliminating five of the coded schedules for various reasons.
We have based some of the simulation parameter estimates on statistics
adduced by Rogers in this analysis. Because of the small size of the
sample, it seemed advisable that all parameter estimates derived from
the Comcom Leisure Study data should rest on the same set of interview
schedules. Therefore, we performed our own secondary analysis of the
Leisure Study data on the same 107 schedules used by Rogers, even
though eight additional interviews had been completed in the interim.
Table 4.1--Marginal percentage breakdowns, on five dimensions, of
the Leisure Study sample and of the adult population of
the Soviet Union as described by the 1959 census.a
Dimension Leisure Study Sample Soviet Population
(N=107) (N=145, 331, 288)
Sex
70
30
Male
Female
Age
16-29
30-49
50+
36
44
20
Education
<4 yrs.
>4, <7 yrs.
>7, 10 yrs.
>10
0
12
48
40
Political Involvement
Party Member
NonParty Member
Residence
Urban
Rural
10
90
79
21
Taken from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," p. 19.
42
58
36
37
27
34
28
34
4
6
94
50
50
_.__________ __ _I___ __ _ _ _ ___ __ __I_ ___ _ I__ _ _ ______
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years of age) Soviet population as described by the 1959 census, and
of the Comcom Leisure Study sample, from which most of our audience
breakdowns were estimated.1 It is clear from this comparison that
urbanites, the better educated, and males were significantly over-
represented in the Leisure Study sample, while older people and Party
members were slightly underrepresented. People with less than four
years of education were not represented at all. Our ultimate object-
ive was to convert the simulation results to exposure statistics for
the 1962-63 Soviet population. Therefore, because of the unrepresent-
ativeness of the Leisure Study sample, we used 1959 all-Union census
figures, updated for the period 1962-63, to model the Soviet
simulation population. Audience breakdowns derived from the Leisure
Study interviews were, of course, adjusted appropriately for this
different base population. We were then able to equate the simulation
outputs with hypothetical rates of exposure in various subgroups of
the Russian population.
Dimensions selected
For the Cuban crisis and Kennedy assassination simulations
we would have liked to construct a sample computer population which
reproduced, in microcosm, the distribution of the 1962-63 Soviet
population across cells formed by'all the attributes or dimensions
significantly related to mass media exposure. However, our choice
-lItogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naselyeniya 1959 goda; SSSR (results
of the 1959 All-Union Census of the U.S.S.R.) (Moscow: Gosstatizdat,
1962).
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of dimensions (and levels) was also constrained in the following
ways:
1. If a dimension (such as eduation) or a dimension level
(such as members of the Communist Party) was felt to be
of particular explanatory value with regard to Soviet
audience behavior, then we made every effort to
include it among the population dimensions or dimension
levels.
2. Dimensions and levels were restricted to those for which
sufficient data was available to estimate the distribution
of the population across cells.
3. Dimensions and levels were chosen in such a way that
the product of the number of levels of each dimension
did not exceed the 500-cell capacity of the simulation
programs.
Bearing these considerations in mind, the dimensions (and levels)
with which we chose to describe the Soviet simulation population
were: sex (male, female), age (16-29, 30-49, 50+), education
(<4 yrs., 4 <7 yrs., >7, 10 yrs., >10 yrs.), political involvement
(Party member, nonParty member), and residence (urban, rural).
Describing the broad outlines of the Soviet mass media system
in Chapter I, we cited the results of the Harvard study and a
Komsomolskaya pravda poll as evidence that three dimensions--
education, political involvement, and urban or rural residence--were
among the most important determinants of a Soviet citizen's exposure
to international news. In reviewing these two studies we found,
for the period 1962-63, that
--frequencies of exposure to newspapers, magazines, tele-
vision, and radio beamed from abroad increased with level
of education as did the range of these types of media
consumed,
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--a favorable attitude toward the Communist regime and a
willingness to be politically involved were positively
correlated with media consumption, and
--frequencies and ranges of exposure with regard to
magazines, domestic radio, television, the oral
agitation network, and radio beamed from abroad were
higher among urbanites than among ruralites (although
these differences were diminishing over time).
The results of the Leisure Study interviews, which, as we have
said, provided the basis for many of our estimated audience break-
downs, also showed the effects of education and political involvement
on media exposure (Tables 4.2 and 4.3).
The findings of the Leisure Study interviews, the Harvard study,
and the Komsomolskaya pravda poll indicated that sex and age differ-
ences with regard to media exposure were smaller than the differences
associated with education, political involvement, and residence.
Dimensions rejected
The 1959 census recorded another dimension--"social group"--
which we knew was significantly related to Soviet audience behavior.
-Because the Soviet base population has been described by sex
and age, a researcher (using the Comcom model) can incorporate in a
simulation any data he may have on changes in habits of media use
as a function of either variable. For example, if he were simulating
the Soviet population's exposure to a series of newspaper articles
about the possibility of lowering the age at which young men had to
serve in the Russian army, he could incorporate in the simulation
any notions he had about the extent to which males in the relevant
age group might become more prone to read newspapers carrying these
articles.
Table 4.2--Percentage of the Leisure Study sample reporting exposure
to newspapers, magazines, and television, by education.a
Newspapers Magazines
(% who read every issue or most
issues of at least one)Education
Television
(% ho watched at
least several times
per month)
Higher (>10 yrs.) 91 79 56
Secondary (10 yrs.) 83 71 48
Less than
Secondary (<10 yrs.) 81 60 35
aTaken from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 55 and 110.
Party members are not included in the tabulation.
Table 4.3--Average number of newspapers and magazines to which Leisure
Study respondents reported regular exposurea and percentage
of the Leisure Study sample reporting access to television,
by political involvement.b
Political
Involvement
Newspapers Magazines Television
(Av. no. read--every issue or most issues) (% who had access)
Party Members 2.1 2.9 73c
NonParty Members 1.5 1.3 58
aBy "regular exposure" is meant that they read every issue or
most issues of the publication.
Calculated from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 52 and 105.
COnly respondents living in an area covered by a television
network are included.
.___ __ __ __ I _ __ __ I __ ___ I
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The importance of "social group" lay in the obvious relationship to
"occupational standing, an attribute identified, in our review of the
literature in Chapter I, as a key determinant of Soviet media consump-
tion. We would therefore have liked to describe the simulation
population by the "social group" dimension in such a way that all
the occupations on a given level of this dimension could be expected
to have a similar effect on media exposure, an effect which differed
from that of the occupations on any other level. We could easily
have done this by redefining the levels of the "social group"
dimension in the Soviet census, if the occupations on each of them
had been clearly specified. Unfortunately, this was not the case.
The 1959 all-Union census is inconsistent in the number of criteria
that are used to define different social groups: for two groups
(independent farmers and collective farmers) it uses organization of
work plus occupation. One of the social groups not defined by
occupation--collective farmers--encompasses a number of occupations,
ranging all the way from field workers to administrative-managerial
personnel, and the results of at least one Soviet study show (not
surprisingly) that these occupational sub-groups differ significantly
in their communications behavior. But the Soviet census gives us
«A. S. Duchal, "Izmenyeniye strucktura rabochevo i soobodnovo
vremeni krestyan za gody sovyetskoy vlasti" (Changes in the Structure
of Working and Free Time of Peasants in the Years of Soviet Power"),
Voprosi Filosofiyi, No. 4 (1965), 74-80, cited in Rogers, "The Soviet
Audience," p. 303, n. 1. The reader is referred to Appendix C of
Rogers' thesis, pp. 300-304, for a more detailed analysis of the
problems occasioned by the definition of social groups used in the
1959 Soviet census.
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no information on the breakdown of collective farmers by occupation.
For this reason we decided not to use "social group" as a cell-
defining attribute of the Soviet simulation population.
We also considered describing the Soviet simulation population
by two other dimensions recorded in the 1959 census--"native language"
and "republic of residence." It is easy to envision communications
scenarios in which one or the other of these attributes could become
an important determinant of media exposure. However, for a combina-
tion of reasons, we decided not to describe the simulation population
by either of these attributes. We were not so much interested in
native language as in language of media consumption and there were
some serious methodological problems in determining the latter from
a knowledge of the former. However, even if we could have done so,
the number of levels on this dimension--15 major nationality languages--
when multiplied by the number of levels on each of the other dimen-
sions, would have exceeded the 500-cell capacity of the simulation
programs. Of course, the same was true of the 15 levels on the
republic-of-residence dimension. However, two alternatives which
might be explored in future Soviet simulations are (1) the use of a
three-level language-of-media-consumption attribute (reading,
listening, and viewing in Russian; reading in Russian, but listening,
and viewing in some other language; reading, listening and viewing
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in some language other than Russian)l ad (2) the use of either a
two-level (RSFSR, nonRSFSR) or a six-level (RSFSR, Kazakhstan,
Central Asian, Transcaucasian, Baltic, European) republic-of-
residence attribute. We lacked the audience breakdowns for media
and themes that would have been required as inputs if we had
incorporated the two variables as cell-defining attributes in these
ways.
Using the Mosteller technique to construct a sample
computer population
As mentioned above, the dimensions (and levels) chosen to
describe the Soviet simulation population were sex (male, female),
age (16-29, 30-49, 50+), education (<4 yrs. ; >,4, <7 yrs.; >,7, 10 yrs.;
>10 yrs.), political involvement (Party member, nonParty member), and
residence (urban, rural). This combination of dimensions and levels
divided the population into 2x3x4x2x2 = 96 types or cells. Four of
the five dimensions were recorded in the 1959 all-Union census.
Extrapolating these figures we obtained the approximate distribution
of the 1963 adult population of the Soviet Union by sex, age,
JWe could reduce the language variable to three levels by
assuming that in 1963 a negligible proportion of the Soviet population
consumed Russian-language electronic media and non-Russian-language
printed media. The bases for this assumption would be that
(1) it required greater fluency in Russian (as in any other language)
to listen to and understand a news broadcast in that language than
to read and comprehend news stories printed in Russian, and (2) the
direction of language change or adoption in the Soviet Union was
from the nationality languages to Russian.
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education and residence (Table 4.4).1 The fifth dimension chosen
to describe the Soviet simulation population, membership or non-
membership in the Communist Party, was recorded in an article
appearing in a 1964 issue of the Party theoretical journal Partinaya
zhizn. From this article we obtained the distributions of the 1963
adult Soviet population by political involvement and sex, political
involvement and age, and political involvement and education (Table 4.5).
The 1959 all-Union census covered an adult Soviet population numbering
145,331,288. After this population base was enlarged to match the
estimated average size of the 1963 adult Soviet population, the extra-
polated census figures encompassed a population of 155,000,000. 
Dividing this number by the 96 cells gave an average of 1.6 million
members of the Soviet population per cell. Of course, the actual cell
IThe two events we were simulating occurred in October of 1962
and November of 1963 respectively. It seemed reasonable to assume
that the marginal breakdown of the adult Soviet population on each
of the variables of interest had not changed significantly between
the time of the 1959 census and November of 1963. It also seemed
reasonable to assume that the 1963 Soviet population, mapped into
computer storage, would provide as suitable a base population for
the October 1962 scenario as for the November 1963 scenario. We
made a similar assumption with regard to audience sizes for the
various media, using for both scenarios estimates derived from 1963
circulation and set figures.
"The C.P.S.U. In Figures (1961-64)."
3Between 1959 and 1963 the total Soviet population grew from
208.8 to 22:3.1 million persons. Assuming roughly the same propor-
tional growth in the adult population over this period, in 1963 it
would have numbered (223.1/208.8) x 145,331,288 - 155 million persons
(Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 godu [National Economy of the
USSR in 1964] [Moscow: Izdatyel'stvo "Statistika," 1965], p. 7).
Table 4.4--Distribution of the adult population of the Soviet Union
by sex, age, education, and residence according to the
1959 census.a
Male Marginal Female Marginal
Education Totals Totals
16-29 30-49 50+ 16-29 30-49 50+
Urban
<4 yrs. 0.4 3%b 0.81% 1.63% 2.87% 0.46% 2.63% 5.11% 8.20%
>4,<7 yrs. 3.01 2.87 1.24 7.12 1.96 3.08 1.30 6.34
>7,<10 yrs. 5.20 3.70 0.82 9.72 6.31 4.73 0.90 11.94
>10 yrs. 0.63 0.73 0.34 1.70 0.88 0.74 0.19 1.81
Marginal
Totals 9.27 8.11 4.03 21.41 9.61 11.18 7.50 28.29
Rural
<4 yrs. 1.18% 1.64% 3.68% 6.50% 1.74% 4.94% 9.04% 15.72%
>4,<7 yrs. 3.62 2.94 1.28 7.84 2.92 3.24 0.74 6.90
>7,<10 yrs. 3.91 2.10 0.26 6.27 4.08 2.12 0.14 6.34
>10 yrs. 0.11 0.22 0.05 0.38 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.35
Marginal
Totals 8.82 6.90 5.27 20.99 8.90 10.47 9.94 29.31
aCalculated from: Kramer, "The Population of the Soviet Union,"
Table I. (Kramer adjusted the 1959 census figures for the age breakdown
16-29.)
bThe entries are percentages of the total population (N=145,.
331, 288).
Table 4.5--Distributions of the adult population of the Soviet Union
by political involvement and sex, political involvement
and age, and political involvement and education in 1 9 6 3 .a
Party NonParty Marginal
Member Member Totals
Male 4 .5 6%b 37.88% 42.44%
Female 1.11 56.45 57.56
Marginal
Totals 5.67 94.33 100.00
16-29 1.12% 35.50% 36.62%
30-49 3.21 33.41 36.62
50+ 1.34 25.42 26.76
Marginal
Totals 5.67 94.33 100.00
<4 yrs. 0.00% 33.20% 33.20%
>4,<7 yrs. 1.58 26.61 28.19
~7,10 yrs. 3.15 31.10 34.25
>10 yrs. 0.94 3.42 4.36
Marginal
Totals 5.67 94.33 100.00
aCalculated from: "The C.P.S.U. In Figures (1961-64)."
bThe entries are percentages of the estimated population in 1963
(N=155, 000, 000).
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sizes varied both well above and well below this average figure, but
it is obvious that we were estimating the sizes of most cells from
very large census categories. In fact, our problem was to assign
computer individuals to cells in such a way that the resulting five-
dimensional table, if collapsed appropriately, would reproduce the
cell frequencies in each of the empirical subtables described above.
The reader will recall that this is one of the kinds of assignment
problems for which we described the application of the Mosteller
technique in Chapter II (p. , condition 1). Accordingly, we used
this iterative assignment procedure to construct a five-dimensional
computer representation of the 1963 Soviet population from one of its
four-dimensional subtables and three of its two-dimensional subtables.
In order to reduce the variance caused by stochastic procedures of
the simulation (such as the approximation of cell means by the random
assignment of probabilities to cells) we chose the size of the
simulation population to be 1,200 computer individuals distributed
across 96 cells or population types. Table 4.6 compares the actual
marginal percentage breakdowns, on each dimension, of the 1963 adult
Soviet population with the corresponding breakdowns produced by the
Mosteller technique in the sample computer population. It can be seen
that the marginal percentage breakdowns of the simulation population
and the Soviet population are virtually identical on each dimension.!
4Among the five dimensions of our simulation population there
were
5C1 + 5C2 + 5C3 + 5C4 + 5C5 or 5 + 10 + 10 + 5 + 1 = 31
possible interactions. Having been able to estimate one four-dimensional
Table 4.6--Marginal percentage breakdowns, on cell-defining dimensions,
of the 1963 adult Soviet population and of the simulation
population.
Dimension Soviet Populationa Simulation Populationb
(N=155,000,000) (N=1,200)
Sex
42.4
57.6
Male
Female
Age
16-29
30-49
50+
36.6
36.6
26.8
42.4
57.6
36.4
36.8
26.8
Education
<4 yrs.
>,4,<7 yrs.
>7,<10 yrs.
>10 yrs.
Political Involvement
Party Member
NonParty Member
Residence
Urban
Rural
33.2
28.2
34.2
4.4
5.7
94.3
49.7
50.3
33.2
28.4
34.2
4.2
5.7
94.3
49.8
50.2
acalculated from: Kramer, "The Population of the Soviet Union,"
Table I.
bCalculated from computer 
printout.
Calculated from computer printout.
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Distributing Soviet Audiences Across Demographic
And Social Strataof the Samle Computer Population
Having distributed exposure-related demographic and social
attributes of the Soviet population over a sample computer population,
we were ready to undertake the other major task of pass I: the
assignment of Soviet media-consumption traits to the sample computer
population. The first step in this procedure was, as explained in
Chapter II, to distribute the media's audiences across cells in the
sample computer population the same way that they were distributed
across corresponding cells in the 1963 adult Soviet population. For
every medium that we chose to include in the simulation, the object
of this distribution procedure was to assign a given number of its
table and three two-dimensional tables for the Soviet population, we,
in effect, knew 19 of these 31 interactions at the outset. An
analysis of computer printout showed that the Mosteller technique
not only reproduced the 5 correct marginal interactions in the
simulation population, but also the 14 higher-order interactions
implicit in the four input tables.
In Chapter II we presented two examples (n. , p. and
n. , p. ) to illustrate that the Mosteller technique could not
converge on a solution unless all the input tables were consistent
in a nonobvious way. From these two examples it should be clear
that the essence of this consistency criterion is that the input
tables describe additive properties. The dimensions we chose for
the Soviet simulation population meet this criterion. For
example, if Party members are better educated than nonParty members
and urbanites are better educated than rural dwellers, it seems
likely that urban Party members are better educated than urbanites
as a whole or Party members as a whole. For this reason we feel
confident that, if we had access to the original Soviet census tapes,
we would find that the Mosteller technique, in correctly reproducing
all 19 of the estimated interactions in the Soviet population, had
also come very close to reproducing the remaining 12 interactions
as well.
349
audience members to each cell of the sample computer population.
The resulting number of audience members assigned to any cell, divided
by the total number of persons that had been assigned to that cell,
would then specify a mean probability of exposure (or audience
rating) for the medium in that cell. We first performed this
distribution task for print media.
Soviet Newspaper and Magazine Readership
Defining individual Soviet print media
In 1963 there were 6,791 different newspaper titles and
editions published on various territorial-administrative levels of
the Soviet Union. Table 4.7 shows the number of newspapers on each
level and their total annual and per issue circulation figures. It
can be seen that, in 1963, the Soviet press, planned as it was on a
territorial-production basis, had a pyramidal structure. At the top
of this structure were the few central or all-Union newspapers.
These made up roughly two-fifths of the total per issue circulation
of newspapers in the USSR and, because of their higher periodicity,
nearly half the annual newspaper circulation. From the same source
on which Table 4.7 is based we found that the volume of an individual
issue of a central newspaper (i.e., its average circulation) was
larger than that of most newspapers on the lower levels.< These
characteristics reflect the leading role played by the all-Union
2 Pechat' 1963, Table 24, pp. 59-60.
Table 4.7--Soviet newspapers published in 1963, by territorial-admin-
istrative level, number of editions, and total annual and
per issue circulation.a
Total Per Issue
Territorial-Administrative Number of Total Annual Circulation
Level Editions Circulation (In Thousands)
All-Union 23 4 7.3 6%b 33,433
Republic 148 17.03 15,492
SubRepublic 6,620 35.61 35,295
Autonomous Republic &
Oblast, Krai, Oblast &
Okrug c 374 20.09 14,638
d
City, Rayon & Adminis-
trations of Operating
Kolkhozese and Savhozese 2,192 13.65 15,072
f
House Organs and
Kolkhozg 4,054 1.87 5,585
Totals 6,791 100.00 84,220
aCalculated from: Pechat'1963, Table 24, pp. 59-60.
bThe entries are percentages of
18,310,796,000 copies.
a total annual circulation of
Administrative territories equivalent to provinces.
dAdministrative territories equivalent to districts.
eCollective farms.
fNewspapers of factories, educational institutions, etc.
gCollective farm newspapers.
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sector of the Soviet press, a role which we discussed in Chapter I.
At the base of the Soviet press's pyramidal structure, both in circu-
lation and importance as sources of international news, were the
most numerous groups of publications--the factory and kolkhoz
newspapers--and, more generally, all the papers published on levels
below the Republic level. As their circulation figures suggest,
newspapers published on the Republic level played a role intermediate
to that of the central and subRepublic papers, both in terms of
reach and authoritativeness. This hierarchy of importance among
different types of Soviet newspapers (with regard to volume and news-
dissemination) had an important bearing on the way we conceptualized
individual newspaper media for the simulation.
The simulation programs can process a maximum of only sixty-four
communications media and their audiences. However, in our computer
model we wished to simulate the Soviet audiences of all communications
media likely to have carried international news during the period
1962-63. As a result, we were forced to exclude from the computer
model as many irrelevant or unimportant types of newspapers as possible
In Table 4.7 we have omitted wall newspapers. These were
not usually printed but instead consisted of hand-written or painted
slogans, typewritten material, and photographs or press cuttings
pasted up and displayed on notice-boards or walls. According to
Buzek, their only function in the early 1960's was to be "... agitator,
critic and organiser in the microcosmos of smaller enterprises and
offices, departments and workshops of large plants, institutions,
ministries, etc." However, he does point out that, since 1956, the
Party had been trying to revitalize wall newspapers and in smaller
plants the latter began (in 1964) to replace factory newspapers
with very small circulations (How the Communist Press Works, pp. 73-74).
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and to represent, for the most part, groups or aggregates of Soviet
newspapers as individual media in the simulation. In limiting the
number of different types of newspapers to be represented we employed
the following decision rules: (1) We excluded all Soviet newspapers
that seemed unlikely to have carried timely stories about international
news events, viz., physical culture papers, sports papers, and wall
newspapers; (2) We excluded all Soviet newspapers that were not
likely to have been read by persons over 15 years of age, viz., Party
publications for children; (3) We excluded foreign newspapers because
of their relatively small circulation within the Soviet Union. 3
~In 1963 there were 11 physical culture and sports newspapers
published ill the Soviet Union, with a total circulation at one
printing of 1.38 million copies, headed by the central or all-Union
Sovietskiy Sport (Soviet Sports), published six days a week
(Pechat' 1963, p. 62).
For the following reasons we did not include wall newspapers as
communications media in the two Soviet simulations: (1) We lacked
circulation data for them. (2) Even if we had had circulation data,
we did not have any reliable information that could have been used
to convert them into readership estimates. (3) It did not seem that
wall newspapers, given their organizational and production focus,
could have been an important source of news for the Soviet population
about either the Cuban missile crisis or the assassination of
President Kennedy.
1-.
In 1963 the Party published 24 newspapers for the pioneers,
children between nine and sixteen years of age, with a circulation
of 10.69 million copies, headed by the all-Union Pionierskaya pravda,
published twice weekly with about 4.1 million copies at one printing
(Pechat' 1963, p. 62 and the Comcom card file.). We excluded the
entire circulation of pioneer newspapers from the simulation on the
grounds that these publications probably were not important sources
of information about the Cuban crisis or the Kennedy assassination
for those in the adult age category.
:The printed word from abroad is increasingly, albeit still
sparsely, available in the Soviet Union. Two thirds of the Leisure
Study respondents, despite their unusual motivation to read foreign
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However, even with these exclusions, the bulk of the Soviet news-
paper circulation still remained to be accounted for in the simulation.
On the central level we represented as individual media in the
simulation nine of the best known and most important Soviet news-
papers: Pravda, Izvestia, Trud, Komsomolskaya pravda, Literaturnaya
gazeta, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, Selkaya zhizn, Nedelya and
Krasnaya zvezda. Pravda, as the central organ of the Party, and
Izvestia, as the official newspaper of the Government, stood above
all other newspapers in their authoritativeness with, and influence
upon, the entire Soviet population. In 1963 Pravda was published
every day of the week. Izvestia, in addition to its Tuesday through
Sunday editions, published a Monday supplement called Nedelya, which
we included as a separate medium in the simulation. The other six
all-Union newspapers which we represented as individual media were
the leading publications of the "specialized press," i.e., those
newspapers directed at, and serving, the (Party-defined) needs of
distinct groups of people. Trud was the central organ of the Soviet
trade unions, Komsomolskaa pravda the official organ of the Young
Communist League--a group consisting of youth over the age of sixteen,
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta the central paper covering economic, industrial
materials and their frequent knowledge of foreign languages, had never
read a book published abroad, and almost half had never had access
to a foreign magazine or journal. The Soviets have started publishing
magazines of reprints of foreign materials, such as Inostrannaya
literatura (Foreign Literature) and Za rubezhom (Abroad). The latter,
started in 1960, had reached a circulation of 400,000 by 1964 (Pool,
"Opportunities for Change").
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and technical problems, Selskaya zhizn the all-Union agricultural
paper, and Krasnaya zvezda the all-Union paper for the Armed Forces.
All of these specialized newspapers published daily editions Tuesday
through Sunday. Literaturnaya gazeta, the central organ of the
USSR Union of Writers, was published three times a week. We combined
the remaining central newspapers into two aggregate newspapers,
published two and three times a week respectively, and represented
each as an individual medium in the simulation.
On the Republic level we represented as individual media
(1) the popular joint daily organ of the Party and Government for
the Russian Federal Republic--Sovietskaya Rossia and (2) the two
corresponding organs (combined) for the republic of Kazakhstan--
Kazakhstanskaya pravda and Sotsialistik Kazakhstan. For purposes of
aggregation we divided the other thirteen union republics into four
groups, such that the republics in each group were geographically
contiguous and demographically similar. The first of these groups
included the central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kirghizistan, and Tadzhikistan; the second the Transcaucasian republics
of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbardzhan; the third the Baltic republics
of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia; and the fourth the European repub-
lics of Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Moldavia. For each such Republic
grouping we combined all the joint daily organs of the Party and
Government and represented the resulting aggregate as one newspaper
medium in the simulation. Finally, on the Republic level, we combined
all komsomol papers into two aggregate newspaper media, published
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three and five times a week respectively, and we combined all
remaining newspapers into four aggregate media, published one, two,
three, and five times a week respectively.
On levels below the Republic level we did not represent any
individual newspapers as individual media in the simulation. We
combined all komsomol papers published on these levels into one
aggregate newspaper medium, published three times a week, and we
combined all remaining newspapers into six aggregate media, published
one, two, three, four, five, and six times a week respectively.
In addition to the thirty newspaper media described above,
we also included as individual print media in the computer model
two Soviet magazines: the illustrated weekly Ogonyok, and the
satirical magazine Krokodil, which appeared every ten days. In 1963
these two publications were among the most popular of Soviet
magazines and seemed more likely to have carried timely commentary
on international news than any other Soviet magazines. Lastly,
Although the annual Soviet magazine circulation had grown
to 858.2 million by 1964 (Pechat' 1964, p. 68), there were only a
few individual magazines with widespread popularity, and the
circulation of these was relatively far behind comparable magazines
in Western countries. Ogonyok and Krokodil were practically the
only Russian-language magazines with political content that had
broad general appeal. Two magazines for women, Rabotnica (Woman Worker)
and Krestyanka (Peasant Woman) were, as their titles suggest, aimed
at readers in distinct social classes and were published only
monthly. The circulation of these four magazines (the four most
popular ones) in 1961 was, in millions: Rabotnica, 2.5; Krestyanka,
2.2; Ogonyok, 1.85; Krokodil, 1.5 (Buzek, How the Communist Press
Works, p. 78). Other Soviet magazines covered a wide range of
topics but, for the most part, were aimed at audiences defined by
a particular interest (science, literature, etc.) or a specialized
occupational grouping (agricultural workers, transportation
workers, etc.)
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we excluded two important categories of print media from the simula-
tion--other Soviet periodicals, and foreign magazines and journals.
We did not include other Soviet periodicals because it was felt that
their predominant concern with specialized topics, such as technical,
scientific, industrial and agitational matters, together with their
comparatively low periodicities, would have made them relatively
unimportant sources of information on the two rapidly-diffused inter-
national news events we were simulating.l We did not represent
foreign magazines and journals in the computer model because of their
relatively small circulation within the USSR in 1963 and because of
their low periodicities.A
Table 4.8 lists the periodicity, number of editions, and
estimated average per issue circulation of each print medium in the
simulation. By comparing the totals in this table with the corres-
ponding totals in Table 4.7 it can be seen that, of all the
Soviet newspaper editions published in 1963, our computer model
represented:
-At the beginning of 1962 there were 950 Soviet periodicals
and, with other similar types of publications, the total number of
titles was 4,121. Their yearly one-issue circulation was 872 million.
From figures published a decade earlier, it would appear that the
approximate breakdown by subject matter was as follows: Party,
politics, economics (5%); science, mathematics (4%); industry,
technology (4%); agriculture (2%); medicine, public health (2%);
education (2%); literature, arts (3%); press, bibliography (2%);
miscellaneous (1%); agitators' notebooks, periodic reviews, annuals,
technical reference publications and bulletins (75%). (Buzek,
How the Communist Press Works, pp. 77-8).
CSee p. above, n.
Table 4.8--Soviet print media in the simulation, by title or type,
periodicity, number of editions, and estimated average
per issue circulation in 1963.
Estimated
Average Per Issue
Number of Circulation
Title or Type Periodicity Editions (In Thousands)
All-Union Newspapers
Pravda 7 per week 1 6,700a
Izvestia 6 " " 1 5,400a
Trud 6 " " 1 1,550b
Komsomolskaya pravda 6 " " 1 3,850C
Literaturnaya gazeta 3 " " 1 1,159d
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 6 " " 1 45 5e
Selskaya zhizn 6 " " 1 3,175c
Nedelya 1 " " 1 1,500 f
Krasnaya zvezda 6 " " 1 1,850g
All Other Papers
Published 2 " " 2 2,935h
All Other :Papers
Published 3 " " 6 1,432i
Totals 17 30,006
All-Union Magazines
Ogonyok 1 per week 1 2,350J
Krokodil every 10 days 1 1,960i
Totals 2 4,310
Table 4.8--Continued
Estimated
Average Per Issue
Number of Circulation
Title or Type Periodicity Editions (In Thousands)
Republic Newspapers
Sovietskaya Rossia
Kazakhstan Party-Govt.
Papers 6
Central Asian Party-
Govt. Papers
Transcaucasian Party-
Govt. Papers
Baltic Party-Govt. Papers
European Party-
Govt.Papers
All Komsomol Papers
Published
All Komsomol Papers
Published
All Other Papers
Published
All Other Papers
Published
All Other Papers
Published
All Other Papers
Published
6 per week
6
6
6
6
3
5
1
2
3
5
II
II
II
II
I.
!I
I.
I
II
'II
ifII!V!
V!
II
11
II
II
II
it
I II
Totals 147 14,325
1
2
9
2,250k
4221
1,265m
1,166 n
1,237°
7
6
6
13
11
24
23
2,017 s
9 7 5t
32
13
2,459 P
202v
Totals 147 14,325
Table 4.8--Continued
Estimated
Average Per Issue
Number of Circulation
Title or Type Periodicity Editions (In Thousands
Sub-Republic Newspapers
All Komsomol Papers Published 3 per week 113 3,251W
All Other Papers Published 1 " " 2,125 133x
All Other Papers Published 2 " " 1,069 728 Y
All Other Papers Published 3 " " 1,675 8,618 z
All Other Papers Published 4 " " 314 2 ,5 7 0 aa
All Other Papers Published 5 " " 199 4,974
All Other Papers Published 6 " " 115 8 ,2 7 8bb
Totals 5,610 28,552
Table 4.8--COntinued
a
Source: Comcom card file.
bEstimated by interpolating the 1962 and 1964 per issue circu-
lation figures obtained from the Comcom card file.
CEstimated by interpolating the 1960 and 1964 per issue
circulation figures obtained from the Comcom card file.
dEstimated by applying the 54.5 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of all-Union newspapers between 1960 and 1963
(Pechat' 1963, Table 24, pp. 59-60) to the 1960 per issue circulation
figure for Literaturnaya gazeta, obtained from the Comcom card file.
eEstimated by assuming that the January, 1963 per issue sub-
scription figure of 387,000, obtained from the Comcom card file,
represented approximately 85 percent of the total per issue
circulation. See pp. below for the rationale underlying
this assumption.
fEstimated by assuming that the 1963 per issue retail circula-
tion figure of 300,000, obtained from the Comcom card file, represented
approximately 20 percent of the total per issue circulation, as did
the estimated per issue retail circulation figure for the parent
publication, Izvestia.
gEstimated by computing the approximate percentage growth in
the average per issue circulation of all-Union newspapers between 1959
and 1963 (Pechat' 1963, Table 24, pp. 59-60) and by applying the
inverse of the result to an estimated 1967 per issue circulation figure
for Krasnaya zvezda, provided us by the Radio Liberty Committee.
hEstimated by interpolating the 1960 and 1964 per issue circula-
tion figures for Pionierskaya Pravda (Pioneer truth), obtained from
the Comcom card file, in order to approximate the 1963 per issue
circulation for that twice-weekly all-union newspaper, and by
subtracting the result from the total 1963 per issue circulation of
twice-weekly all-Union newspapers, obtained from Pechat' 1963, pp. 62-63.
iEstimated by subtracting the approximate 1963 per issue circu-
lation of the thrice-weekly, all-union Literaturnaya Gazeta (see note d
above), from the total 1963 per issue circulation of thrice-weekly all-
Union newspapers, obtained from Pechat' 1963, pp. 62-63.
jEstimated by applying the 22.5 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of all-Union newspapers between 1961 and 1963
(estimated from Pechat' 1963, Table 24, pp. 59-60) to the 1961 per
issue circulation figure, obtained from Buzek, How the Communist Press
Works, p.
Table 4.8--Continued
kEstimated by interpolating the 1962 and 1964 per issue
circulation figures obtained from the Comcom card file.
1Estimated by applying the 100 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963
(Pechat' 1963, Table 24, pp. 59-60) to the sum of the 1956 circulation
figures for Kazakhstanskaya pravda and Sotsialistik Kazakhstan,
obtained from the Comcom card file.
mEstimated by applying the 100 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963 to
the sum of the 1956 circulation figures, obtained from the Comcom
card file, for Turkmenskaya iskra (Turkmen Spark), Sovet Turkmenistany
(Soviet Turkimenistan), Pravda vostoka (Truth of the East), Kyzyl
Uzbekistan (Red Uzbekistan), Sovietskaya Kirgizia (Soviet Kirglizstan),
Sovietik Krgyzstan (Soviet Kirghizstan), Kommunist Tadzhikistana
(Tadzhikistan Communist), Sovet Tochikistoni (Soviet Tadzhikistan)
and Tochikistoni Soveti (Soviet Tadzhikistan).
nEstimated by applying the 100 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963
to the sum of the 1956 circulation figures, obtained from the Comcom
card file, for Zarya Vostoka (Eastern Dawn), Kommunisti (Communist),
Kommunist (Communist), Sovetakan Aistan (Soviet Armenia), Bakinskiy
rabochiy (the Baku Worker), Kommunist, and yet another Kommunist.
°Estimated by applying the 100 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963
to the sum of the 1956 circulation figures, obtained from the Comcom
card file, for Sovietskaya Litva (Soviet Lithuania), Tiesa (Truth),
Sovietskaya Latviya (Soviet Latvia), Cina (Fight), Sovietskaya Estonia
(Soviet Estonia) and Rahoa Haal (People's Voice).
PEstimated by applying the 100 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963
to the sum of the 1956 circulation figures, obtained from the Comcom
card file, for republic level Komsomol papers published 3 times a week.
qEstimated by applying the 100 percent growth in the average
per issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963 to
the sum of the 1956 circulation figures, obtained from the Comcom
card file, for republic level Komsomol papers published 3 times a
week.
rEstimated by applying the same procedure described in note j
to all republic level Komsomol papers published 5 times a week.
Table 4.8--Continued
SEstimated by applying the percentage growth in the average per
issue circulation of republic newspapers between 1956 and 1963 to
the 1956 per issue circulation figures obtained from the Comcom card
file, for republic level pioneer papers published once a week, and by
subtracting the resulting total per issue circulation of these papers
from the total 1963 per issue circulation of republic newspapers
published weekly (Pechat' 1963, pp. 62-63).
tEstimated by applying same procedure described in note s
to republic newspapers published twice a week.
UEstimated by subtracting the approximate 1963 per issue
circulation of republic level Komsomol papers published 3 times a week
(see note g above) from the total 1963 per issue circulation of
republic newspapers published 3 times a week (Pechat' 1963, pp. 62-63).
VEstimated by applying the same procedure described in note s
to republic newspapers published 5 times a week.
Estimated by subtracting the approximate 1963 per issue
circulation of all central and republic level Komsomol papers (see
notes c, q, and r) from the 1963 per issue circulation of all Komsomol
papers (Pechat' 1963, p. 62).
XEstimated by summing the 1963 per issue circulation figures for
Kray, Oblast, Okrug, Autonomous Republic and Oblast, City, Collective
Farm Administration, Rayon, House organs and Kolkhoz weekly newspapers
(Pechat' 1963, pp. 62-63), and by subtracting from this sum the estimated
per issue circulation of weekly pioneer papers published on subRepublic
levels. The latter was computed by subtracting the 1963 per issue
circulation of all central and republic level pioneer papers, obtained
from the Comcom card file, from the 1963 per issue circulation of all
pioneer papers (Pechat' 1963, p. 62), and assuming that half of the
resulting per issue circulation pertained to weekly pioneer papers.
YEstimated by applying the same procedure described in note x
to newspapers published twice a week.
ZEstimated by summing the 1963 per issue circulation figures
for Kray, Oblast, etc. newspapers published 3 times a week (Pechat'
1963, pp. 62-63), and by subtracting from this sum the approximate 1963
per issue circulation of Komsomol papers published 3 times a week on
subRepublic levels (see note w).
Table 4.8--Continued
aaEstimated by summing the 1963 per issue circulation figures
for Kray, Oblast, etc. newspapers published with the appropriate
periodicity (Pechat' 1963, pp. 62-63).
bbEstimated by summing the 1963 per issue circulation figures
for Kray, Oblast, etc. newspapers published 6 times a week (Pechat'
1963, pp. 62-63), and by subtracting from this sum the estimated 1963
per issue circulation of subRepublic level physical culture and
sports papers. The latter was computed by subtracting the estimated
1963 per issue circulation of the central sports paper (computed by
applying the all-Union press's per issue circulation growth rate
between 1960 and 1963 to the 1960 per issue circulation figure for
Sovietskiy sport, obtained from the Comcom card file) from the 1963
per issue circulation of all sports and physical culture papers
(Pechat' 1963, p. 62), and by assuming that the resulting per issue
circulation pertained to papers published only on subRepublic levels.
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--17 of 23 all-Union editions, comprising about 90 per cent
of the total per issue circulation of all-Union newspapers,
--147 of 148 Republic editions, comprising about 92 per cent
of the total per issue circulation of Republic newspapers,
and
--5,610 of 6,620 subRepublic editions, comprising about
81 per cent of the total per issue circulation of sub-
Republic newspapers.
Thus, our computer model included a total of 5,776 of the 6,791 Soviet
newspaper titles and editions published in 1963, comprising about 87
per cent of the total average per issue newspaper circulation during
that year.
Estimating the sizes of single-issue readerships
In the Soviet simulation we defined each edition of a newspaper
or magazine as an issue of that publication, and we defined the average
readership of any edition as the average single-issue audience of that
publication. Before estimating how the average single-issue readership
of each of the thirty-two print media in the simulation might have been
distributed across the ninety-six population cells in 1963, we first
had to estimate the magnitude of this readership, i.e., the average
number of persons who normally read an edition of the publication in
1962-63. We now proceed to describe how that was done.
In general, there is a straightforward way to estimate the
per issue readership of any newspaper or magazine from its per issue
circulation figure. One simply multiplies the latter by the estimated
average number of persons who read an individual copy of a typical
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issue. However, in the Soviet case we were forced to develop a
somewhat more complex method of estimating single-issue readerships,
because we had no information bearing directly on the average number
of readers per copy for individual Soviet newspapers and magazines.
Instead, we had two related types of data for Soviet print media as
a whole.
First, we had information suggesting what proportion of the 1963
per issue circulation of Soviet newspapers and nonspecialized magazines
might have been sold by each of three possible methods: institutional
subscription, (i.e., a subscription by a library, reading room,
culture house, club, place of work, dormitory, etc.), individual
subscription, and retail sales (via stores, newsstands, etc.). Based
on this information we assumed that in the early 1960's about eighty-
five per cent of the total per issue circulation of Soviet newspapers
and nonspecialized magazines was sold by subscription (either to
individuals or to institutions), and the rest by retail. We also
assumed that approximately fifteen per cent of the total subscription
of these publications was made up of subscriptions by institutions.
According to Soviet sources, in the early 1960's approximately
75-85 per cent of the total Soviet newspaper and magazine circulation
was sold by either individual or institutional subscription and the
rest by retail. Buzek cites the figure of "about 75%" for 1961 and,
during this period, Bogdanov and Vyazemskiy stated that "up to 85%
of the individual circulation of central and local newspapers and
magazines was distributed by subscription, the remaining 15% by
retail," (How the Communist Press Works, p. 233, quoting the Soviet
periodical Razprostraneniye pechati [Dissemination of the Press],
[October 19, 1961], p. 11, and Spravochnik Zhurnalista, 1961, p. 590,
both cited by Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," p. 32, n. 3). With
regard to the percentage of the total Soviet newspaper and magazine
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The second type of data we had related each of the four possible
methods by which a copy of a Soviet print medium could be obtained--
institutional subscription, individual subscription, retail purchase,
pass-on--to the medium's likelihood of being frequently read by a
person who obtained it in that way and to the likelihood of its being
subscription made up of subscriptions by institutions, Rogers cites
the estimate of 10 per cent, made by a foreign correspondent of
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta for his own newspaper, as representative of
the majority of newspapers and nonspecialized magazines ("The Soviet
Audience," p. 33).
In estimating single-issue readerships for the print media in
the simulation we assumed a slightly higher proportion of the total
subscription (fifteen percent) was made up of institutional subscrip-
tions and we used the higher estimate (eight-five percent) of the
total per issue circulation sold by subscription. Our reason for
choosing these two values was that, when combined with the other
data available, they produced a readership estimate for each individual
print medium in the simulation, and thus for print media as a whole,
which averaged out to 2.75 adult readers per copy. We had selected
this figure (somewhat arbitrarily) as a target because it exceeded,
by what seemed to be a reasonable amount, the average number of adult
readers per newspaper copy in the United States. For example, a
1961 study of newspaper reading in the United States found a national
average of 2.04 adult readers per newspaper copy (Audits and Surveys
Company, Inc., A National Study of Newspaper Reading: The Functions
of Newspapers for Their Readers [New York: Audits and Surveys Company,
Inc., 1961]).
In a Western country such as the United States, an average
readers-per-copy ratio reflects (1) the economic forces of the market
for print media and (2) the average number of adults per household.
But in the Soviet case, enforced supply of, and unsatisfied demand for,
specific print media have been a frequent occurrence in the recent
past, and we know that the manipulation of supply still occurred to
some degree in 1963. Also, the well-known housing shortage in the
Soviet Union undoubtedly meant that there were a greater average number
of adults per household there than in the United States in 1963. Both
of these factors suggest a higher number of readers per copy in the
USSR than in the U.S. However, it seems reasonable to assume that
with the lifting of ceilings on subscriptions, around 1960, the
average number of adult readers per newspaper copy in the Soviet Union
began to diminish with the result that, by 1963, it was gradually
approaching (but still greater than) readers per copy ratios in the
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passed on by him to others. This data was in the form of answers to
the following two questions from the Leisure Study interview:
(:L) "How did you normally get each of your journals and newspapers?
Subscribed, bought at store or stand, at organization meeting, at
culture house or club, at library or reading room, at work, or passed
on to you by another person? This person who gave it to you was
himself: The original recipient of the journal, or had received
it by pass on?" (2) "When you were finished with it, did you usually
pass your magazine or newspaper on to someone else? Yes, no, or
sometimes but not regularly?" Comcom respondents answered both of these
questions for each newspaper or magazine which they indicated they
had read while living in the Soviet Union. The results, in the form
in which we used them for converting per issue circulation figures
to per issue readership estimates, are summarized in Table 4.9.
United States and other Western countries. We cite two facts in
support of this assumption: (1) The lifting of subscription ceilings
is known to have resulted in a spectacular rise in the circulation
figures of certain Soviet newspapers and magazines (see, e.g., Rogers,
"The Soviet Audience," p. 40, n. 2); (2) Answers to questions in
the Comcom Leisure Study as to whether respondents would have liked
to subscribe to more newspapers or magazines than they did, referred
mostly to inadequate access to foreign publications. While a number
of respondents did cite cost as an obstacle to additional subscrip-
tions, they generally referred to magazine subscriptions (Rogers,
"The Soviet Audience," p. 40, n. 3).
The unrepresentativeness of the Leisure Study sample, its
small size, and the closed form of the questions on readership fre-
quency, while troublesome, did not prevent us from deriving usable
per issue readership estimates from answers to the two readership
questions on the Leisure Study interview schedule. The small sample
size problem was overcome by computing average readership rates for
newspapers as a whole and for magazines as a whole, and applying
them uniformly to the various print media in the simulation. The
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Table 4.9--Continued
Adapted from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Table II.9,
p. 74. By "regularly read" is meant that every issue or most issues
of the publication were read by the respondent.
bCalculated from an independent tabulation of Comcom survey
results made by the author. The N's differ from those in column two
because (1) less respondents answered the question on ways of
disposing of a print copy than the one on ways of obtaining a
print copy, and (2) a few periodicals of another type were inad-
vertently included in the magazine count.
CCalculated from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Table II.8,
p. 73.
dTotals on the basis of which percentages were calculated.
ePublications obtained at place of work, library, reading room,
culture house, club, dormitory, etc.
fPublications purchased at stores, newsstands, etc.
gPublications obtained by institutional subscription obviously
can not be passed on to others in the same sense as can publications
obtained by individual subscription, retail purchase, or pass-on.
hThe entries are percentages of the duplicated total number of
individual newspaper titles regularly read by members of the Comcom
sample (N-148).
iThe entries are percentages of the duplicated total number of
individual magazine titles regularly read by members of the Comcom
sample (N=142).
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The estimation procedure
A concrete example is perhaps the simplest way to illustrate
how we used the circulation estimates in Table 4.8, together with
the two sets of data described in the preceding paragraph, to estimate
the average single-issue readership of each Soviet print medium in
the simulation. In Figure 4.1 we illustrate how this was done for
the all-Union youth paper Komsomolskaya pravda. The basic procedure
was characterized by three sets of simplifying assumptions. First,
as the example suggests, we applied the total and institutional sub-
scription rates, assumed for Soviet newspapers and nonspecialized
magazines as a whole, to each newspaper and magazine medium in the
simulation. This approach, which ignores differences in subscription
rates across individual print media, was dictated by the absence of
reliable data on which to base estimates of the magnitudes of these
closed form of the question relating respondents' regular readership
rates to the method of obtaining a publication was no problem because
these rates could be computed for each group obtaining the medium a
different way ("subscribed" = individual subscription; "bought at
store or stand" = retail purchase; "at organization, at culture house
or club, at library or reading room, at work" = institutional subscrip-
tion; "passed on to you by another person" = pass-on). The regular
readership and pass-on rates for differently obtained print media,
computed as they were from the answers of Comcom respondents, undoubt-
edly were distorted somewhat by the overrepresentation of the educated,
urbanites and males in the sample. However, we multiplied these rates
by circulation and subscription figures that were based on the Soviet
population as a whole. It seemed reasonable to assume that the
resulting per issue readership estimate for any print medium in the
simulation--tied as it was to the medium's estimated per issue circula-
tion and subscription figures, and to the approximate regular readership
rates among groups of persons obtaining the medium in different ways--
was more accurate than any estimate based solely on Comcom respondents'
average readership rate for that medium or type of medium.
Name of print medium: Komsomolskaya pravda
Estimated 1963 average per issue
Circulation:
Subscriptions: 85% x 3.85
Institutional subscriptions: 15% x 3.27
Individual subscriptions: 85% x 3.27 =
Retail sales: 15% x 3.85 =
Pass-ons from individual subscribers:
50% x 2.78 =
Pass-ons from retail consumers:
25% x .58 =
Pass-ons from original consumers:
1.39 + 0.15 =
Pass-ons from pass-on consumers:
33 1/3% x 1.54 =
Pass-ons: 1.54 + .51 =
Readership from institutional subscribers: 
85% x 15 x 0.49
Readership from individual subscribers:
88% x 2.78
Readership from retail consumers:
96% x 0.58
Readership from pass-on consumers:
73% x 2.05
3.85 million
3.27
= 0.49
2.78
0.58
1.39
0.15
1.54
0.51
2.05
= 6.26
= 2.45
= .44
= 1.49
Readership: 10.64 million
(6.9%)
Based on an estimate of 12 persons having access to an average
institutional copy of a magazine (see pp. for source).
Fig. 4.1--Estimating the 1963 average per issue readership of
Komsomolskaya pravda.
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differences. It undoubtedly produced a certain amount of error in
the total and institutional subscription estimates for some of the
print media in the simulation. But the reader will recall that the
estimated total per issue circulation of all thirty-two of these media
comprised about eighty-seven per cent of the average 1963 total per
issue circulation of all Soviet newspapers and nonspecialized
magazines. We therefore assumed that the uniform application of
average subscription rates estimated for this type of medium as a
whole to each individual medium of this type in the simulation would
not produce a significant error in the total and institutional
subscription estimates for the thirty-two print media as a whole. 4
A second set of simplifying assumptions is implicit in the
way we used regular readership and pass-on rates derived from the
Leisure Study interview data. As the example in Figure 4.1 indicates,
in the absence of fuller data, we assumed that the uniform application
of average pass-on and regular readership rates (for Soviet newspapers
as a whole) to each newspaper medium in the simulation, together with
the uniform application of corresponding rates (for Soviet magazines
as a whole) to each magazine medium in the simulation, would not
To be more specific, we assumed that no significant error
would be produced in the duplicated sum of these estimates over the
thirty-two print media.
2Unfortunately, we could not compute regular readership and
pass-on rates for nonspecialized Soviet magazines as a whole, because
the bulk of the magazines cited by Comcom respondents were of a
specialized nature. As a result, we did not use the regular reader-
ship and pass-on rates in the "magazine" portion of Table 4.9 when
estimating the per issue readerships of Ogonyok and Krokodil. Because
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produce a significant error in the number of pass-ons per issue and
in the readership per issue estimated for the thirty-two print media
as a whole. However, the validity of this assumption rested not only
on the fact that the estimated total per issue circulation of print
media in the simulation comprised the bulk of the average 1963 per
issue circulation of all Soviet newspapers and nonspecialized magazines.
It depended also on the validity of the additional assumption that the
regular readership and pass-on rates derived from Leisure Study inter-
view data, although based on the duplicated total number of newspaper
or magazine titles cited by respondents, were fairly representative of
corresponding rates based on the total number of copies per issue,
both for Soviet newspapers as a whole and for Soviet magazines as a
whole.
The third set of simplifying assumptions which characterized
our technique for estimating average single-issue readerships is impli-
cit in the way these estimates were computed. It suffices to describe
the method for newspapers alone because an identical procedure was
followed for the two magazine media in the simulation. We assumed that
the total and institutional subscription rates and the regular con-
sumption and pass-on rates for Soviet newspapers as a whole could be
regarded as the probabilities, averaged over many issues of many Soviet
both of these magazines were of a nonspecialized nature, we used
instead the rates estimated for newspapers as a whole, assuming that
they would be closer to the actual values for general interest
magazines.
IHere again we assumed that no significant error would be
produced in the duplicated sum of these estimates over the thirty-two
print media.
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newspapers, that an individual copy of a paper undergoes each of these
processes. Accordingly, in order to obtain what amounted to expected
value estimates of the total number of subscribers and the number of
institutional subscriptions to any newspaper medium in the simulation,
we multiplied its circulation and total subscription figures by the
appropriate rates or "mean probabilities" (0.85 and 0.15 respectively),
as illustrated in Figure 4.1 above. The number of retail consumers
of the newspaper was then computed by subtracting the total number of
subscribers from the estimated per issue circulation, and the number
of individual subscribers to the newspaper was computed by subtracting
the number of institutional subscriptions from the total subscription.
The next step in the estimation procedure was to determine the
total number of persons to whom copies of an average issue of the
newspaper were passed on, either by original recipients of the paper
or by other pass-on recipients. In order to obtain an expected value
estimate of the total number of pass-ons by the initial recipients of
any newspaper medium in the simulation, we multiplied the number of
individual subscribers and the number of retail consumers by the
appropriate pass-on rates for these groups (0.50 and 0.25 respectively)
and summed the two products. (Persons having access to an insti-
tutional subscription were not considered able to pass a copy of the
paper on to someone else.) In order to obtain an expected value
estimate of the total number of pass-ons by pass-on recipients of
the newspaper, we multiplied the number of first-round pass-on
recipients of the paper by an assumed pass-on rate for this
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group (0.33). The total number of pass-on recipients of the
paper was then obtained by summing the number of pass-ons by initial
recipients of the paper and the number of pass-ons by pass-on
recipients, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 above.
1in reality, 33 1/3% was the average pass-on rate for all
pass-on recipients of a newspaper, as estimated from Leisure Study
data. Therefore, because we applied this rate only to the number of
first-round recipients of a newspaper in order to estimate the total
number of additional pass-on recipients of that paper, it may seem
that we underestimated the total number of pass-on recipients per
issue for most papers. One might argue that, with a target figure
of 2.75 readers per average copy for newspapers as a whole, we should
have treated each newspaper copy as if it had two rounds of pass-on
recipients. In that case we would have multiplied the first round
of pass-on recipients by the inflated pass-on rate of 50% in order to
produce a 33 1/3% pass-on rate for all such recipients of newspapers.
However, even though we did not follow this procedure we are fairly
confident that our method did not underestimate the total number of
pass-on recipients per issue for most individual papers, and especially
for newspapers as a whole. The 2.75 readers-per-copy ratio we were
aiming at was an assumed average over all kinds of newspaper copies,
including institutionally-subscribed copies. As can be seen in
Figure 4.1, we estimated that there were about 13 readers per average
institutional copy (85% x 15) for newspapers as a whole (see pp.
of the text: for the source of this estimate). With approximately 13%
of the total per issue newspaper circulation made up of institutional
copies (15% x 85%), we estimated the average number of readers per
non-institutional copy as follows:
(13%) (13) + (87%) (x) = 2.75
x = 1.22 readers per non-institutional copy
In other words, it would appear that only about 1.6 persons had access
to the average non-institutional copy of a newspaper (100 [1.54])/
[3.85 - 0.49] passed it on to others. If one assumes that there were
seldom more than two rounds of pass-ons, then it can be seen that
the application of the 33 1/3% pass-on rate to the first round of
pass-on recipients reproduces the estimated total of 1.6 recipients
(original plus pass-on) per average non-institutional copy. However,
this procedure does imply a somewhat lower average pass-on rate (25%)
for all pass-on recipients than that estimated from the Leisure Study
sample (33 1/3%). But this can be explained by the quite plausible
assumption that most Comcom respondents, when relating how they
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The final step in the estimation procedure was to compute the
average single-issue readership. For any newspaper this figure is
simply the sum of the per issue readerships within the four groups
of persons obtaining a copy of the paper in each of the possible ways.
Therefore, in order to derive an expected value estimate of the total
number of readers of an average issue of any newspaper medium in the
simulation, we multiplied the estimated number of persons obtaining
a copy of that paper by institutional subscription, individual sub-
scription, retail purchase, and pass-on by the appropriate regular
readership rates for these groups (0.85, 0.88, 0.76, and 0.73 respect-
ively). Then, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 above, we took the sum
of the four resulting products as the approximate average single-
issue readership of that newspaper.
disposed of the newspapers they received by pass-on, answered in
terms of newspapers they obtained from original recipients rather than
from pass-on recipients. Because of the nature of the bias in the
Leisure Study sample, persons who received newspapers at third (or
more) hand were probably underrepresented. As a result, the pass-on
rate computed for Comcom respondents who obtained newspapers by
pass-on may well have been more representative of the rate for first-
round pass-on recipients of newspapers than for any higher-round group
of pass-on recipients.
Tmplicit in this procedure is another simplifying assumption.
The readership rates which had already been tabulated from Leisure
Study data were based on regularly read newspaper titles. By using
these available rates, and only these rates, to compute single issue
readerships, we were, in effect, estimating the magnitude of any
newspaper's per issue readership as one-hundred per cent of its regular
readers (persons reading every issue or most issues) plus zero per
cent of its occasional readers (persons reading only an occasional issue).
We assumed. that this technique would not result in a significant
overestimation of the single-issue readership for most individual
newspaper media in the simulation, and, especially, for newspapers
as a whole. An alternative procedure would have been to subtract
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One additional aspect of this estimation procedure requires
explanation. We attempted to estimate the average number of persons
having access to a copy of an institutionally subscribed Soviet
newspaper in 1963. To make this estimate we used the data summarized
in columns one and six of Table 4.9 above, and we employed the follow-
ing computational technique:
Let Ni = the total no. of newspaper copies per issue obtained
by institutional subscription,
Nin d = the total no. of newspaper copies per issue obtained
by individual subscription,
R. = the total no. of institutionally subscribed newspaper
copies regularly read,
Rind = the total no. of individually subscribed newspaper
copies regularly read,
X = the average no. of persons having access to an
institutionally subscribed newspaper copy.
Then N ins. 15/85 (85%) (x) Ns Riins md ins ins
R. /R =35/33 (88%)N =Rins ind ind ind
So X = 6 persons per copy
Fig. 4.2--Estimating the average number of persons who had access to
an individual copy of an institutionally subscribed Soviet
newspaper in 1963
each of these regular readership rates-from one-hundred per cent in
order to obtain readership rates based on occasionally read newspaper
titles. Then, for any newspaper medium, we would have estimated not
only the number of persons obtaining that medium each way who regularly
read it (as in Figure 4.1), but also the numbers of persons obtaining
that medium each way who occasionally read it. Finally, in order to
estimate the medium's total per issue readership, we would have made
some arbitrary assumption about what proportions of its regular and
occasional readers were in the average single-issue readership.
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However, to at least one student of the Soviet scene, an esti-
mate of 6 Russians having access to an average copy of a newspaper
subscribed to by a club, dormitory, library or work place in 1963,
appeared somewhat low.! If the estimate is, in fact, low, it may
be due to the overrepresentation of the better educated in the Leisure
Study sample. Because of this bias, blue collar workers, who for the
most part worked at relatively large institutions (such as factories
and collective farms), were underrepresented, while white collar
workers and professionals, most of whom probably worked or studied
in relatively moderate- or small-sized institutional settings (such
as stores, libraries, dormitories, etc.), were overrepresented. In
addition, it seemed likely that (1) the ratio of regularly-read
newspapers obtained by institutional subscription to regularly-read
newspapers obtained by individual subscription would have been smaller
among white collar workers and professionals than among the blue
collar working class, and (2) the relative probability of an individually
subscribed versus an institutionally subscribed newspaper copy being
regularly read by a person would have been smaller, on the average,
among white collar workers and professionals than among blue collar
workers.:
Rogers regards this estimate as low. Pool, on the other hand,
finds it somewhat more plausible than the estimated 15.0 persons per
copy which we actually used in the simulation.
Because individual subscriptions cost money, and because this
commodity is dearest on the lower levels of the class structure, it
would seem likely that obtaining a newspaper by individual subscription
would be much more highly correlated with regular readership of that
paper among the blue collar working class than among white collar
workers or professionals.
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As we mentioned in Chapter I, magazines were, in the early
1960's disproportionately read by the Soviet educational elite.
This was also the most highly overrepresented group in the Leisure
Study sample. It therefore seemed reasonable to assume that an
estimate of the average number of persons per institutionally subscribed
copy, based on Comcom respondents' regular readership rates, would be
more valid for magazines than for newspapers. Accordingly, we carried
out the estimation procedure in Figure 4.2 using the Leisure Study
sample's regular consumption rates for magazines. The result was an
estimated average of twelve persons per copy for institutionally
subscribed magazines. Reasoning that the corresponding figure might be
somewhat higher, on the average, for newspapers and for the two general-
interest magazines in the simulation, we assumed an average, in1963,
of fifteen persons per institutional copy, both for Soviet newspapers
and for nonspecialized Soviet magazines. In estimating single-issue
readerships we applied this figure uniformly to each and every print
medium in the simulation, even though it obviously represented an
average over all Soviet print media (and subscribing institutions).
For reasons already discussed, we assumed that, with regard to the
thirty-two print media as a whole, this approach would not produce a
significant error in the resulting per issue estimate of the number
of persons having access to institutionally subscribed copies.
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Plausibility of the estimated readership sizes
Table 4.10 lists two different estimates of the average per
issue readership of each Soviet print medium in the simulation.
One set of estimates is based solely on readership data from the
Leisure Study, i.e., it is based on Comcom respondents' answers to
questions on their daily reading habits. It was derived by assigning
to the average single-issue readership of a print medium 90 per cent
of the proportion of the Leisure Study sample who said they read
"every issue" of that title or type of medium, 70 per cent of the
proportion of the sample who said they read "most issues," and 20 per
cent of the proportion of the sample who said they "occasionally"
read an issue. The other set of estimates was obtained by the more
complex method described above. It is therefore based on (1) the
answers to questions relating Comcom respondents' ways of acquiring
print media to their regular readership and pass-on rates for those
media (Table 4.9), (2) assumed total and institutional subscription
rates for Soviet newspapers and nonspecialized magazines as a whole
(85 and 15 per cent, respectively), and (3) estimated per issue
circulation figures for the thirty-two print media in the simulation
(Table 4.8).
A comparison of the two sets of estimates not only provides
evidence for the reasonableness of the set derived by the more complex
method; it also suggests the plausibility of subtotals of these
estimates for print media published on the all-Union Republic, and
subRepublic levels. The total of the single-issue readership
Table 4.10--The average per issue readership of each Soviet print
medium in the simulation estimated two ways.
Average Per Issue Readership
Based on Leisure Study
Assumed Subscription Rates,
Based on Leisure and Estimated Per Issue
Title or Type Study Alone Circulation Figures
All-Union Newspapers and Magazines
Pravdab 2 3 .4%a 11.8%
Izvestia 22.2 9.2
Trud 2.5 2.8
Komsomolskaya pravda 10.8 6.9
Literaturnaya gazeta 10.9 2.1
Ekonomicheskaya gazeta 0.0 0.8
Selskaya zhizn 1.0 5.7
Nedelyac 1.5 2.6
Krasnaya zvezdad 0.7 1.8
All Other Papers Published
2 Times a Weeke 3.8 5.2
All Other Papers Published
3 Times a Week 1.8 2.5
Ogonyokf 20.7 4.2
Krokodil 10.9 3.5
Totals 110.2 59.1
Table 4.10--Continued
Average Per Issue Readership
Based on Leisure Study
Assumed Subscription Rates
Based on Leisure and Estimated Per Issue
Title or Tnype Study Alone Circulation Figures
Republic Newspapers
Republic Newspapers
Sovietskaya Rossia .8% 4.0%
Kazakhstan Party-Govt. Papersg .8 0.7
Central Asian Party-Govt.Papers 2.5 2.2
Transcaucasian Party-Govt.Papers 2.3 2.1
Baltic Party-Govt. Papers 2.4 2.2
European Party-Govt. Papers 4.7 4.4
All Komsomol Papers Published
3 Times a Week 1.2 1.1
All Komsomol Papers Published
5 Times a Week 2.5 2.3
All Other Papers Published
1 Time a Week 3.9 3.6
All Other Papers Published
2 Times a Week 1.9 1.7
All Other Papers Published
3 Times a Week .9 0.8
All Other Papers Published
5 Times a Week .4 0.4
Totals
-- - - --- - --
24.3 25.5
Table 4.10--Continued
Average Per Issue Readership
Based on Leisure Study
Assumed Subscription Rates
Based on Leisure and Estimated Per Issue
Title or Type Study Alone Circulation Figures
SubRepublic Newspapers
All Komsomol Papers Published
3 Times a Weekh 1.9% 5.8%
All Other Papers Published
1 Time a Week 1.2 3.6
All Other Papers Published
2 Times a Week 0.4 1.3
All Other Papers Published
3 Times a Week 4.8 15.4
All Other Papers Published
4 Times a Week 1.5 4.6
All Other Papers Published
5 Times a Week 2.9 8.9
All Other Papers Published
6 Times a Week 4.7 14.8
Totals 17.4 54.4
Table 4.10--Continued
aEstimates represent percentage of the 1963 adult Soviet
population.
bWe knew the 1963 subscription figures for Pravda, Izvestia,
and Ekonomicheskaya gazeta. Thus, when we estimated the average
per issue readerships of these three papers by the more complex
method, we used the known subscription figures instead of multiplying
estimated 1963 per issue circulation figures by the assumed average
subscription rate (eighty-five per cent) for that year.
CWe knew the retail sales figure for Nedelya. Thus, when we
estimated the average per issue readership of this paper by the more
complex method, we subtracted the known retail sales figure from the
estimated 1963 per issue circulation figure instead of multiplying
the latter by the assumed average subscription rate for that year.
din estimating the average per issue readership of Krasnaya
zvezda by the more complex method, we assumed there were no
institutional subscriptions to that paper.
eIn order to estimate the average per issue readerships of the
two aggregate all-Union newspaper media based on the Comcom survey
alone, we first computed the unduplicated total readership of all
central papers cited by Comcom respondents (Table 4.9), except (1) sports
papers, (2) pioneer papers, and (3) the nine individual titles included
as separate media in the simulation. Then, after adjusting this figure
for frequency of readership in order to estimate the total per issue
readership, we divided the resulting figure between the all-Union
aggregate newspaper medium published twice a week and the one published
three times a week in proportion to the estimated total per issue
circulations of both types of publications (Table 4.8). These two
circulation figures were also used to estimate the average per issue
readerships of both aggregate all-Union newspaper media by the more
complex method. Thus, there is an error factor in all four of these
estimates because they do not account for duplicated readership between
the individual newspapers which make up the two aggregate all-Union
media. The first method, by dividing the total Comcom readership between
both aggregate all-Union newspapers according to their duplicated total
per issue circulations, assumes that the ratio of the duplicated to
the unduplicated total readership is about the same for both newspaper
groupings. The second method, based as it is on an estimate of the
duplicated total per issue circulation for each aggregate paper,
assumes that the total readership duplication is negligible in each
grouping. However, neither of these assumptions could have been
far wrong. Because each of the major all-Union print titles was
represented as an individual medium in the simulation, and because of
Table 4.10--Continued
the realities of multiple newspaper readership (even in the Comcom
sample few persons were regularly exposed to more than two newspapers,
as can be seen in Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Table II.6, p. 52),
there probably was very little readership duplication between the
individual newspapers which made up the two aggregate all-Union papers.
In any event, whatever error was produced in the per issue readership
estimates for these two media by ignoring duplication must certainly
have been a small percentage of the total readership estimate for the
thirty-two print media as a whole.
In estimating the average per issue readerships for the two
general-interest magazines, Ogonyok and Krokodil, by the more
complex method, we used the pass-on and regular readership rates
computed for Soviet newspapers as a whole rather than the corres-
ponding rates computed for Soviet magazines as a whole, because the
latter category was predominantly made up of specialized publications.
If we had used the magazine rates, then the estimated per issue
readerships for Ogonyok and Krokodil would have been 4.3 and 3.6 per
cent respectively. In other words, it would have made very little
difference.
gin order to estimate the average per issue readerships of the
eleven aggregate republic newspaper media based on the Comcom survey
alone, we first computed the unduplicated total readership of all
republic papers cited by Comcom respondents (Table 4.9) except
Sovietskaya Rossia, the Party-Government organ in the RSFSR. Then,
after adjusting this figure by frequency of readership in order to
estimate the total per issue readership, we divided the resulting
figure between the eleven aggregate republic newspaper media in
proportion to their estimated total per issue circulations (Table 4.8).
These circulation figures were also used to estimate the average per
issue readerships of the aggregate republic newspaper media by the
more complex method. We have assumed that only a small error was
produced in these estimates by the failure to account for duplicated
readership between individual republic newspapers. Because few
persons in the Soviet Union were regularly exposed to more than two
newspapers (see note e above), and because of the way in which we
aggregated republic level newspaper media for the simulation (i.e.,
Party-Government organs, youth papers, others by periodicity), there
probably was very little readership duplication between the individual
newspapers which made up the aggregate republic papers. E.g., there
were generally two Party-Government organs in a given republic, one
in Russian and one in the major nationality language of that republic.
Persons residing in the republic read either one or the other, but
seldom read both. Also, newspapers published in one republic were
seldom read by persons who resided in another republic.
Table 4.10--Continued
hIn order to estimate the average per issue readerships of
the seven aggregate subRepublic newspaper media based on the Comcom
survey alone, we first computed the unduplicated total readership of all
subRepublic papers cited by Comcom respondents (Table 4.9). Then after
adjusting this figure by frequency of readership in order to estimate
the total per issue readership, we divided the resulting figure among
the seven aggregate subRepublic newspaper media in proportion to their
estimated total per issue circulations (Table 4.8). These
circulation figures were also used to estimate the average per issue
readerships of the aggregate subRepublic newspaper media by the more
complex method. For the same reasons outlined in note g, above,
we have assumed that only a small error was produced in these estimates
by the failure to account for duplicated readership between individual
subRepubl:ic newspapers.
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estimates derived from Leisure Study interview data alone for central
newspapers and magazines substantially exceeds the corresponding
total derived from Leisure Study interview data and estimated per issue
circulation figures. At the same time, the total of the single-issue
readership estimates derived from Leisure Study data alone for sub-
Republic newspapers is substantially less than the corresponding total
derived from Leisure Study data and circulation figures. Because of
the overrepresentation of the educated, urbanites, and males in the
Leisure Study sample, this is precisely the way we would have expected
totals based solely on readership data from that sample to deviate
from the real per issue readership totals for print media published
on these two levels. Accordingly, in the simulation we used the set
of per issue readership estimates based on the Leisure Study data and
the assumed subscription rates and estimated per issue circulation
figures for 1963.
Distributing single-issue readerships across cells
Having estimated the size of each simulated print medium's
average single-issue readership, we next had to determine how these
readerships were distributed across demographic and social strata of
the adult Soviet population in 1963. We now proceed to describe
how that was done.
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Findings of the Leisure Study and other studies
In Chapter I we mentioned the fact that there were, in addition
to the Comcom Leisure Study, at least three other important studies
with findings that related (in part) to the demographic and social
composition of Soviet audiences: the Harvard study of Soviet society,
a series of Soviet time budget studies, and a Komsomolskaya pravda
poll. With regard to print readership the combined results of these
three studies and the findings of the Comcom Leisure Study are in
substantial agreement. They may be summarized as follows: By the early
1960's the increased education of the Soviet population since the
Second World War had somewhat narrowed the gap in newspaper and
magazine consumption between the better educated and the laboring
classes (i.e., workers and collective farmers), but it had not
eliminated it. Education and occupational standing were still the
most powerful determinants of newspaper and magazine consumption,
both being positively correlated with exposure. Two other attributes
positively correlated with newspaper and magazine consumption were
(1) a favorable attitude toward the Communist regime and (2) a willing-
ness to be politically involved. Correlations between sex or age and
exposure to print media worked within the educational framework, men
having slightly higher exposure than women and the evidence with regard
to age being inconsistent. Finally, although the improved distribution
of newspapers and magazines over the last quarter century had probably
lessened the influence of residence on exposure to both types of
media, in the early 1960's exposure to magazines still increased with
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urbanism. 
Problems with the other studies
As the foregoing summary suggests, when taken together the
findings of the Harvard study, Soviet time budget studies, a
Komsomolskaya pravda poll, and the Comcom Leisure Study provided us
with a broad qualitative picture of newspaper and magazine readership
in the Soviet Union during the early 1960's. However, for each print
medium in the simulation we wished to derive a quantitative estimate
of the distribution of the average single-issue readership across
demographic and social strata of the Soviet population. Unfortunately,
of these four studies only the Comcom Leisure Study contained data
in a form which could be used to make such estimates. Among other
things, the communications section of the Harvard study focused on
the amount of exposure to broadly-defined communications sources, such
as "newspapers" and "magazines". But it did not break these sources
down into any of the narrower categories by which we had defined
the print media in the simulation, i.e., by title, type, administrative
level, or periodicity. Moreover, even if the Harvard study had
defined communications sources more nearly as we had defined the print
media in the simulation, we still could not have used its results to
estimate the distributions of their readerships across the Soviet
IFor the data and analysis on which this summary is based the
reader is referred to Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 50-64, in
which a number of tabulations from the Comcom survey, the Harvard
study, Soviet time budget studies, and the Komsomolskaya pravda poll
are reproduced and discussed.
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population. Most of the respondents in the Harvard study had left
the Soviet Union either during or shortly after the Second World War.
As a result, data from this study apply mainly to the pre-War period.
A series of time budget studies undertaken in the Soviet Union
since the late 1950's did cover the period in which we were inter-
ested, but several difficulties prevented us from using the data from
these studies to estimate readership distributions for the various
print media in the simulation. The time budget studies did not
present data on reading of newspapers and magazines in the kind of
detail that could be related to individual newspaper and magazine
media in the simulation. They did not even treat these two activities
separately. The majority of the studies lumped reading of newspapers,
magazines, and books in a single category, and the rest treated reading
of either newspapers and magazines or books and magazines as one
category. But, here again, even if the time budget studies had defined
reading of magazines and newspapers in a way that could have been
related to reading of individual print media in the simulation, we
still would not have been able to use them to estimate readership
distributions for these media. As their name suggests, most of the
time budgetstudies measured newspaper and magazine reading in terms
of the time expended on these activities. However, there was no
way that we could translate a figure for time spent on reading
newspapers (or magazines) into a figure such as "number of newspapers
(or magazines) read" or, if the time budget studies had been more
detailed, into a figure such as "frequency of exposure to a given
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newspaper (or magazine)." 1 Further, even if we could have made
this translation, and even if the time budget studies had covered
reading of the kinds of print media represented in the simulation,
there was still another problem which would have prevented us from
translating their findings into estimates of readership distributions
for these media. The Soviet time budget studies measured only primary
activities. Where reading a newspaper or magazine was one of a
respondent's secondary activities, it was ignored.2
With regard to the use of their data for estimating readership
distributions, neither the Komsomolskaya pravda poll nor the Comcom
Leisure Study shared the serious drawbacks of the Harvard study or
the Soviet time budget studies. Both the poll and the Leisure Study
investigated, among other things, reading of newspapers and magazines--
not as a single activity but rather as two separate activities, and
not in terms of time spent on these activities but rather in terms
of frequency of exposure. Also, the facts that (1) the poll results
1 The results of the Comcom survey indicated that the difference
in the average time spent by two groups of respondents on reading news-
papers on a typical day was not proportional to the difference in the
average number of newspapers to which the respondents in these two groups
reported exposure (Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Appendix A, p. 294).
The reason for this was that there was a difference in the average
time spent by the two groups of respondents on an issue of a newspaper.
For the same reason we can presume that, had the tabulation been made,
we would have found that the difference in the average time spent by
two groups of respondents on reading a given newspaper on a typical
day was not proportional to the difference in the average frequency
with which respondents in these two groups reported exposure to the
particular newspaper.
IFor a detailed discussion of the difficulties involved in using
the findings of the Soviet time budget studies as a supplement to
Western studies of Soviet media consumption, the reader is referred
to Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Appendix A, pp. 290-96.
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were published in February of 1966 and (2) the median year in which
Comcom refugee respondents left the Soviet Union was 1964, suggested
that the results of these two studies, unlike the results of the
Harvard Project and the Soviet time budget studies, were indeed
applicable to the period encompassed by the scenarios we wished to
simulate. However, the Komsomolskaya pravda poll did share one
characteristic with these other studies which prevented us from
making direct use of its results to estimate readership distribu-
tions for the various print media in the simulation: it did not break
down the newspapers and magazines to which respondents reported
exposure into the categories by which we had defined these print
media. On the other hand, the Leisure Study interview schedule contained
an open-ended question asking respondents to list, by title, the various
newspapers and magazines which they read (see p. above). From
the answers to this question we were able to identify, and aggregate
as necessary, the newspapers and magazines to which Comcom respondents
were exposed, in terms of the categories by which we had defined the
print media in the simulation.
Applicability of the Leisure Study
For the reasons discussed above, we chose to use the data
from the Comcom Leisure Study-to estimate the readership distributions
for the various print media in the simulation and assess the
plausibility of the resulting estimates by comparing them with the
broad exposure patterns observed in the findings of the other studies.
We turn next to a discussion of how each of the problems associated
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with the Leisure Study data affected the way in which we estimated
these readership distributions.
With regard to frequency of readership, we were prepared to
"beg the question" of what percentages of the Leisure Study sample
identifying themselves as readers of "every issue," "most issues,"
and "occasional issues" of a publication should be assigned to the
average single-issue readership of that publication. It seemed
reasonable to assume that the distribution of a publication's regular
readers (those reading every issue or most issues) over the sample
would be approximately the same as the distribution of the publication's
average single-issue readership over the sample, because occasional
readers probably constituted a small fraction of that readership on
the average. The problem of bias caused by the overrepresentation of
urbanites, the well educated, and males in the sample was solved, for
the most part, by weighting the respondents in each cell in such a way
as to make the distribution of these traits over the sample exactly
match their known distribution over the 1963 adult Soviet population.
But this still left two possible sources of bias in the Leisure Study
sample, one relating to its size and the other to the nature of the
respondents. Because of the small size of the Leisure Study sample,
even if the interviews had been conducted with persons living inside
the Soviet Union, it would have been by no means certain that the
weighted sample members in any population cell were representative
of the type of Soviet citizen defined by that cell. In addition,
ninety-seven out of the 107 respondents interviewed in the Leisure
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Study had left the Soviet Union to live elsewhere, some legally and
others illegally. (Ten of the respondents were Soviet visitors to
Western Europe.)
We therefore had to consider the implications of the fact that
many of the Leisure Study respondents were very likely persons dis-
affected with Soviet society. This disaffection could easily have
been a source of sample bias, because the communications behavior of
refugee respondents when they lived in the Soviet Union may not have
been representative of the communications behavior of other Soviet
citizens. It could also have produced response bias. For example,
refugee respondents may have exaggerated the extent of their media
exposure (particularly exposure to the print media) to demonstrate
the high degree of regimentation in Soviet society, or they may have
understated their media exposure to show their indifference to, or
mistrust of, the Soviet media. Rogers has analyzed the Leisure Study
protocols with an eye toward these considerations. Her findings may
be summarized as follows:
In order to qualify as a Comcom respondent, each person had to
meet the following criteria: he had to have left the Soviet Union not
earlier than 1956; he had to have been at least sixteen years old in
his last year of residence in the Soviet Union; he had to have lived
in the Soviet Union as a citizen or resident for at least 10 years.
Seventy-two of the 107 respondents had been born in the Soviet Union
and had lived there all their lives, while two more had been born
there but had lived outside the country a good part of their lives.
Half of those who had not been born in the Soviet Union were less than
twenty years old when they entered the country, and all but a
handful of those born outside the Soviet Union either had a USSR
language as their native language or were young enough when they
entered the country (less than ten years of age) to have become func-
tionally bilingual (Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 16-17).
395
--The extent to which refugee respondents were persons
disaffected with Soviet society or the Communist regime
appeared to be less than one might have expected. The
reasons for leaving the country cited by respondents
in general, whether defectors or emigres, seldom contained
more than a small ideological component. Most respondents
reported leaving for personal reasons--for example, at the
urging of relatives outside the USSR because their parents
or spouses were leaving, out of curiosity, etc.'
--On the basis of side conversations between respondents
and interviewers, it appeared that all educational and
occupational groups in the Leisure Study sample were
mixed with regard to attitudes toward the Soviet regime.
This suggested that, even if refugee-related attributes
did bias the sample as a whole, relationships between
subgroups in the Soviet population could still be
inferred from relationships between subgroups in the
sample.
--The communications behavior of refugee respondents when
they lived in the Soviet Union appeared to be more typical
of the communications behavior of other Soviet citizens than
might have been expected. This conclusion was suggested
by the fact that the results of the interviews with defect-
ors and emigres seemed consistent with the results of the
interviews with Soviet visitors to Western Europe. -
In any event, the design of the Comcom Leisure Study was such
that the completed protocols could not be used to measure disaffection
with the Soviet system or regime. For example, the questionnaire
did not elicit systematic information on events in a respondent's
life that could be presumed to have fostered this kind of attitude,
such as arrest experience, forced resettlement, lack of access to
education because of the respondent's particular ethnic or political
background, etc. (Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 21-22).
2Rogers compared the media exposure sections of the defectors'
and emigres' protocols with those of the visitors to Western Europe
and found that the general patterns that emerged from the inspection
of one set were consistent with those that emerged from the other.
For example, when visitors to Western Europe were excluded from the
sample, the average number of newspapers and magazines to which
respondents in the different educational groups reported regular
exposure did not decrease, but actually increased slightly. However,
it is important to point out that because of the small numbers
involved (e.g., only ten visitors to Western Europe) this general
agreement between the two subsamples serves only to help establish
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--Because the Leisure Study interview schedule contained
only factual questions about a respondent's everyday life,
and because the questions about media exposure were
interpreted as neutral and nonsensitive questions by
refugee and non-refugee respondents alike, the problem
of response bias appeared to be negligible in most
cases .
In addition to the evidence summarized above, one other factor
serves to establish a measure of confidence in the Leisure Study
data. In Table 4.11 we present data on the sample members' frequency
of regular exposure to newspapers and magazines by education, grouped
in such a way as to make it comparable with the results of the
Komsomolskaya pravda poll referred to above. Although the poll's
results are consistently somewhat higher, it can be seen that there
is considerable agreement between the two sources. Because the
Komsomolskaya ravda poll was based on a sample of over 13,000 Soviet
citizens, and because we had no reason to suspect the reliability of
reporting of the poll's results, the close agreement between them
a prima facie basis for confidence in the media exposure data from the
Leisure Study. Nevertheless, the possibility that the communications
behavior of refugee respondents, when they lived in the Soviet Union,
was in fact representative of the communications behavior of other
Soviet citizens, is also supported by the findings of the Harvard
study which indicated that occupation, education and social class
are more powerful determinants of media exposure than anti-Soviet
sentiment ("The Soviet Audience," pp. 22-24).
1A few strongly anti-Soviet respondents expressed their dis-
appointment with the Leisure Study interview because it did not give
them a chance to express their feelings about the Soviet Union. On
the other hand, those with mixed or favorable attitudes toward the
regime, and the Soviet visitors to Western Europe who agreed to take
the interview, did not object to any of the questions (Rogers, "The
Soviet Audience," p. 23).
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and the relatively sparse Comcom Leisure Study data gave us added
confidence that the latter source could be used to derive reasonable
estimates of readership distributions for the print media in the
simulation.
Using the Mosteller technique to construct
sample computer readerships
For the purpose of estimating any individual print medium's
readership distribution we had available five one-dimensional tables
from the Leisure Study, viz., the tables which gave the readership of
the medium on each level of each of the five dimensions of the
simulation population. Because the Leisure Study was based on a
sample, before weighting, of size 107, sampling errors would not
have justified our using multi-dimensional readership tables from
that source. In weighting to match the 1963 adult Soviet population,
many Comcom respondents were counted more than once, so the resulting
weighted sample size was 1,075. Dividing this number by the 96
lHere again we refer to the total print readership rather than
to the readership of individual print media.
We did not weight members of the Leisure Study sample by cell,
because the sparse nature of the sample would have made this operation
meaningless for most cells. In fact, the sample was so sparsely
populated that we could not even control for the important education
variable in its weighting. We were forced to produce five different
weighted samples, each of which was weighted by level on one and only
one of the cell-defining dimensions. To estimate the marginal
percentage breakdown of any print medium's readership on a given
dimension we used the sample that had been weighted on that dimension.
The weighted samples are shown below:
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population cells gave an average of only 11.2 weighted sample members
per cell. Even though individual cell samples varied both well above
and well below this average, it should be obvious that we were esti-
mating the sizes of print readerships in many cells from relatively
small samples. For each print medium in the simulation the problem
was to assign a proportion of the computer individuals in each cell
to the average single-issue readership of that medium in such a way
that the resulting five-dimensional table, when collapsed appro-
priately, would reproduce the readership frequencies in each of the
one-dimensional tables estimated for that medium from the sparse
Leisure Study data. Here again we were faced with one of the kinds
Breakdown of Leisure Study Sample
Weighted by: Before Weighting (%) After Weighting (%)
Sex
Male 75 (70) 451 (42)
Female 32 (30) 624 (58)
Age
16-29 39 (36) 387 (36)
30-49 47 (44) 398 (37)
50+ 21 (20) 290 (27)
Education
<4 yrs. 0 (0) 366 (34)
>4, <7 yrs. 13 (12) 301 (28)
?>7, <10 yrs. 51 (48) 365 (34)
>10 yrs. 43 (40) 43 (4)
Political Involvement
Party member 11 (10) 65 (6)
NonParty member 96 (90) 1010 (94)
Residence
Urban 85 (79) 538 (50)
Rural 22 (21) 537 (50)
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of assignment problems for which the application of the Mosteller
technique was described in Chapter II (p. , condition )
Accordingly, we used this iterative assignment procedure to construct
a five-dimensional computer representation of the 1963 adult Soviet
readership of each print medium in the simulation from the five
one-dimensional tables estimated for that readership from the Leisure
Study data. Because we had only these sparse marginal data on the
distribution of each print medium's readership, we wished to bias
these readership distributions toward the distribution of the 1963
adult Soviet population, on which we had multi-dimensional census data.
Accordingly, before using the Mosteller technique to construct- each
sample computer readership of a print medium, we initialized the
cells of the five-dimensional table with the cell sizes in the sample
computer population, i.e., with the population values produced by the
earlier use of the Mosteller technique. To sum up, then, the
estimated marginal distributions of each print medium's readership
were biased by the computer population's cell values to produce the
cell values for that readership.
O0f course, using the Mosteller technique this way can result
in some cells being assigned readerships larger than their population.
This did not happen for any media in the Soviet case, however, because
individual media in the simulation had relatively small single-issue
readerships. (No individual medium had a single-issue readership
greater than fifty per cent of the total population, and most had
single-issue readerships considerably smaller than this.)
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Plausibility of the resulting readership distributions
Table 4.11 lists the marginal percentage breakdown, on each
cell-defining dimension, of that portion of the weighted Leisure Study
sample regularly exposed to each print medium in the simulation. t
For each all-Union print medium in the simulation, the Table also shows
the corresponding marginal percentage breakdowns produced by the
Mosteller technique in the sample computer readerships. It can be
seen that the marginal percentage breakdowns of the simulated print
readerships and the corresponding print readerships in the weighted
Leisure Study sample are virtually identical on each dimension (A
similar result was obtained for the other print media in the
simulation). In Table 4.12 we compare the marginal percentage
breakdown, on each cell-defining dimension, of the simulation popula-
tion and the total simulated newspaper readership on each territorial-
administrative level. From this comparison it can be seen that males,
those between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine, those with seven
or more years of education, and Party members were overrepresented in
the total sample computer readership. These patterns, which are even
more pronounced in the all-Union readership (where urban residents
are also overrepresented), conform to the general findings summarized
~The Leisure Study sample was too sparsely populated to record
a readership figure for some of the print media in the simulation.
For the readerships of these media we estimated marginal percentage
breakdowns on cell-defining dimensions by extrapolating (or inter-
polating) the corresponding breakdowns recorded for the readerships
of other media. The assumptions made for this purpose are documented
in the notes to Table 4.11.
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Table 4.11--Continued
aThe readership marginals were estimated by assuming values
in relation to those computed for Pravda, Izvestia and Komsomolskaya
pravda.
bBecause Eknomicheskaya gazeta is a Government publication
and is geared to a specialized audience of scientific, technical, and
managerial personnel, we assumed its readership marginals resembled
those computed for Pravda, but perhaps with slightly less Party
members.
CBecause Nedelya serves as a supplement to Izvestia we assumed
that readership marginals were the same as those estimated for
Izvestia.
dBecause Krasnaya zvezda is an armed forces paper, we assumed
that 98 per cent of its readership was male. We further assumed
that officers were more likely than enlisted men to read the paper,
thereby causing its audience distribution to be skewed toward the
older end of the age continuum. We based our estimates of the
paper's education and political involvement readership distributions
on a note on page eight of Ezhe godnik 1966 (Yearbook of the Great
Soviet Encyclopedia for 1966) stating that every fourth Soviet
officer has higher military or specialized education and that ninety
per cent of all Soviet officers belong to the Party or the komsomol.
Finally, considering the composition and deployment of Soviet ground
forces, we assumed the readership of Red Star was somewhat more
rural than urban.
eWe estimated the readership distributions for the two
"residual" all-Union papers by assuming they were the same as the
distribution of the combined readership of all central papers for
which a readership count was recorded in the Leisure Study sample.
fTo estimate the readership distribution for any Republic level
Party-Government newspaper medium in the simulation, we biased the
distribution of the combined readership of all Republic level papers
cited by Comcom respondents by an amount proportional to the difference
between the population distributions for the Soviet Union as a whole
and the territorial unit encompassed by that Republic level Party-
Government paper.
gWe estimated all but the education marginals for the reader-
ship of the two Republic level komsomol papers by assuming that the
ratio of a given marginal for each Republic level komsomol paper to
the corresponding marginal for Komsomolskaya pravda was the same as
the ratio of these two marginals for the combined readerships of all
Table 4.11---Continued
Republic level and all central papers read by Comcom respondents.
The education marginals were estimated by assuming plausible values in
relation to those computed for Komsomolskaya pravda, all the central
papers cited by Comcom respondents, and all the subRepublic papers
cited by them as well.
hWe estimated the readership distributions for the four
"residual" Republic level papers by assuming they were the same
as the distribution of the combined readership of all Republic level
papers for which a readership count was recorded in the Leisure Study
sample.
iWe estimated all but the education marginals for the reader-
ship of the subRepublic komsomol paper by assuming that the ratio of
a given marginal to the corresponding marginal for Komsomolskaya
pravda was the same as the ratio of these two marginals for the
combined readerships of all subRepublic and all central papers read
by Comcom respondents. The education marginals were estimated by
assuming plausible values in relation to those computed for
Komsomolskaya pravda, all the central papers cited by Comcom
respondents, and all the subRepublic papers cited by them as well.
Jwe estimated the readership distributions for the six
"residual" subRepublic papers by assuming they were the same as
the distribution of the combined readership of all subRepublic
papers for which a readership count was recorded in the Leisure
Study sample.
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in Chapter I and at the beginning of this section. They therefore
testify to the plausibility of the readership distributions mapped
into computer storage from the weighted Leisure Study sample.
Soviet Radio and Television Audiences
Defining individual Soviet electronic media
In 196:3 there were 716 different radio stations and television
centers in the Soviet Union, with domestic broadcasts originating
both on the central and regional levels. Table 4.13 shows the number
of major radio and TV stations and the total programming hours per day
for central and regional broadcasts. Radio was far ahead of
television in terms both of number of major stations and total
broadcast time.
Table 4.13 also indicates that, like the Russian press, Soviet
electronic media had a vertical structure. Domestic radio programs
originated on four territorial-administrative levels: all-Union or
central radio; Republic level radio (aimed at the population of
1
the entire republic); radio broadcasting below the Republic level
(in autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, and individual krays
and oblasts within the republic); and the radio-diffusion
exchanges. The latter supplied systems of
1
The RSFSR was an exception. See Chapter V, p.
Table 4.13--Soviet radio and television broadcasting, in 1963, by
territorial-administrative level, number of stations
and total daily programming time.
Territorial-Administrative Number of Stations Total Daily
Level or Centers Programming Hours
RADIO
Central 76.0
Regional - 653.0
Totals 25 6a 729.0
TELEVISION
Central - 19.3
Regional - 373.3
Totals 150 392.6
Grand Totals 406 1,121.6
aTaken from: Durham, "Radio and Television," Table I.E, p. 101.
Approximately half of these radio stations were located in the RSFSR.
Taken from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Table III.1, p. 80.
T]his figure includes TV centers and the most important relay stations.
In addition, there were another 310 relay stations of minor significance.
CEstimated from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," Table III.2,
p. 81, by interpolating the 1959 and (planned) 1965 figures.
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wired radio with broadcasts from the central and regional levels,
but were set up so that they could also add broadcasts of their own.
Television broadcasts emanated from Moscow (Central Television) and
from the capitals of the Union republics and other kray and oblast
centers. In the case of both radio and television, central broad-
casts were not only a model for local broadcasts, but made up part
of the local broadcasts as well. For example, in the first half of
1966 central broadcasts were relayed to the capitals of twelve union
republics and close to one hundred other large towns.
These characteristics reflect the important role played by
central radio and television broadcasts, a role which we discussed
in Chapter I. The dependence of regional on central broadcasts, with
respect to program schedules and program content, had an important
bearing on the way we conceptualized individual electronic media
for the simulation.
The obvious strategy, somewhat analogous to the definition
of each newspaper as a print medium, would have been to define each
television or radio station as an electronic medium. However,
there were several reasons why this could not be done. First, the
simulation programs can process a maximum of only sixty-four
1 The amount of regional broadcasting varied with the size of
the republic. In 1963 the largest amount of regional broadcasting
took place within the RSFSR, which had approximately half the radio
stations and, in 1959, nearly two-thirds of the television stations
in the USSR (Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," p. 84).
%One difference between these two approaches stems from the
fact that newspapers have several editions.
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communications media and their audiences, but as we have seen, in
1963 there were over 700 radio and television stations in the Soviet
Union. Second, even if we had consolidated all the radio and TV
stations in a reasonably small number of station "groups", and defined
each group as an individual medium, two serious problems would still
have remained.
In the Comcom sample, the amount of radio listening and
television viewing varied greatly over a day, reaching peaks in the
"early morning" (5:30-8:29 a.m.), at "lunch time" (noon-2:59 p.m.),
and during "late afternoon-evening" (6:00-9:29 p.m.) for radio, and
":in the evening" (6:00-11:59 p.m.) for television. Moreover, the
composition of the listening audience varied as well; women were a
much greater proportion of the audience in the "midmorning"
(8:30-11:59 a.m.) and "afternoon" (3:00-5:59 p.m.) than at other times
of the day. It would have been impossible to simulate the effects
of these shifting radio and television audiences if we had defined
individual media in terms of stations or groups of stations and treated
newscasts (or items in newscasts) as separate messages in these media.
The other difficulty in defining stations as electronic media
was related to the problem of duplication. In Chapter II we described
how the largest part of the duplication between the audiences of two
media is accounted for, in the simulation, by cell means. We also
showed that the simulation could only make small modifications to an
audience duplication which was random at the cell level but which
did not match the estimated empirical duplication. If we had used
413
stations as media, it would have been impossible both to simulate
duplications that were random (or nearly random) at the cell level,
between pairs of messages occurring over two stations at different
times, and to simulate zero duplications between other pairs of
messages occurring over these two stations at the same (or nearly
the same) time.
For these reasons it was more appropriate to define individual
radio and TV media in terms of periods of the day. It seemed
reasonable to assume that, for a given time of day, the audience
total over all stations would have remained roughly the same, both in
1
size and composition, from one day to the next. We treated given
times of day as single "issues" of radio or TV media defined in
terms of those time slots, and we treated the various newscasts (or
items in the newscasts) occurring during those periods as messages
in the media.
Comcom Leisure Study data on radio listening, summarized in
Table 4.15, showed three times of peak listening, each followed by
a period of much lighter listening. The pattern observed for tele-
1
We would have preferred to restrict this assumption to a
given day of the week, but Comcom listening and viewing data were
not broken down that way.
Table 4.15--Times of day at which Comcom respondents reported listening
to Soviet radio and viewing Soviet television.a
Number of Respondents
Time of Day Who Attendedb
Radio
Early morning (5:30-8:29 a.m.) 69
Midmorning (8:30-11:59 a.m.) 18
Lunchtime (noon-2:59 p.m.) 50
Afternoon (3:00-5:59 p.m.) 18
Early evening (6:00-9:29 p.m.) 62
Late evening ('9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) 15
Television
In the afternoon (hour unspecified or before 5:00
p.m.) 6
In the evening 54
(between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m.) 5
(hour unspecified or from 6:00 p.m. on) 49
No answer 5
aTaken from: Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 114 and 115.
bFor radio N=99; for television N=59.
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vision viewing, also summarized in Table 4.15, was quite different.
TV viewing typically occurred in the evening, after 6:00 p.m. The
few respondents who reported any exposure during the day all
1
mentioned the evening as their typical viewing time.
It seemed reasonable to assume that (1) the daily distributions
of listeners over time slots were roughly similar for radio and TV
stations on all territorial-administrative levels, and (2) the
composition of the radio and TV audiences shifted between heavy
and light listening and viewing periods. Accordingly, the figures
in Table 4.15 suggested that, for the purpose of defining individual
domestic electronic media, we divide the Soviet listening day into
six time slots--5:30-8:29 a.m., 8:30-11:59 a.m., noon-2:59 p.m.,
3:00-5:59 p.m., 6:00-9:29 p.m., and 9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.; and that we
divide the Soviet viewing day into two time slots--ll:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.
and 6:00 p.m. on.
We defined ten Soviet radio media and four Soviet television
1
These figures largely reflect television programming times.
For example, in 1963 the Moscow station, which carried the heaviest
program load, offered a daily hour-long show at noon, and programming
again from about five to eleven p.m. Sunday programs ran without
interruption from noon to midnight ("35 Million Watch Soviet
Television," The New York Times, May 19, 1963, p. 9). However, the
viewing figures also reflect the fact that television was much less
accessible than radio in the work environment.
416
media in the simulation, distinguishing central from regional
broadcast in different time slots.
Table 4.16 lists the time of day and types of broadcasts used
to define each Soviet electronic medium in the simulation.
Estimating the sizes of daily audiences
In the simulation model we treated all broadcasts during a given
part of a day as constituting the analogy to an "issue" of a print
medium, and we treated the average number of persons who listened
or viewed at: all during that time of day as the average "single-issue"
audience of that electronic medium. We now proceed to describe
how the magnitude of this audience figure was estimated for each of
the fourteen Soviet domestic electronic media conceptualized in
the simulation.
The method used to estimate radio and TV audiences was
determined by the kind of data we had available. In Western media
systems ratings of the. actual audience of a particular radio
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or television program, are widely distributed. They generally
represent average percentages of the sampled homes in a given area
that have their radio or television set tuned to the given program.
By projecting these ratings to all households in the population of
interest, assuming that in every household only one radio or TV set
is playing at a given time, and using listener or viewer "densities,"
i.e., numbers of adult males and females listening or viewing per
set playing (also projected from sampled homes), the average
1
audiences of given radio and TV programs can be estimated.
The Soviets, however, report no ratings. We had two different
types of relevant data for Soviet electronic media. First, we
knew what percentages of the Comcom survey sample listened to radio
or watched television at various times of the day. This information
was in answers to the following questions: "About how many
minutes, if at all, would a radio set be on where you could
hear it?" "About how many minutes, if at all, would a television
set be on where you could hear it? (At what time of day?)" Comcom
respondents answered the radio question for each of seven time
In Western countries additional data is available which allows
one to take account of the substantial radio listening and TV viewing
outside of the home, as, for example, while commuting in cars or
while visiting (see, e.g., Kramer, "A Computer Simulation," Chapter IV).
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slots: "early morning", "midmorning", "lunch", "early afternoon",
late afternoon", "evening", "late night". They answered the TV
question either for specific times of day or for each of two time
slots: "afternoon", "evening". Table 4.17 summarizes the raw
listening and viewing data for each Soviet electronic medium defined
in the simulation.
The second type of data we had were estimated of the maximum
potential audiences for Soviet domestic radio and TV. The Chairman
of the State Committee on Radio and Television put the size of the
Soviet radio audience at 150,000,000 out of a total Soviet popula-
tion of about 224 million in 1963.1 Various estimates of the size
of the Soviet television audience have also been published. Accord-
ing to a former Chairman of the State Committee on Radio and Tele-
vision, the TV audience in 1963 numbered between 35 and 40 million
persons.
Table 4.18 lists two different estimates of the average
audience of each Soviet electronic medium in the simulation. One
set of estimates is based on listening and viewing data from the
weighted Leisure Study sample, i.e., on Comcom respondents' answers
to questions about their daily consumption of radio and TV. The
~Durham- Radio and Television, p. 74, quoting Kharlamov.
~t bid.
For these estimates we used the Leisure Study sample weighted
to match the education breakdown of the adult 1963 Soviet population.
In the case of central radio and television media, we divided the
weighted audience estimate by the number of respondents who "knew
some Russian" and multiplied the result by the corresponding (estimated)
Table 4.17--Times of day at which Comcom respondents reported being
able to listen to central and regional Soviet radio and
view central and regional Soviet television.
Percentage of the Leisure Study
Medium Sample That Could Attend
Radio
Early morning central (5:30-8:29 a.m.) 27.1
Lunchtime central (noon-2:59 p.m.) 34.6
Early evening central (6:00-9:29 p.m.) 45.8
Late evening central (9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) 17.8
Early morning regional (5:30-8:29 a.m.) 43.0
Lunchtime regional (noon-2:59 p.m.) 14.0
Early evening regional (6:00-9:29 p.m.) 20.6
Late evening regional (9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) 8.4
Midmorning (8:30-11:59 a.m.) 3.7
Afternoon (3:00-5:59 p.m.) 8.4
Television
Daytime central (11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) 6.5
Nighttime central (6:00 p.m.-midnight) 24.3
Daytime regional (11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) 6.5
Nighttime regional (6:00 p.m.-midnight) 30.8
N=10 7.
Table 4.18--The average audience of each Soviet electronic medium in
the simulation, estimated two ways.a
Average Single-Issue Audience
Based on Maximum Audience
Based on Comcom Estimates and Comcom
Medium Leisure Study Leisure Study
Radio
Early morning central
(5:30-8:29 a.m.) 19.3% 12.7%
Lunchtime central
(noon-2:59 p.m.) 32.2 21.1
Early evening central
(6:00-9:29 p.m.) 34.3 22.5
Late evening central
(9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) 13.9 9.1
Early morning regional
(5:30-8:29 a.m.) 51.2 33.6
Lunchtime regional (noon-
2:59 p.m.) 8.5 6.6
Early evening regional
(6:00-9:29 p.m.) 17.5 11.5
Late evening regional
(9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) 8.1 5.3
Midmorning b
(8:30-11:59 a.m.) 2.6 1.7
Afternoon
(3:00-5:59 p.m.) 5.8 3.8
Television
Daytime central
(11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) 2.6 1.2
Nighttime central
(6:00 p.m.-midnight) 15.7 7.1
Daytime regional
(11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) 1 .9 0.9
Nighttime regional
(6:00 p.m.-midnight) 26.3C 11.9
Table 4.18--Continued
aEstimates represent percentages of the 1962-63 adult Soviet
population.
bBecause the number of Comcom respondents who reported listen-
ing to either midmorning or afternoon radio was so small, we used
the total for the media as a base for estimating the size of their
combined average audience and derived the audience for each as a
fraction of the resulting estimate.
CThe number of Comcom respondents who reported watching
either daytime central television or daytime regional television
was too small to use as a base for reliably estimating the size of
each medium's average audience. As a result, we derived these
audience sizes by assuming that both they and the combined audience
estimate for midmorning and afternoon radio were directly proportional
to the corresponding audience count obtained from the Leisure Study
sample.
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other set of estimates incorporates the approximate sizes of the
maximum potential audiences for radio and TV in 1963. It was
computed by assuming that the largest audience derived from the
Leisure Study data for a given time also represented, for radio,
half of all potential listeners, and, for television, two thirds-of
all potential viewers, ratings not unlike those at peak hours in the
United States. Audiences were then distributed across the other time
slots to match the distribution derived from the Leisure Study.
The first procedure produces estimates significantly larger than
the second. There are several possible reasons for this. The Leisure
Study estimates are based on a group of respondents who are, on the
average, of higher education and status than the median of the Soviet
population. Furthermore, they were answering regarding the times of
day a radio or TV set would normally be playing where they could hear
it. However, they may not have answered in terms of every day, but
rather in terms of most days. This would tend to make the resulting
audience estimates somewhat high. It is difficult to know whether
or not published estimates of the sizes of the Soviet radio and TV
audiences accurately reflect the total number of persons who had
access to collective radio listening and the even greater incidence
of collective television viewing in the Soviet Union during the
early 1960's.
percentage of the 1963 Soviet population. For the other radio and
TV media we simply took the weighted audience estimate, as a per-
centage of the total sample.
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Since we were unable to ascertain the basis for the total
audience sizes on which the second set of estimates rests, we used
in the simulation the radio and TV audience estimates derived from
the Comcom Leisure Study listening and viewing data. 
Distributing daily audiences across cells
Having estimated the size of each simulated Soviet electronic
medium's average audience, we next had to determine how these audiences
were distributed across demographic and social strata of the adult
Soviet population in 1963. We now proceed to describe how that
was done.
Findings of the Leisure Study and other studies
With regard to radio listening and TV viewing the results
of the Harvard study, Soviet time budget studies, the Komsomolskaya
A third type of data we had available, which also related
to the size of Soviet radio and TV audiences, was the number of
sets in use during 1963. The figures are as follows: 33 million
wired sets, 32 million wave sets, and 8 million television sets
(Durham, Radio and Television, Appendix IA, p. 96). Unfortunately,
we had no reliable information on listening and viewing densities
(average number of listeners and viewers per set) which could be
used to convert these set estimates to audience estimates. It is
interesting to note, however, that if we assume half the radio sets
and two-thirds of the television sets were turned on during the peak
listening and viewing periods, and if we further assume average
attendance densities of 2.0 adults per radio set and 5.0 adults per
TV set, we obtain audience estimates which fall about halfway between
those shown in Table 4.18. We speculate that an estimation procedure
based on these assumptions might have provided a more reasonable set
of audience figures for Soviet radio and TV than the ones that were
actually used in the simulation.
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pravda poll, and the Comcom Leisure Study are, once again, in sub-
stantial agreement. They may be summarized as follows: By the early
1960's frequency of exposure to Soviet radio had become about the
same in all educational groups. Frequency of exposure to television
still increased with education and occupational standing, but the
pattern was changing. With the continued expansion of the distribution
and reception networks, TV exposure patterns were beginning to approach
those observed for radio. The spread of electrification to the country-
side had all but eliminated the radio consumption gap between urbanites
and residents of rural areas, but access and exposure to TV still
increased somewhat with urbanism. As in the case of Soviet print
media, pro-Communist attitudes and a willingness for political involve-
ment were positively correlated with radio and TV consumption, while
sex and age differences were slight and worked within the educational
and occupational frameworks.
Table 4.19 shows Comcom respondents' frequency of exposure to
television by education, with the Leisure Study data grouped in such
a way as to make it comparable with the results of the Komsomolskaya
pravda poll.4 The close correspondence between these two sets of
«For the data and analysis on which this summary is based, the
reader is referred to Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," pp. 109-113, in
which a number of tabulations from the Comcom survey and the
Komsomolskaya pravda poll are reproduced and discussed.
We were unable to make a similar comparison for radio because
Comcom respondents were not asked about the frequency of their radio
listening over an extended period of time--e.g., whether they
listened daily, several times per week, or less. In fact, Comcom
respondents were not asked about the frequency of their television
viewing either, but in this case Rogers was able to reconstruct the
breakdown from their comments ("The Soviet Audience, p. 109).
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results, together with the considerations reviewed in the first part
of this chapter, serve to establish a measure of confidence in the
Leisure Study data on radio and TV consumption. Accordingly, we
used the Leisure Study data to estimate audience distributions for
the Soviet electronic media in the simulation.
Using the Mosteller technique to construct
sample computer audiences
For the purpose of estimating the distribution of any individual
Soviet radio or television medium's audience we had available, as in
the case of print media, five one-dimensional tables from the Leisure
Study which gave an estimate of the audience of the medium on each
dimension of the simulation population. Faced once again with the
kind of assignment problem described in Chapter II, we used the
Mosteller technique to construct a five-dimensional computer represent-
ation of the 1963 adult Soviet audience of each Soviet radio or TV
medium in the simulation from the five one-dimensional tables derived
for that audience from the Leisure Study data. Having only these
sparse marginal data on each electronic medium's audience, we again
biased each Mostellerized audience distribution toward the more
firmly established 1963 population distribution by initializing the
cells of each five-dimensional table with the sample computer
population's cell values.
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Plausibility of the resulting listenership and
viewership distributions
Table 4.20 shows the marginal percentage breakdown, on each
cell-defining dimension, produced by the Mosteller technique in
the sample computer readerships for the Soviet electronic media in
the simulation. For every medium we obtained the same type of
result that: was illustrated in Table 4.11 above: Simulated audience
marginals were virtually identical with the corresponding marginals
in the weighted Leisure Study sample, thus providing further evidence
of the satisfactory functioning of the Mosteller technique.
Table 4.21 compares the marginal percentage breakdown, on each
cell-defining dimension, of the simulation population and the total
simulated Soviet radio and television audiences, on both the central
and regional levels. We note in the case of domestic radio that
females, persons fifty or more years of age, persons with less than
seven years of education, nonParty members, and urbanites were all,
in. varying degrees, overrepresented in the total sample computer
audience. A similar pattern prevailed on the central level, and on
the regional level as well, with but two exceptions: Persons having
seven to ten years of education and rural inhabitants were over-
represented in the simulated audience of regional radio. Females,
nonParty members, and urbanites were also overrepresented in the
sample computer audience of Soviet television (escept for Party
members on the central level), but in this case it was the youngest
age group and the two middle education groups that were overrepresented.
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Table 4.20--Continued
aBecause the number of Comcom respondents who reported
listening to either midmorning or afternoon radio was so small,
we used the combined total for both media as a base for estimating
the distribution of their average audiences, assuming that this
distribution was about the same for each medium.
bThe number of Comcom respondents who reported watching
either daytime central television or daytime regional television was
too small to use as a base for reliably estimating the audience
distributions for these two media. As a result, we estimated
these distributions by assuming they were about the same as for
midmorning and afternoon radio.
Table 4.21--Marginal percentage breakdowns, on cell-defining dimensions,
of the simulation population and the total simulated radio
and television audiences on the central and regional levels.
Dimension Total Simulated Audience
Simulation
Level Population Central Regional Total
(N=1,200) (N=1,298) (N=1,025) (N=2,323)
Radio
Sex
Male 42 37 38 37
Female 58 63 62 63
Age
16-29 36 36 32 34
30-49 37 31 37 33
50+ 27 33 31 33
Education
<4 yrs. 34 41 33 37
>4,<7 yrs. 28 30 27 29
>7,10 yrs. 34 26 37 31
>10 yrs. 4 3 3 3
Political
Involvement
Party Member 6 5 3 4
NonParty Member 94 95 97 96
Residence
Urban 50 55 46 51
Rural 50 45 54 49
Table 4.21--Continued
Dimension Total Simulated Audience
Simulation
Level Population Central Regional Total
(N=1,200) (N=1,298) (N=1,025) (N=2,323)
Television
S ex
Male
Female
Age
16-29
30-49
50+
Education
<4 yrs.
>,4,<7 yrs.
>7,<10 yrs.
>10 yrs.
Political Involvement
Party Member
NonParty Member
Residence
Urban
Rural
42
58
36
37
27
34
28
34
4
23
77
41
38
21
26
36
33
5
8
92
79
21
6
94
50
50
29
71
26
74
46
37
17
26
25
45
4
2
98
66
34
44
37
19
26
29
41
4
4
96
72
28
- --
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Also, the simulated audiences of Soviet TV contained significantly
more females and urbanites than the domestic radio audience.
These patterns are largely the ones described in Chapter I
and summarized at the beginning of this section. As such, they
attest to the reasonableness of the electronic audience distributions
mapped into computer storage from the weighted Leisure Study sample.
The Soviet Audience For Foreign Radio
Defining individual foreign radio media
By 1963 broadcasts from at least nineteen different foreign
radio stations were reaching the Soviet population. Radio Liberty
led by far in terms of daily programming hours (24), followed by Voice
of America (7) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (3). VOA
transmissions were in Russian and in three of the basic nationality
languages. The BBC was broadcasting in Russian, and Radio Liberty
was transmitting material in seventeen languages of the USSR, to
eight different target areas, covering by far the largest amount of
territory. Other foreign broadcasters included Deutsche Welle
(1' 1/2 hours daily), Voice of Canada (1 hour), French Radio (1 hour)
and stations located in the Vatican, Peking, Tokyo, Ceylon, Tangiers,
Madrid, Monte Carlo, Athens, Rome, Warsaw, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
and East Germany. 1 Most foreign stations concentrated the bulk of
1 This list was compiled from the foreign radio stations to which
Comcom Leisure Study respondents reported listening.
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their broadcasts during the evening and early morning hours.
With the discontinuation of Soviet jamming of VOA and the BBC
in June of 1963, Radio Liberty remained as the only important Western
broadcaster still jammed. During this period at least one in every
three adult Russians had access to a radio set which could receive
1
foreign programs and, in the view of Radio Liberty's director of
audience research, Soviet daily listeners to foreign radio ranged
as high as 15 to 25 million persons. 2 Thus, by the early 1960's
foreign radio had become an important source of information about
the outside world for a significant element of the Soviet popu-
lation. We can assume that this was especially true during periods
of international crisis.
For the same reasons outlined in the previous section, we chose
to define individual foreign radio media in terms of daily time slots,
treating the various foreign newscasts (or items in these newscasts)
transmitted during a given part of the day as messages in a given
discrete foreign radio medium.
Comcom Leisure Study data on foreign radio listening were too
sparse to yield a reliable estimate of the distribution of listeners
over various times of the day. However, more ample data was available
for the Radio Liberty Audience. Table 4.22 shows an estimate developed
1
Pool, "Opportunities for Change," p. 6.
2
Max Ralis, Comcom Soviet Memorandum No. 3, p. 4.
Table 4.22--Most favored Radio Liberty listening times,
January 1, 1962 to January 31, 1964.*
Per Cent of
ListenersTime of Day
Early morning (4:00-7:59 a.m.)
Midmorning (8:00-11:59 a.m.)
Afternoon (Noon-3:59 p.m.)
Early evening (4:00-7:59 p.m.)
Evening (8:00-11:59 p.m.)
Late evening (Midnight-3:59 a.m.)
8
1
2
28
39
22
Adapted from: Max Ralis, Comcom Soviet Memorandum
No. 6. Figures, which are based on letters received by Radio Liberty
from several hundred of their Soviet listeners, represent the per-
centages whose most favored listening times were as indicated.
However, the figures probably represent a fairly good estimate of
the station's total listener distribution over these times of day
as well.
____ __ __
· _I __ __ I __
_ _ I I_____ ___ __I_
I _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ I __ ___ _ _ _I
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by Radio Liberty's audience research division, of the station's daily
listener distribution during the period 1962-64. We note that
listening typically occurred in the evening and very early morning
hours. It seemed reasonable to assume that (1) the daily distributions
of listeners over time slots were roughly similar for the three major
foreign radio stations, and (2) the composition of the daytime foreign
radio audience was somewhat different from that of the evening audience.
Accordingly, the data shown in Table 4.22 suggested that we divide
the Soviet day into at least two time periods.
We therefore defined nine foreign radio media in the simulation.
Three of the media carried Voice of America broadcasts and
encompassed the following three time slots: 4:00-7:59 a.m.; 8:00 a.m.-
7:59 p.m.; 8:00 p.m.-3:59 a.m. Another three carried BBC broadcasts
and the third three Radio Liberty broadcasts in the same three time
slots. Table 4.23 lists the station and time of day used to define
each foreign radio medium in the simulation.
I
Ibid.
Table 4.23--Foreign radio media in the simulation, by title and
time of day.
Time of Day
Early morning Voice of America
Daytime Voice of America
Nighttime Voice of America
Early morning British Broadcasting
Corporation
Daytime British Broadcasting Corporation
Nighttime British Broadcasting Corporation
Early morning Radio Liberty
Daytime Radio Liberty
Nighttime Radio Liberty
4:00-7:59 a.m.
8:00 a.m.-7:59
8:00 p.m.-3:59
4:00-7:59 a.m.
8:00 a.m.-7:59
8:00 p.m.-3:59
4:00-7:59 a.m.
8:00 a.m.-7:59
8:00 p.m.-3:59
Medium
p.m.
a.m.
p.m.
a.m.
p.m.
a.m.
b_ _ _
__
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Estimating the sizes of daily audiences
As with Soviet domestic radio and TV, we had no program rating
data on listening to foreign radio broadcasts beamed to the USSR. We
did, however, have two different types of pertinent information--one
for VOA, the BBC, and Radio Liberty, and the other for foreign radio
as a whole. First, we knew what foreign radio stations Comcom re-
spondents listened to most often, and what percentage of the Leisure
Study sample listened to each of these stations. This information
was based on the answers to the following question from the Leisure
Study interview: "Which foreign radio station] did you listen to
most often?" Table 4.24 summarizes the raw listening data on each
foreign radio station represented in the simulation.
The second piece of information we had was an estimate of the
average size of the total daily audience for foreign radio as a whole.
According to Radio Liberty's Director of Audience Research, in 1963
a plausible range for this figure was between 15 and 25 million
1
persons.
1
Max Ralis, Comcom Soviet Memorandum No. 3, p. 4. Ralis also
estimated the ranking of the top three foreign stations to be VOA,
the'BBC, and RadioSLiberty, an estimate which coincided with the
'Leisure Study findings (Comcom Soviet Memorandum No. 6).
Table 4.24--Foreign radio stations to which Comcom respondents
listened most often.
Percentage of the Leisure
Study Sample That ListenedStation
Voice of America 43.0
British Broadcasting Corporation 29.0
Radio Liberty 15.9
N=107.
_ _ _ ___ _ __ ___ __ ___
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Table 4.25 lists two different estimates of the average audience
of each foreign radio medium in the simulation. One set of estimates
is based on listening data from the weighted Leisure Study sample--
i.e., on Comcom respondents' answers to questions about their consump-
tion of foreign radio broadcasts--and on the estimated daily distri-
bution of Radio Liberty listeners over time slots (Table 4.22).
The other set of estimates incorporates the average size of the total
daily audience for foreign radio in 1963 (which we have assumed to
be 20 million persons). This set of estimates was computed by
assuming that the largest audience for a given station and time slot,
as derived from the Leisure Study and Radio Liberty data, included
virtually all of the persons who listened in the course of an aver-
age day. Audiences were then distributed over the other station-
time slot combinations to match the distribution derived from the
Leisure Study and Radio Liberty data.
The first set of estimates is somewhat larger than the second.
As in the case of domestic radio and TV, there are at least two
possible reasons for this. The Leisure Study/Radio Liberty estimates
are based on Comcom respondents' answers regarding the foreign radio
stations to which they listened most frequently. We weighted each
respondent's answers by his frequency of foreign radio listening.
IFor these estimates we used the Leisure Study sample
weighted to match the education breakdown of the adult 1963 Soviet
population. For each station we allocated the estimated daily
audience to the three time slots in such a way as to match the
distribution derived from Radio Liberty data.
Table 4.25--The average daily audience of each foreign radio medium
in the simulation, estimated two ways.
Average Single-Issue Audience
Based on Comcom Based on Total Daily Audience
Leisure Study and Estimates, Comcom Leisure
Medium Radio Liberty Time- Study, and Radio Liberty Data
Sheet Data
Early morning VOA
(4:00-7:59 a.m.)
Daytime VOA
(8:00 a.m.-7:59 p.m.)
Nighttime VOA
(8:00 p.m.-3:59 a.m.)
Early morning BBC
(4:00-7:59 a.m.)
Daytime BBC
(8:00 a.m.-7:59 p.m.)
Nighttime BBC
(8:00 p.m.-3:59 a.m.)
Early morning RL
(4:00-7:59 a.m.)
Daytime RL
(8:00 a.m.-7:59 p.m.)
Nighttime RL
(8:00 p.m.-3:59 a.m.)
2.7% 1.7%
11.0
20.4
1.5
5.9
11.5
1.5
5.9
11.7
7.0
12.9
1.0
3.7
7.3
1.0
3.7
7.4
Estimates represent percentages of the 1962-63 adult
Soviet population.
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In so doing, however, we counted as "daily" such answers as "very
often", "frequently", and "practically every day". In retrospect it
is clear that this assumption may have caused the resulting audience
estimates to be somewhat high. More important, our respondents were
unusually prone to engage in foreign radio listening.
In practice, we used in the simulation the foreign radio audience
1
estimates derived from the Comcom Leisure Study and Radio Liberty data.
This may have resulted in as much as a fifty per cent overestimate of
foreign radio listening in our computer simulation output. That
fact is taken account of in our discussion in the text. On the other
hand, the higher estimates should be kept in mind as more representative
of contemporary Russia, even if not of 1963.
1
A third type of data we had available, which also related
to the size of the Soviet foreign radio audience, was the number of
sets in use during 1963. As indicated in n. on p. , there
were approximately 32 million such sets in use in the USSR in 1963.
Unfortunately, we had no reliable information on listening density
(average number of listeners per set) which could be used to convert
these set estimates to audience estimates. It is interesting to
note, however, that if we assume at least two-thirds of these
receivers were equipped with short wave bands and half of the latter
were turned on during the peak period of foreign radio listening,
and if we further assume an average listening density of 2.0 adults
per wave set, we obtain a set of audience estimates which falls between
the two sets shown in Table 4.25. We speculate that an estimation
procedure based on these assumptions might have provided a more
reasonable set of audience figures for incoming foreign radio trans-
missions than the figures that were actually used in the simulation.
We observe, however, that on an absolute basis the range between
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Distributing dailyauidiences across cells
Having estimated the size of each foreign radio medium's
average audience, our next stop was to estimate the distributions of
these audiences over socially and demographically defined subgroups
of the adult 1963 Soviet population. We now proceed to describe
how that was done.
Findings of the Leisure Study and other studies
The results of the Comcom Leisure Study, and the earlier
Harvard study, established a picture of the Soviet foreign radio
audience which may be summarized as follows: Between 1940 and 1963
the number of wave radio sets in the USSR increased from 1 to 32
million. However, in the early 1960's these sets still were dis-
proportionately concentrated in the urban centers. As a result,
foreign radio broadcasts were accessible to a greater percentage of
these people (probably a majority) than by others, as well as by dis-
proportionately large segments of the young and males. Differences
in foreign radio listening by Party membership were considerably smaller
than those by age, urbanism, and education.
the high and low estimates in Table 4.25 is rather small in all
but the case of the "nighttime" time slot. But even in that case it
is not great enough to invalidate or compromise the simulation
results with respect to foreign radio, which are described in
Chapters VI and VII. It is important to remember that our audience
estimates for Soviet print and electronic media may have been some-
what inflated as well (see n. , p. and n. , p..
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Table 4.26 shows the education breakdown of a sample of several
hundred Radio Liberty listeners, with the data grouped in such a way
as to make it comparable with the results of the Comcom Leisure
study for the three major foreign stations. The similarity of these
two breakdowns, together with the factors discussed earlier, serve to
establish a degree of confidence in the Leisure Study data on foreign
radio consumption. Accordingly, we used that data to estimate audience
distributions for the foreign radio media in the simulation.
Using the Mosteller technique to construct
sample computer audiences
Faced again with the kind of assignment problem described in
Chapter II, we used the Mosteller technique to construct a five-
dimensional computer representation of the 1963 adult Soviet audience
of each foreign radio medium in the simulation from five one-
dimensional tables estimated for that audience from the Leisure Study
data. In the absence of more than sparse marginal data on each
foreign radio medium's audience, we again, as with Soviet print and
electronic media, biased each Mostellerized audience distribution
toward the more firmly established 1963 population distribution by
initializing the cells of each five-dimensional table with the sample
computer population's cell values.
Table 4.26--Education breakdown of VOA, BBC, and Radio Liberty
listeners in the Leisure Study sample and a larger
sample of Radio Liberty listeners.
Education Comcom Radio Liberty
Higher (>10 yrs.) 39.4%a 36.0%b
Secondary or
less (<10 yrs.) 60.6 64.0
aN=94 .
bFigures are based on several hundred letters received
by Radio Liberty from their listeners. We adduced the approximate
education breakdown from the published occupation breakdown of
these listeners (Radio Liberty Committee, Annual Report of the
Committee, November 30, 1964, p. 12).
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Plausibility of the resulting listenership distributions
Table 4.27 shows the marginal percentage breakdown, on each
cell-defining dimension, produced by the Mosteller technique in the
sample computer audiences for the foreign radio media in the
simulation. For every medium these simulated audience breakdowns
were virtually identical with the corresponding breakdowns in the
weighted Leisure Study sample, just as they were in the case of
Soviet print and electronic media, providing additional evidence of
the Mosteller technique's effectiveness.
Table 4.28 compares the marginal percentage breakdown, on each
cell-defining dimension, of the simulation population and the total
simulated Soviet audience of foreign radio. We note that males,
persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine, persons having
ten or more years of education, and urbanites were all, in varying
degrees, overrepresented in the total sample computer audience of
foreign radio. These results are consistent with the audience
structure discussed in Chapter I and reviewed at the beginning of
this section. They therefore provide support for the plausibility
of the foreign radio audience distributions mapped into computer
storage from the weighted Leisure Study sample.!
lAn "oral agitation" medium was also conceptualized in the
simulation, On the basis of the information summarized in Chapter I
(p. , n. ) and in Rogers, "The Soviet Audience" (p. 186), we
assumed that members of the Soviet population who would have attended
oral agitation meetings attended, on the average, one such meeting
during each of the ten-day periods following the Cuban crisis and the
Kennedy assassination. In other words, we specified one "issue" of
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Table 4.27---Continued
Because the number of Comcom respondents who reported
listening, either in "early morning", "daytime", or "nighttime",
to any of the three major foreign radio stations was so small,
we used the total daily audience of each station as a base for
estimating the marginal distribution of its average daily
audience. Lacking additional information we used the resulting
"average" audience distribution for a given station in each of
the three time slots.
Table 4.28--Marginal percentage breakdowns, on cell-defining
dimensions, of the simulation population and the
total simulated foreign radio audience.
Simulation Total Simulated ForeignDimension
Population Radio Audience
(N=1,200) (N=860)Level
Sex
Male
Female
Age
16-29
,30-49
50+
42
58
36
37
27
56
44
62
14
14
Education
<4 yrs.
>,4,<7 yrs.
>7,<10 yrs.
>10 yrs.
Political Involvement
Party Member
NonParty Member
Residence
Urban
Rural
34
28
34
4
10
18
31
41
6
94
7
93
50
50
52
48

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Distributing Soviet Audiences Within Demographic
and SOcial Strata of the Sample Computer Population:
The Problem of Cumulation
In the first section of this Chapter we described how a sample
computer population was distributed across ninety-six Soviet audience
types defined by five dimensions. In the next section we explained
how individual communications media were defined, how the size of
each medium's audience was estimated, and how each audience was then
distributed across the ninety-six audience types.
the oral agitation medium for each of the two scenarios. Inkeles,
in his landmark study of Soviet communication, reported that attendance
at oral agitation meetings ran as low as 10 per cent, in many places
averaged as little as 25 to 30 per cent, and frequently could not be
got above 50 per cent without extra effort (Public Opinion in Soviet
Russia, p. 122). On the basis of this information and the fact that
oral agitation had declined in importance as a source of news for the
Soviet population since the time Inkeles wrote, we assumed the
average attendance at an oral agitation meeting in 1962-63 ran at
about 35 per cent of the target population. The latter, we assumed,
consisted primarily of blue collar and farm workers, which Kramer
has estimated as 80 per cent of the adult population ("The opulation
of the Soviet Union"). Thus, in the simulation we specified an
average oral agitation audience of 35% x 80% = 28 per cent of the
adult 1962-63 Soviet population, or 43.5 million persons.
The marginal percentage breakdown of this audience on each
cell-defining dimension was established in relation to the corres-
ponding breakdowns for the all-Union newspaper Trud, which we assumed,
attracted the same type of audience as oral agitation meetings.
Specifically,,we set the "sex" and "residence" distributions equal
to those for the readers of Trud, the "political involvement" distri-
bution one-quarter as Party-affiliated as that for the readers of Trud,
the "age" distribution somewhat older than that for the readers of
Trud, and the "education" distribution somewhat less educated than
that for the readers of Trud.
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Within a given audience type the ratio of the resulting
audience of any medium to the number of people of that type repre-
sents the average probability of exposure to the medium for that
audience type. Thus, for each medium in the simulation the next step
was to assign exposure probabilities to individual audience members
of each type in such a way that the mean exposure probabilities (or
cell means) for each type would be reproduced.
In Chapter II we showed how, for any communication medium,
the distribution of exposure probabilities over the population, and
over audience types within the population, governs (1) the rate of
cumulative exposure to the medium, and (2) the distribution of
exposure frequencies over the medium's audience. We also explained
how the cumulation rate and the frequency distribution are affected
by the degree of structure in a medium's audience--i.e., by the extent
to which the population can be divided into subgroups of users of the
medium each having a mean exposure probability divergent from the
overall population mean. The simulation is programmed to account
both for the distribution and structure of any medium's audience by
dividing the population into three groups--regular users or subscribers,
modrate or casual users, and very infrequent users of the medium.
For each of these groups a beta function distribution of probabilities
is generated which is consistent with the group's size, and with the
average audience and the two-issue cumulative audience for the group.
Probabilities are then allocated from each of the three distributions
to members of each audience type or cell in such a way as to preserve
the medium's cell means and its overall one- and two-issue cumulative
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audiences.
Accordingly, for each medium in the Soviet simulation we had to
specify three distributions of probabilities, each defined in terms
of its size, average audience, and two-issue cumulative audience.
We now proceed to describe how these parameters were estimated for
the three distributions specified for each medium in the simulation.
Readership Cumulation for Soviet Newspapers and Magazines
For each simulated Soviet print medium we first estimated the
sizes of regular, moderate, and infrequent user distributions as well
as the size of the average single-issue readership in each. Figure
4.3 illustrates how this was done for the all-Union youth paper
Komsomolskaya pravda. The basic procedure was to combine the esti-
mated numbers of institutional and individual subscribers, retail
consumers, and pass-on recipients of a paper with the estimated
readership rates in each of these categories.i (We described how
these estimates were made on pp. above.)
To obtain the total number of readers of institutionally
subscribed copies, we multiplied the estimated number of institutional
subscriptions by the estimated number of persons having access to an
1For the reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, we assumed
that the uniform application of recipient-category and readership
rates estimated for newspapers as a whole to each individual newspaper
medium in the simulation would not produce a significant error
in the distribution sizes and readership means estimated for print
media as a whole.
Name of print medium: Komsomolskaya pravda
Estimated institutional subscriptions = 0.49 milliona
Institutional subscribers = 15 x 0.49 = 7.36
Individual subscribers = 2.78a
Regular readers = 10.14
Average regular readership = (7.36/10.14)85%a+ (2.78/10.14)88% a = 85%
Retail sales = 0 .5 8a
Pass-ons = 2.05
Moderate readers = 2.63
Average moderate readership = (0.58/2.63)76%a + (2.05/2.63)73%a = 74%
Infrequent readers = 155.0b - 10.14 - 2.63 = 142.23
Average infrequent readership = (10.64a - 10.14 x 85% - 2.63 x 74%)/142.23 =
11%
aFor the derivation of this statistic see Figure 4.1 above and pp.
bEstimated size of the 1962-63 adult Soviet population
Fig. 4.3--Estimating the sizes of, and the average per issue
readerships in, regular, moderate, and infrequent
user distributions for Komsomolskaya pravda.
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average institutional newspaper copy. The result when added to the
estimated number of individual subscribers, gave an estimate of the
size of the regular reader distribution. We obtained the average
per issue readership among regular users simply by taking the
weighted sums of the corresponding statistic for institutional and
individual subscribers.
To estimate the size of the moderate reader distribution, we
summed the estimated number of retail consumers and pass-on recipients
of the paper. The weighted sum of the average per issue readerships
among retail consumers and pass-along readers formed our estimate of
the average single-issue readership among moderate users of the
medium.
Having estimated the size and average single-issue readership
for both the regular and moderate user distributions, we computed the
size of the infrequent user distribution as the remainder of the adult
1962-63 Soviet population, and we computed the average per issue
readership for this distribution as the remainder of the paper's per
issue readership divided by the distribution's size.
Table 4.29 shows, for each Soviet print medium in the simulation,
the sizes and average per issue readerships calculated for the regular,
moderate, and infrequent user distributions by means of the procedure
described above.
In Chapter II (p. , n. ) we alluded to an important constraint,
arising from the beta function model, which relates the size of the
average audience and the maximum reproducible size of the two-issue
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cumulative audience for any distribution: the proportion of the
population in the two-issue cumulative audience may not exceed the
difference between twice the average audience proportion and the square
of the average audience proportion. Accordingly, the maximum relative
accumulation--the two-issue cumulative audience divided by the average
audience--which can be simulated for any distribution is also limited
by the size of the average audience for that distribution: it may
not exceed the difference between 2.0 and the average audience propor-
tion. Since the possible values of the average audience proportion
lie between 0.0 and 1.0, the value of the relative accumulation must
be between 1.0 and 2.0; moreover, the larger the average audience,
the smaller must be the relative accumulation.
From the distribution sizes and average readerships shown in
Table 4.29, we were able to calculate the maximum reproducible values
of the two--issue cumulative readerships for the three subdistributions
and the total distribution associated with each simulated print medium.
These values are shown in Table 4.30. Dividing each maximum two-issue
cumulative readership by the corresponding average single-issue
readership, we obtained the maximum reproducible relative accumulation
for each simulated print medium. These maximum values for the population
structured by three distributions are shown in Table 4.31, along with
the maximum values implied by the total average readership of each
print medium--i.e., the maximum relative accumulations in an
unstructured population.
We note that structuring the population into three reader
Table 4.30--Maximum Two-Issue Cumulative Readerships, by Distribution,
for Each Simulated Soviet Print Medium.
Distribution
Title or Type Regular Moderate Infrequent Total
All-Union Newspapers
Pravda 10.7% 2.8% 0.4% 13.9%
Izvestia 8.4 2.3 0.2 10.9
Trud 2.5 0.7 0.0 3.2
Komsomolskaya pravda 6.4 1.5 0.2 8.1
Literaturnaya gazeta 1.9 0.5 0.0 2.4
Ekonomicheskya
gazeta 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.0
Selskaya zhizn 5.3 1.3 0.1 6.7
Nedelya 2.3 0.5 0.0 2.8
Krasnaya zvezda 1.0 1.2 0.1 2.3
All Others Published
2 Per Week 4.9 1.1 0.1 6.1
All Others Published
3 Per Week 2.3 0.6 0.1 3.0
All-Union Magazines
Ogonyok 3.9 0.9 0.9 5.7
Krokodil 3.2 0.8 0.1 4.1
Table 4.30--Continued
Distribution
Title or Type Regular Moderate Infrequent Total
Republic Newspapers
Sovietskaya Rossia 3.7% 1.0% 0.1% 4.8%
Kazakhstan Party-Govt.Papers 0.7 0.3 0.0 1.0
Central Asian Party-Govt.Papers 2.1 0.6 0.0 2.7
Transcaucasian Party-Govt.Papers 2.0 0.5 0.0 2.5
Baltic Party-Govt.Papers 2.0 0.6 0.1 2.7
European Party-Govt.Papers 4.1 1.0 0.1 5.2
All Komsomol Papers
Published 3 Per Week 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.2
All Komsomol Papers
Published 5 Per Week 2.2 0.5 0.0 2.7
All Others Published 1 Per Week 3.3 0.7 0.1 4.1
All Others Published 2 Per Week 1.7 0.4 0.1 2.2
All Others Published 3 Per Week 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.0
All Others Published 5 Per Week 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.5
SubRepublic Newspapers
All Komsomol Papers Published 5.4 1.3 0.1 6.8
3 Per Week
All Others Published 1 Per Week 3.3 0.7 0.1 4.1
All Others Published 2 Per Week 1.2 0.4 0.0 1.6
All Others Published 3 Per Week 13.8 4.0 0.3 18.1
All Others Published 4 Per Week 4.3 1.0 0.1 5.4
All Others Published 5 Per Week 8.3 2.0 0.2 10.5
All Others Published 6 Per Week 13.8 3.3 0.3 17.4
The percentages are based
Soviet Population.
on the total adult 1962-63
Table 4.31--Comparison of the Maximum Relative Accumulations,
for each Simulated Soviet Print Medium, Under the
One-and-Three-Beta Function Models.
Maximum Relative Accumulation
Three One
Title or Type Distributions Distribution
All-Union Newspapers
Pravda 1.18 1.88
Izvestia 1.18 1.91
Trud 1.17 1.97
Komsomolskaya pravda 1.14 1.93
Literaturnaya gazeta 1.14 1.98
Economicheskaya gazeta 1.25 1.99
Selskaya zhizn 1.17 1.94
Nedelya 1.08 1.97
Krasnaya zvezda 1.28 1.98
All Others Published 2 Per Week 1.17 1.95
All Others Published 3 Per Week 1.20 1.97
All-Union Magazines
Ogonyok 1.35 1.96
Krokodil 1.17 1.96
Table 4.31--Continued
Maximum Relative Accumulation
Three One
Title or Type Distributions Distribution
Republic Newspapers
Sovietskaya Rossia 1.20 1.96
Kazakhstan Party-Govt. Papers 1.43 1.99
Central Asian Party-Govt. Papers 1.23 1.98
TranscaucasianL Party-Govt. Papers 1.19 1.98
Baltic Party-Govt. Papers 1.23 1.98
European Party-Govt. Papers 1.18 1.96
All Komsomol Papers Published 3 Per Week 1.09 1.99
All Komsomol Papers Published 5 Per Week 1.17 1.98
All Other Papers Published 1 Per Week 1.14 1.96
All Other Papers Published 2 Per Week 1.29 1.98
All Other Papers Published 3 Per Week 1.25 1.99
All Other Papers Published 5 Per Week 1.25 1.99
SubRepublic Newspapers
All Komsomol Papers Published 3 Per Week 1.17 1.94
All Others Published 1 Per Week 1.14 1.96
All Others Published 2 Per Week 1.23 1.99
All Others Published 3 Per Week 1.17 1.85
All Others Published 4 Per Week 1.17 1.95
All Others Published 5 Per Week 1.18 1.91
All Others Published 6 Per Week 1-.18 1.85
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distributions, each with a different average readership probability,
sharply lowered the maximum relative accumulation for each medium.
In fact, when we compare the two-issue cumulation percentages in
Table 4.30 with the distribution sizes and one-issue readership
percentages in Table 4.29, we observe that there simply was no
possibility of a significant growth in exposure, on a population-wide
basis, in any of the three distributions associated with a print medium.
The regular distribution population was almost completely (85 per cent)
exposed to the first issue; the size of the moderate distribution
population was so small (between 0.2 and 3.6 per cent of the total
population.) that cumulative exposure within it was insubstantial;
and exposure to each issue in the infrequent distribution population
was so small (between 0.0 and 0.2 per cent of the population) that
it did not accumulate significantly over repeated issues. We note,
however, that virtually all of the limited cumulation possible was
restricted. to the one to eighteen per cent of the population in the
regular and moderate reader distributions. Accordingly, it mattered
little what figures were chosen for the two-issue cumulations in the
infrequent distributions; the significant figures were those for the
regular and moderate distributions.
AIt is interesting to compare this result with Kramer's findings
in the Cincinnati simulation, which encompassed a metropolitan rather
than a national population. In the Cincinnati case, a significant
increase in newspaper exposure was possible in the moderate user
distribution, because one-half to one-quarter of the simulation popu-
lation fell in that distribution. In the Soviet case, however, no
significant increase in print exposure was possible (on a national
basis), because the regular and moderate user distribution populations
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We had no data relating directly to Soviet newspaper (or
magazine) cumulation. We did have some information on cumulation
rates for U.S. newspapers, however, from the 1961 newspaper reader-
ship study mentioned in Chapter I.* For all the daily newspapers
in the study (with a total average readership of 81.9 per cent of
the adult population), the relative accumulation value was 1.05.
With little more than this data for guidance, we arbitrarily set the
value of the relative accumulation for each regular reader distri-
bution at 1.05. This amounted to having the second issue expose 91.3
per cent of those who would have been newly exposed if exposure were
completely random from issue to issue within the distribution. Since
the average readership proportion was somewhat lower in the moderate
reader distribution (73 per cent) than in the regular reader distri-
bution (85 per cent), we assumed the moderate distribution's relative
accumulation would be somewhat higher. We therefore arbitrarily set
the value of the relative accumulation for each moderate distribution
at 1.25, which amounted to having the second issue expose 97.4 per cent
of those who would have been newly exposed if exposure were completely
random from issue to issue within the distribution population.
represented such small shares of the national population. This
difference reflects the fact that the newspapers represented in the
Cincinnati simulation had substantial average readerships on a
population-wide basis, while the print media conceptualized in the
Soviet simulation had, with but few exceptions, very small average
readerships as a percentage of the simulation population.
See p. , n.
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Following out this line of reasoning for the infrequent reader
distributions (average readerships of less than 0.1 per cent), we
arbitrarily set their relative accumulations at the maximum reproducible
value, which amounted to having the second issue expose 100.0 per cent
of those who would have been newly exposed if exposure were completely
random from issue to issue within the distribution population.
Table 4.32 displays the resulting readership cumulations.
Audience Cumulation for Soviet Radio and Television
For each simulated Soviet electronic medium we first estimated
the sizes of regular, moderate, and infrequent user distributions as
well as the average daily audience within each distribution population.
We based these estimates on data from the Comcom Leisure Study and
the Komsomolskaya pravda poll, cited earlier, regarding respondents'
frequencies of radio and TV consumption. The pertinent data are
summarized in Table 4.33.
To use these data we arbitrarily defined each regular listener
(viewer) distribution as consisting of persons who listened (watched)
at least several times per week, and each moderate listener (viewer)
distribution as consisting of persons who listened (watched) at least
several times per month. We then estimated the sizes of regular
and moderate user distributions for the Soviet radio (TV) audience
as a whole by taking the weighted sum of the listening (viewing)
Table 4.32--Two-Issue Cumulative Readerships, by Distribution,
for Each Simulated Soviet Print Medium.
Distribution
Relative
Title or Type Regular Moderate Infrequent Total Accumulation
All-Union Newspapers
Pravda 9.9% 2.7% 0.4% 13.0% 1.10
Izvestia 7.7 2.2 0.2 10.1 1.10
Trud 2.4 0.6 0.0 3.0 1.07
Komsomolskaya
pravda 5.8 1.6 0.2 7.6 1.10
Literaturnaya
gazeta 1.8 0.5 0.0 2.3 1.09
Ekonomicheskaya
gazeta 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.12
Selskaya zhizn 4.8 1.3 0.1 6.2 1.09
Nedelya 2.1 0.7 0.0 2.8 1.08
Krasnaya zvezda 0.9 1.1 0.1 2.1 1.17
All Others
Published
2 Per Week 4.5 1.1 0.1 5.7 1.10
All Others
Published
3 Per Week 2.2 0.6 0.0 2.8 1.12
All-Union Magazines
Ogonyok 3.6 0.9 0.1 4.6 1.09
Krokodil 3.0 0.7 0.1 3.8 1.08
Table 4.32--Continued
Distribution
Relative
Title or Type Regular Moderate Infrequent Total Accumulation
Republic Newspapers
Sovietskaya Rossia 3.4% 0.9% 0.1% 4.4% 1.10
Kazakhstan Party-
Govt.Papers 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.14
Central Asian Party-
Govt. Papers 1.9 0.6 0.0 2.5 1.14
Transcaucasian Party-
Govt. Papers 1.8 0.5 0.0 2.3 1.10
Baltic Party-
Govt. Papers 1.9 0.4 0.1 2.4 1.09
European Party-
Govt. Papers 3.7 1.0 0.1 4.8 1.09
All Komsomol Papers
Published 3 Per Week 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.2 1.09
All Komsomol Papers
Published 5 Per Week 1.9 0.6 0.0 2.5 1.09
A:ll Others Published
L Per Week 3.1 0.8 0.0 3.9 1.08
All Others Published
2 Per Week 1.5 0.4 0.0 1.9 1.12
All Others Published
3 Per Week 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.9 1.12
All Others Published
5 Per Week 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.10
SubRepublic Newspapers
All Komsomol Papers
Published 3 Per Week 4.9 1.3 0.1 6.3 1.09
All Others Published
1 Per Week 3.1 0.7 0.1 3.9 1.08
All Others Published
2 Per Week 1.1 0.3 0.0 1.4 1.08
All Others Published
3 Per Week 13.1 3.4 0.3 16.8 1.09
All Others Published
4 Per Week 3.9 1.0 0.2 5.1 1.11
All Others PubLished
5 Per Week 7.5 2.1 0.2 9.8 1.10
All Others Published
6 Per Week 12.5 3.3 0.3 16.1 1.09
* ~ ~ .
The percentages are
population.
based on the total adult 1962-63 Soviet
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percentages in the three education categories. The calculations
are shown below:
Radio
Regular
(79% x 0.04 + 80% x 0.34~ + 75% x 0.62 )155 million = 118.4 million
Moderate
(19% x 0.04 + 14% x 0.34 + 22% x 0.62) 155 million = 30.1 million
Television
Regular
(40% x 0.04 + 36% x 0.34 + 32% x 0.61)155 million = 52.2 million
Moderate
(51% x 0.04 + 45% x 0.34 + 35% x 0.61)155 million = 60.5 million
The next step was to compute average daily audience proportions
for these distributions. This required that we estimate the sizes
of the total daily radio and TV audiences. The estimates were
obtained by summing the largest central and local audiences in a
given time slot, both for radio and TV, and subtracting an assumed
amount of audience overlap in each case, as shown below:
1Percentage of the adult Soviet population having higher,
secondary, and less than secondary education respectively, according
to the 1959 all-Union census.
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Radio Television
30.0 million (early morning central) 24.4 million (nighttime central)
+ 79.5 million (early morning regional)+40.8 million (nighttime regional)
109.5 million 65.2 million
- 5.1 million (1/3 chance overlap) - 20.2 million (chance overlap)
104.4 million (estimated total 45.0 million (estimated total
daily audience) daily audience)
We then experimented with various combinations of average daily
audience proportions for the regular and moderate radio and TV distri-
butions until we found a plausible set which reproduced values slightly less
than these total daily audience figures. The results are summarized
below:
Soviet Radio
118.4 million x 0.8 + 30.1 million x 0.2 = 100.7 million
Soviet TV
52.2 million x 0.7 + 60.5 million x 0.1 = 42.6 million
In the absence of more detailed data we treated each simulated
radio and television medium the same way, specifying as the average
daily audience proportions 0.8 and 0.2 of the regular and moderate
listener distributions respectively, and 0.7 and 0.1 of the regular
and moderate viewer distributions respectively. The sizes of these two
distributions for any radio or TV medium were computed as a multip-
licative function of (1) the medium's average daily audience, (2)
the total daily radio or TV audience, and (3) the distribution size
for the medium as a
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whole, as follows:
Radio
No. of regular listeners = (medium's av. aud./total daily aud.)
118.4 million
No. of moderate listeners = (medium's av. aud./total daily aud.)
30.1 million
Television
No. of regular viewers = (medium's av. aud./total daily aud.)
52.2 million
No. of moderate viewers =(medium's av. aud./total daily aud.)
60.5 million
Having estimated the size and average daily audience proportion
for each of the regular and moderate user distributions, we computed
the size of each infrequent user distribution as a remainder of the
1962-63 adult Soviet population, and we computed the average daily
audience proportion for each infrequent user distribution as the
remainder of the given electronic medium's average daily audience
divided by the distribution's size. Table 4.34 shows the resulting
distribution sizes and average daily audience proportions for each
Soviet electronic medium in the simulation.
As with print media, we had no data bearing directly on
the cumulation of Soviet radio and television audiences. We did
have some information on cumulation rates for U.S. radio programs,
however, from Politz's 1953 audience study cited in Chapter I.I
See p. , n.
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Figure 4.4 shows a plot of the relative accumulation versus the-
average audience proportion, within various demographic categories,
for the four U.S. radio programs studied by Politz. Treating these
points as a scatter diagram, we used a "least squares" type of
curve to estimate the two-day cumulation for each Soviet radio and
TV distribution in the simulation. The resulting values are shown
1
in Table 4.35.
Cumulation for the Soviet Audience of Foreign Radio
For each simulated foreign radio medium we used listening
data from the Comcom Leisure Study to estimate the sizes of regular,
moderate, and infrequent user distributions and the proportion
of each distribution population in the average audience. Table 4.36
displays the data that were used.
As with Soviet domestic electronic media, we again defined
regular listeners to be persons who listened at least several times
per week, and moderate listeners to be persons who listened at least
several times per month. We then estimated the sizes of regular
and moderate user distributions for the total Soviet audiences of
1
Specifically, we used this method to estimate the two-day
cumulations for the moderate user, regular user, and total distri-
butions, and we computed the two-day cumulation for the infrequent
user distribution by subtraction.
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foreign radio by taking the weighted sum of the listening percentages
in the three education categories. The calculations were as follows:
Regular
1 1 1
(40% x .04 + 45% x 0.34 + 29% x 0.62 ) 155 million = 54.6 million
Moderate
(9% x 0.04 + 8% x 0.34 + 9% x 0.62) 155 million = 12.9 million
We next estimated the size of the total daily foreign radio
audience by summing the largest audiences for VOA, the BBC, and
Radio Liberty in a given time slot (the "late evening" slot in
each case) and subtracting from the total an arbitrarily assumed
amount substantially greater than the chance audience duplication.
This calculation is shown below:
1
Percentage of the adult Soviet population having higher,
secondary, and less than secondary education respectively, according
to the 1959 all-Union census.
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31.7 million (late evening VOA)
17.8 million (late evening BBC)
+ 18.2 million (late evening RL)
67.7 million
- 32.,7 million (three and one-half times the chance duplication)
35.0 million
We again tried various combinations of average daily audience
proportions for the regular and moderate foreign radio distributions
until we found a plausible set which reproduced values slightly
less than this daily audience figure. The results are shown below:
54.6 million x 0.6 + 12.9 million x 0.1 = 34.0 million
Lacking more detailed data on foreign radio cumulation, we
treated each simulated medium in a comcom fashion, specifying 0.6
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and 0.1 as the average daily audience proportions for the regular
and moderate listener distributions respectively. The sizes of
these two distributions for any individual foreign radio medium were
computed in a manner analogous to that used for Soviet radio and TV,
as follows:
No. of regular listeners = medium's av. aud./total daily aud.)
54.6 million
No. of moderate listeners = (medium's av. aud./total daily aud.)
12.9 million
Having estimated the size and average daily audience proportion
for each of the regular and moderate user distributions, we computed
the size of each infrequent user distribution as a remainder of the
1962-63 adult Soviet population, and we computed the average daily
audience proportion for each infrequent user distribution as the
remainder of the given foreign radio medium's average daily audience
divided by the distribution's size. Table 4.37 shows the resulting
distribution sizes and average daily audience proportions for each
foreign radio medium in the simulation.
For the two-day cumulations of each foreign radio distribution
we used the procedure described above for domestic radio and TV
audiences, thus making the values of the relative two-day accumulations
comparable to the Politz radio data cited above. The resulting
values are shown in Table 4.38. "
IFor the oral agitation medium that was conceptualized in the
simulation, we estimated distribution sizes and means, and cumulative
audiences, as follows: We computed the size of the infrequent user
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Assigning Individual Exposure Probabilities to Cells
At this stage of the simulation we had completed three basic
steps:
--We had distributed a sample computer population over
audience types or cells defined by exposure-related
demographic and social variables.
--We had distributed the audience of each simulated medium
over the cells defined by these population variables, the
ratio of the audience in a cell to the population of that
cell specifying a mean probability of exposure to the
medium among the persons in the cell.
--For each simulated medium we had used cumulation informa-
tion and beta functions to model three discrete distributions
of exposure probabilities, the proportion of the medium's
probabilities in each distribution agreeing with the propor-
tion of the simulation population in that distribution, and
the probabilities chosen so as to reproduce the cumulation
data for each distribution and for the medium as a whole.{
The next step was to allocate each medium's exposure probabil-
ities to the cells of the sample computer population in such a way
distribution as the total nonfarm worker and nonblue collar worker
population plus 50 per cent of the farm and blue collar workers,
on the basis of the information received in n. , p. above.
To estimate the sizes of the frequent and moderate user distribu-
tions, we arbitrarily divided the remainder of the total population
between these two categories in about a 2.5 to 1 ratio. We set
the means of the infrequent and frequent user distributions at 0.01
and 0.80 respectively, and we specified relative accumulations of
1.14 and 1.11, and 1.99 for the total, frequent, and infrequent
user distributions respectively. The remaining cumulation parameters
were then calculated by subtraction.
The discrete probabilities which are initially generated do
not exactly reproduce the beta function. When this results in the
average audience of a medium being different from the value speci-
fied, the simulation makes appropriate adjustments to the discrete
probabilities.
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as to reproduce the cell means that had already been specified for
the medium.
The allocation procedure which is embodied in the simulation
computer program was designed to satisfy two requirements: First,
the number of exposure probabilities allocated to any cell for a
given medium must equal the population size for the cell. Second,
the average value of the allocated probabilities must equal the
medium's cell mean. In Chapter II we described the random assign-
ment procedure which was developed to meet these requirements
(pp. ).
Table 4.39 lists the marginal percentage breakdown, on each
cell-defining dimension, produced by this random assignment procedure
in the sample computer audience of each simulated medium. For each
all-Union print medium in the simulation the table also shows the
This procedure does not reproduce, exactly, the cell means
derived from audience data in the first part of the simulation.
The reader will recall, however, that these means are produced by
the Mosteller technique, and are themselves only estimates of the
empirical values. Also, in most simulation runs one is not likely
to analyze the output for single cells (unless they are very large),
but rather for groups of cells, and the larger the number of prob-
abilities in a cell or group of cells, the more likely is the random
assignment procedure described in Chapter II to reproduce closely
the mean exposure probability specified for that subpopulation.
For the oral agitation medium, the percentage breakdowns
were as follows:
Political
Sex Age Education Involvement Residence
Non-
Male Female 16-29 30-45 50+ <4 >4, <7 >7, 10 >10 Party Party Urban Rural
65.1 34.9 35.1 24.9 4.0 44.9 35.1 18.1 1.9 2.1 97.9 67.9 32.1
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corresponding marginal percentage breakdowns which had earlier
been produced by the Mosteller technique. It can be seen that the
two sets of print marginals are virtually identical on each dimension.
(A similar result was obtained for the other media in the simulation
as well.)
Thus, after having processed the cumulation data for Soviet
audiences, we had, for each simulated medium, probabilities of expo-
sure assigned to each cell of the sample computer population in such
a way that the estimated empirical audience marginals were closely
reproduced. However, the exposure probabilities had not yet been
assigned to specific individuals within the population cells. In
making this assignment we had to account for the audience overlaps
or duplications between media. The following section describes how
the magnitudes of these duplications were estimated.
Establishing Joint Distributions of Soviet Audiences
Within Demographic and Social Strata of
the Sample Computer Population: The Problem of Duplication
As we mentioned earlier, there are several ways in which the
simulation structures the base population in the computer. The
first of these involves the specification and cell by cell assign-
ment of exposure probabilities for individual media. This results
in some people being almost constantly exposed, others almost never
exposed, and still others only occasionally exposed. For any medium
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these three subgroups are fashioned in such a way as to produce net
and cumulative audiences which just equal the corresponding figures
derived from survey data and other considerations. A second important
way the simulation structures the sample computer population is
through the specification of duplications among media audiences.
In Chapter II we showed how nonrandom duplications among
media audiences (i.e., other than chance duplications) are often
accounted for, either in whole or in part, by the demographic and
social distributions of those audiences. Such duplications are
automatically reproduced by the simulation through the assignment of
cell means, i.e., through the assignment of mean probabilities of
exposure to each audience type for each medium. To reproduce dupli-
cations which are not wholly accounted for by cell-defining variables,
.however, the simulation must jointly assign the media's probabilities
nonrandomly within cells. In Chapter II we described the assignment
procedure developed for this purpose (pp. ).
We did not know how much of the audience duplication among Soviet
media was accounted for by demographic and social factors and how much
was due to other factors which were not specified as dimensions of the
simulation population. However, the simulation is programmed to
compare each empirical audience duplication it is given with the
duplication which would be produced between the two media by the
random assignment of exposure probabilities within cells. Depending
on the magnitude of the difference between these two figures, the
simulation does or does not make a nonrandom assignment of
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probabilities. Accordingly, in the Soviet case we simply specified
empirical audience duplications among those media for which such
estimates were possible. The simulation then performed nonrandom
within-cell assignments as required.
We had no direct empirical measurement of the duplications
among Soviet media audiences in 1962-63. Accordingly, we were
forced to rely on some broad structural characteristics of the Soviet
media system (about which we did have information) for our duplica-
tion estimates. For example, readership duplications between the
all-Union and the Republic level newspaper media in the simulation
were established on the basis of a hypothesis for which Rogers has
found strong support: that there exists a substantial degree of
complementarity between all-Union and Russian language regional
newspapers, with language (i.e., use of Russian) as the intervening
variable. In 1962-63 this complementary relationship was probably
strongest on the Republic and Autonomous Republic levels, due to the
fact that the higher the level of the regional newspapers, the
greater was their similarity with the central newspapers--with respect
to authoritativeness, the types of specialized newspapers available,
the range of content covered, the size of the circulation, and the
periodicity. To reflect this structural feature of the Soviet
4Rogers hypothesized that regional newspapers were not distri-
buted independently of central newspapers, but rather that they com-
plemented central newspapers--the ratio of central to regional news-
papers varying from republic to republic in such a way as to bring
about a total volume distributed more evenly per capita over republics
than the volume of regional papers alone. The intervening variable
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media system in the simulated newspaper readerships we arbitrarily
set duplication between the all-Union and the Republic newspaper
media at one-third of the value of the chance duplication (i.e., one-
third of the produce of the readership means). The resulting pairwise
duplications are shown in Table 4.40.
Readership duplications among the Republic level newspaper
media in the simulation were established on the basis of the follow-
ing conditions which prevailed in 1962-63:
--In the case of every Soviet republic, a high percentage
of the regional newspapers were printed in the language
of the basic nationality of that republic. As a result,
this segment of the press did not have a large potential
audience outside the republic.
--Russian language newspapers were printed in every
republic, so that an individual had no need to try to
obtain, for reasons of language, a Russian newspaper
from another republic. (In addition, every republic
received some part of the central press, which, of
course, appeared only in Russian.)
which she found best accounted for the variation in the ratio of
central to regional papers was language--the extent to which Russian
was used in a republic as compared with the language of the basic
republic nationality and other minority languages. For nonRussian
readers in a republic the most authoritative newspapers available
were the Republic or Autonomous Republic newspapers in the nationality
or in a minority language, while a reader of Russian had a choice
between Republic and all-Union newspapers. Accordingly, Rogers
hypothesized that most of the substitution of regional for central
papers occurred on the Republic and Autonomous Republic levels. In
support of this hypothesis she found a significant negative correla-
tion between the extent of use of Russian in a republic and the
amount of Republic and Autonomous Republic level newspapers available
in that republic, but no significant correlation between the use of
Russian and the availability of lower level papers ("The Soviet
Audience," pp. 37-49).
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Table 4.40--Continued
aDuplications were specified only for newspapers with average
readerships in excess of 3 million persons. In all other cases
the difference between chance and one-third chance duplication
(less than 0.1% of the population) was regarded as negligible.
To estimate the chance duplication values we assumed a readership
mean for each central paper, in each of the six territorial units,
which was the same as the overall readership mean for the central
paper.
bThe percentages are based on the total adult 1962-63 Soviet
population.
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--The press on each territorial-administrative level paid
particular attention to the problems which were "local
problems" at that level. It would therefore have been
far more interesting to persons living in the territorial
unit to which it was directed than to anyone else.
--Among Comcom Leisure Study respondents only one reported
having read a regional newspaper from a republic other
than that of his residence. f
On the basis of these findings we concluded that, in 1962-63, news-
papers printed in one republic were distributed only in that republic
and nowhere else, and that, as a result, a resident of a given Soviet
republic had access to the centrally published press, and the press
published in the republic in which he lived, but was virtually without
access to the other regional press. Accordingly, we specified zero
duplications between the readerships of the Republic level newspaper
media in the simulation, as indicated in Table 4.41.
Based on reasons analogous to those outlined above for all-Union
and Republic level newspapers, we also set audience duplications
between the central and the regional radio media, and the central
and the regional TV media, in the simulation at one-third of the
random values. Table 4.42 shows these duplications, and Table 4.43
Rogers, "The Soviet Audience," p. 35.
ZThe language factor probably plays an important role with
the electronic as well as with print media. Because of the compar-
atively greater difficulty of comprehending the spoken versus the
written word, a language used in newspaper exposure is used also
in radio exposure. As far as the choice of the language of exposure
to television is a decision by the audience, this choice probably
follows the same pattern as in the case of radio, since both media
rely on comprehension of the spoken word.
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Table 4.41.--continued
*The percentages are based on the total adult 1962-63
Soviet population. Each nonzero value simply represents the
average readership of the given newspaper medium.
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Table 4.42.--continued
a
The percentages are based on the total adult 1962-63
Soviet population.
b
No duplications were specified between radio and
television media.
Table 4.43--Estimated empirical audience duplications between
simulated foreign radio media.a
Medium
Nighttime Nighttime Nighttime
Medium VOA BBC RL
Nighttime VOA 20.4%b 13.9 14.1
Nighttime BBC 13.9 11.5 7.9
Nighttime RL 14.1 7.9 11.7
aDuplications were specified only for foreign radio media
with average audiences in excess of 3 million persons, because
the difference between chance and three times chance duplication
was insubstantial otherwise.
bThe percentages are based on the total adult 1962-63 Soviet
population. Each nonzero value simply represents the average
audience of the given medium.
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displays the overlapping audiences which resulted from specifying
three times the chance duplication between the audiences of the
different foreign radio stations represented in the simulation.
(We based the latter figure on the far from complete penetration of
the Soviet population with radio sets having short wave bands).
Secondary sources analyzed in the course of the Comcom
project contained almost no information with regard to audience
duplications between the five basic media types conceptualized in
the simulation--newspapers, magazines, radio, TV, and foreign radio.
However, there was little reason to believe that such duplications
were not rather well explained by the exposure-related demographic
and social characteristics of the audiences, rather than by factors
which were not considered in defining the sample population. There-
fore, we did not attempt to derive estimates of the empirical audience
duplications between different types of media.
CHAPTER V
DISTRIBUTING SOVIET MESSAGE-RESPONSE CHARACTERISTICS
OVER SAMPLE COMPUTER AUDIENCES
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CHAPTER V
DISTRIBUTING SOVIET MESSAGE-RESPONSE CHARACTERISTICS
OVER SAMPLE COMPUTER AUDIENCES
Introduction
The simulation up to this point had assigned each individual in
the computer population probabilities of exposure to each of the
fifty-six media conceptualized in the model. However, this description
of the Soviet population in terms of its media-consumption habits was
only a precondition for simulating the exposure of the population to
media messages associated with the Cuban missile crisis and the assassin-
ation of President Kennedy. Before we could simulate exposure to
messages, we also had to describe the Soviet population in terms of
its message-response characteristics. This meant that we had to
provide the simulation with aggregate theme- and format-response data
which it could use to estimate each simulated individual's average
probability of exposure to each message type in the two scenarios,
given that he was exposed to the medium which carried the given type
of message. The simulation could then compute an individual's exposure
to a message in a medium as the product of his probability of exposure
to the medium and his conditional probability of exposure to the
message.
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In Chapter III we showed how the simulation uses aggregate
theme- and format-response data provided by the researcher, to
compute conditional message exposure probabilities. We now proceed
to describe how the required theme- and format-response parameters
were estimated for Soviet audiences.
Soviet Newspaper and Magazine Audiences
Theme-response characteristics
The simulation programs require aggregate theme-response data
summarized in terms of ratios of average theme-exposure probabilities
on adjacent: levels of one or more population dimensions. Thus,
for newspapers (and magazines) we had to specify information of the
following kind: the relative likelihood of men versus women being
exposed to articles on international affairs, the relative likeli-
hood of Party members versus nonParty members being exposed, etc.
Because of the paucity of this type of data for Soviet audiences,
it was necessary to treat each individual theme in the Cuban crisis
and Kennedy assassination scenarios as part of the broader theme
of international affairs, in order that we might specify one set of
ratios of average theme-exposure probabilities for all themes and
print media in the two scenarios.
Our only source of theme-response data for Soviet newspaper
readers was a reading experiment conducted by Rogers with thirty-
nine of the respondents who had been given the Comcom Leisure Study
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interview and with two other former Soviet residents (who would also
have qualified for the interview). The aim of this experiment,
which covered six issues of Pravda and four issues of Izvestia dating
from November 1964 to May 1965, was to determine who in the Soviet
newspaper audience was reached by the most significant and authori-
tative material in those issues, and to learn what techniques Soviet
readers employed to extract information from such material. We have
used the data from this study to estimate relative likelihoods of
news readership on adjacent levels of each dimension of the simula-
tion population.
The portion of the reading experiment with which we were
concerned was conducted in the following manner. Each respondent
was shown the ten newspapers in a random sequence and asked to identify
all the articles that he "would have read if he had been reading such
an issue of Pravda or Izvestia while in the Soviet Union."1 Due to
the way in which the experiment was structured, the respondents
made their decision on whether they "would have read" a given article
or not essentially on the basis of the title and the format of the
1We note here that the definition and data used in generating
average theme-exposure probabilities for newspapers, and for the
other media types in the simulation as well, refer to the chance
that a member of the audience of a medium would have been exposed
to and will recall that he would have been exposed to, a given type
of message in a given Soviet medium, even though a significant
period of time has elapsed since he last was exposed to that medium
in a natural situation. (Rogers reports that this type of question
did not seem to disturb respondents.) Therefore, the exposures
which are output from the simulation are really, in the Soviet case,
estimates of aided recall several years after the appearance of
the medium.
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article, and the place in the newspaper at which the article
appeared. What they were asked about, then, was essentially whether
they would have begun to read a certain article; not, how closely
they would have read it, or whether they would have finished reading
it.2
The data from this segment of the forty-one interviews were
recorded in the following form: For each article in each of the ten
newspapers--the title and date of the issue, and the ID number of
each respondent followed by a plus or minus depending on whether
he would or would not have read the article. Unfortunately, not
every respondent was shown all four (or six) pages in each newspaper.
If there were time constraints, only two or three pages were shown.
Also, the experimenter recorded some respondents' choices only among
ten articles in which she was particularly interested.3 As a result,
the proportion of the forty-one respondents who were shown an article
varied significantly from one article to the next, and in no case
was it very large. Accordingly, we chose not to use the aggregated
results of the experiment as estimates of the average proportion of
men, the average proportion of women, the average proportion of Party
members, the average proportion of nonParty members, etc., who would
have read an article if they had read the paper at all. Instead, we
used as rough measures of these parameters the average proportion
A description of the experimental methodology, the hypotheses
tested, and the complete results is presented in Rogers, "The Soviet
Audience," Chapter VI.
See p. below, n.
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of all appearances of articles which would have been read by men,
women, Party members, nonParty members, etc. Table 5.1 shows the
estimated average and relative theme-exposure probabilities which
resulted, on each dimension of the simulation population, from this
estimation procedure.
We note several limitations with regard to these estimates.
First, the stories used in the reading experiment came only from
two papers, Pravda and Izvestia, and from issues published in 1964
and 1965. Thus, we cannot be certain that the news articles in
these ten issues were truly representative of the news articles that
appeared in the Soviet press during the periods following the Cuban
missile crisis and the assassination of President Kennedy. Two
other factors which bear on the validity of the estimates in Table 5.1
relate to the content of the newspaper articles and the composition
of the sample used in the reading experiment.
Data from the reading experiment are based on a total of 179
newspaper articles from the 10 issues referred to above. These
articles dealt not only with international affairs but with a range
of domestic subjects as well. Unfortunately, it was not possible to
base our estimates of average theme-exposure probabilities on the
data pertaining only to international news stories, because the numbers
involved would have been too small to yield reliable values.
A third compromising factor is the makeup of the sample used
in the reading experiment. As can be seen in Table 5.2, among the
forty-one respondents interviewed, urbanites, the well educated, and
Table 5.1--Estimated average and relative probabilities of exposure to
a newspaper news article on each dimension of the simulated
Soviet population.
Average Theme-Exposure
Dimension Probability (N)a Ratio
Sex
Male 0.308 (2,122)
Female 0.237 (1,263) 1.30
Age
16-29 0.344 (1,478)
30-49 0.257 (1,577) 1.34C
50+ 0.118 (330) 2.18C
Education
<4 yrs. 0.030b (--)
>4, <7 yrs. 0.039 (153) 0.76
>7, <10 yrs. 0.239 (1,075) 0.16d
>10 yrs. 0.320 (2,157) 0.75d
Political Involvement
Party Member 0.416 (327)
Non Party Member 0.267 (3,058) 1.56
Residence
Urban 0.281 (2,957)
Rural 0.287 (428) 0.98
aTotal number of article-respondent
the calculations were made.
pairs on the basis of which
bAn extrapolated value, since persons with less than four years
of education were not represented in the sample.
CIn the simulation runs these values caused message audience
substantially greater than the media audiences in some cells, for
some message formats. Accordingly, these ratios had to be changed to
1.10 and 1.60 respectively. For a detailed explanation of the rela-
tionship between format factors and relative theme-exposure probabil-
ities the reader is referred to Chapter III, p.
din the simulation these values had to be changed to 0.80, 0.60,
and 0.80 respectively, for the reasons indicated in note b above.
Table 5.2--Marginal percentage breakdown, on five dimensions, of the
Comcom reading experiment sample, the Leisure Study sample,
and the adult population of the Soviet Union as described
by the 1959 census.
Reading Experiment Leisure Study
Sample Sample
(N=41) (N=107)D:imension
Sex
Male
Female
Age
16-29
30-49
50+
73
27
46
42
12
Education
<4 yrs.
>4, <7 yrs.
>,7, 10 yrs.
>10 yrs.
Political Involvement
Party Member
Non Party Member
Residence
Urban
Rural
0
5
34
61
15
85
85
15
70
30
36
44
20
0
12
48
40
10
90
79
21
Soviet
Population
(N=145,331,288)
42
58
36
37
27
34
28
34
4
6
94
50
50
__ __ ___ __I_ _I___ I_ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ ____ _____
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males were even more overrepresented than in the parent Leisure
Study sample. For simulation purposes, however, we were prepared
to assume that this source of bias, as well as the other sources
mentioned above, had a much stronger effect on individual estimates
of average theme-exposure probabilities than on the ratios of these
estimates. Accordingly, we used the ratios shown in Table 5.1 for
each of the themes in the Cuban crisis and Kennedy assassination
1
scenarios.
1
If Soviet newspaper readers are at all comparable to readers
in this country, then some support for the validity of the relative
values estimated for the sex dimension comes from a study done by
Swanson which summarizes the results of the Advertising Research
Foundation's Continuing Study of Newspaper Reading, a source we cited
earlier in connection with newspaper cumulation data. Swanson found
the following average and relative readership figures for articles
dealing with general international news:
Category of
Article
War
News
Defense
News
Dimension
Level
Male
Female
Male
Female
Average Theme-
Exposure Probability
0.394
0.298
0.308
0.274
Economic-Social
International
Relations News
Male 0.221
Female 0.181 1.27
(Charles E. Swanson, "What They Read in 130 Daily Newspapers,"
Journalism Quarterly, XXXII (Fall, 1955), 411-21, cited by Kramer,
"A Computer Simulation," p.
Ratio
1.34
1.37
-
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Format-response characteristics
To compute conditioned message exposure probabilities the
simulation programs require not only aggregate theme-response data,
but aggregate format-response data as well. The latter had to be
summarized in terms of "attractiveness" factors for differently
formatted messages in each simulated medium. For newspapers (and
magazines) we therefore had to specify information of the following
kind: the average proportion of readers of an issue exposed to an
editorial on international affairs, the average proportion exposed
to a short news item on international affairs, etc.
The reading experiment conducted with Comcom Leisure Study
respondents also served as our basic source of format-response data
for Soviet newspaper readers. The 179 stories which appeared in
the 10 newspapers were coded not only for content but also for two
format characteristics. One set of format variables referred to the
5In Chapter III we explained how the simulation programs were
designed so that a researcher would have the option of specifying
format factors which had one of two possible meanings: (1) the
average proportion of a medium's audience exposed to the theme in
the given format, divided by the average proportion exposed to the
theme in all, possible formats; (2) the average proportion of a
medium's audience exposed to the theme in the given format. The
reader will note that we exercised the second option. Thus, when
we specified ratios of average theme-exposure probabilities on each
population dimension, we also specified 1.0 as the average proportion
of a medium's audience exposed to each theme in its most attractive
format. This was done so that the simulation would correctly normalize
the format factors which we had specified. The reader is referred
to Chapter III, pp. , for a detailed description of the
relationship between format factors and average theme-exposure
probabilities.
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page location of the story (the coding was therefore 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
or 6), and the other to the type of article or mode in which the
story appeared. The categories in this latter set were: (1) editorial,
(2) short news item, (3) announcement, (4) speech, (5) telegram or
letter, (6) slogan, (7) long news article, (8) long commentary,
(9) photograph, (10) cartoon.
For the same reasons that were outlined above, we could not
use the results of the reading experiment as estimates of the average
proportion of readers of a Soviet newspaper who would have been ex-
posed to an article in a given format if they had read the paper at
all. Moreover, because of the small numbers involved, we could not
use the readership data to estimate factors for sixty different
article formats, cross-classified by page location and type or mode.
Instead, we chose to aggregate the readership response data over
page locations and use as estimates of format factors the average
proportion of all editorials, short news items, announcements,
etc., on international affairs which would have been read by members
of the Soviet newspaper/audience. Before we could do this, however,
we had to develop a computational procedure to account for a poten-
tially important source of variation in the values of these format
factors from one newspaper audience to another.
The reader will recall that frequency of regular exposure
to newspapers, and the number of newspapers to which regular exposure
was reported, increased with increasing education and political
involvement in the Leisure Study sample. Similarly, within the
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reading experiment sample Rogers found that the kind and amount of
"important" 6 material in authoritative Soviet newspapers to which
respondents exposed themselves was significantly larger in the more
educated and politically more involved groups than in the less
educated and politically less involved groups. Of particular inter-
est to us was her finding that the more educated and politically
more involved tended to identify relatively more analytical, critical,
and policy relevant material and less general information and propa-
ganda material as "important" or "interesting" than did the less
educated and politically less involved. This suggested that the
breakdown of a newspaper's readership by education and political
involvement might significantly affect the aggregate response of that
readership to differently formatted articles. We speculate, for
example, that difficult editorials and long analytical commentaries
probably attracted larger proportions of the per issue readership
on the average, in those Soviet newspapers that had the more educated
and the politically more involved readers.
To account for the possibility of such variations in format
response in the simulation, it was necessary to estimate for each
6In structuring the reading experiment, Rogers selected the
six issues of Pravda and the four issues of Izvestia on the basis
of the fact that each contained an article with analytical material
in the areas of Soviet politics, economics or social relations--
material that: she considered "important" because of the discussion,
criticisms, or policy statements it contained. Her findings with
respect to the differences between the educated and politically
involved and the less well educated and politically less involved
are based on the readership or nonreadership of these ten articles.
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print medium a set of format factors which reflected the distribution
of the medium's readership by education and political involvement.
Accordingly, we used the reading experiment data in the fashion
described above to estimate format factors for editorials, short news
items, announcements, etc., within each of the following four
audience types:
Type Education/Political Involvement7
1 High (>10 yrs.)/High (Party member)
2 High (>10 yrs.)/Low (NonParty member)
3 Low (10 yrs.)/High (Party member)
4 Low (10 yrs.)/Low (NonParty member)
The results are summarized in Table 5.3.
The next step was to compute a set of format factors for each
print medium in the simulation. This required that we estimate the
proportion of each medium's readership in each of the four categories
defined above. A rationale for making these calculations was devel-
oped from Kramer's estimated breakdown of the 1959 Soviet population
7We defined "high political involvement" as it was defined
in the reading experiment sample--membership in the Communist Party
or, in the case of nonParty members, membership in occupational roles
in which the individual is expected to be a high media consumer.
Respondents who did not fall in this category were defined as having
"low political involvement." Type 3 contained only one respondent
and he was a Party member with a ten year education. We reassigned
him to type 1 and estimated the format factors for type 3 by
interpolation.
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Table 5.3--Continued
aTotal number of article-respondent pairs on the basis of which
the calculations were made.
bBased on conversations with Rogers we assumed that slogans
had an average (noncrisis) format factor of 0.6 for each of the four
readership types. We did not apply this factor to repeat slogans,
such as the New York Times' "All the News That's Fit to Print."
Such slogans, which undoubtedly have a negligible attention-getting
value, were not a part of either message scenario.
CFor editorials, the numbers in the reading experiment were so
small that we could not use them to estimate format factors. Instead,
we used the same values that were derived for long news articles/
commentaries, since these two types of articles usually contained
the most difficult reading material and because editorials attracted
the highest overall audience proportion after long news articles/
commentaries.
d"Long news articles" and "commentaries" were aggregated in
the simulation content analysis because the coder had difficulty
distinguishing these two types of articles. Accordingly, we only
computed format factors for the aggregated type.
eShort news items are perhaps the most popular type of article
with Soviet newspaper readers. The relatively low format factor
computed for short news items probably reflects the comparatively high
frequency with which they occur.
fFor letters and telegrams, the numbers in the reading experiment
were so small that we could not use them to estimate format factors.
Instead, we used the same values that were derived for short news items,
both because of the comparatively frequent occurrence of letters and
their generally short, encapsulated format.
gSince there were no respondents in this readership type (see n.
p. ), we estimated the format factors by interpolation--basing our
estimates on Rogers' hypothesis that, with regard to exposure to content
within newspapers, the low education-high political involvement group
would most resemble the two groups with higher education and show generally
higher exposure than the low education-low political involvement group.
hSince there were no respondents in the low education-high political
involvement readership type, the format factor shown for "all types"
refers only to the other three types.
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by education and class, which is reproduced below: 8
Class
Education
White Collar Blue Collar Farmer Totals
(millions) (millions) (millions) (millions)
<10 yrs. 30.0 99.4 65.4 194.8
>10 yrs. 11.9 1.6 0.5 14.0
Totals 41.9 101.0 65.9 208.8
It seemed reasonable to assume that virtually all persons
in the white collar category fell into the "high political involvement"
group defined above (p. , n. ), i.e., that they were either members
of the Communist Party or filled occupational roles in which one
could expect them to be comparatively high media consumers. Consist-
ent with this assumption were the following two additional assumptions:
--that approximately 85 percent of those with higher
education were either Party members or in occupa-
tional roles which made them media-immersed;
--that approximately 15 percent of those without
higher education were either Party members or in
occupational roles which made them media-immersed.
By extending these two assumptions to the readership of each print
medium in the simulation, we were able to estimate the proportion
of each medium's readership in each of the four audience categories--
8Adapted from: Kramer, "The Population of the Soviet Union,"
Table IV.
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high education-high political involvement, etc.--for which we had
already calculated format factors. For each print medium we then
computed nine format factors, one for each type of article, by
taking a weighted sum of the format factors in Table 5.3, where the
weights were simply the estimated audience proportions in the four
education-political involvement categories. Table 5.4 gives a sample
of the results--for two all-Union newspapers. The format factors
computed for all thirty-two simulated print media appear in Appendix A,
Table A, along with a summary of the computation procedure for each
medium.
It is interesting to note that wide variations in print
readerships with respect to education and political involvement
breakdowns only gave rise to a modest variation in the estimated
format factors for given types of articles. For simulated print
media with periodicities of less than 6 per week, we used just
half the values of the estimated format factors on certain days
of the week. The assumptions we made in this regard, which are
reviewed in Appendix B, Tables B.7-B.9, may be summarized as follows:
Periodicity Days of Publication
5 per week Su Tu W Th F
Tu W Th F Sa proportion of estimated
0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 format factor used
4 per week Tu W Th Sa
Tu W F Sa proportion of estimated
1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 format factor used
3 per week Su W F
Tu Th Sa proportion of estimated
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 format factor used
2 per week Su F
Tu Sa proportion of estimated
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 format factor used
1 per week W
Th proportion of estimated
0.5 0.5 format factor used
(continued)
Table 5.4--Estimated format factors for two simulated Soviet
print media.
Format Factors
Pravda Trud
Article Format
Slogan 0.685 0.622
Editorial 0.435 0.395
Long News
Article/Commentary 0.435 0.395
Speech 0.325 0.307
Announcement 0.330 0.287
Short News Item 0.214 0.189
Telegram/Letter 0.214 0.189
Cartoon 0.137 0.138
Photograph 0.088 0.044
(continued)
In other words, lacking more detailed data we assumed that,
for example, half the readership of an aggregated paper published
3 days a week received the paper on Monday, Wednesday and Friday,
and half on Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday. For the most likely
days of publication we consulted Paul Cox, a graduate student at
Harvard University who had recently visited the Soviet Union.
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Soviet Radio and Television Audiences
Theme-response characteristics
As we mentioned above, to compute conditional message exposure
probabilities the simulation programs require aggregate theme-response
data summarized in terms of relative theme-exposure probabilities
on one or more population dimensions. Thus, for radio and TV we
had to specify the following kind of information: the relative
likelihood of urban versus rural dwellers being exposed to broadcasts
on international affairs, the relative likelihood of persons between
the ages of 16 and 29 versus persons between the ages of 30 and 49
being exposed, etc. Again, because of the lack of detailed data
on Soviet audience response characteristics, we treated individual
themes in the two scenarios as part of one theme--"international
affairs"--so that we could specify one set of relative theme-exposure
probabilities for all themes carried by radio media in the two
scenarios, and one set for all themes carried by TV media.
The Comcom Leisure Study served as our basic source of theme-
response data for Soviet radio and television audiences. Each Leisure
Study respondent was asked the following questions: "What [radio]
programs, if any, did you try to listen to regularly . . .? Give names
of programs." "What [television] programs, if any, did you try to
listen to regularly. . . ? Give names of programs." Respondents
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answered the radio question for each of seven time slots and the
television question either in terms of specific times of day or for
each of two time slots. (We described these time slots in Chapter IV,
p. ). Unfortunately, since the respondents were not presented
with a checklist of program types, we could not be certain each
respondent's spontaneous answers represented an exhaustive enumera-
tion of the types of programs he attended to. In addition, the
number of respondents who listened to radio or watched TV at all,
and hence the number who attended to newscasts, varied significantly
over the daily time slots--in some time slots being too small to
provide a valid base for estimating average theme-exposure probabil-
ities. For these reasons we chose not to use the Leisure Study data
to estimate a set of average theme-exposure probabilities for each
Soviet electronic medium in the simulation. Rather, we chose to
aggregate the Leisure Study responses over time slots, and thereby
obtained one set of estimates for all radio media and another set for
all TV media. The resulting estimated average and relative theme-
exposure probabilities on each population dimension are shown in
Table 5.5.
Here again it is important that we note the limitations with
respect to such estimates. Aside from (1) the bias of the sample,
(2) the likelihood that the newscasts to which respondents said they
attended referred to a much broader range of content than just
international news, and (3) the possibility that the real average
and relative theme-exposure probabilities varied over times of the day,
Table 5.5--Estimated average and relative probabilities of exposure
to radio and television newscasts on each dimension of
the simulated Soviet population.
Radio Television
Average Average
Theme-Exposure Theme-Exposure
Probability (N) a Ratio Probability (N)a RatioDimension
Sex
Male 0.959 (73) 0.433 (30)
Female 0.871 (31) 1.10 0.428 (21) 1.01
Age
16-29 0.921 (38) 0.273 (22)
30-49 0.934 (45) 0.99 0.524 (21) 0.52
50+ 0.953 (21) 0.98 0.625 (8) 0.84
Education
<4 yrs. 1.0 0 0 b 0.500b
>4, <7 yrs. 1.000 (13) 1.00 0.500 (4) 1.00
>7, <10 yrs. 0.980 (49) 1.02 0.619 (21) 0.81
>10 yrs. 0.857 (42) 1.14 0.269 (26) 2.26
Political Involvement
Party Member 0.909 (11) 0.500 (8)
Non Party Member 0.936 (93) 0.97 0.419 (43) 1.19
Residence
Urban 0.927 (82) 0.445 (45)
Rural 0.955 (22) 0.97 0.333 (6) 1.34
aTotal number of Comcom respondents on
calculations were made.
the basis of which the
bAn extrapolated value, since persons with less than four
of education were not represented in the Leisure Study sample.
years
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there is another important factor which bears on the validity of
our estimates: Lacking data on the sample members' attention to
individual newscasts, we assumed that the relative proportion of two
subgroups attending news type programs at all would serve as an
approximate measure of their relative probability of exposure to an
individual newscast.
Notwithstanding these qualifiers and the ones enumerated earlier
for newspaper theme-exposure estimates, several features of both sets
of results are worth noting. First, radio appears to
rank far ahead of television and newspapers as a news medium, while
TV ranks only slightly ahead of newspapers. (In fact, given the 0.9+
average exposure estimates, radio appears to serve primarily the
news dissemination function.) Second, relative theme-exposure
probabilities on each dimension are greatest for newspapers, smallest
for radio, with the young and the well educated more likely to attend
to newspaper news and the old and the less well educated more likely
to attend to radio news. These patterns are all fairly consistent
with what we know about the effects of literacy, income, and penetra-
tion on the relative news dissemination functions of the three major
Soviet mass media.
Format-response characteristics
The manner in which we defined and estimated format factors
for Soviet radio and television audiences was dictated largely by
the type of aggregate format-response data available. The Leisure
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Study sample again served as our principal source. We mentioned
above that Comcom respondents were asked to list the kinds of radio
and TV programs to which they attended. Unfortunately, since the
respondents were not presented with a checklist of program types,
they answered these questions broadly, in such terms as "news",
"music", etc. Consequently, their answers with respect to attendance
to news programs did not distinguish between different formats--
straight news, press reviews, commentaries, and the like. We
therefore could not use the Leisure Study data to estimate, as we
had for print media. the values of factors which would reflect the
relative attractiveness of different news formats.
However, we also had data on the time and place limits of
availability of radio and TV newscasts. As a result, for every
simulated Soviet electronic medium we were able to estimate format
factors defined in the following way: the average proportion of
early morning listeners exposed to an early morning radiocast on
the Fourth Program, the average proportion of evening viewers exposed
10
to an evening news telecast on the First Program, etc. We now
proceed to describe how these estimates were made.
The number of Comcom respondents who listened to radio or
watched TV was too small during some time slots to provide stable
estimates of format factors for the various times of day. Accord-
ingly, we could not use the Leisure Study data by itself to compute
To be sure, these estimates were averages pertaining to all
news content broadcasts rather than just to international affairs
newscasts, as we would have preferred.
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format factors which would reflect changes in format-response within
radio and TV audiences during the course of a day. Instead, we
aggregated the Leisure Study responses over time slots (and presumably
over different newscast formats as well), and used the results to
estimate an average newscast format factor for radio and an average
newscast format factor for TV, in each of three education categories:
>10 years; >7,<10 years; and <7 years. The results are summarized
in Table 5.6. We then computed an average newscast format factor
for each simulated radio and TV medium by taking a weighted sum of
the format factors in Table 5.6, where the weights used were just the
medium's estimated audience proportions in the three education
categories. Table 5.7 lists these results.
It is important to note that the "average format factors"
in Table 5.7 represent average proportions of radio and TV audiences
exposed to newscasts at all, rather than average proportions exposed
to individual newscasts. We also note that the results clearly show
television ranking a distant second to radio with regard to their
use as news media. 1
1 1The most widespread use of the radio by Leisure Study
respondents was as a news medium. The other type of program to which
they reported almost as wide exposure was musical programs. Concom
respondents reported a more varied diet, however, for television.
The most popular TV programs with the sample members were films,
followed by three program types which were mentioned with about equal
frequency--musical programs, sports programs, and news/commentary.
Almost all citations of news programs came from regular users of
television, but even among them not more than half mentioned news
as a program they typically watched. (Rogers, "The Soviet Audience,"
p. 119).
Table 5.6--Estimated proportions of Soviet radio and television
audiences who attended to newscasts, by education.
Audience Proportions
Radio (N) Television (N)Education
>10 yrs. 0.810 (42) 0.193 (31)
,77,4 10 yrs. 0.870 (38) 0.612 (18)
L 7 yrs. 0.910 (23) 0.500 (10)
Total number of respondents on the basis of which audience
proportions were calculated. Because of the uneven distribution
of Party members over the education variable, we also computed the
education breakdown of radio and TV newscast audiences among just
the non Party members in the sample. The results, in descending
order on the education variable, were as follows: Radio--0.790,
0.860, 0.910; Television--0.130, 0.612, 0.500. Since these
figures did not differ much from those in the Table, we used the
latter set in the simulation.
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The next step was to convert the average format factors in
Table 5.7 to individual factors for the various newscast formats
defined by the possible combinations of radio or TV media (i.e.,
daily time slots) and Programs (First, Second, Fourth and local for
radio; First, Second and local for TV). Our objective was to ensure
that, of the 89 or so percent of a given radio medium's audience or
the 50 or so percent of a given TV medium's audience exposed to
newscasts at all, an appropriate proportion would be exposed to any
one newscast. Of course, this proportion had to be a function of
the Program on which the newscast occurred and the number of newscasts
occurring on that Program in the given medium (time slot). Thus,
before individual format factors could be estimated, the following
additional pieces of information were required: (1) the number of
newscasts which occurred in 1962-63 in each of the medium-Program
combinations; and (2) the average proportion of each medium's audience
in each of the Program audiences.
We obtained the distribution of newscasts over Programs and
time slots from published Soviet broadcast schedules and other
schedules inferred from them for all-Union and local radio and
IV Programs (see Appendix B, Tables B.10-B.14). The estimated dis-
tribution of newscasts derived from these schedules is shown in
Tab le 5.8.
We computed an approximate average distribution of radio
audiences over all-Union Programs on the basis of the distribution
of the Soviet population and the distribution of receiving sets over
Table 5.8--Estimated distribution of newscasts over simulated Soviet
electronic media and Programs in 1962-63
Number of Newscasts
First Second Fourtha Regionalb
Program Program Program Programs
Medium Days
Radio
Early morning central Mon.-Fri. 4 2 4
(5:30-8:29 a.m.) Sat.& Sun. 3 - 3
Lunchtime central Mon.-Fri. 3 1 5
(noon-2:59 p.m.) Sat. 2 1 3 -
Sun. 2 1 4
Early evening central Mon.-Fri. 5 2 5
(6:00-9:29 p.m.) Sat.& Sun. 4 2 4
Late evening central Mon.-Fri. 4 1 8
(9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) Sat.& Sun. 4 1 5
Early morning regional Mon.-Fri. - - - 2
(5:30-8:29 a.m.) Sat.& Sun.
Lunchtime regional
(noon-2:59 p.m.) Mon.-Sun. - - - 1
Early evening regional
(6:00-9:29 p.m.) Mon.-Sun. - - - 2
Late evening regional
(9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) Mon.-Sun. - - - 1
Midmorning Mon.-Fri. 3 2 3 2
(8:30-11:59 a.m.) Sat. 2 2 2 2
Sun. 2 1 2 1
Afternoon Mon.-Fri. 5 - 3
(3:00-5:59 p.m.) Sat.& Sun. 4 - 2
Table 5.8--Continued
Number of Newscasts
First Second Fourth Regional
Program Program Program Programs
Medium Days
Television
Daytime central
(11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) Mon.-Sun. - -c
Nighttime central
(6:00 p.m.-midnight) Mon.-Sun. 1 2
Daytime regional
(11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) Mon.-Sun. - - --
Nighttime regional Tues.-Sat. - - - 2
(6:00 p.m.-midnight) Sun.& Mon. - - - 1
awe did not represent the Fifth Program
message scenarios. This Program consisted of
"persons at sea," emigres, etc.
in the simulation
special broadcasts for
bThis category referred to all broadcasts not emanating in
central or all-Union level.
the
CThere was no "Fourth Program" on domestic TV. A "Third Program"
added in the Fall of 1963 was not represented in the simulation message
scenarios on the assumption that its audience would have been negligible
during November of 1963. We assumed, as indicated in the Table,
virtually no news broadcasts on daytime TV in 1962-63.
Program target areas in 1962, as shown below:12
Population Total Receiving Sets
Target Area (millions) (% of Total) (Millions) (% of Total)
First Program
(USSR) 218.2 (100) 65.9 (100)
Second Program
(European RSFSR) 99.8 (46) 32.9 (50)
Fourth Program
(Siberia, Soviet East, 46.4 (21) 13.0 (20)
central Asia)
These distributions suggested that we allocate radio audiences to
Program I, II and IV in approximately the ratios 10:5:2.
We estimated the average distribution of TV audiences over all-
Union Programs in the following way. First, we assumed, on the basis
of published Soviet estimates, that the maximum potential television
1 2Population figures were taken from the 1959 all-Union census
(updated linearly to 1962), broken out as follows: European RSFSR--
Northwest, 11.1 million; Central, 37 million; Central South, 20.7
million; Volga Urals, 31 million. Siberia, Soviet East and Central
Asia--Soviet Far East, 4 million; Lake Baikal, 3.8 million; Western
Siberia, 11.6 million; Eastern Siberia, 1.8 million; Kazakh SSR,
10 million; Uzbek SSR, 9 million; Kirghiz SSR, 2.3 million; Tadzhik
SSR, 2.2 million; Turkmen SSR, 1.7 million. Wire and wave set figures
were calculated from the 1959 all-Union census data and people per set
figures predicted from a regression equation developed by Dr. Noralou
Roos from available data on'-the Union Republics ("Soviet Memorandum
No. 9," February 1965). The receiving set figures estimated this way
were incremented to match the 1962 total as follows: European RSFSR--
Northwest, 3.2 million; Central, 11.6 million; Central South, 6.1
million; Volga Urals, 12.0 million. Siberia, Soviet East and Central
Asia--Soviet Far East, 1.2 million; Lake Baikal, 1.3 million; Western
Siberia, 4.4 million; Uzbek SSR, 2.1 million; Kirghiz SSR, 0.4 million;
Tadzhik SSR, 0.3 million; Turkmen SSR, 0.4 million.
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audience at the start of 1963 was about 40 million persons.13 We
estimated that the Moscow region (the target area for Program II)
included about 10 million persons at that time. Assuming that a
relatively high percentage of the residents of this highly urbanized
area were within the TV diffusion network, we concluded that the
Program II audience must have been at least one fourth the size of the
average audience of Program I, which was beamed to the whole USSR.
Table 5.9 shows the distributions of radio and TV audiences
over all-Union and regional Programs derived from the estimation
procedures outlined above.
The final step was to compute individual format factors by
combining average format factors for the various radio and TV media
(Table 5.7) with the estimated distribution of newscasts over media
and Programs (Table 5.8) and the estimated distribution of media
audiences over Programs (Table 5.9). This synthesis was achieved by
means of the following algebraic procedure:
Let F = the average format factor for a given Soviet
electronic medium,
N = the number of newscasts occurring in that medium
on a given Program,
f = the average fraction of the Program's audience exposed
to a given newscast occurring in that medium on that
Program, and
1 3See Chapter IV, p. , n.
1 4This estimate was based on a 1959 all-Union census figure
for the Northwest area of the RSFSR (Moscow and its environs) of
1.0.8 million people.
Table 5.9--Estimated distribution of simulated Soviet radio and television
audiences over all-Union and regional Programs in 1962-63.
Audience Proportions
First Second Fourth Regional
Program Program Program Programs
Medium
Radio
Early morning central (5:30-8:29 a.m.) 0.60 0.30 0.10 -
Lunchtime central (noon-2:59 p.m.) 0.60 0.30 0.10 -
Early evening central (6:00-9:29 p.m.) 0.60 0.30 0.10 -
Late evening central (9:30 pm.-5:29 a.m.) 0.60 0.30 0.10 -
Early morning regional (5:30-8:29 a.m.) - - - 1.00
Lunchtime regional (noon-2:59 p.m.) - - - 1.00
Early evening regional (6:00-9:29 p.m.) - - - 1.00
Late evening regional (9:30 p.m.-5:29 a.m.) - - - -
Midmorning (8:30-11:59 a.m.) 0.37 0.19 0.07 0.37
Afternoon (3:00-5:59 p.m.) 0.37 0.19 0.07 0.37
Television
Daytime central (11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) 0.80 0.20 - -
N:ighttime central (6:00 p.m.-midnight) 0.80 0.20 - -
Daytime regional (11:00 a.m.-5:59 p.m.) - - - 1.00
Nighttime regional (6:00 p.m.-midnight) -- 1.00
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Af = the average fraction of the Program's audience
exposed to a given newscast occurring in that
medium on that Program, but not exposed to any
other such newscast.
For computational purposes we assumed that the audience dupli-
cation between any pair of newscasts occurring in a given radio or
TV medium on a given Program was greater than chance to the extent
that Af would equal l/3(f-f2). Accordingly, ignoring the effects of
triplicated, quadruplicated, etc., exposure to newscasts, recalling
that the average format factor for a medium referred to the average
fraction of its audience exposed to at least one newscast, and applying
each medium's average format factor to each Program occurring on it,
we were able to solve for f as follows:
Af = 1/3(f - f2 )
and f + (N - 1) Af P
so f = [-(N + 2) + (N + 2) - 12(N- 1)P ]/2(1 - N)
We used this quadratic formula to compute a newscast format
factor for each Program on each simulated radio and TV medium. 1 5 The
resulting factors represented average fractions of the Program audiences.
We therefore had to convert them to average fractions of the media
audiences, i.e., to the parameters required for the simulation, by
multiplying them by the Program factors in Table 5.9. A sample of the
results is shown in Table 5.10--for a Soviet radio medium and an
1 5The positive solution values were taken as the format
factors.
Table 5.10--Estimated format factors for two simulated Soviet
electronic media.
Format Factors
First Second Fourth Regional
Program Program Program Programs
Medium Days
M:idmorning radio Mon.-Fri.
(8:30-11:59 a.m.) Sat.
Sun.
Nighttime
central television Mon.-Sun.
(6:00 p.m.-midnight) Sun.
0.286 0.158
0.314 0.158
0.314 0.169
0.284 0.102
0.054
0.059
0.059
0.029
0.029
0.030
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all-Union Soviet television medium. The format factors computed
in this way for all fourteen simulated Soviet electronic media are
listed in Table A.2 of Appendix A, along with a summary of the compu-
tation procedure for each medium.
The Soviet Audience of Foreign Radio
Theme-response characteristics
For foreign radio, as for Soviet radio and TV, we had to specify
theme-response parameters of the following kind: the relative likelihood
of Party versus nonParty members being exposed to newscasts, the relative
likelihood of persons with less than four years of education versus
persons with between four and seven years of education being exposed, etc.
Each Leisure Study respondent was asked the following questions:
"At what time of day] did you listen [to foreign radio stationsj most?"
"Could you rank the quality of their news broadcasts? RFE ., BBC ,
VOA , RL_, Other Western stations , Other Socialist stations ."
Respondents who answered the first question but not the second were
considered to listen to foreign radio but not to newscasts on foreign
radio. Respondents who answered the second question but not the first
were considered to be only rare listeners to foreign radio. Only those
respondents who answered both questions were regarded as listeners of
:foreign radio newscasts. It was on the basis of their answers, aggregated
over times of day and stations, that we estimated the average and
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relative theme-exposure probabilities shown in Table 5.11.
Format-response characteris tics
For each simulated foreign radio medium we were able to follow
a procedure analogous to that described above for radio and TV, to
estimate format factors defined as follows: the average proportion
of nighttime VOA listeners exposed to a newscast after midnight, the
average proportion of daytime BBC listeners exposed to a newscast
after 4:00 p.m., etc. Below, we describe how these estimates were
made for each of the three major foreign radio stations represented
in the simulation.
Because of the comparatively small sample size, we could not
use Leisure Study data alone to estimate format factors for each
individual foreign radio medium in the simulation. Instead, we
aggregated the Leisure Study responses over time slots and different
1 6The same kinds of limitations inherent in the theme-exposure
estimates for radio and TV also apply to the corresponding estimates
for foreign radio: the sample bias, the likelihood that the news to
which respondents listened did not refer simply to international news,
the possibility that the real average and relative probabilities of
exposure to foreign radio newscasts varied over times of the day, and
the fact that relative probabilities of exposure to any newscast are
not necessarily the same as relative probabilities of exposure to
individual newscasts. However, supporting the plausibility of the
resulting estimates are the following features: (1) Among listeners,
foreign radio appears to rank second only to domestic radio as a source
of news, leading domestic TV and newspapers in this regard; (2) Relative
theme-exposure probabilities on each dimension are lower for foreign
radio than for domestic TV and newspapers, although not quite as low
as for domestic radio; (3) The well educated and males are more likely
to listen to news than others. These patterns are consistent with
available information on the Soviet foreign radio audience.
Table 5.11--Estimated average and relative probabilities of exposure
to foreign radio newscasts on each dimension of the
simulated Soviet population
Average Theme-Exposure
Probability (N) a Ratio
Dimension
Sex
Male 0.844 (51) 1.50
Female 0.562 (16)
Age
16-29 0.682 (22)
30-49 0.750 (32) 0.91
50+ 1.000 (13) 0.75
Education
<4 yrs. 0.5 40b (-)
>,4,<7 yrs. 0.636 (11) 0.85
,7,<10 yrs. 0.750 (32) 0.85
>10 yrs. 0.875 (24) 0.86
Political Involvement c
Party Member 0.800 (5)
Non Party Member 0.774 (62) 1.03
Residence
Urban 0.785 (51)
Rural 0.750 (16) 1.05
aTotal number of Comcom respondents
calculations were made.
on the basis of which the
An extrapolated value, since persons with less than four years of
education were not represented in the Leisure Study sample.
CWe speculate that the unexpectedly small difference in foreign
newscast exposure between Party and nonParty members may be
spurious--a result of the small N for Party members.-
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foreign radio stations (as well as different types of newscast formats),
and used the results to estimate an average format factor for foreign
radio as a whole in each of three education categories: >10 years,
>7, 10 years, and 7 years. The results are summarized in Table 5.12
below.
Table 5.12--Estimated proportion of the Soviet audience of foreign
radio exposed to newscasts, by education
*
Education Audience Proportions (N)
>10 yrs. 0.910 (22)
>7, <10 yrs. 0.965 (28)
<7 yrs. 0.572 (7)
Total number of Comcom respondents on the basis of which the
calculations were made.
We then computed an average newscast format factor for each simulated
foreign radio medium by taking a weighted sum of the format factors
in Table 5.6, where the weights used were just the medium's estimated
audience proportions in the three education categories. Table 5.13
below lists these results for each of the three foreign stations.1 7
17Since we used the same set of education marginals for each
time slot-station combination, each foreign radio medium in the
simulation had one of the average format factors shown in the
Tab le.
Table 5.13--Estimated average newscast format factors for the three
foreign radio stations represented in the simulation.
Audience Percentage Breakdown Average b
Station by Educationa Total Format Factor
(>10 yrs) (7, 10 yrs.) (7 yrs.)
VOA 38.0 25.5 36.5 100.0 0.801
BBC 44.0 22.5 33.5 100.0 0.807
RL 36.0 21.0 43.0 100.0 0.775
a
The education marginals mapped into the computer audiences
in Pass I.
b
The sum of products of a medium's education marginals and
the corresponding audience proportions in Table 5.12.
Here we note that, as with radio and TV, the "average format
factors" in Table 5.13 represent average proportions of foreign radio
audiences exposed to newscasts at all, rather than average proportions
exposed to individual newscasts. We also note that among its listeners
foreign radio ranks much closer to domestic radio than to TV with
regard to use as a news medium.
The next step was to convert the average format factors in
Table 5.13 to individual factors for the various newscast formats
defined by the possible combinations of foreign radio media, i.e.,
stations and time slots, with more finely divided time slots and with
additional elements limiting the time and/or place of newscast avail-
ability. In the case of Voice of America the additional element was
the broadcast language--Georgian, Armenian, Ukrainian, or Russian; in
the case of the British Broadcasting Corporation, it was the length of
the newscast--10, 90, or 110 minutes; and in the case of Radio Liberty,
it was target area--Minsk, Moscow, Molotov, Kiev, Kharkhov, Stalingrad,
or Tibilis. Thus, before newscast format factors could be estimated
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for individual foreign radio media, the following additional pieces
of information were required: (1) the number of newscasts which occurred
in 1962-63 in each medium timeslot-language (newscast length, target
area) combination; (2) the distribution of each medium's audience by
time slot, and (3). the distribution of each medium's audience by
language (newscast length, target area).
From broadcast schedules published by the three major foreign
radio stations we were able to obtain the distribution of newscasts
by time slot and by broadcast language (VOA), duration (BBC), or
target area (RL) (see Appendix B, Tables B.15-B.22). The estimated
newscast distributions derived from these schedules are shown in
Table 5.14.
We computed an approximate average distribution of foreign
radio audiences over three basic times of day and five time slots on
the basis of the Radio Liberty listenership data cited in Chapter IV.18
The results are shown in Table 5.15 below.
Table 5.15--Estimated distribution of the Soviet audience of foreign
radio, by time of day and time slot, in 1962-63.*
Time Slot Factors
4:00- 8:00 a.m.- 4:00- 8:00- Midnight-
Time of Day 7:59 a.m. 3:59 p.m. 7:59 p.m. 11:59 p.m. 3:59 a.m.
Early Morning 1.00 - - -
Daytime - 0.10 0.90 - -
Nigh'ttime - - - 0.64 0.36
Based on Radio Liberty listenership estimates for the period
.1962-64.
1 8See p. , n.
Table 5.16--Estimated distribution of the Soviet audiences of VOA, BBC,
and RL, by language of media consumption, newscast length,
and target area respectively, in 1962-63.
Audience Proportions
Language of Media Consumption VOA
Georgian 0.016
Armenian 0.014 -
Ukrainian 0.198 0.204
:Russian 0.772 0.796 1.000
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
Newscast Length BBC
10 minutes 0.333 0.333 - - -
90 minutes - 0.667 1.000 0.500 -
110 minutes 0.667 - - 0.500 1.000
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Target Area RL
IMinsk 0.140 0.148 0.177
Moscow 0.173 0.184 0.218
Molotov 0.150 0.159 -
Kiev 0.177 0.188 0.224
Kharkov 0.213 0.227 0.270
Stalingrad 0.088 0.094 0.111
Tibilis 0.059 - -
Total * 1.000 1.000 1.000
Audience proportions were estimated for the various combinations
of languages, newscast lengths, and target areas encompassed by different
time slots.
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We estimated the distribution of the VOA audience by language of
media consumption on the basis of the distribution of the Soviet popu-
lation by native language as shown in the 1959 all-Union census.
Radio Liberty Committee audience estimates for 1963 provided us with an
approximate breakdown of that station's potential listeners by target
area, which we used as the approximate audience distribution by target
area. Finally, we arbitrarily assumed that the audience sizes for 90
and 110 minute BBC broadcasts during a given time slot were about the
same and equalled approximately twice the size of the audience for a
10 minute newscast in that time slot. Table 5.16 shows the distribu-
tions of VOA, BBC and Radio Liberty audiences by language of media
consumption, length of newscast, and target area respectively, derived
from these estimation procedures.2 0
The final step was to compute individual format factors by
combining average format factors for the various foreign radio media
(Table 5.13) with the estimated distributions of newscasts and media
audiences by time slot, and by language, duration, or target area
(Tables 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16). This was accomplished by means of the
same algebraic procedure which has already been described for radio
and TV. 1 A sample of the results--for a VOA medium, a BBC medium,
19That is, we counted a given person's language of media con-
sumption as that which he gave as his native -tongue in the census.
Borter, "Audience Data Estimates."
21We used the quadratic formula on p. above to compute a
newscast format factor for each time slot and each broadcast language,
newscast length or target area. The resulting factors represented
546
and a Radio Liberty medium--is shown in Table 5.17. The format factors
computed in this way for all nine simulated foreign radio media are
listed in Table A.3 of Appendix A, together with a summary of the
computation procedure for each medium.
22
average fractions of subaudiences--for time slot and language, time
slot and newscast length, etc. We therefore had to convert them to
average fractions of the media audiences. In the case of VOA this
meant multiplying the resulting factors by the time slot and language
factors in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, in the case of the BBC, by the time
slot and newscast length factors in Tables 5.15 and 5.16, and in the
case of RL, by the time slot and target area factors in Tables 5.15
and 5.16.
2 2We arbitrarily assumed that the audience response to the
content of oral agitation meetings would be something like the
response of Soviet newspaper readers to short news items. We there-
fore estimated an average newscast format factor for the oral agitation
audience as the sum of products of the audience's estimated education-
political involvement marginals and the average format factors which
had been computed, for short news items, within each education-
political involvement category of newspaper readers. Similarly, for
relative theme-exposure probabilities on each dimension of the oral
agitation audience we used the values which had been estimated for
Soviet newspaper readers.
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CHAPTER VI
SIMULATING SOVIET EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA
MESSAGES DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Introduction
Chapters IV and V described how the static portions of the
Comcom simulation--pass I and the first part of pass II--were used
to map Soviet media-consumption and message-response traits into
a sample computer population. In the current chapter and the one
which follows it we explore the combined implications and extended
consequences of the Comcom simulation as a whole--pass I and pass II--
by evaluating its postdictive power in two historical cases.
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For this purpose we have confronted our computer sample
of the Soviet population with scenarios summarizing the streams
of messages that appeared in Soviet mass media and foreign radio
transmissions to the USSR during two periods of international
tension that arose in the recent past: the Cuban missile crisis
and the aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination.
In this chapter the postdictive test and its results will be
described for the case of the Cuban missile crisis. Chapter VII
covers the same material for the Kennedy assassination.
The Cuban Missile Crisis
Overview
On Monday evening, October 22, 1962, President Kennedy
announced in a nationally-televised speech that the United States, to
insure its own safety and that of the entire Western Hemisphere, was
imposing a quarantine on Cuba to prevent further importation of
nuclear missiles
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and other offensive weapons to that island from the Soviet
Union and other communist countries. The President also
declared that the United States intended to take whatever
military steps were necessary to secure the dismantling
and removal of existing Soviet missiles and sites in Cuba.
At first, the Soviet, Government temporized but by Thursday,
October 25th, apparently deterred by America's firm stand,
they had begun to retreat, and by Sunday, October 28th,
the Soviet Government officially accepted American condi-
tions and announced the withdrawal of their missiles and
military personnel from Cuba.
Chronology
The Cuban crisis was a complex East-West confronta-
tion characterized by a large number of interrelated
events. Accordingly, it will be useful to present a brief
chronology of these events.' The crisis was triggered by
President Kennedy's quarantine speech, delivered in
.For a chronology of the Cuban crisis, as well as
an outline of significant events preceding the crisis,
we have relied on the following sources:
Robert D. Crane, "The Cuban Crisis: A Strategic Analysis
of American and Soviet Policy," Orbis, VI, No. 4 (1963),
528-46; The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XX,
No. 43 (1962), 2049 and 2108-09; F. Gayle Durham,
"Scenario--Cuban Crisis" (memorandum prepared for Comcom
project, M.I.T., 1966). (Mimeographed.); Department of
State Bulletin, XLVII, Nos. 1217 and 1220 (1962).
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Washington, D. C. on Monday evening, October 22, 1962, at
7:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. We chose to begin the
simulation at this point and to have it cover the succeed-
ing ten 24-hour time periods. In the chronology which
follows, crisis events are dated in terms of Eastern
Standard Time, because most of the historical material
available to the author was dated that way. Due to the
seven hour time difference between Washington and Moscow,
however, the crisis actually began for the Soviets on
Tuesday morning, October 23, 1962 at 2 a.m. Moscow Central
Time .
1The Cuban missile crisis probably had its real
beginnings as early as July of 1962 when Cuban defense
minister Raul Castro visited Moscow at the invitation of
Marshal Malinovsky. Castro's talks with top level Soviet
military and political leaders resulted, among other things,
in the shifting of Cuban cargo reservations from Western
to Communist bloc ships. By the end of July a large
number of Soviet weapons and technicians had arrived in
Cuba, along with a top Soviet rocket-force general. On
August, 21st the United States reported that fifteen
Soviet ships had arrived in Cuba in late July, and the
leader of the Cuban refugees, Mira Cardona, claimed
5,000 Soviet troops had also arrived. The next. day Presi-
dent. Kennedy denied the United States had information
Russian troops were in Cuba but he did acknowledge "an
increased number of technicians" there. Toward the end
of August there were growing reports in the United States
press that the Soviets had stepped up shipments of military
equipment and technical personnel to Cuba. An article by
David Lawrence described in detail the clandestine unload-
ing of Soviet shipments onto trailers the length of
ballistic missiles.
The first significant. American reaction to these
reports came on August 31st, when Senator Keating publicly
objected on the Senate floor to the Soviet missile buildup
in Cuba. At a press conference on September 4th, President
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October 22d.--President Kennedy summoned seventeen
Congressional leaders to Washington for a bipartisan brief-
ing. He also called together the Cabinet and National
Kennedy acknowledged that; Russian missiles had been
delivered to Cuba, but he characterized them as "defensive"
with a "slant range" of twenty-five miles. Nevertheless,
he ordered that the entire island be photographed in de-
tail and, three days later, requested Congress to give him
stand-by authority to call up 150,000 military reservists.
On September 2d, the Soviets announced their intention to
send defensive armaments and technical specialists to
Cuba to meet "imperialist threats." On September 8th,
the Soviet Ministry of Defense threatened in Krasnaya zvezda
to drop nuclear bombs on American bases if the United States
started a war over Cuba, and three days later the Soviet
government officially warned the United States that an
attack on Cuba or Cuban-bound Soviet ships might bring
nuclear war. The rest of the month saw growing U.S. concern
over the situation in Cuba, and there were even some sugges-
tions of a blockade or the use of armed force in pre-
election campaign speeches and Congressional debate.
Gromyko reiterated the Soviet warning of possible war over
Cuba.
At his September 13th press conference President
Kennedy had once again maintained that Soviet missiles in
Cuba were "defensive" in nature. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk reiterated this view on a news program September 30th.
Testifying on October 3d before the House Select Committee
on Export Control, Under Secretary George Ball documented
these contentions with data on the limited range of the
missiles in Cuba. By this time the OAS Foreign Ministers
had agreed on a policy of increased surveillance of arms
shipments to Cuba, and the United States was denying her
ports to ships transporting Soviet bloc supplies to Cuba.
On the third weekend in October, five days after Senator
Keating had publicly warned that. the Soviets were con-
structing intermediate range ballistic missile launching
sites in Cuba, there was a significant reversal in U.S.
policy. Reconnaissance flights having confirmed the fact
that the force configurations in Cuba was indeed offensive,
President Kennedy met with his advisers to plan a response
t.o the Soviet, missile buildup. As a result, of plans de-
veloped at that, meeting, both the President and Vice
President, cancelled all political campaign trips, a general
military mobilization and deployment. was begun in the
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Security Council for meetings. At, the same time the Navy
was cancelling a scheduled practice landing at Vieques,
an island east of Puerto Rico, blaming the dispersal of
ships on Hurricane Ella. Press Secretary Pierre Salinger
announced that the President would address the Nation on a
"subject of the highest national urgency." Then, in an
evening speech carried over nationwide radio and tele-
vision, President Kennedy revealed that the U.S. had
stationed naval forces in the Caribbean as part of prepara-
tion for a quarantine to prevent further shipment of of-
fensive missiles to Cuba. The President also announced
the invocation of an immediate meeting of the OAS to
authorize the quarantine so that it could be implemented
as soon as possible,.and he requested that the United
Nations Security Council act on a U.S. resolution which
(1) called for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of
all offensive missiles in Cuba under the supervision of
a U.N. observer corps and (2) promised termination of the
quarantine measures after the observer corps had certi-
fied compliance. In his address the President stated
that it would be the policy of the U.S. "to regard any
nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation
southeastern part of the United States, and naval
maneuvers were initiated in the Caribbean.
___
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in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union
on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response
upon the Soviet Union." Simultaneously, the chief U.S.
delegate to the U.N., Adlai E. Stevenson, delivered a let-
ter to the President of the Security Council, Valerian A.
Zorin, informing him that a quarantine had become neces-
sary to defend the security of the Western Hemisphere
"against, external interference and aggression."
October 23d.--After hearing from Secretary Rusk that the
U.S. had "incontrovertible evidence of missile bases in
Cuba," the OAS unanimously adopted a resolution recommend-
ing that the member states "take all measures, individually
and collectively, including the use of armed force, which
they may deem necessary . . . to prevent the missiles in
Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active
threat to the peace and security of the continent." Presi-
dent Kennedy signed a proclamation, effective on October
24th at 5:00 p.m. Moscow Central Time, ordering "forces
under [his] command to stop, search and turn back any
ships found carrying offensive weapons to Cuba." American
naval and air forces prepared to intercept an estimated
twenty-five Soviet bloc vessels headed for Cuba. Support
for President Kennedy's actions came not, only from
Congressional leaders and ex-Presidents Hoover, Truman,
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and Eisenhower but also from leaders in Great Britain,
Italy, and West Germany where, in West Berlin, it was
feared the Soviet Union might initiate retaliatory
action. The Soviet Union accused the United States of
taking a step toward "unleashing thermonuclear war"
but did say it was willing to enter negotiations over
Cuba. The quarantine was referred to by Cuban Premier
Fidel Castro as "the most dangerous adventure since the
end of World War II" and a "pirate act." The U.N.
Security Council held a special session at which
Ambassador Stevenson called for removal of offensive
weapons from Cuba, a U.N. observer team to confirm arms
removal, and Security Council support, of consultations
between the United States and Russia on Cuba. Soviet,
Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A. Zorin rejected the
proposal and charged the United States with "aggression."
October 24th.--The President instructed all Cabinet
members not to campaign during the crisis, and the State
Department arranged a series of five regional briefings
for members of Congress. The Defense Department reported
that six ships bound for Cuba had altered course, while
others were continuing toward the island. Assistant,
Defense Secretary Arthur Sylvester said there was now
"undeniable evidence" of at least thirty missiles and
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more than twenty IL-28 jet; bombers in Cuba. The Presi-
dent asked Congressional leaders to prepare to be called.
back to Washington on eight hours notice and he cancelled
his November trip to Brazil. France issued a statement
in support of the United States. Premier Khrushchev,
replying to a telegram from Lord Bertrand Russell, said
that the Soviet Union would do nothing reckless but, would
act if the United States carried out "pirate actions."
He also suggested a summit meeting to avoid a thermo-
nuclear war. Acting U.N. Secretary General U Thant.
appealed to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev for
a two-week cooling off period to avoid direct. military
confrontation and possible war. He called for a volun-
tary suspension of Soviet arms shipments to Cuba and a
voluntary lifting of the U.S. quarantine, so that both
parties could meet and negotiate.
October 25th.--The State Department announced that at
least. eight Latin American countries had volunteered to
help in the United States quarantine, and the Pentagon
reported twelve Russian ships had turned back. The
Soviet tanker Bucharest was intercepted by U.S. ships
which allowed it to proceed after determining it. had
only oil aboard. A United States military buildup con-
tinued in South Florida although public reaction was
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reported calm. A total of 1,703 women and children
evacuated from the Navy base at Guantanamo Bay arrived at
Norfolk, Virginia. In Prague, angry crowds demonstrated
in front of the U.S embassy, and in Poland, housewives
began a run on foodstores. President Kennedy, in his
reply to U Thant's appeal, emphasized that, Soviet. removal
of the offensive weapons in Cuba was a pre-condition of
all other action. In the U.N., Ambassador Stevenson
engaged in a heated exchange with Soviet Ambassador Zorin
about; the latter's denial there were Soviet MRBM's and
IRBM's in Cuba. Stevenson exhibited aerial reconnaissance
photographs of Soviet missile sites in Cuba.
October 26th.--United States officials pointed out that
work on missile bases in Cuba was continuing at a "rapid
pace." The first search of a Soviet-chartered vessel
took place. The Marucla, a ship of Lebanese registry,
was boarded and allowed to proceed after no arms were
found aboard. President Kennedy received a message from
Premier Khrushchev, the text of which was not disclosed.
I.n answering it, the President said Khrushchev's proposals
were "generally acceptable." After a new appeal from
U Thant to halt action for a "limited time" to permit
discussions, the President agreed to avoid a direct
confrontation "in the next few days." Premier Khrushchev
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said he had ordered Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to
avoid the quarantine zone.
October 27th.--The Secretary General of the OAS stated
that the United States could forcibly remove offensive
missiles from Cuba without further sanction from Latin
American allies. A group of Governors offered the Presi-
dent, full support in any civil defense effort, necessitated
by the Cuban crisis. The State Department announced a
system of clearances to assist vessels transiting waters
in the vicinity of Cuba not carrying offensive weapons.
More the 1,000 pickets, including Student Peace Union
marchers and the American Nazi party, paraded in front
of the White House. Reports from Havana said "unidenti-
fied" planes had been fired upon by Cuban anti-aircraft
batteries. The United States warned it would take
"counter-action" if attempts were made to interfere with
its continuing aerial surveillance of Cuba, and a U.S.
reconnaissance plane was reported missing after a flight
over Cuba. Premier Khrushchev, in a second letter to
President Kennedy, offered t.o withdraw offensive weapons
from Cuba if the United States would remove its missiles
from Turkey. President Kennedy refused to consider the
proposal until work on the Cuban bases was halted and
the weapons dismantled.
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October 28th.--An American plane flew over Siberia, the
President, claiming that the overflight was due to a
navigational error. Electric power stations of a U.S.-
controlled petroleum corporation in Venezuela were
dynamited and Communist sabotage was suspected. About
8,000 pacifists rallied near the U.N. building in New
York to urge a peaceful settlement of the Cuban problem.
Premier Khrushchev sent a third letter to President
Kennedy, this time offering to dismantle Soviet missile
bases in Cuba under U.N. supervision and to "crate and
return" the missiles to Russia in return for a U.S.
pledge not to invade Cuba. President Kennedy, in reply
to this letter, agreed to lift, the quarantine after the
missile bases were dismantled under a suitable inspection
system, and pledged the United States not to invade Cuba
or assist any Latin American country in doing so. The
United States continued its military precautions and
went on with mobilization of troop carrier reserve units.
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro issued terms for Cuba's
acceptance of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, which
included a demand for the United States' evacuation of
Guantanamo Naval Base. Newspapers in England, Ireland,
and Italy described the missile showdown as an American
success and a Russian surrender. U Thant announced he
would leave the following day for Havana but. would stay
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there only long enough to arrange for U.N. observer teams
to inspect. the dismantling of missile bases.
October 29th. --President Kennedy agreed to suspend the
United States quarantine of Cuba for two days, beginning
October 30t.h, during U Thant's visit to Havana.
October 30th.--Senators Keating, Scott, Capehart and
Goldwater warned against any missile removal agreement
that would insure a permanent Communist base of operations
in Cuba. After learning from Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Vasily Kuznetsov that, the dismantling of Soviet
rocket. bases in Cuba had already begun, U Thant left. for
'Havana. An initial conference between Thant and Castro
made little progress.
October 31st.--U Thant left. Cuba but took with him all
U.N. personnel, instead of leaving behind an inspection
team to observe the dismantling of missile bases. He
claimed to have been given assurances the missiles would
be removed. by November 2d. The United States announced
resumption of its naval quarantine and air surveillance,
and the Soviet Union announced that Deputy Premier
Anastas I. Mikoyan would fly to Cuba on an "urgent. mission."
1 On November 2d Republicans asked President Kennedy
t.o clarify eight points, among them whether a Cuban settle-
ment. meant Russian jet planes and military personnel would
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Themes Coded for the Content Analysis
From our discussion in Chapter III the reader will
recall that the first, two steps in simulating a computer
population's exposure to messages in a given media system
are (1) the identification of the classes of content or
themes, and types of messages or formats, that are of
interest and (2) an analysis of the media's content for
the purpose of constructing a scenario in which each
message is identified not only by its theme and format
but, also by the time at which it appeared and the medium
in which it appeared. We now proceed to describe the
results of these undertakings for the Soviet media system
in the case of the Cuban missile crisis.
Coded for the content analysis of Soviet, media
material and incoming foreign radio transmissions during
the Cuban missile crisis were the following themes:
remain in Cuba. A day later the President issued a
statement that aerial surveillance had shown Soviet
missile bases in Cuba were being destroyed. He said
that U.S. aerial surveillance would continue in the ab-
sence of an international system of inspection. As it
happened, the U.S. naval quarantine and aerial surveil-
lance of Cuba were the only forms of inspection and
verification ever carried out. Between October 29th and
November 9th the Russians removed forty-two offensive
missiles from Cuba, and on November 20th the Soviets
promised to remove their offensive bombers. The last days
of October and early November brought protests from some
Congressmen that the President had been too lenient with
Khrushchev and should revoke his no-invasion pledge, but
thereafter the missile crisis gradually receded in inten-
sity.
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1. The U.S. Naval Quarantine of Cuba
2. Reports of Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S.
Reactions
3. Reports of Pro-U.S. or Anti-Soviet
Reactions
4. Soviet Allegations of U.S. Hostility
Towards Cuba
5. Soviet Agreement to Remove Their Missiles
From Cuba
6. U.S. Threats Directed Against the Soviets
7. Soviet, Threats Directed Against the U.S.
An individual news item might well have carried
more than one of these themes. For example, a single
Pravda article on the Cuban debate in the United Nations
Security Council might have emphasized Soviet; warnings to
the U.S. (theme 7) and evidence of long-standing U.S.
hostility toward Cuba (theme 4). A Radio Liberty news-
cast. transmitted to the Soviet Union might have reported
on the U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba (theme 1) and
reactions of world leaders supporting the U.S. move
(theme 3). Whenever a single news item made reference to
two or more themes this way, the item was recorded for
each theme it contained.
We purposely selected themes of a continuing na-
ture rather than discrete themes--such as "the Kennedy
speech" or "the Soviet Government's official response."
To construct a message scenario which included themes
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of the latter type would have required a more comprehen-
sive and precise content analysis than was possible with
the media material available. As regards the substance of
each theme, our choice was influenced by two simulation
objectives: (1) To measure the effect of Soviet attempts
to suppress, temporarily, some aspects of the Cuban crisis
while giving early and heavy emphasis to others; (2) To
gauge the degree of success achieved by foreign radio
stations in getting the Western version of events through
1
to the Soviet public. First, we hypothesized that
1Were it not for the constraints of storage capacity
and run time, many additional themes could have been in-
cluded in the simulation. Examples of interesting themes
which might be candidates for future simulations are the
fo 1 lowing:
--U.S. allegations of Soviet offensive missiles
in Cuba (Part. of theme 3 in the current
simulation)
--The role of the U.N. in general
--U Thant's mediating efforts in particular
--Reports of U.S. force mobiliations (Part of
theme 6 in the current simulation)
--Reports of Soviet force mobilizations
(Part of theme 7 in the current simulation)
--The Soviet offer to exchange removal of their
missiles from Cuba for removal of U.S. bases
from Turkey
--The correspondence between Bertrand Russell and
Premier Khrushchev
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simulated exposure to themes 3, 5, and 7 would indicate
the relative effectiveness of selective de-emphasis and
understatement practiced by Soviet media during the crisis,
and perhaps also, the degree of success achieved by
foreign radio broadcasts in countering these tactics.
Secondly, we assumedthat simulated exposures to themes 2,
4 and 6 would demonstrate the degree of saturation
achieved by Soviet media in giving heavy coverage to
particular aspects of the crisis. Lastly, we expected
the simulated pattern of theme 1 exposures to show the
impact of delayed Soviet coverage--i.e., suppression fol-
lowed by extensive propagation--and the importance of
incoming foreign radio transmissions as a supplement. and
corrective to Soviet domestic reportage during the Cuban
crisis.
Appendix B contains a brief description of each
theme in the content: analysis (as it was explained to the
coders) and the code sheets that were used for the various
--The correspondence between Bertrand Russell
and President Kennedy
--Reports of the U.S. boarding of a Soviet ship
Our choice of themes for the current. simulation was
guided not. only by available media material and the antici-
pated use of each theme as an index either of propagation
or suppression; the seven themes chosen encompass a large
and representative proportion of the media messages that
appeared during the ten-day period,
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media types content analyzed (Tables B.1-B.6).
The Reconstructed Pattern of
Theme Appearances
Soviet press coverage
Overview
In cases where news or incidents cannot be sup-
pressed entirely, Soviet authorities use delaying and
distorting tactics rather than outright press censorship.
This gives the official propaganda apparatus time to
prepare itself and the public for material that will
eventually have to be released. Soviet press coverage
of the Cuban missile crisis provides a clear example of
these tactics.l
President Kennedy's quarantine speech was de-
livered in the early morning hours of October 23d, Moscow
time.2 Soviet newspapers published no report of the
IFor a description of how the Soviet press
covered the Cuban missile crisis, as well as a summary of
Soviet. press coverage during the months preceding the
crisis (n. 2, pp. and ), we have relied on Buzek, How the
Communist Press Works, pp. 46-48 and 193-40; translated
excerpts from Pravcda and Izvestia in Current Digest. of the
Soviet Press, vol. XIV; a conversation with Mr. Leonid
Finkelst.ein, who, at, the time of the Cuban crisis, was the
editor of a popular Soviet. science magazine.
2 We have already pointed out., however, that the
real origins of the Cuban crisis can be located as far
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President's statement on the 23d, however, because it was
made after their stop-press. On Wednesday, October 24th,
Russian newspapers did publish in full a lengthy Soviet,
official version of Kennedy's speech and the Soviet
back as July of 1962. This contention is supported by
digests of the Soviet press for the earlier period.
Throughout July and August Soviet newspapers carried re-
ports of air and sea violations of Cuba's territorial
integrity, committed either by the United States or by
Cuban emigres. Beginning in August, and continuing into
September, Soviet; mass communications policy was geared
to reporting U.S.-sponsored provocations against Cuba,
presenting them as evidence of an impending invasion of
Cuba by the U.S. Toward the end of August Cuban emigre
students shelled Havana from a launch, an incident
which drew extensive Soviet press commentary. The blame
for emigre "provocations" was repeatedly placed upon the
United States. Raul Castro's visit to Moscow and the
signing of a Soviet-Cuban technical assistance pact for
the Cuban fishing industry were also widely reported in
the Soviet press. During September there were repeated
Soviet newspaper accounts of "war hysteria" in the United
States and reports of an anti-Cuban propaganda campaign
allegedly being conducted by Congress and the American
press. Soviet newspapers also protested what was de-
scribed as increasing U.S. economic pressure on Cuba,
claiming that a de facto economic blockade of the island
existed. Soviet papers charged that the U.S. was trying
to involve her NATO and OAS allies in the trade embargo.
An official Soviet government warning to the United
States issued on September 1lth also appeared in Soviet
newspapers, as did foreign reactions favoring Soviet
policy or denouncing the U.S.'s Cuban policy. In October,
before the President's quarantine speech, the Soviet press
was increasingly filled with reports of U.S. attempts to
pressure OAS members and her European allies into taking
a stand against Cuba. Also, there were continued reports
of United States violations of Cuban territorial integrity
and allegations of stepped up American plans for an in-
vasion of Cuba. Included in these reports were claims
that the U.S. was interfering with the transit rights of
Cuban-bound ships belonging to other countries as well as
stories about actions taken in Congress by the President to
bring American armed forces to a state of military pre-
paredness.
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Government's reaction to the "aggressive act" and "piracy"
of the United States. This story was carried on the front
page of most papers, generally under the factual headline
"The Statement of the Soviet Government." At the same
time, Communist propaganda efforts were being reflected
in the writing of Soviet journalists. For example, the
editorial article of Pravda on October 24th characterized
the American quarantine as the action of "cowardly beasts
of prey." It is interesting to note, however, that
neither editorial articles of this kind nor the Government
statement that was carried by Soviet newspapers on the 24th
informed readers of the American allegation that a new and
dangerous factor--Soviet missiles in Cuba--had created the
need for the quarantine. The most direct reference to
American charges about the existence of offensive missiles
in Cuba was contained in an article, carried on the second
page of most papers under the caption "In the Security
Council," that referred to U.N. Ambassador Zorin's denial
of "U.S. allegations."
It is a well-known fact, that slogans and headlines--
the classical form of Communist agitation--become even
more numerous in the Soviet, press at the time of important
international events. Pravda's issues during the Cuban
crisis are representative of other Soviet newspapers in
this respect. On October 24th the paper carried the
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following slogans at the top of the front page:
BRIDLE THE HIGH-HANDED AMERICAN AGGRESSORS!
HANDS OFF CUBA!
The leading article was headlined:
FRUSTRATE THE CRIMINAL INTENTIONS OF THE
ENEMIES OF PEACE!
At the bottom of the front page Pravda carried a
photograph, with an agitational caption, of a demonstra-
tion meeting in a Moscow factory.
Over pages 2 and 3 appeared the bold type slogans:
WE ARE WITH YOU, CUBAN BROTHERS!
STOP THIS DANGEROUS GAME WITH FIRE!
Another picture of a factory meeting appeared on the
second page, together with the slogan:
THE IMPERIALIST WARMONGERS WILL MEET
CRUSHING RESISTANCE
MESSRS IMPERIALISTS, DO NOT THRUST YOUR
HEADS INTO FIRE!
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Also on page two, above reports of protest meetings organ-
ized all over the Soviet Union, were printed slogans such
as the following:
THE IRE OF KOLKHOZ PEASANTRY
THE ANGRY VOICE OF MILLIONS, etc.
On Thursday, October 25th, Soviet newspapers still
made no mention of U.S. allegations that the Russians had
established offensive missile bases in Cuba. With regard
to crisis developments, most: papers simply printed more
detailed accounts of Security Council proceedings than
they had the day before. On the 25th, two slogans were
spread across the top of the entire front page of Pravda,
the first simply repeating the headline of the previous
day's leader:
FRUSTRATE THE CRIMINAL INTENTIONS OF THE
ENEMIES OF PEACE!
and the second:
DEFEND AND STRENGTHEN PEACE ON EARTH'
This issue of Pravda also carried the following slogans:
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IN THE INTEREST OF ALL NATIONS, IN THE NAME
OF GENERAL PEACE--REMOVE THE DANGER OF WAR!
ANGRY WORDS FROM THE SOVIET PEOPLE
THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ANGRILY DENOUNCE
AMERI CAN ADVENTURERS
HANDS OFF CUBA
WE WILL DEFEND PEACE ON EARTH
On the front page, above the headline "Angry Words
from the Soviet People," Pravda printed a photograph of
women attentively listening to the speaker at a factory
meeting.
Reproduced quite small on the last page of the
October 25th Pravda issue was a picture of demonstrators
outside the American embassy in Moscow.
On Friday, October 26th, Soviet newspapers made
their first: reference to Soviet missile bases in Cuba.
However, the missiles were described as defensive in
nature and were referred to only in stories about the
proposed trade of their removal for the dismantling of
U.S. missile bases in Turkey. "Leaders," i.e., headlines
in all Central Soviet papers mentioned the proposed
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Turkey-Cuba exchange. Slogans which appear, in retrospect,
to have been paving the way for the impending reversal of
Soviet policy appeared in Pravda:
DO EVERYTHING TO PREVENT WAR
REASON MUST TRIUMPH!
Angry agitational slogans were relegated to the fifth page
and severely toned down:
THE FATE OF THE WORLD IS IN THE HANDS OF HUMANITY
THE ROAD TO WAR!
BRIDLE THE AGGRESSORS!
On Saturday, October 27th, most Soviet. newspapers
adopted a much more strident tone. Heavy attention was
devoted to the U.S. naval quarantine, which was character-
ized as "a flagrant violation of international law" that
had moved the world to "the brink of war." The latter
emphasis created a mounting panic among large segments
of the Soviet population. (Interestingly enough, large
slogans and all mention of "American imperialists and
aggressors" had entirely disappeared from the front page
of Pravda by the 27th; only the foreign news headlines
in that paper still maintained a mild agitational tone.)
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On Sunday, October 28th, the tone of Soviet, news-
papers grew nearly hysterical. President, Kennedy was
portrayed either as a dark and evil personage or as having
been misled by the "hawks" around him. Russian papers car-
ried a report; that all Soviet officers on vacation had been
recalled to their commands, and this news raised tension
within the USSR to a new high. According to at least one
observer, there was now widespread fear among the Russian
1
population that war might break out at any moment. Also
on the 28th, Sunday morning editorials in Pravda, Sovietskaya
Rossia, Trud, and Krasnaya zvezda were replaced with the
text of two Khrushchev letters: one that had been sent to
President, Kennedy the day before proposing the simultaneous
abolition of missile bases in Cuba and Turkey, and another
that had been sent to U Thant on the 26th saying that
Soviet vessels had been instructed to keep away from the
"Tpiratic" blockade zone around Cuba.
By Monday, October 29th, everything had changed.
Virtually the only important Soviet, newspapers that pub-
lished editions on this day were Pravda and Nedelya.
Completely gone was the stridency which had been building
in the reportage of these and other Soviet newspapers
during the previous two days. Also absent, was any mention
ILeonid Finkelstein (see n. , p. ).
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of the Cuba-Turkey exchange that had been proposed and
widely publicized earlier. Both papers carried small
articles reporting that, to show Soviet "peaceloving
intentions," the Soviet Government had decided to with-
draw its missiles from Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge
not, to invade that island. The publication of this an-
nouncement marked the first, reference (albeit indirect)
in the Soviet press to the offensive capability of
Russian missile bases in Cuba. In a sense, it. signalled
a. complete turnabout of the Soviet Government's public
posture.
During the next, few days Soviet; newspapers were
filled with self-congratulatory articles praising the
Government for its statesmanlike behavior in taking what.
was repeatedly characterized as a unilateral step towards
peace.
We have been describing Soviet press coverage of
the Cuban crisis in terms of its shifting emphasis and
tonal variations. Much of Soviet newspaper reportage for
the period, however, does not lend itself to this kind of
analysis. For example, throughout the ten-day period the
Soviet, press carried reports of foreign reactions favor-
able to their side of the issue or in opposition to the
U.S.'s side. Also included in Soviet, newspaper coverage
were continuing accounts of (1) U Thant's efforts at
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intercession and conciliation, (2) meetings at which vari-
ous Soviet public organizations expressed solidarity with
the Cuban people, (3) crisis-related force mobilizations
undertaken by the Soviet Union and the United States,
and (4) incidents cited as examples of the U.S.'s under-
lying hostility towards Cuba.
Results of the content analysis
We have analyzed the content of seven all-Union
and six Republic-level Soviet, newspapers as well as two
Soviet magazines during the ten-day Cuban crisis period
covered by the simulation. Approximately 10,000 differ-
ent stories were coded--not only for each of the seven
themes listed above and described in Appendix B, but for
ten different article formats as well.l The coding of
themes was limited to fifteen of the thirty-two Soviet
print media in the simulation, for the following reasons:
(1) Copies of only nine of the thirteen all-Union print
media in the simulation were available for October of
1i962; (2) On the Republic level, only copies of Party-
Government editions were available for the October 1962
1The print titles used in the content analysis
are listed in Appendix B (Table B.9) and the article
formats coded for this content analysis are identified on
the sample press code sheet in Appendix B (Table B.1).
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period, and it was felt that a representative picture could
be obtained by content analyzing six of these; (3) No copies
of subRepublic print titles were available for October of
1962. Accordingly, from the thematic treatment of the
Cuban crisis in fifteen Soviet publications content analyzed,
we had to infer a likely pattern of theme appearances over
the other seventeen Soviet print media in the simulation.
The publication periodicities and assumptions used in
making these inferences are outlined in Appendix B.
Table .1 summarizes the message schedule obtained
by content analyzing all-Union and Republic-level Soviet
newspapers and spreading the resulting theme appearances
over all thirty-two Soviet print media conceptualized in
the simulation. It shows an estimated total of 4,416
occurrences of the seven themes in the thirty-two print
media. As we had hypothesized, two of the most prominent
themes were the ones entitled "Reports of Pro-Soviet or
Anti-U.S. Reactions" (theme 2) and "Allegations of U.S.
Hostility towards Cuba" (theme 4). It. is not surprising
to find over half the total messages related to these
themes. They represent the Russian side of the story and,
therefore, a version which we might expect to have received
1 For the print titles or types which each of
these thirty-two media encompass see Appendix B (Table B.9).
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greatly disproportionate emphasis in the Soviet press.
Another prominent theme was "the U.S. Naval Quarantine
of Cuba" (theme 1). The early appearance of this theme
in Soviet, press coverage of the Cuban crisis probably
reflects the Soviet authorities' undoubted awareness that
large segments of their population were learning about
the quarantine via short-wave radio transmissions from
the West. Considering the boldness of this American
maneuver, which came very close to being an act of war,
the heavy coverage it received in the Soviet press is
readily understood.
Each of the remaining four themes used in the
content analysis was covered relatively lightly by the
fifteen Soviet publications. Reflecting the characteristic
one-sidedness of Soviet crisis coverage are the compara-
tively few mentions of "Reports of Pro-U.S. or Anti-
Soviet Reactions" (theme 3). Virtually all mentions of
this theme (which occurred only about one-fifth as often
as "Reports of Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S. Reactions"
[theme 2]) appeared in the context of either a refutation
of the report's substance or a discreditation of its
source. "Soviet Agreement to Remove their Missiles from
Cuba" (theme 5) also did not receive heavy coverage.
One might. expect this to have been the case, however,
because the agreement. marked a dramatic and somewhat
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contradictory retreat by the Soviet Government from its initial
stand in the confrontation.
It is interesting to note that, contrary to our expectation,
the high level of threat perception which apparently existed within
the Soviet population (and probably also within the Government)
during this period is not reflected in a relatively large number of
press occurrences of the theme "U.S. Threats Directed Against the
Soviets" (theme 6). At least two explanations suggest themselves:
First, the coder may have failed to record, for this theme, messages
which implicitly carried the idea of a United States threat to
Soviet security. For example, discussions of the U.S. naval
quarantine or reports of its -enforcement, referring as they frequently
did to the possible boarding of Russian ships, may well have carried
with them the implicit suggestion of a threat to Soviet security.
(The coder did not make this assumption, however.) The Central
Committee officials who guide press coverage may have wished to
avoid such ultimately disturbing messages that would have changed
the perception of the crisis from one in Cuba to one reaching
the homeland.
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Finally, we note, as expected, the comparatively
small number of press occurrences of the theme "Soviet
Threats Directed Against the U.S." (theme 7) and the
virtual disappearance of this theme after the Soviets had
agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba. The relatively
infrequent press accounts of "Soviet threats directed
against; the U.S." reflects the facts that. (1) stories
referring to Soviet missiles in Cuba ( which were coded
for this theme) did not appear in Russian newspapers
until the fourth day of the crisis, and (2) except: for an
oblique reference in the announcement of their withdrawal,
stories about the offensive nature of these missiles
(which would, have been coded for this theme) were never
publi shed.
The results of the content. analysis demonstrate
not only the effects of selective propagation (themes 1,
2 and 4) and de-emphasis (themes 3, 5 and 7) in Soviet.
press coverage of the Cuban crisis, but also the manner
in which Soviet communications strategy was geared to the
ebb and flow of the crisis. This can be seen not only in
the gradual buildup and subsequent steady decline of total
theme occurrences over time, but also in the distribution
of each individual theme's occurrences over the days of
the crisis period. The appearance of theme 5 in the
Soviet press on the 29th signalled the denoument of the
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crisis. The Soviets had agreed to dismantle their Cuban missile
bases. From this day on--with the exception of "Reports of
Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S. Reactions" (theme 2), for which stories
about world admiration of the Soviet move were recorded)--the
daily number of occurrences of each theme gradually declined.
As the intensity of the crisis was diminishing, related aspects
of the Soviet newspaper campaign were gradually being phased
1
out.
Soviet radio and television coverage
Overview
The Russian authorities' use of delaying and distorting tac-
tics in reporting news of the Cuban missile crisis to the home
population was apparent not only in Soviet press coverage of the
crisis but in Soviet radio
1
In the content analysis of the Soviet press, the same person,
working closely with the author, coded all stories in every issue
of the fifteen publications. The coder participated in the
development and definition of the format categories that were used.
In any event, the content analysis appears to be sufficiently
accurate as input for the simulation when one considers the
assumpations we had to make in order to infer the overall pattern
of newspaper message appearances.
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reportage as well. 1
News of President Kennedy's speech, delivered at
2:00 a.m. Moscow Central Time on October 23d, did not;
appear in Soviet domestic media until some nine hours
later. Soviet radio, the first. domestic source, carried
For a description of Soviet radio reportage on
the Cuban missile crisis, as well as a review of Soviet
radio coverage during the months preceding the crisis
(n. 2, pp. ), we have relied on the F.B.I.S. Daily
Report, Nos. 207-14; Buzek, How the Communist Press Wor s,
pp. 46-48 and 139-40; the conversation with Finkelstein.
2 Nevertheless, monitoring reports on Soviet
domestic radio transmissions during the three months pre-
ceding Kennedy's dramatic announcement, together with the
digests of the Soviet press summarized above (n. 2,,
pp. and ), provide solid evidence that major ingredi-
ents of the crisis were present during this earlier
period. The August shelling of Havana by Cuban emigres
drew extensive commentary on the Soviet domestic service,
as had Raul Castro's July visit. to Moscow and the subse-
quent signing of a Soviet-Cuban technical assistance
pact. During September the Moscow home service continu-
ally carried accounts of alleged United States-backed
provocations of Cuba and warned that the U.S. was planning
an immanent invasion of Cuba. In September Soviet domestic
radio broadcasts also described foreign reactions and
demonstrations supporting Soviet policy towards Cuba or
denouncing U.S. actions in the Caribbean. Accounts of
anti-Cuban war hysteria in the United States and extensive
commentary on U.S economic sanctions against. Cuba were
widely broadcast by Moscow radio in September. The Moscow
domestic service also carried an account of the September
2d communique announcing Soviet. technical and arms
assistance for Cuba and broadcast. the official Soviet
Government warning to the U.S., issued on September 1lth.
Many references to allegedly nefarious objectives of the
OAS conference scheduled for October 2d also appeared in
Soviet. domestic radio broadcasts during September, as well
as numerous accusations that the United States was attempt-
ing to use the current U.N. session for selfish purposes.
The first; half of October saw a sharp increase in Soviet
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a brief and distorted TASS announcement which made no refer-
ence at all to the U.S. naval quarantine or the Soviet
domestic radio accounts of alleged "provocative" U.S.
activities in relation to Cuba. Frequently mentioned in
this regard were the OAS conference, the call-up of U.S.
reserves, and Congressional anti-Cuban speeches.
In the forty-eight hour period before President
Kennedy's speech, fears of an immanent U.S. invasion of
Cuba appear to have reached a peak in the Soviet Union.
The Moscow domestic service cited reports that an emergency
meeting of OAS members had been called in connection with
"new aggressive actions" against Cuba, adding that a
battalion of, U.S. marines had been dispatched to the
Guantanamo naval base. Moscow radio gave heavy attention
to the "continuous conferences of supreme military
leaders" in Washington, President Kennedy's sudden return
to Washington for talks with top officials, and U.S.
military maneuvers in the Caribbean. Moscow domestic
service commentator Druzhinin said the atmosphere in the
United States was "becoming hotter literally with every
hour." Moscow commentator Shakhov declared that
Washington had realized that the American propaganda
campaign against Cuba was not, frightening anyone, so it
had decided to resort. to military demonstrations and was
carrying out large-scale maneuvers in the Caribbean, in-
cluding landing operations, while provocations from the
American base at Guantanamo had become more frequent.
Shakhov went on to say that this campaign was only aimed
at, lulling the world public and serving as a smokescreen
for preparations to attack Cuba (italics are mine).
Another Radio Moscow commentator said that American
papers had been ordered to shout as much as possible about
U.S. military might and the nature of the Caribbean
maneuvers in order to intimidate the Cuban people, to
demonstrate U.S. determination, and to exacerbate the
international situation. Finally, an International Review
published in Pravda and reported by TASS said there was
'alarming news" t.hat Washington was "hatching a new ad-
venture" and. declared that, the aggressors [intended] to
bring international tension to red heat.," warning that
"he who plays with fire risks burning his fingers."
During the three-month period before President
Kennedy's quarantine speech, the general argument for
the Soviet position broadcast by the Moscow home service
emphasized the following key points: (1) Soviet arms
shipments to Cuba were for defensive purposes and there-
fore constituted no threat to the United States' security;
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missiles in Cuba. During the afternoon and evening of the 23d,
Soviet radio carried TASS reports that Marshal Grechko, Commander
in Chief of the Warsaw Pact forces, had ordered the implementation
of "several measures in increasing the military preparedness of
troops and navies which (were) members of the united armed forces,"
and that the Soviet Defense Ministry had been ordered to "hold
up the release of senior-age groups in the strategic rocket troops,
troops of antiaircraft defense, and personnel of the submarine
fleet until further notice, to cancel the leave of all personnel,
and to raise the battle readiness and vigilance of all troops."
However, none of these relatively brief reports made any mention of
the U.S. naval quarantine of Cuba or Soviet missile bases on the
(2) The Soviet Union had no need to station rockets beyond her
own borders; (3) The United States' real fear about the Cuban
revolution was that it might ignite similar Latin American movements;
(4) The United States' policy towards Cuba was part of a world-wide
strategy of tension manipulation; (5) Current U.S. intervention in
Russian affairs after the October 17th revolution; (6) United
States overseas bases and naval fleets, not Soviet defensive arms
in Cuba, were the real threat to world peace.
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island.
It, was left to a 2,500-word Soviet Government state-
ment, issued in the late-evening hours of October 23d and
carried by the Moscow home service at, 11:30 p.m. Moscow
Central Time, more than twenty-one hours after President
Kennedy's broadcast, t.o explain in full the nature of the
U.S. naval quarantine. But not even this statement men-
tioned the Soviet missiles and bases in Cuba. Character-
izing the quarantine as "an aggressive act [of] piracy,"
the Soviet Government statement warned the U.S. that "by
taking the measures announced by President Kennedy it,
i[was assuming] a grave responsibility for the destinies
of peace, and [was] recklessly playing with fire." The
Government statement went, on to declare that "if the
aggressors touched off a war, the Soviet Union would
strike a very powerful retaliatory blow" and that by in-
sisting "military equipment Cuba needs for self-defense
be removed from Cuban territory," the United States was
making a demand "which naturally no state which values
its independence [could] meet;." The statement concluded
with the veiled threat that the Soviet, Government. was
taking "all necessary measures for preventing [the]
country from being taken unawares and to enable it. to
offer a deserved reply to the aggressor."
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Other activities triggered by the U.S. naval
quarantine of Cuba, and reported by Moscow radio
either late in the evening of the 23d or early on the
morning of the 24th, included a meeting called by First
Deputy Premier Kuznetzov at which ambassadors of the
socialist countries were informed of the Soviet Govern-
ment statement, and a meeting of Kuznetzov with American
Ambassador Kohler who was handed the 2,500-word Soviet
,Government; "reply to the statement by U.S, President,
John Kennedy." At this time, Moscow radio also carried
TASS reportage of remarks to the U.N. Security Council
by Soviet Ambassador Zorin in which he asserted that
the question of Cuba being a threat to the United States
was "mythical" and a "clumsy attempt to cover up unpre-
cedented aggressive actions undertaken by the United
States against Cuba."
On October 24th Soviet radio broadcast a much
greater amount of material about the Cuban crisis than
it had the day before. Radio Moscow carried a TASS report
that the Soviet Foreign Ministry had returned the note
received from the U.S. Embassy "accompanying the list of
measures arbitrarily taken by the U.S. Government to
establish a sea blockade of Cuba." Another significant
piece of Soviet radio reportage on the 24th was a Pravda
editorial, reviewed by TASS, charging that U.S. actions
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concerning Cuba were a crude violation of elementary
standards of international law and all international
customs, and were incompatible with the principles of the
U.N. Charter. TASS reported the paper as having said
that, in taking this "latest gamble," U.S. ruling circles
were "acting like cowardly beasts" and were "lying and
dodging" because they knew that "peace-loving peoples
[would] brand them with ignominy." The TASS report
went on to say that Pravda had termed U.S. military ac-
tions "gross blackmail which might lead to disastrous
consequences for all mankind," and had asserted that "a
special responsibility [rested] with the United Nations
." to discharge its mission or it "[would] share the
destiny of the League of Nations and the universal con-
tempt, of the peoples."
On October 24th Radio Moscow also carried a
round-table discussion by Izvestia and Radio Moscow com-
mentators who charged that the U.S. Defense Department
had produced "some kind of faked photographs taken from
spy planes" to justify its "aggressive" acts. The com-
mentators said that it. was "difficult; to interpret other
than as an act of direct, aggression" the naval "blockade"
against, Cuba, and warned that the socialist, countries
'possessed impressive means for cooling down the ardor
of bellicose and zealous generals and admirals and all
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those who [were singing] their tune" in the United States.
Radio Moscow also reported a statement by TASS commentator
Orlov that the "'lying diversionist; fable" about the
supplying of Soviet "offensive weapons" to Cuba had de-
ceived no one, and Moscow's domestic commentator Shragin
declared that the "big lie" which in the United States
had been brought to the level of presidential statements
had but one aim: to cover or to justify "in any way" the
"far-reaching aggressive actions of the United States."
Finally on the 24th, the Moscow domestic service carried
a TASS report of proceedings in the U.N. Security Council
which said that the "fabrications" of the U.S. delegation
had also been adopted by British delegate Dean.
In none of the heavy Soviet radio reportage on
October 24th was there any direct mention of American
charges about the existence of offensive Soviet missiles
in Cuba. The allusion in the roundtable discussion men-
tioned above to "faked photographs" was the closest and
only reference to these allegations.
On October 25th the Moscow home service carried
a TASS review of an Izvestia article which asserted that,
"small Cuba [had] powerful friends" who had everything
necessary to make the imperialists "lose their taste for
poking their noses into the internal affairs" of
others. October 25t;h also saw the first mention in
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Soviet domestic media of U.S. allegations about offensive
Russian missiles in Cuba. Radio Msocow charged that the
United States had "dug up a pile of hysterical rubbish
and brought to light, falsehoods about Soviet offensive
rockets in Cuba." It went on to say that the USSR had
"sufficiently powerful rocket carriers for its nuclear
warheads and there [was] no need to seek sites for them
outside of the borders of [the] country." Radio Moscow
also stated that if the United States began "intercepting
and searching vessels bound for Cuba, it [would] be
tantamount to aggression," and declared that "retaliatory
measures [could not] but follow."
On October 25th the Moscow home service also
carried a TASS report of a Krasnaya zvezda article which
reviewed a speech given to an army conference by Soviet
Defense Minister Malinovsky in which he declared that the
"'high preparedness and invincible.might" of the Soviet
armed forces was considered to be the "antidote to the
strategy of imperialism which [was boiling] down to
preparations for preventive war." According to the TASS
report, Malinovsky had also declared that "at the first
signal, the entire might of [Soviet] armed forces [had to]
be immediately brought to bear against the enemy, his
military-strategic, economic, and political centers, and
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his main groupings of troops." The minister was also re-
ported to have said that Soviet "global rockets" had
"deleted from military strategy the notion of geographic
invulnerability," and to have pointed out that the Soviet
Union possessed nuclear weapons of small and large caliber
ranging up to 50-60 megatons and more.
Finally on the 25th, Khrushchev's reply to a
telegram from Bertrand Russell (appealing to him not to
be provoked by the "unjustified action" of the United
States against Cuba) was transmitted textually by TASS and
widely broadcast by Moscow radio. In his letter to
Russell, Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Government
would not take "any reckless decisions" and went on to
say that the question of war and peace was so vital that
"we should consider useful a top-level meeting to discuss
all the questions that have arisen, to do everything to
remove the danger of unleashing a thermonuclear war."
On October 26th the Cuban crisis was the dominant,
topic in Soviet. domestic radio transmissions, with
broadcasts highlighting reports of protest statements and
meetings at, home and abroad. The Moscow domestic service
carried reports on protest meetings that had taken place
in Berlin, New York, London, and other major cities. It
reported that the Chinese Peoples' Republic had issued a
statement supporting Cuba and that the Soviet U.N.
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Association had lodged a protest against the U.S. quarantine.
Also broadcast by the Moscow home service on the 26th were
several roundups of world reaction critical of U.S. policy,
along with a TASS report that heads of churches and reli-
gious organizations in the USSR had condemned the U.S. ac-
tions. A Pravda editorial, summarized by TASS and carried
textually on the Moscow domestic service, said a wave of
mass meetings had swept over the Soviet, Union "unanimously
supporting the Soviet statement, wrathfully condemning
t:he criminal actions of the U.S. aggressors," and conveying
messages of solidarity to the Cuban people. The editorial
went on to say that the USSR "resolutely condemned the
piratical actions of the U.S. ruling circles" and was
ready to do everything to prevent a military disaster.
Also broadcast by the Moscow domestic service on
October 26th was a TASS-reviewed Krasnaya zvezda editorial
which called for "vigilance and military preparedness."
The editorial declared that "unprecedented aggressive
actions" of the United States had caused the USSR to
take steps to increase the military preparedness of
Soviet armed forces, and this applied "above all to the
strategic rocket forces, which [were] the main striking
force of the Soviet Army." Another Pravda article re-
viewed by TASS and carried textually on the Moscow home
service said that after many months during which the
591
United States had tried to pose as a peacemaker, "the
sham [had] come to an end." The article went on to say
that nothing had so exposed "the real predatory nature"
of U.S. ruling circles as the "provocative hysteria they
[were] whipping up around Cuba," concluding that Washing-
ton had been driven in its provocative acts by an
"animal fear of the onward march of history."
Widely broadcast by Radio Moscow on October 26th
were an "urgent appeal" from U.N. Acting Secretary
General U Thant, proposing that arms shipments to Cuba
and the blockade be suspended for two or three weeks to
allow time for peaceful negotiations, and Khrushchev's
reply to this appeal, which he described as in accord
"with the interests of peace." Radio Moscow also carried
a Pravda editorial which said that "too much was at stake
as a result of the piratic actions of the American
military on the high seas" and stated that the USSR was
ready "to do everything to prevent the unleashing of
war." The Pravda editorial also said that the world
welcomed Soviet Premier Khrushchev's reply to Bertrand
Russell and his acceptance of U Thant's appeal as proof
of the "good will and love for peace of the great, Soviet
power," and was expecting that at "this crucial hour the
U.S. Government [would] heed the voice of reason and
weigh all consequences of its reckless policy."
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Washington had to realize that the situation, if "aggravated
to the extreme, [could] push the world into an abyss of war,"
the editorial stated. Radio Moscow asserted that it was
necessary for the United States, as well as the Soviet
Union, to "display the greatest wisdom and commonsense in
evaluating the current international situation."
On the 26th the Moscow home service also carried a
TASS report of the previous day's U.N. Security Council
debate. The report said that the "groundless position" of
Mr. Stevenson, who "again repeated the absurd claim "that
it had been necessary to establish the quarantine, had
been subjected to "devastating criticism by Soviet dele-
gate Zorin in a vivid speech replete with facts." The
TASS report went on to say that after Zorin had "strongly
denounced and exposed Stevenson's false interpretation of
Khrushchev's reply to Lord Russell," the U.S. Ambassador
"tried to assume the role of an accuser and to put ques-
tions to the Soviet representative which [could] only be
described as demogogic."
Other Moscow radio comment on the 26th was largely
concerned with denying President Kennedy's assertion that
the USSR had supplied offensive weapons to Cuba. Stating
that President Kennedy's position "could be understood
only if there really [were] a threat" to the United States
from Cuba, Moscow radio said the President's charge that,
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there were "offensive Soviet rockets" in Cuba was a "great
lie" because nobody could say "that he [had] seen these
Soviet weapons of attack in Cuba." A widely broadcast
Vavilov commentary said that the photographs purporting
to prove the existence of missile sites in Cuba could not
be considered proof, citing the opinion of British military
experts as reported by the Daily Mail. Moscow radio com-
mentator Leonov, in a widely broadcast talk, said President
Kennedy's assertion that the USSR had delivered offensive
missiles to Cuba was a "barefaced lie," invented to stun
the American people and the allies of the United States
and thereby justify Washington's aggressive policy. An-
other commentary carried on the home service, by one
Aleksayev, said mankind was "approaching the final border
of nuclear war." "This [would] be the result," he as-
serted, if the United States maintained its blockade and
carried out its threat to sink ships "which [did] not
obey the orders of the American pirates." At, the same time
several Moscow broadcasts reported that ships loaded with
"peaceful cargoes" were leaving Soviet ports for Cuba.
On October 27th Radio comment from Moscow--prior
to the release of Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy
proposing the Cuba-Turkey exchange--including a TASS-
reviewed Sovietskaya Rossia article by Borisov which
"[unmasked] the fakes fabricated by the Pentagon and
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claimed by the U.S Defense Department to be 'documents'
allegedly proving the presence of 'offensive' weapons in
Cuba." The author said one might laugh at the photographs
shown at a Pentagon press conference were it not that these
"fakes had been the cause of the most, unbridled war
hysteria." A Korinov article in Pravda, reviewed over
the Moscow home service, said that; the U.S. actions were
not, caused by "mythical offensive weapons allegedly in
Cuba" or election campaign maneuvering by the ruling
Democrats, but by economic recessions, unemployment, and
the threatened loss of leadership by the West.
The substance of Khrushchev's letter to President
Kennedy proposing the simultaneous abolition of missile
bases in Cuba and Turkey was broadcast for the first time
by the Moscow domestic service at 5:00 p.m. Moscow Central
Time on the 27th. For the remainder of the day this
letter was the leading topic in Soviet domestic radio
broadcasts. Khrushchev's message to U Thant saying that
Soviet vessels had been instructed to keep away from the
"piratic" blockade zone around Cuba was also widely dis-
tributed by the Moscow domestic service.
The text of Khrushchev's October 28th message to
President; Kennedy, stating that orders had been given to
Soviet, officers to dismantle missile bases in Cuba and
ship them back to the USSR under U.N. supervision, was
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first broadcast by the Moscow home service at 5:00 p.m.
Moscow Central Time on the 28th. Khrushchev's message to
U Thant and President Kennedy's statement welcoming the
Soviet Premier's "statesmanlike decision" were also
texted by TASS and the Moscow domestic service. Moscow
radio's main evening news bulletin on the 28th, largely
devoted to a roundup of foreign reaction, said that all
leading news agencies in other countries had interrupted
their regular transmissions to give summaries of Khrushchev's
message as the world listened with rapt attention.
On October 29th, and for several days thereafter,
material relating to the Cuban situation continued to re-
ceive priority treatment in Soviet domestic radio broad-
casts, although its volume was markedly reduced from the
level that had been maintained during the previous week.
Radio comment on the 29th and 30th generally hailed the
Soviet decision, stressing that it constituted a "victory
for reason and commonsense" and had aroused hope in all
parts of the world. A widely broadcast article by Moscow
commentator Viktorov emphasized that Khrushchev's deci-
sion to dismantle missile sites in Cuba had come as a re-
sult of Kennedy's declaration that there would be no
attack on the country by the United States or other
countries in the Western Hemisphere. A Druzhinin report
from New York for the Moscow domestic service said that
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people in America were sighing with relief over the develop-
ments after having existed in an atmosphere of "military
hysteria." Many Americans, he added, understood well that
it was only the restraint of the Soviet Union, which had
refused to let itself be provoked into military conflict,
that: had halted those who were contemplating military
adventure against Cuba. TASS also transmitted a New York
report by Pravda commentators Zhukov and Mayevskiy warning
that reactionary propaganda was continuing "its sinister
deeds." Fresh aggressive plans against Cuba were being
hatched behind "tightly closed doors of certain 'offices,'"
the authors said, stressing that there was still the
danger of new "complications" which could only be avoided
if U.S. statesmen demonstrated the same wisdom as the
Soviet Union had displayed, proceeding from "positions of
reason" and not from "positions of strength." Also on
the 30th, TASS reported without comment the news that. the
United States would lift its quarantine of Cuba during
U Thant's two-day visit there.
On October 31st the Moscow home service carried a
Tass-reviewed Pravda article which charged that "several
irresponsible persons" in the United States continued to
call for an invasion of Cuba and were seeking to prevent
a relaxation of tension in the area. Under these circum-
stances, the article said, "the strict fulfillment of the
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pledges assumed by the United States" to respect the
integrity of Cuba was "acquiring special importance." Radio
Moscow said that if such recent statements by persons in
"quite influential circles" in the United States formed
the "basis of U.S. policy, it. would sow the seeds of
further conflicts fraught with the most dangerous conse-
quences for peace in general." Also on October 31st, the
Moscow domestic service reviewed an Izvestia editorial
that had appeared under the heading "Reason Prevails,"
which declared that the course of events in the Cuban situ-
ation had demonstrated that the "farsighted and wise course"
of the Soviet Government had been the "only correct one" in
the situation which had developed. It. had led to the cre-
ation of conditions in which the interests of general
peace and the independence and integrity of the Cuban
republic would be insured, the editorial added, cautioning,
however, that "dark clouds still [hung] over the Caribbean
basin" and the "greatest vigilance" would be necessary to
foil any and all intrigues of the forces of aggression.
A Shragin commentary broadcast to the Soviet
people on the 31st remarked that some individuals belong-
ing to "quite influential circles" in the United States
were not pleased with the course of events. Shragin noted
that Senator Capehart was not concealing "his rage" over
the fact that the United States had pledged not to attack
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Cuba, adding that Capehart was being echoed by Senator
Goldwater, who called for a harsher policy toward Cuba.
Such provocative statements by no means facilitated the
implementation of the agreement. that; had been achieved,
Shragin concluded. The Moscow domestic service also
carried a TASS-reviewed Pravda article by Borovskiy, on
the 31st, which told of "malicious anti-Cuban concoctions"
spread by "several irresponsible persons" in the United
States who were continuing to instigate an invasion of
the island and were seeking to prevent a relaxation of
the tension they had created. The author went. on to say
that the Soviet people believed the U.S Government
would refrain from "shortsighted steps ' and would be able
to curb "irresponsible instigators." Another Moscow
domestic commentator asserted that while U Thant was in
Havana for talks, counterrevolutionary leader Miro
Cardona had issued a provocative statement saying that he
reserved "the right to use force against Castro."
Lastly, an Izvestia report transmitted by TASS on
October 31st delcared that the temporary lifting of the
blockade while U Thant was in Cuba had emphasized the
necessity of ending it once and for all.
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Results of the content analysis
We have content analyzed a sample of the material
transmitted over the Moscow domestic service during the
ten-day Cuban crisis period covered by the simulation.
Approximately fifty different, broadcasts were coded--not
only for each of the seven themes referred to above, but
for six different. times of day as well.l The coding of
themes was limited to broadcasts carried by the Moscow
domestic service and to only a small sample of the total
material broadcast by this source during the Cuban crisis,
because no record of other Soviet radio commentary was
available for the period. But the ten Soviet, radio media
in the simulation were conceptualized in such a way that
only four of them consisted strictly of the all-Union
Moscow home service broadcasts. Another four were made
up entirely of local broadcasts and the remaining two
combined local with all-Union broadcasts. This meant that,,
from the thematic treatment of the Cuban Crisis in the
fifty or so Moscow domestic service broadcasts content
analyzed, we had to infer a pattern of theme appearances
over all the broadcasts likely to have been carried during
1The times of day coded for the content analysis
of Soviet radio broadcasts, and for the content inference
of Soviet. television broadcasts, appear on sample code
sheets (Tables B.2 and B.3) in Appendix B.
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this period by the ten Soviet radio media in the simula-
tion. Moreover, there was no available record of Soviet
television broadcasts during the Cuban crisis period, so
we also had to use the results of the radio content analy-
sis to infer a pattern of theme appearances over all the
broadcasts likely to have been carried during this period
by the four television media in the simulation. The radio
and television broadcast schedules as well as the assump-
tions used in making these inferences are included in
Appendix B (Tables B.10, B.12, B.13, and B.14).
Tables 6.2 and 63 summarize the message schedules
obtained by content analyzing Moscow domestic service
broadcasts and spreading the resulting theme appearances
over all fourteen Soviet electronic media in the simulation.
They show estimated totals of 1,706 occurrences of the
seven themes in the ten radio media and 1,618 occurrences
of the seven themes in the four television media.l
Several features of the resulting radio and television
message schedules are worth noting. First, they bear a
close resemblance to the message schedule obtained (from
considerably better data) for the Soviet press (Table 6.1)
in regard to the total number-of occurrences of each theme
1For the portions of the day which each of these
fourteen media span see Appendix B (Tables B.12 and B.14).
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over the ten-day period. Although their rank ordering
differs between Soviet print and electronic media, in
each case "'the U.S. Naval Quarantine of Cuba" (theme 1),
"Reports of Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S. Reactions" (theme 2),
and "Soviet Allegations of U.S. Hostility Towards Cuba"
(theme 4) are the three themes that occur with the
greatest frequency. In each case, also, "Soviet Agree-
ment to Remove Their Missiles From Cuba" (theme 5) and
"U.S. Threats Directed Against the Soviets" (theme 6)
are the two themes that occur with the lowest, frequency,
and their rank-ordering in this respect is the same be-
tween print and electronic media. Lastly, each message
schedule shows "Reports of Pro-U.S. or Anti-Soviet
Reactions (theme 3) and "Soviet Threats Directed Against
the U.S." (theme 7) as the two themes receiving an inter-
mediate level of coverage, with their rank-ordering re-
versed between print and electronic media.
An overall similarity in theme emphasis between
the Soviet print and electronic message schedules synthe-
sized for the Cuban crisis simulation is especially sig-
nificant in. light of the facts that (1) very different
definitions of what constituted a unit message occurrence were em-
ployed for these two media types, (2) the two content
analyses were coded by different persons,l and (3) the
1 The author coded all broadcasts in the content
analysis of Soviet radio,
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electronic schedules were constructed from a much sparser data base
than the print schedule. The fact that a close correspondence in
theme emphasis across Soviet newspapers, radio, and television is
apparent in spite of these sources of error suggests the high degree
of uniformity and coordination that must have characterized
coverage of the Cuban crisis in these media.
A second interesting feature of the message schedules con-
structed for Soviet radio and television is the way they differ
from the schedule obtained for the Soviet press with regard to the
relative coverage given the three groups of themes discussed above.
Figure 6.1 below lists the total number of occurrences of each of
these groups of themes in the Soviet press, radio, and television
message schedules that were used as inputs for the Cuban crisis
simulation.
From this comparison it would appear that all three Soviet
media types gave about the same relative attention to the most and
least heavily covered groups of themes, but that Soviet electronic media
gave comparatively more attention thatn Soviet print media to the
605
Message Schedule
Soviet Soviet Soviet
Themes Coded Press Radio Television
1. The U.S. Naval Quarantine
of Cuba
2. Reports of Pro-Soviet or 3,794 1,312 1,252
Anti-U.S. Reactions (8 6%)a (77%) (78%)
4. Soviet Allegations of U.S.
Hostility towards Cuba
3. Reports of Pro-U.S. or
Anti-Soviet Reactions 456 316 302
7. Soviet Threats Directed (10%) (18%) (18%)
Against the U.S.
5. Soviet Agreement to Remove
Their Missiles from Cuba 166 78 64
6. U.S. Threats Directed (4%) (5%) (4%)
Against the Soviets
Total No. of theme
Occurrences 4,416 1,706 1,618
Fig. 6.1.--Occurrences of three groups of themes
in the Soviet press, radio, and television message schedules
that were input to the Cuban crisis simulation
group of themes receiving an intermediate level of coverage.
In other words, the results of the content analysis suggest
that relative to the other five themes "Reports of Pro-U.S.
or Anti-Soviet Reactions" (theme 3) and "Soviet Threats
Directed Against the.U.S." (theme 7) were somewhat more
likely to have occurred in Soviet radio and television
broadcasts than in the Soviet press during the Cuban
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missile crisis.'
Finally, we note that the distributions of theme
occurrences over crisis days in the message schedules
constructed for Soviet electronic media differ consider-
ably from the temporal distribution of theme occurrences
in the message schedule generated for the Soviet press.
Table 6.1 shows a gradual buildup of theme occurrences
to a peak around October 25th-26th followed by a gradual
decline thereafter. In contrast, however, theme occurrences
in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 exhibit a highly irregular pattern.
This difference may be due to the fact that the
radio monitoring reports we used to construct Soviet
electronic message schedules consisted only of a random
sample of the material actually transmitted by the Moscow
domestic service during the Cuban crisis period. 2 There
is, however, one important exception to the irregular
pattern of theme appearances in the message schedules ob-
tained for Soviet radio and television. No occurrences of
"Soviet Threats Directed Against the U.S." (theme 7) were
recorded on or after October 28th--the day the Soviets
lOf course, the sparseness of the radio material
we content analyzed makes this finding highly speculative.
It may reflect the impact of foreign radio in forcing
Soviet electronic media to compete for the domestic audi-
ence.
2 See Chap. 1, p. , n.
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agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba. On the other hand,
occurrences of this theme in the Soviet press did not begin to subside
until the following day, i.e., the 29th. This difference illustrates
one advantage continuous media (radio and television) have over
discontinuous media (newspapers and magazines) as instruments of
policy in Soviet domestic reportage of international crises: they
provide greater flexibility and responsiveness.
Foreign radio coverage
Overview
Former Soviet citizens frequently testify that within the
USSR the British Broadcasting Corporation is considered a more
reliable and accurate source of international news than other
foreign radio stations and enjoys greater popularity as a result.
BBC transmissions to the USSR during the Cuban crisis period
probably were quieter in tone and provided a somewhat more balanced
and rational assessment of events than Voice of America or Radio
Liberty broadcasts. Unfortunately, the British Broadcasting
Corporation does not retain records of their broadcast material
for any length of time,
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so we lack the source data with which to
document, the qualitative part of this assumption. But,
transcripts of VOA broadcasts supplied by the United
States Information Agency do enable us to describe this
station's Cuban crisis coverage.2
Beginning on October 23d at 4:30 a.m. Moscow
Central Time (only two and one-half hours after President
Kennedy's quarantine speech) and continuing for the next.
several days, virtually everyVoice of America broadcast
beamed to the USSR was devoted to news about the Cuban
missile crisis. Up to this period VOA had been broadcast-
ing six hours a day to the Soviet Union, but. on the first
day of the Cuban crisis the station added nine special
.half hour broadcasts to its regular schedule, and on
each succeeding day of the crisis,through November 1st, a
special half hour broadcast, was added to the normal VOA
programming.
1We did receive support for this assumption from
our conversation with Leonid Finkelstein.
2Transcripts of many of VOA's Russian-language
news broadcasts during the Cuban crisis period were not
locatable, but it seems safe to assume that they closely
resembled VOA's Georgian, Armenian, and Ukrainian broad-
casts during the period, copies of which were made avail-
able to us by the USIA.
3For the scheduling of these additional broad-
casts see Appendix B (Table B.15).
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On October 23d VOA broadcasts in Ukrainian in-
cluded a translation of President Kennedy's quarantine
speech, an announcement of times when the speech would be
rebroadcast, a news analysis entitled "U.S. Action on
Cuba Does Not Change Berlin Commitment," a report, on re-
actions to the President's speech in Havana, London, the
Netherlands and Argentina, accounts of the personal re-
actions of Mateos, Mora, Holyoake, Menzies and Brandt, a
report. on Diefenbaker's call for an impartial inspection
of Cuba, a translation of the"Official Statement of the
Soviet. Government," a description of concurrent measures
being taken. by N.A.T.O., and an account of ongoing U.S.
quarantine efforts. In addition to carrying the text of
President Kennedy's Quarantine speech, VOA broadcasts in
Georgian on the 23d also included a discussion of the
Cuban missile sites, reports of reaction to the President's
speech in London and Bonn, accounts of the personal reac-
Lions of former President Truman as well as Republican and
Democratic Party leaders, and the news analysis referred
to above. VOA Armenian broadcasts on the 23d included a
translation of President, Kennedy's speech and a special
news roundup of Cuban crisis developments.
Russian-language broadcasts carried by VOA on
October 23d included a translation of President Kennedy's
address, a summary of White House activity and other U.S.
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actions in connection with the quarantine, a roundup of
world reaction to President Kennedy's decision on Cuba, a
report on the convocation of the U.N. Security Council,
a translation of Secretary Rusk's statement to the O.A.S.
Council, a news analysis of the U.S.'s Berlin commitment
(referred to above), a report on continuing N.A.T.O meet-
:ings, a discussion of Soviet-controlled Cuban missile
sites, a late-evening report on U.N. proceedings, an
announcement of West German support for the American
quarantine action, and a news analysis entitled "The
Cuban Quarantine: President Kennedy's Speech."
On October 24th VOA Georgian broadcasts included
a translation of President Kennedy's quarantine proclama-
tion, a report on the extension of U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps duty, an account of the U.N. Security Council
session--including Ambassador Stevenson's call for the
withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba and Soviet
Ambassador Zorin's statement in reply, a report on OAS
approval of the quarantine proclamation, an American
resolution on Cuba, reports on Argentinian, Colombian,
Netherlands, and West German endorsement of the quarantine,
an account of Soviet cancellation of armed forces leaves
and Cuban war mobilization moves, textual excerpts from
President Kennedy's speech, and a review of U.S. press
comment regarding President Kennedy's action on Cuba.
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In addition to news of the quarantine proclamation,
U.N. and OAS proceedings, Western allied support for U.S.
actions, and U.S press comment on Cuba, VOA's American
broadcasts on the 24th included an account of President
Kennedy's meeting with Congressional leaders, Eisenhower's
call for domestic support of the President, a review of
the information on Cuban missiles that had been released
by the Pentagon, and a rebroadcast of the news analysis
concerned with the U.S.'s Berlin commitment.
VOA Ukrainian broadcasts on October 24th included,
in addition to most of the reports mentioned above, an
account of U.S, activities in connection with enforcement
of the quarantine and an allegation that no Cubans were
allowed on Soviet rocket sites in Cuba.
VOA's Georgia, Armenian, Ukrainian and Russian
broadcasts on October 25th each consisted of a repeat
broadcast of President Kennedy's quarantine speech and a
comprehensive roundup of crisis developments. The latter
included Defense Department reports of some Soviet Cuban-
bound ships having altered course while others were still
proceeding toward the island, a review of the latest re-
actions in London, the Vatican, and Canada, an account of
Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky's speech (which had
appeared in Krasnaya zvezda) describing the battle readi-
ness of Soviet Armed Forces as well as their
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intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, a report
on Bertrand Russel's correspondence with Kennedy and
Khrushchev and the latter's reply, a discussion of Defense
Department allegations regarding the Soviet force configura-
tion in Cuba, U Thant's first appeal to the U.S. and USSR
for joint conciliatory action, an account of the day's U.N.
proceedings, a report on the Washington announcement that
American Republics were offering the U.S. military help in
the quarantine enforcement, the announcement that an Ameri-
can naval vessel had intercepted a Soviet tanker bound for
Cuba but had allowed it to proceed after discovering that
it was carrying only petroleum, and a review of the domestic
political and popular support for President Kennedy's
Cuban policy.
On October 26th the VOA's Georgian broadcasts in-
cluded a report on U.N. Proceedings which covered
Stevenson's presentation of photographic evidence and his
verbal exchange with Zorin, a translation of a White House
statement on the gravity of the world situation and the
search of a Soviet tanker, a translation of the TASS-
reported Soviet Government. statement on the quarantine,
Mayor Brandt's comments on the U.S. pledge to maintain
its Berlin commitment, a review of U.S. press comment on
Kremlin reaction to the quarantine, and a political analy-
sis entitled "U.S. Political Solidarity on Cuba."
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Armenian broadcasts carried by VOA on the 26th
included a report that U Thant was holding private talks
on Cuba, an account of U.N. proceedings, the White House
statement referred to above, Mayor Brandt's statement, an
offer of help from Prime Minister MacMillan, a news analy-
sis entitled "Cuba and the Lesson of History," and a
roundup of world press commentary on Cuba.
VOA's Ukranian broadcasts on the 26th included a
report that, the U.S Navy had intercepted a Libyan
freighter under Soviet Charter, the announcement of
Khrushchev's pledge to keep Cuban-bound ships out of the
quarantine zone, a report that the U.S. and USSR had ac-
cepted U Thant's call for discussions, a rebroadcast of
Jose Mora's statement on Cuba, and most of the news re-
ports that were carried in the Georgian and Armenian
broadcasts.
On October 27th Georgian VOA broadcasts included
translations of Khrushchev's and Kennedy's replies to
U Thant's second appeal, Press Secretary Salinger's
statement that Cuban missile sites were still under rapid
construction, the State Department reiterationof Presi-
dent Kennedy's warning, Kennedy's reply to Bertrand
Russell, a report on the Moscow demonstration outside the
U.S. embassy, reactions to the Cuban crisis by Jose Mora
and Konrad Adenauer, an account of the searching and
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passing of a Lebanese freighter, a report on U.N. pro-
ceedings, a news analysis entitled "No Soviet Answer to
a Simple Question," and a political analysis entitled
"The Atmosphere in Washington."
In addition to many of the report's carried in
Georgian broadcasts, the VOA's Armenian broadcasts in-
cluded statements of support for the U.S. stand from Japan
as well as Asian, Latin American and European countries,
the text of Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy offering to
remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for the
dismantling of U.S. bases in Turkey (first broadcast at
117:30 Moscow Central Time on the 27th), Press Secretary
Salinger's remarks on Khrushchev's letter, and a news
analysis entitled "Cuba--the First Stage of a Major
Showdown."
In addition to most of the Georgian and Armenian
broadcasts VOA material transmitted to the Ukraine on the
27th included an analysis of Khrushchev's proposed Cuba-
Turkey exchange which was characterized as a Moscow ad-
mission that there were "offensive weapons in Cuba,"
an announcement that the U.S. would continue the quarantine
while attempting to avoid direct confrontations, and a
rebroadcast of the preceding day's political analysis:
"U.S. Political Solidarity on Cuba."
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On October 28th VOA's Georgian broadcasts in-
cluded Kennedy's letter to Khruschev in which the pro-
posed Cuba-Turkey exchange was rejected as unacceptable,
a report that a U.S. reconnaissance plane was missing over
Cuba, an announcement of the U.S., reserve call-up, a report
on Defense Secretary McNamara's ordering of twenty-four
troop carrier squadrons of the air force reserve into
active duty, the text of Khrushchev's announcement that
he had given orders to dismantle Cuban missile sites under
U.N. supervision (first broadcast at 5:30 Moscow Central
Time on the 28th), a report that Castro had invited U Thant
to Cuba to discuss implementation of the arms removal,
and a guest analysis entitled Weapons in Place: The Real
Point."
In addition to the Georgian broadcasts referred
to above, VOA's Armenian and Ukrainian broadcasts on the
28th also included an account. of Venezuelan mobilization
activity, and the Ukrainian broadcasts carried an earlier
White House statement, that. work on Soviet missile sites in
Cuba was still proceeding, a translation of President
Kennedy's second letter to U Thant, a report on the St.ate
Department's system of clearances for ships in the quar-
antine area, rebroadcasts of the two news analyses: "No
Soviet, Answer to a Simple Question" and "U.S. Political
Solidarity in Cuba," and the text of President. Kennedy's
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letter to Bertrand Russell.
On October 29th VOA's Georgian broadcasts carried
the text of President, Kennedy's reply to Khrushchev's
letter announcing the dismantling of Soviet missile
bases in Cuba, a report on U Thant's planned trip to Cuba,
a State Department announcement that the U.S. would not
accede to Castro's demand to give up the Guantanamo naval
base, a report that Secretary of State Rusk had briefed
Latin American Ambassadors on the latest crisis develop-
ments, and the text of a Defense Department allegation
that work on the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in
Cuba had not yet begun. In addition to this material
VOA's Armenian broadcasts also carried the text of Prime
Minister Mac Millan's message to Khrushchev congratulating
the Soviet Premier on his statesmanlike action, a news
analysis entitled "The President's Response to Khrushchev's
statement," a review of commentary in the New York Times,
the New York Herald Tribune, the Washington Post, and the
Philadelphia Enquirer entitled "On Latest Developments in
the Cuban Crisis," and a report that U Thant had arranged
for a second round of conferences with U.S. and Soviet
representatives before proceeding on his trip to Havana.
In addition to most, of the material carried by VOA's
Georgian and Armenian broadcasts on the 29th, Ukrainian
broadcasts carried a report on Ambassador Stevenson's
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first; conference with U Thant, a rebroadcast of news
about Venezuelan mobilization activity, a rebroadcast of
the political analysis: "The Cuban Crisis Reviewed," and
the text of a State Department allegation that the sabo-
tage in Venezuela had been ordered by Castro.
On October 29th VOA's Georgian and Armenian broad-
casts carried a report that. President Kennedy had sus-
pended the quarantine for the two days during which U Thant
was to be in Cuba and had named a three-man committee to
assist, Ambassador Stevenson in the U.N. negotiations, a
report on U Thant's departure for Cuba, the news that
Swedish officers had been chosen for the U.N. observer
team which would verify the missile withdrawal, a rebroad-
cast, of the State Department's announcement on Guantanamo
and its allegation of Castro-sponsored sabotage and sub-
version in Latin America, the text of a speech by former
President Eisenhower warning that the U.S. should not
relax its vigilance in spite of an apparent Soviet re-
treat, and a diplomatic correspondent's report noting
that while Washington welcomed the Moscow move many prob-
lems still remained. In addition to this material Georgian
broadcasts carried a report that. President Kennedy would
hold a news conference the following day,a report, on
Washington preparations for an Adenauer visit, and a
review of the latest editorial comment on the Cuban crisis
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in the U.S. press. Armenian broadcasts also included a
news analysis entitled "Why Washington Takes the Cautious
View. 
On October 30th VOA's Ukrainian broadcasts car-
ried, in addition to much of the material transmitted in
the Georgian and Armenian broadcasts, a statement by
Defense Undersecretary Sylvester that no new Soviet ships
were presently approaching the quarantine zone, a review
of Washington reaction to Khrushchev's move on Cuba, a
report on continuing Defense Department surveillance over
Cuba, news of U Thant's meeting with Kusnetzov, Stevenson,
Mc Cloy and Garcia, a report of the President's having
met twice with the National Security Council, a cor-
respondent's report entitled "The President Lifts the
Quarantine," news of U Thant's arrival in Havana, an
account of a VOA interview with U.S Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin Martin, in which Martin
claimed that the Castro regime would risk losing Soviet
economic support if it hindered U.N. verification of the
missile base removal, a roundup of world leaders' reac-
tions to the Soviet missile withdrawal agreement, an
analysis of the significance of Soviet acceptance of
international inspection in Cuba, and a news analysis
entitled "Cuba Continues a Regional Problem."
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On October 31st VOA's Georgian, Armenian and
Ukrainian broadcasts carried accounts of U Thant's meet-
ings with Castro, further reports of the U.S. suspension
of the quarantine at U Thant's request, a report that
American air surveillance of Cuba would be suspended for
the duration of Thant's stay in Cuba, and a news analysis
entitled "The Unfinished Tasks." In addition to this
material VOA's Georgian transmissions carried a rebroad-
cast of the interview with Assistant Secretary Martin.
Armenian broadcasts also included a speech by Harold
Mac Millan in which the Prime Minister praised allied
governments for their firm attitude during the crisis,
and a correspondent's report on President: Kennedy's lift-
ing of the quarantine. Ukrainian broadcasts also in-
cluded this speech as well as a roundup of U.S. press
commentary entitled "U.S Press Takes a Longer View at
the Cuban Developments." Ukrainian broadcasts also
carried late-evening/early-morning (Moscow time) reports
that U Thant and all his aides were returning to New
York from Cuba, that Mikoyan was to visit Cuba, a speech
by Lord Hume praising President Kennedy and attacking
Soviet deception, and lastly a report that DeGaulle had
been kept up to date on Cuban crisis developments by U.S.
officials.
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Results of the content analysis
We have content analyzed transcripts of the material
broadcast by Voice of America and Radio Liberty during the
ten-day Cuban crisis period covered by the simulation. Also,
as a surrogate for British Broadcasting Corporation broad-
casts, we have content analyzed issues of the London Times
published during this period. Approximately 1,100 foreign
radio broadcasts and 1,000 newspaper articles were coded
for each of the seven themes referred to above. VOA and
Radio Liberty broadcasts were also coded for the hour of
day during which they occurred. From the thematic treatment
of the Cuban crisis in the material content analyzed we in-
ferred a pattern of theme appearances over all the broad-
casts beamed to the Soviet Union by VOA, Radio Liberty,
and the BBC during this period. The broadcast schedules
and assumptions used in making these inferences are included
in Appendix B (Tables B.15, B.17, B.18, B.19, B.20 and B.22).
Tables 6.4- 6,6 summarize the message schedules ob-
tained by spreading theme appearances in the content
analyzed material over all nine foreign radio media in the
simulation. For the seven themes they show estimated totals
of 994 theme occurrences in three Voice of America media,
392 theme occurrences in three British Broadcasting
Corporation media, and 5,175 theme occurrences in three
Radio Liberty media.l These differences in total
1For the portions of the day which each of these
nine media span see Appendix B (Tables B17, B.19, and B.22).
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coverage reflect the fact that, in 1962, VOA's Russian
broadcasts totalled six and one-half hours a day while the
BBC's daily Soviet broadcasts lasted only about half this
long and Radio Liberty was transmitting material to the
USSR around the clock. As one might expect, the three
foreign radio message schedules emphasize, for the most
part, the American events and play down the Soviet side
of the quarantine story. In each schedule "The U.S. Naval
Quarantine of Cuba" (theme 1), "Reports of Pro-U.S. or
Anti-Soviet Reactions" (theme 3), and "Soviet Threats
Directed Against the U.S." (theme 7) rank as the three
most frequently occurring themes, while "Soviet Allegations
of U.S. Hostility towards Cuba" (theme 4) is the theme that
occurs with the lowest frequency in each case.
Differences across the three message schedules
obtained for foreign radio are perhaps more worthy of note.
Theme 5, "Soviet Agreement to Remove Their Missiles from
Cuba," occurs with a lower relative frequency in the BBC
message schedule that it does in the VOA and BBC schedules,
and theme 2, "Reports of Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S. Reactions,"
occurs with a greater relative frequency in the BBC message
schedule than in either of the other two schedules. These
differences conform to the assumption of a somewhat
more balanced treatment of the crisis by the British
Broadcasting Corporation than by either of the other two
625
stations. "Reports of Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S. Reactions"
(theme 2) constitute over ten per cent of the total theme
occurrences in the message schedule obtained for Radio
Liberty but only about. five per cent of the total theme
occurrences in VOA's schedule. Also, there were no oc-
currences of theme 4, "Soviet Allegations of U.S. Hostil-
ity Towards Cuba," in the message schedule obtained for
VOA, whereas this theme constitutes about five per cent
of the messages in the Radio Liberty schedule. Lastly,
"Soviet Threats Directed Against the U.S." (theme 7)
appeared in about twenty-five per cent of the total mes-
sages in the VOA schedule but only in about fifteen per
cent of the total messages in the Radio Liberty schedule.
While these differences are modest they do suggest that,
at. least during the Cuban crisis period, VOA's broadcasts
were more one-sidedly pro-American than Radio Liberty's,
a finding which runs counter to the generally assumed
pattern.
1 Our content comparisons across the three major
foreign radio stations have to be regarded as highly specu-
lative for the following reasons: (1) the content of BBC
broadcasts had to be inferred from London Times issues;
(2) Coding reliability and validity were probably somewhat
lower in the content analyses done for foreign radio than
in the content analyses done for the .-Soviet media in the
simulation. The author coded VOA transcripts, but the
Radio Liberty microfilmed newsscripts were translated and
coded by a German-reading research assistant and the
London Times issues were coded by a second research as-
sistant. Due to the pressures of the research schedule,
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It is interesting also to compare the message
schedules obtained for foreign radio with those obtained
for Soviet print and electronic media. To facilitate
this comparison we have divided the seven themes into four
groups: a group representing the Soviet side of the
issue (themes 2 and 4); a group representing the American
version of events (themes 3, 7, and 5); the quarantine
theme (theme 1), because it received relatively heavy
coverage in. the Soviet domestic and foreign radio media;
'"U.S. threats directed against the Soviets" (theme 6), be-
cause this theme received relatively light coverage in
Soviet media and foreign radio transmissions. Figure 6.2
compares the total number of occurrences of each of these
themes or groups of themes in the message schedules ob-
tained for Soviet media and foreign radio. It, can be seen
that well over half the theme occurrences in the Soviet
message schedules (57%) are related to the Russian side
of the quarantine story while only sixteen per cent pertain
t.o the Western version of events. Foreign radio message
schedules, on the other hand, show exactly the opposite
pattern, with over half their theme occurrences (53%)
related to the American side of the quarantine story and
it was not possible to give these two assistants the ex-
tensive training that had been given the assistant who
content, analyzed Soviet newspapers.
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only fifteen per cent reflecting the Russian version.
Figure 6.2 also provides further evidence of two patterns
remarked on above: relatively more coverage of the
American side of the issue in Soviet electronic media than
in Soviet print media; relatively more attention to the
Russian point of view in the BBC message schedule than in
that of Radio Liberty, and more attention to the Russian
side in the Radio Liberty message schedule than in that
of VOA. Finally, it is interesting to note that the
comparatively greater one-sidedness of the press among the
Soviet media and of VOA among foreign radio is further sug-
gested by the greater relative emphasis which each of these
media types gives to the details of the quarantine and, in
the case of VOA, to anti-Soviet threats made by the United
States.
The message schedule
Table 6.7 shows the message schedule used for
the Cuban crisis simulation. It simply combines the
schedules obtained for the Soviet press, radio, and tele-
vision, and for Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and the
British Broadcasting Corporation. To sum up, the content
analyses from which these schedules were derived covered a
sample of the material that appeared during the Cuban

TABLE 6.7--Continued
the reduced scenario values.
e
We have assumed that members of the Soviet population
who would have attended oral agitation meetings ttended, on
the average, one such meeting during the ten-day period encompassed
by the Cuban crisis simulation (see Chapter I, p. , n. and,
also, Rogers "The Soviet Audience", p. 186, for evidence bearing
on this point). We have also assumed that the bulk of Soviet
oral agitation meetings during the Cuban crisis period occurred
on the 27th, the day on which tension in the
USSR is reported to have reached a peak, and we have arbitrarily
set the thematic content of these meetings equal to the thematic
content of Pravda on the 27th. As a result, the estimated total
number of occurrences for each of themes 1, 2, and 4 includes,
respectively, 8, 20, and 7 oral agitation occurrences. (Each
oral agitation message was arbitrarily assigned the format factor
that had been assigned to short news items appearing in Pravda,
the latter being the most common format for newspaper stories.)
f
The simulation allows a maximum of 1,800 occurrences of
any single theme in a scenario. For this reason 3,989 of the
estimated 14,336 occurrences of the seven themes had to be
omitted in constructing the message schedule for the scenario.
For each theme the zeroes in parentheses indicate time periods
for which the simulation could not accept messages as a result
of this constraint. Even though the omission of messages was
not distributed evenly across individual themes, it did not affect
the validity of the simulation results, for the following
reasons: No messages had to be omitted during the first four
time periods; The simulation results indicate that by the end
of this interval the population had been saturated with exposure
to each of the themes in question; Our analysis of the simulation
results for each theme is confined to the pre-saturation period.
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crisis period in twenty-eight of the fifty-six media con-
ceptualized in the simulation. Approximately 12,200 dif-
ferent articles and broadcasts were coded in all (includ-
ing the broadcasts duplicated for the television content
inference) resulting in a total of 3,103 occurrences of
the seven themes in the twenty-eight media. Combining
the content analyses with print periodicities and broad-
cast schedules we inferred an additional 11,233 occurrences
of the seven themes in these and the other twenty-eight
simulated media, resulting in an estimated total of
14,336 occurrences of the seven themes in the fifty-six
simulated media over the ten-day Cuban crisis period.
Changes in Soviet Habits of Media Use And
Message Response Triggered by the Crisis
From our discussion in Chapter III the reader will
recall that in simulating a computer population's exposure
to the messages in a given media system there is an im-
portant option which the researcher can exercise: In order
to account for changing levels of interest in themes over
the period encompassed by a simulation, the researcher can
superimpose dynamic potentialities on the computer popula-
tion's stable habits of media use and message response.
For this purpose he is allowed to specify one or more
patterns of change in individual exposure probabilities--as
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a function either of previous theme exposure or the pas-
sage of time. Each such modification must be identified
by (1) its direction and magnitude, (2) the types of
media for which it applies, (3) the subset of popula-
tion types or cells over which it acts, and (4) the
types of probabilities to which it applies. We now
proceed to describe how dynamics of this kind were
specified for the Soviet, media system in the Cuban crisis
simulation.
We chose to account for the Soviet population's
changing level of interest in themes about. the Cuban
missile crisis by modifying individual exposure probabil-
ities-as a function of time, i.e., as a function of the
stage of the scenario, rather than on the basis of indi-
vidual exposure histories. This choice was dictated more
by convenience than anything else. The only data we had
on changes in Soviet media-consumption and message-
response behavior during the Cuban crisis period were
qualitative in nature and were organized in terms of
various stages of the crisis. From Buzek's treatment of
Soviet, press coverage and our interview with Finkelstein
we were able to piece together the following picture:
The lite strata of Soviet, society--i.e., the better-
educated and the more politically involved--appear to
have been aware of the seriousness of the crisis and to
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have become active information-seekers from the very first
day. Among the broad masses of the population, however,
interest probably did not rise sharply until four days
after Kennedy's speech (October 26th), when the Govern-
ment's widely publicized "brink of war" reaction to
boardings of Soviet ships apparently triggered widespread
panic within the USSR. This crisis atmosphere persisted
and perhaps even intensified somewhat on the 27th. On
October 28th, however, the Russian people learned of
their Government's agreement to dismantle the Cuban
missile bases. From this point. on, interest in crisis
themes seems to have subsided among all strata of the pop-
ulation, and patterns of media consumption and theme re-
sponse appear to have returned to normal fairly rapidly
as the intensity of the crisis receded.
There seem to have been two different levels of
awareness within the USSR during the Cuban crisis. The
poorer-educated less politically involved segments of the
Soviet population apparently exhibited a more diffuse type
of interest, their concern and arousal focusing mainly on
the prospect of war, while the better-educated and po-
litically sophisticated probably were more aware of and
interested in the details and complexities of the actual
confron ta tion.
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To reflect the foregoing dynamics in the Cuban
crisis scenario we specified the probability modifica-
tions described in Figure 6.3. 1
In the present version of the simulation all
probability changes which are specified as a function of
time period must occur with the same time phasing. This
constraint prevented us from initiating "modification #1"
on October 23d, although we would have preferred it to
begin on this date to reflect the fact that the crisis
triggered the interest of the better-educated portion of
the population almost immediately. It is worth noting,
however, that the inaccuracy produced by "pulsing" the
probabilities of all population types at the same
stage of the scenario probably was rather small. The
better-educated segments of the Soviet population were
media-saturated to begin with, so any crisis-generated
increments in their normal exposure probabilities could
1Recalling our discussions of probability modifi-
cations in Chapter III, the reader will note that by spe-
cifying October 25th as the day on which each probability
increase started and October 27th as the day on which it
reached its full extent, we insured that, there would be
no probability increments on the 25th and only half of the
full increments would take affect on the 26th. Similarly,
by specifying October 27th as the day on which each prob-
ability increase began to recede and November 1st as the
day on which it. no longer existed, we insured that the
probability increments would have their full effects on the
27th and diminish in five equal steps each day thereafter
until, on November 1st, they would no longer have any effect.
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Time phasing of all probability modifications
Modification Starts to Take Effect:
Modification has Its Full Effect:
Modification Starts to Recede:
Modification No Longer Has
Any Effect:
Modification #1
October 25th (T=3)
October 27th (T=5)
October 27th (T=5)
November 1st (T=10)
Modification #2
Direction and
Magnitude:
INormal p I .0 1 0. I
I New p I U. I U.b 
I Normal p I 0.0 1 0. 
I New P I U.z I U.b I
Types of Media
Affected:
Newspapers Television
Radio Foreign Radio
Oral Agitation
Radio Foreign Radio
Oral Agitation
Types of Persons Those with >10 yrs. ed.
Affected: Those with 7,_10 yrs.
ed.
Types of Probabilities
Affected: Message Exposure
Those with 4,<7 yrs. ed.
Those with <4 yrs. ed.
Message Exposure
Fig. 6.3--.Changes in Soviet message exposure prob-
abilities hypothesized for the Cuban crisis simulation
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only amount to relatively small percentages of these base prob- 636
abilities. (We discussed this "ceiling effect" phenomenon in
Chapter III, pp. - .)1 As for the magnitude of change in
individual media exposure probabilities, both modifications specify,
somewhat arbitrarily, that persons who normally had a 50-50 chance
of being exposed to a particular type of message in a given type of
medium were twenty per cent more likely to have been exposed to such
messages at the high point of their interest in the crisis, and that
persons who would not normally have noticed a particular type of
message in a given type medium were likely to have noticed one out
of every five such messages at the peak of their interest in the crisis.2
The reader will recall from our discussion of probability
modifications in Chapter III that the simulation
'We applied probability modifications to population types defined
in terms of education alone because (1) this variable has the strongest
correlation with differences in media-use behavior in the USSR, and
(2) our qualitative data on changing levels of interest during the
crisis are not sufficiently detailed to suggest comparative
hypotheses about cross-classified Soviet population types.
2
The magnitudes of the increases in 0.0 and 0.5 probabilities
which we specified are purely experimental. Comcom data provide
some information on how Soviet citizens increase their information-
seeking in gernral, and their media consumption in particular, during
crisis situations. The relevant questions are phrased as follows:
Now...I want to...consider two crisis periods while you were
still in the Soviet Union. I'd like to see what you did
differently at that time.
Did you read any more newspapers? (Yes, No)
If yes: Which ones?
Did you use the radio any more or frequently?
How?
Did you seek other sources of information?
If yes: What sources?
While the answers to these questions are interesting in their
own right, it is not readily apparent how they can be used to estimate
the kinds or probability increments required by the simulation.
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uses information about what happens to 0.0 and 0.5 prob-
abilities to compute increases in all other probability
values in such a way as to reproduce a ceiling effect.
While the percentage magnitude of the change we speci-
fied in lower-valued probabilities may appear rather
large, it should be noted that we applied these modifi-
cations to message exposure probabilities. Each message
exposure probability is the product of (1) an individual's
probability of being exposed to a given medium and (2) the
individual's probability of being exposed to a particular
theme appearing in that medium in a particular message
format given that he is exposed to the medium. Accord-
ingly, by specifying a 2,000 per cent increase in message
exposure probabilities close to zero we were actually re-
quiring much smaller percentage increases in the media
exposure and conditional message exposure probabilities
of which they were composed. 1
For the two better-educated groups we applied
time-dependent increments to exposure probabilities for
1 For example, suppose an individual's prob-
ability of being exposed to a given medium is 0.2 and
his conditional exposure probability for a particular
type of message in that medium is 0.05. An increase of
4,000 per cent in his 0.01 message exposure probability
could be achieved by raising his media exposure prob-
ability 400 per cent, to 0.8, and his conditional ex-
posure probability 500 per cent, to 0.25.
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messages appearing in all five media types used in the
simulation, while for the lower two educational groupings
we only applied these probability increments to messages
appearing in three of the five media types: Soviet
domestic radio broadcasts, incoming foreign radio trans-
missions, and oral agitation meetings. Our purpose here
was to have the simulation reflect the following hypothe-
sis: Under the impact of the crisis, elite groups in
the USSR, being regular users of all the media, increased
their usage of these media, while the lesser educated
strata only increased their usage of the types of media
to which they were normally exposed. It is well known
that in the early part of this decade newspapers, and
especially magazines, were the medium of the Soviet edu-
cational elite, while domestic radio, and to a lesser
extent oral. agitation meetings, served as news vehicles
for the broad masses of the Russian population. We as-
sumed newspapers, because of the literacy problem, were
not widely read by those with less than seven years of
education, and that television, because of its expense
and the correlation between occupation and education,
was not. readily accessible to most of the poorer-educated
group during the Cuban crisis period.
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The Simulated Pattern of Theme Exposures
At, this point, we are ready to describe and analyze
the simulated Soviet population's exposure to themes in
the Cuban crisis scenario. We will examine in turn the
buildup of exposures for individual themes, the distribu-
tion of theme exposures across various population sub-
groups, the duplication of exposures between pairs of
themes, and the relative importance of different types of
media in diffusing themes.
We have tabulated and plotted in various ways the
time series of exposures produced by the simulation and
our analysis will be organized around the resulting
tables and graphs. Before turning to the analysis, how-
ever, it, is necessary to explain some of the features of
these exhibits.
The first point. that requires clarification is the
meaning of ordinates and abscissas. On each graph that
we will analyze, the horizontal axis indicates the days of
the crisis and it, covers either the period from October
23d to November st, 1962 or some portion of that inter-
val. It is important to note, however, that each dis-
crete point on the horizontal axis represents the entire
day with which it is labeled, and that the spaces between
these points are only for ease of representation. To be
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technical we should either have drawn histograms--i.e.,
spikes rising vertically to plotted exposure values from
corresponding day points on the horizontal axis--or we
should simply have plotted discrete exposure values in
two-space. Instead, we chose to connect plotted exposure
values with differently textured lines, each representing
a different, theme, dimension level, or media type, because
this kind of display facilitates comparative analysis.
Only the plotted exposure values above each day point are
data; the lines connecting them are not. There is one
other important feature of the horizontal axis on each
graph: A given abscissa represents the period running
from 4:00 a.m. Moscow Central Time on the day with which
it, is labeled to 3:59 a.m. Moscow Central Time on the
following day.
All of the graphs and many of the tables that. we
will analyze are divided into two parts--one of which
describes the population's cumulative exposure to themes
(reach), and the other of which describes the exposed
population's repeat exposure to themes (frequency). The
labeling of the vertical axes for these two plots should
serve to define both statistics unambiguously. There is
a problem, however, with some of the cumulative exposure
time series produced by the simulation. In the early
1960's the only medium to which virtually 100 per cent of
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the adult Soviet population had effective access was radio.
Because of illiteracy probably not more than 70 per cent of
the population could read newspapers or magazines. Because
of incomplete diffusion networks only about one-half of the
population had access to television, and perhaps one-third
to foreign radio stations. Nevertheless, when we examined
the simulated buildup of theme exposures via each type of
medium we found in some cases that, for one or more of
these media types, the cumulative percentage of the popula-
tion exposed reached a value greater than the maximum pos-
sible percentage. A clue to the cause of this phenomenon
was obtained from the observation that it only occurred
after increases in normal exposure probabilities had been
initiated.
The simulation uses two probability increments
specified by the researcher to compute a formula for in-
creasing probability values, and it applies this formula
to specified types of individual exposure probabilities.
From our discussion in the previous section the reader
will recall that we specified these formula increases be
applied to message exposure probabilities. Each such mes-
sage exposure probability is the product of an individual's
probability of exposure (1) to a given medium and (2) to a
particular type of message appearing in that medium given
that he is exposed to the medium. The problem is that,, due
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to the way it was programmed, the simulation applied the
formula increase to zero-valued message exposure prob-
abilities, even when such a probability was zero because
the individual's media exposure probability was zero--
i.e., because he did not have access to the medium in
which the message appeared. As a result of this program-
ming error, our specification that crisis-triggered in-
creases be applied to message exposure probabilities
caused the simulation to ignore the exposure ceilings
imposed by illiteracy and incomplete television and
foreign radio diffusion networks in the USSR. This ef-
fect artificially inflated the rate of buildup of theme
exposures via each type of medium. We therefore restrict
our comparative analysis to the period before probability
increases were initiated. 
There is also a problem with some of the time
series of repeat exposures produced by the simulation.
Because of' a space limitation in the computer and the
programming techniques required to take account of this,
1Fortunately, the simulation results indicate
that the Soviet population's cumulative and repeat ex-
posure to all but one of the Cuban crisis themes reached
a significant level before the point at which we ini-
tiated crisis-triggered increases in message exposure
probabilities. Accordingly, the role played by the mass
media in diffusing news of the Cuban crisis to the Soviet
population is largely observable in the "pre-triggering"
portion of' the simulation output.
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the data needed to generate the total cumulative number
of exposures among different, types of persons in the
simulation population is accumulated in the computer as
the expected number of exposures for each simulated indi-
vidual via each of the media types for up to six media
types. The Cuban crisis simulation was run on a computer
population of 1,200 persons and it. included five media
types. Thus, 6,000 numbers had to be kept, cumulatively
up to date to generate these exposure totals. In order
to keep such a large number of statistics in the computer
the simulation is programmed to pack them in thirty-six-
bit computer words, four individuals' statistics to a
word. Exposures are then measured in fiftieths allowing
as many as 511 (29-1) fiftieths or 10.2 exposures for
each individual via each media type. For themes which
have a large number of messages, the number of exposures
for some individuals via some media types can easily ex-
ceed 10.2 exposures. In each such case the computer
stops accumulating exposures for the person via this
media type after they have reached the 10.2 ceiling, and
it; continues to record only 10.2 exposures for him re-
gardless of how much further the scenario proceeds, thus
undercounting his exposures. As a result, for themes
with large numbers of messages this calculation procedure
can produce inaccurate counts of the total cumulative
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number of exposures within various population subgroups.
Many of the tables and graphs that we will analyze
show the buildup of repeat exposures among various popula-
tion subgroups. For any subgroup and a given time period
we have defined this statistic as the average cumulative
number of exposures per person among the portion of the
subgroup exposed at least once through that time period.
This is just the total cumulative number of exposures
within the subgroup as a whole--i.e., the undercounted
statistic--divided by the number of persons in the sub-
group exposed at least once. Accordingly, many of the
repeat, exposure figures are underestimated in the tables
and graphs which show the buildup of exposures within
population subgroups. Fortunately, the simulation pro-
duces other totals of the cumulative number of exposures
in addition to those for population subgroups (by indi-
vidual media and by each of the media types), and these
totals are accurate. From them we are able to determine
the total amount of undercounting which has taken place
for each of the themes at any stage of the scenario and,
thus, to estimate the amount of undercounting within popu-
lation subgroups.
The final feature of the tables and graphs requir-
ing explanation is the way in which they represent time.
President. Kennedy's quarantine speech was delivered on
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Monday evening, October 22d, 1962, at 7:00 p.m. Eastern
Standard Time. In terms of Moscow Central Time the
speech was therefore delivered on Tuesday morning,
October 23d, at. 2:00 a.m. We chose to begin the Cuban
crisis simulation at, 4:00 a.m. Moscow Central Time on
Tuesday morning, October 23d. (Our content analyses
showed that no crisis-related messages appeared in the
Soviet media system during the two hours between Kennedy's
speech and the beginning of this first simulation time
period.) The tabulated and plotted exposure values rep-
resent statistics at. the end of the indicated intervals
or days. For example, Graph 6.1 shows that about sixty
per cent of the Soviet population was exposed to some
news about the U.S. naval quarantine at the end of the
first simulation time period, i.e., by 4:00 a.m. Moscow
Central Time on the morning of October 24th, or twenty-
six hours after Kennedy's speech.
Having noted the major problems with the data,
we are now ready to analyze the simulated time series of
Soviet exposures to themes about the Cuban missile crisis.
The buildup of theme exposures
In Table 6.8 we present some of the important
input and output statistics for themes in the Cuban crisis
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scenario. For each theme the table shows the number of
messages in the simulated media, the number of exposures
to these messages within the simulated population, the
average number of exposures per person in the population
as a whole, the average number of exposures per message,
the number of persons exposed at least once to each theme,
the number of persons exposed at least once per message,
and the average number of exposures per person in the ex-
posed population. These statistics are the values at. the
end of the first three time periods (or at the end of a
simulated seventy-two hour interval). We choose a three-
day "snapshot" of the population's theme exposure for
purposes of comparison because, by the end of this period,
substantial proportions of the population had been exposed
to each theme and the distortions produced by crisis-
triggered probability increases had not yet begun to occur.
The number of exposures for the population as a
whole during the first seventy-two hours ranges from a
low of 4,044 exposures to the theme of U.S. threats di-
rected against the Soviets, for which there were 384
1Exposure outcomes for theme 5 (Soviet agreement
to remove their missiles from Cuba), which did not begin
until 13/24 of the way through time period 6 (October
28th), are not shown because they were distorted by a
programming error in the probability triggering routine
(see pp. - above for details).
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messages, to a high of 12,494 exposures to the theme of
Soviet allegations of U.S. hostility towards Cuba, for
which 857 messages appeared. We note, however, that the
theme of the U.S naval quarantine of Cuba received the
second greatest, exposure during this three-day period.
Many of the messages conveying this theme were also
likely to have carried, at least by implication, the
theme of a U.S. threat directed against the Soviets.
Therefore, it is probably reasonable to conclude that
the effective extremes in theme exposure at the end of
seventy-two hours were a low of 5,053 exposures to re-
ports of pro-U.S. or anti-Soviet reactions, for which
there were 688 messages, and a high of 12,944 exposures
to Soviet charges of U.S. hostility towards Cuba.
The theme to which there apparently were the
least exposures during the first seventy-two hours is
related to the American version of events and the theme
to which there were the most exposures during this period
is related to the Soviet version. The exposure difference
between themes 3 and 4 suggests, not surprisingly, that
many more messages in the mass media carrying the pro-
Soviet theme reached the Russian population than messages
carrying the pro-American theme. We also note that, the
number of messages carrying the most diffused theme during
the first seventy-two hours is less than one-third again
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as great as the number of messages carrying the theme
that apparently was least diffused during this period,
but, the total and average number of exposures to the pro-
Soviet theme are over two and one-half times the cor-
responding totals for the pro-American theme. The explana-
tion for this disparity between coverage and exposure
lies in the fact, that the average number of exposures to
a message conveying the most diffused theme (14.5) is
almost twice as great as the average number of exposures
to a message conveying the theme that presumably was least
diffused (7.3). This average is just. the expected number
of exposures for the population divided by the number of
messages. It depends on the sizes of the average audiences
for the media in which the messages for a theme appear and
the formatting of those messages. Accordingly, the simu-
lation results indicate, quite reasonably, that the audi-
ences for media in which most Soviet allegations of U.S.
hostility towards Cuba appeared (Soviet media) were larger,
on the average, than the audiences for media in which most
pro-U.S. or anti-Soviet reactions appeared (radio broad-
casts beamed to the USSR from abroad), and that the format-
ting of messages for the pro-Soviet theme was probably
more salient, on the average, than the formatting of mes-
sages for the pro-American theme.
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In spite of the differences between themes 3 and 4,
however, the most interesting aspect of the simulation
output summarized in Table .8 is the extent to which
themes related to the American version of events, and
other themes deemphasized in the Soviet, media, apparently
got, through to the Russian population. We note that the
average number of exposures to the least diffused theme,
pro-American or anti-Soviet reactions, is 4.2 exposures
for the population as a whole at, the end of the three-day
period. Over seventy per cent of the population (865
simulated persons) was exposed at least. once to this
theme, and among those exposed the average number of ex-
posures was 5.9. These figures suggest that the bulk of
the Soviet population was exposed to pro-American messages
in the mass media during the first seventy-two hours of
the Cuban crisis. Moreover, it seems likely that 5.9 ex-
posures in seventy-two hours would have been enough to
cause a significant change in the information level of
the average exposed person. Accordingly, the simulation
results also suggest that a substantial majority of the
Soviet population had become aware of the American version
of the quarantine story within seventy-two hours of Presi-
dent Kennedy's speech. As added support for this conten-
tion we note the cumulative and repeat, exposure to reports
about the quarantine (theme 1) and Soviet threats directed
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against the United States (theme 7). Exposures to the
latter theme are significant because it, formed an im-
portant part, of the American argument justifying the
establishment of the quarantine.
The simulation records cumulative exposure to a
theme as the expected number of individuals exposed at
least once.. The maximum value this number can grow to
is, of course, the size of the simulation population.
Generally speaking, as more and more messages go out. in
the mass media we expect two things to occur: (1) more
and more people are reached at. least once, but. at a
diminishing rate; (2) the average number of persons ex-
posed at, least. once per message decreases. We observe
this general effect, in the fift.h and sixth columns of
Table 7.8.
1 in non-crisis and slow-diffusion situations, per-
haps a more interesting set. of statistics would be the
expected number of persons exposed zero times, once,
twice, and so on--i.e., the frequency distribution of ex-
posures to each theme. Although this distribution can
easily be calculated, it could not. be stored in the
computer for which the simulation was programmed at the
time of the Cuban crisis run. (Part of the simulation
has since been reprogrammed for a larger machine and can
now generate and store frequency distributions.) In any
event,, the cumulative exposure and estimated average num-
ber of exposures produced by the original version of the
simulation proved to be adequate statistics for describing
the mass media diffusion of Cuban crisis and Kennedy
assassination themes through the Soviet, population.
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For themes 1, 2, 6 and 7 the average number of
exposures per message lies between 9.2 and 10.5. This
indicates that, the distribution of messages over media
and over formats within media varied only moderately
across these four themes. But the variation in average
number of exposures per message over all six themes
ranges from 7.3 to 14.5, and this variation had an inter-
esting effect on exposure outcomes. At, the end of three
time periods cumulative exposure to each of themes 2 and
4 exceeds that, for theme 1 in spite of the fact that by
this time a substantially greater number of messages
had appeared for theme 1 than for either of these two
themes. From performing the content analyses we retained
the impression that: accounts of the U.S. naval quarantine
(theme 1) appeared in Soviet media in somewhat less
salient or attention-getting formats, on the average,
than either pro-Soviet and anti-American reactions (theme
2) or Soviet, allegations of U.S hostility towards Cuba
(theme 4). We speculate that themes 2 and 4 each have a
higher average number of exposures per message than theme
1 primarily because of this difference in the distribution
of messages over formats.
We have been analyzing a simulated record of the
Soviet. population's exposure to Cuban crisis themes at a
given stage of the crisis--seventy-two hours after
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President Kennedy's speech. To make the analysis dynamic
we now consider Graph 6.1, which shows the simulated
buildup of cumulative and repeat exposure over a period
of several days.l As one might expect, differences in
cumulative exposure to the various themes narrow over time.
'We also note that after 24- and 48-hour periods all but
two of the themes have the same ordinal ranking with re-
gard to cumulative exposure that they had after the
seventy-two hour period analyzed above. The exceptions
are pro-Soviet reactions (theme 2) and U.S. threats di-
rected against the USSR (theme 6).
Soviet threats directed against the United States
were more widely diffused than reports of pro-Russian or
anti-American reactions during the first forty-eight
hours of the crisis, the situation reversing itself
thereafter. This effect is largely attributable to the
way in which Soviet domestic media reported the crisis.
Recall our earlier description of how, except for a
strongly-worded official Government statement, Soviet
authorities initially suppressed quarantine details and
American charges about offensive Russian missiles in
1Exposure outcomes for theme 5, Soviet agreement
to remove their missiles from Cuba, are not shown for
the reasons discussed in footnote 1 on p.
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Cuba. Later, they disclosed information on these matters
along with accounts of world reaction in support of the
Soviet position or in opposion to American actions. The
more rapid. initial buildup of cumulative exposure to
Soviet threats than to pro-Soviet; reactions also reflects
the success of foreign radio in getting the American per-
ception of' events through to the Russian population.
(We will analyze the role of foreign radio more fully in
subsequent sections of this chapter.)
It. appears that the end of the second crisis day
was the only time the Russian population's cumulative
exposure to American threats exceeded their cumulative
exposure to pro-American reactions. This may have been
caused by the fact, that, because of their stop-press time,
the 24th was the day on which Russian newspapers first
reported the President's quarantine speech.
The Cuban crisis was a situation characterized
by the rapid diffusion of news, not just, in Western coun-
tries but in the Soviet. Union as well. Accordingly, an
important feature of the simulation results is the pro-
portion of the sample population reached by each theme
in the early stages of the crisis. The most interesting
outcomes in this regard are the ones which indicate
that more than a day after President Kennedy's quarantine
speech as much as forty per cent of the Russian population
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had learned nothing about the quarantine from the mass
media, almost, half had not been exposed to any media re-
ports of Soviet threats directed at the United States,
and close to two-thirds had heard no mass media accounts
of explicit American threats directed against the Soviet
Union. In contrast, virtually everyone in the West must.
have been exposed to: the three themes by this time be-
cause each theme occurred in the President's dramatic and
widely-publicized speech.
Graph 6.1 also shows that twenty-six hours after
Kennedy's speech almost three-quarters of the Russian
population had been exposed at least once via the mass
media to Soviet charges of American hostility towards
Cuba. This result is not surprising, however, because
our content analyses showed these allegations to be a
frequently occurring theme, not only at the height. of the
missile crisis but also before and after the period
covered by our scenario (see n. 2, pp. ).
The simulation results show that by the end of
the first. day a majority of the Soviet population still
had not been exposed to explicit mass media accounts
either of pro-Russian or pro-American reactions from
around the world. As we speculated above, low exposure
to pro-Russian reactions on the 23d is probably due to the
fact that a substantial amount of material in support of
657
the Soviet, case or in opposition to American actions did
not begin to appear in Russian media until the 24th, the
day on which the Government first released news of the
American charges and details of the quarantine. Low ex-
posure to pro-American world reactions on the 23d can be
attributed to the fact that they had not, fully materialized
twenty-six hours after Kennedy's speech. As a result, the
effectiveness of foreign radio in bringing these reactions
to the Soviet population is only partially reflected in
the cumulative exposure to this theme at the end of the
first time period.
Finally, we observe that, while the differences in
cumulative exposure to the themes tend to narrow over time,
the differences in repeat exposure apparently broaden, at
least during the first seventy-two hours. This is espe-
cially true for the two most rapidly-diffused themes com-
pared to the two themes that had the slowest buildup of
cumulative exposure, and it reflects the fact that after
October 23d most exposures to Soviet allegations of U.S.
hostility towards Cuba and to reports about the quarantine
were mainly among persons who had already been exposed to
each of these themes, while on October 24th and 25th ex-
posures to reports of pro-American world reaction and to
explicit accounts of U.S. threats directed at the Soviet
Union were still occurring mainly among persons who had
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not. yet been exposed to either of these themes.
The distribution of theme exposures
over population subgroups
For the simulation population as a whole, and for
each level. of the "age" and "education" dimensions,
Table 6,9 shows the cumulative percentage of persons ex-
posed to individual Cuban crisis themes at least once and
the average cumulative number of exposures per person
among those exposed at, least once, after three time periods
of the scenario. The number of exposures per person is
slightly undercounted for each theme, for reasons discussed
above (pp. - ). By comparing the expected average
number of exposures per exposed person in the simulation
population as a whole (Table 6.9) with the corresponding
statistic summed over the various media types (Table 6.8),
we can determine the total amount of undercounting for
each theme. The comparison shows that for theme 1, by
the end of the third time period, 14.1 per cent of the
exposures were uncounted. For theme 2 the figure is 10.4
per cent, for theme 3 9.9 per cent, for theme 4 23.2 per
cent, for theme 6 7.1 per cent, and for theme 7 12.3 per
cent. We note that the undercounting is not, random; its
magnitude increases with the expected average number of
exposures per person. As a result, those population
¢4
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subgroups having the greatest repeat exposure are probably
also the ones for which this statistic is most under-
estimated.
The cumulative and repeat exposure figures in
Table 6.9 vary significantly from theme to theme and, for
a given theme, within socio-demographic categories. In
every case, however, we find (not surprisingly) young
people are more exposed than older people and educated
people more exposed than the less well-educated. (The
simulation results also showed urbanites slightly more
exposed than rural persons; they showed no significant
exposure differences by "sex" and "political involvement,"
however.) Persons with more than ten years of education
have 14.0 to 46.7 per cent. more cumulative exposure and
1.7 to 2.9 times the repeat exposure of persons with less
than four years of education. The corresponding ranges on
the "age" dimension are 8.5 to 26.6 per cent and 1.3 to
1.5 times. These simulation results suggest that (1) the
"education" dimension accounted for more of the variation
in exposure to Cuban crisis themes over subgroups of the
Soviet population than either the "sex," "age," "political
involvement," or "residence" dimension, and (2) the "age"
dimension explained more of the variation not accounted
for by "education" than either the "sex," "political
involvement," or "residence" dimension.
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The most interesting and important. feature of
Table 6.9 is the pattern of exposure differences which it
reveals. Three days into the crisis almost half of all
Russians with less than four years of education had not
been exposed to any media reports of pro-American or
anti-Soviet world reaction, and similar percentages of
this group and of all Russians fifty or more years old had
heard no explicit mass media accounts of American threats
directed against the Soviet Union. At the same time,
however, at least two-thirds and, in most cases, over
three-fourths of the Russians on every other dimension
level had been exposed at. least once to each of these two
themes and, of course, to each of the other themes as
well. This pattern, reflecting as it. does the combined
flow of messages from Soviet domestic media and foreign
radio, suggests that after seventy-two hours of the Cuban
crisis, Soviet techniques of selective propagation had
probably been effectively counteracted, among all but
the uneducated and aging segments of the Russian popu-
lation, by radio broadcasts beamed to the USSR from
abroad.
Graphs .2 and .3 show, for two of the Cuban
crisis themes, the buildup of cumulative and repeat
exposure over a period of several days on each level
of the "age" and "education" dimensions in the simulated
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Soviet population.l We note that the pattern observed
at the end of seventy-two hours (Table 6.9) also prevails
at the end of the first. and second crisis days: the
better-educated and the young more rapidly and heavily
exposed than those with less education and older people.
At the end of each of the first two crisis days the simu-
lation results also showed urbanites slightly more exposed
than rural dwellers, small and inconsistent exposure dif-
ferences by "sex" and "political involvement." With re-
gard to the diffusion of the pro-American theme among
various population subgroups, we observe that over seventy
per cent of all Russians with more than ten years of educa-
tion had been exposed at least once by the end of the
first. full time period (twenty-six hours after Kennedy's
speech), while only about one in every four Russians with
less than four years of education had been similarly ex-
posed at this point.. We also note that the percentage of
persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine exposed
1The repeat exposure figures in the lower portion
of these graphs are slightly underestimated, for reasons
discussed above (pp. - ). We also noted above that
the undercounting is greatest for those themes which have
the highest. average number of exposures per exposed person
(pp. - ). Therefore, in the bottom portions of
Graphs 6.2 and 6.3, the repeat exposure figures should be
somewhat. higher for each subgroup, the percentage increase
rising with a subgroup's level of exposure and with suc-
ceeding time periods.
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to the pro-American theme at least once is almost twice
as great as the corresponding percentage among persons
fifty or more years of age. Even among young people,
however, cumulative exposure had not quite reached fifty
per cent by the end of the first crisis day.
It. is particularly interesting to note in Graphs
6.2 and 6.3, that the variation in exposure over both
the "education" and "age" dimensions is consistently
greater for the pro-American than the pro-Russian theme.
This result undoubtedly reflects the differential impact
of foreign radio. The extent, of that medium's effective-
ness is suggested by the simulation outcome showing more
educated Russians and more young Russians exposed to the
pro-American theme than to the pro-Russian theme by the
end of the first crisis day.
Finally, several additional features of Graphs
6.3 are worthy of note. For both the pro-American and
the pro-Russian theme the pattern of cumulative exposure
over the "education" dimension has a clearly definable
tripartite structure. It, builds most rapidly and to the
greatest level among persons with more than ten years of
education, least rapidly and to the lowest. level among
persons with less than four years of education. Within
the two middle education groups--persons with between
four and ten years of education--the rate of buildup
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and the magnitude of cumulative exposure have intermediate
and roughly equal values. A similar structure is also evi-
dent in the population's repeat exposure to the theme of
pro-Russian reactions. For the theme of pro-American re-
actions, however, repeat exposure is structured dichoto-
mously along the "education" dimension. It, builds most,
rapidly and to the greatest, level with the best-educated
group. At the same time, its rate and magnitude are sig-
nificantly lower and roughly the same within the other three
education groups--those with ten or less years of education.
These findings probably reflect a well -known fact about the
diffusion of news in the Soviet media system: During a
complex international confrontation like the Cuban missile
crisis, the best-educated stratum of Soviet, society is more
rapidly and heavily exposed to mass media accounts of the
Western version of events than the rest of the population.
In Chapter VIII we will observe a distinctly different
pattern in the simulated Soviet population's exposure to
themes about the assassination of President Kennedy--a
dramatic but, intrinsically less complex international crisis
than the Cuban confrontation.
For individual themes Table 6.10 shows the most
exposed and least exposed two-dimension subgroups in the
simulated Soviet, population, and for each of these subgroups,
the cumulative percentage of persons exposed at. least once
iABLE 6.10.--Most and least exposed subgroups of the simulated
Soviet population, for individual, Cuban crisis themes,
after seventy-two hours of the scenarioa
Most Exposed Least Exposed
Theme Group Exposure Group Exposure
b
1. The U.S. naval Age 16-29, 100.0c Age 50+ 64.3
quarantine of Cuba . 10 yrs. ed. (17.9) 44 yrs. ed. (3.7)
2. Reports of pro-Soviet Age 16-29 99.9 Age 50+ 69.6
or anti-U.S. reactions ,10 yrs. ed. (16.4) Z4 yrs.ed. (2.9)
3. Reports of pro-U.S. Age 16-29 100.0 Age 50+ 44.6
or anti-Soviet reactions ?10 yrs. ed. (12.9) 1 4 yrs.ed. (2.5)
4. Soviet allegations of Age 16-29 98.6 Age 50+ 81.0
U.S. hostility towards -10 yrs. ed. (13.4) <4 yrs.ed. (5.2)
Cuba
6. U.S. threats directed Age 16-29 99.8 Age 50+ 44.3
against the Soviets 10 yrs. ed. (10.2) <4 yrs.ed. (1.9)
7. Soviet threats directed Age 16-29 100.0 Age 50+ 63.2
against the U.S. 710 yrs. ed. (14.0) <4 yrs.ed. (3.5)
a
Exposure outcomes for theme 5 are not shown for reasons discussed
in the footnote to Table 6.8. Excluded from the comparison in Table
7.10 are subgroups of the simulation population containing less than
15 persons. There were six such groups: Female Party members (13);
Party members, age 16-29(11); Party members with less than 4 years of
education (0); Party members with more than 10 years of education (9);
rural dwellers with more than 10 years of education (7); persons 50
or more years of age with more than 10 years of education (7). For
each theme the data underestimate repeat exposure (average number of
exposures per person among those exposed at least once), especially in
the subgroups with greatest exposure (see pp. - above for details).
bCumulative percentage exposed at least once.
CAverage number of exposures per person among those exposed
at least once.
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and the average cumulative number of exposures among per-
sons exposed at. least once, after three time periods of
the scenario. There are several interesting features of
these data.
First, we observe (as we did for population sub-
groups defined by one dimension at, a time) that the levels
of cumulative and repeat exposure vary significantly from
theme to theme and, for a given theme, from the most to
the least, exposed subgroups. It is important to note,
however, that in each case the most exposed subgroup is
persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine with
more than ten years of education, and the least, exposed
subgroup is persons fifty years of age or older with less
than four years of education. The fact that the most and
least exposed subgroups are the same for each theme sug-
gests that the distributions of exposures over population
subgroups were similar for each theme in the following
sense: The rank-ordering of subgroups by number of ex-
posures probably was the same for each theme.l
1This assumption is supported by the simulation
outcome showing that., for each theme, nonParty members with
more than ten years of education and females with more than
ten years of education were either the second- or third-
most. exposed subgroups, and that rural residents with less
than four years of education and rural residents fifty or
more years of age were either the second- or third-least
exposed subgroups.
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For any theme the distribution of exposure over
population subgroups depends on four factors: the dis-
tribution of the media's audiences over population sub-
groups; the distribution of messages over media; the dis-
tribution of messages over formats within media; the ratio
of average exposure probabilities for the levels on each
dimension. The design of the simulation computer programs
required that we establish one set. of ratios of average
exposure probabilities for all themes. We know, however,
that the formatting of messages did vary somewhat from
theme to theme and that the distribution of messages over
media varied significantly between Soviet media, on the
one hand, and foreign radio, on the other. The simulation
results therefore suggest that, for Soviet domestic media
as a whole and for foreign radio media as a whole, the
distribution of media audiences over subgroups of the
Soviet population were similar, in the following sense:
The rank-ordering of population subgroups by average per-
centage of the subgroups in the audience of an individual
medium probably was similar. Checking the simulation out-
put we did, in fact, find this to be the case for all but
the "sex" dimension. With Soviet, domestic media males had
an average coverage of 6.5 per cent, females 8.8 per cent.
In the case of foreign radio, males had an average cover-
age of 9.6 per cent,, females 6.0 per cent.
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The greatest range of exposure between the most
and least exposed two-dimension subgroups is for theme 6,
explicit, accounts of American threats directed against the
Soviets, followed closely by theme 3, reports of pro-
American or anti-Russian world reaction. We have already
discussed the fact. that, of the seven themes, these two
received the least coverage in Soviet domestic media. The
wide variation in exposure to each of them reflects, again,
the differential impact of foreign radio. The narrowest
range of exposure is for the fourth theme, Soviet. allega-
tions of U.S. hostility towards Cuba. Of the seven themes
in the Cuban crisis scenario, theme 4 received the heaviest.
coverage in Soviet domestic media. The simulation results
therefore suggest that Soviet efforts to emphasize
selected Cuban crisis themes in their media reportage
were far more effective among older, poorly-educated per-
sons than among the younger, better-educated segments of
the population. At, the end of seventy-two hours,
1The fact, that the range of exposure between the
most.- and the least-exposed two-dimension subgroups varies
somewhat. from theme to theme suggests that, while the
audience distributions for Soviet, media and foreign radio
were similar in the ordinal sense described above, their
means of variances differed. Specifically, the variations
in the range of exposure reflects the fact. that the young
and the educated were even more overrepresented in the
foreign radio audience than in the audience of Soviet
domestic media.
cumulative exposure to theme 3 (which the Soviets played down) and
theme 4 (which they propagated) was roughly the same among
persons with more than ten years of education who were between the
ages of sixteen and twenty-nine. Repeat exposure to the two themes
was also about the same in this highly exposed subgroup. Among
persons fifty or more years old with less than four years of
education, however, cumulative exposure to theme 4 was almost
twice as great as cumulative exposure to theme 3, and repeat
exposure more than twice as great.
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The simulation results also suggest that, tactics
of delay and deemphasis in the Soviet media's thematic
treatment of the Cuban missile crisis were far more ef-
fective among older, poorly-educated persons than among
the younger, better-educated segments of the population.
The percentage of persons with more than ten years of
education between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine who
were exposed at. least once to the pro-American theme
after seventy-two hours appears to have been over twice
as great as the percentage of persons fifty or more
years old with less than four years of education who
were exposed at; least once. Moreover, virtually all of
the young, well-educated group were exposed to the pro-
American theme at least once by this stage of the crisis
and their average exposure frequency was more than five
times as great as that of exposed persons in the aging,
uneducated group.
Another interesting feature of Table 6.10 is the
range in exposure between the most, and least exposed sub-
groups. The most exposed group has 18 to 55 per cent
more cumulative exposure than, and 2.6 to 5.7 times the
repeat exposure of, the least exposed group. We note
that, these differences are even greater than the range
of exposure found on either the "age" or "education" di-
mention alone. Thus, the simulation results not only
671
suggest that Russians with advanced schooling were signifi-
cantly more likely to have been exposed to Cuban crisis
media material than their less educated countrymen, and
that young Russians were more likely to have been exposed
than middle-aged or older Russians; they also indicate that
the influence of "age" and education" were additive in this
regard.l Put another way, more of the variation in exposure
is explained by the dimensions "age" and "education" to-
gether than by either dimension alone.
Finally, we note that within seventy-two hours of
President. Kennedy's speech virtually every Russian between
the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine with more than ten
years of education had been exposed to each of the six
Cuban crisis themes at, least 10 times. Also, a minimum
of nearly half the Russians in the least exposed subgroup
(persons fifty or more years old with less than four years
of education) had been exposed to each theme at, least
twice. We therefore conclude that. by the end of the third
day of the Cuban crisis the majority of most (two-dimen-
sionally defined) subgroups of the Soviet population had
heard mass media accounts of each theme.
1The kinds of predisposing attributes studied in
the social sciences are generally additive in their effects,
whether the behavior under study is media consumption, the
adoption of innovations, voting, etc. For an example in the
area of voting behavior the reader is referred to Pool,
Abelson, and Popkin, Candidates, Issues, & Strategies,
pp -.
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Graph 6.4 shows, for two of the Cuban crisis
themes, the buildup of.cumulative and repeat exposure over
a period of several days within the most and least, exposed
two-dimension subgroups of the simulated Soviet population.
We note that the pattern observed at the end of seventy-two
hours (Table 6.10) prevails at. the end of the first and
second crisis days as well: young, educated Russians more
rapidly and heavily exposed than their older, less educated
countrymen. We also observe that over eighty per cent of
all Russians in the most exposed subgroup had been exposed
to the pro-American theme at least, once by the end of the
first crisis day while less than a quarter of the least, ex-
posed subgroup had been reached by the theme at this point.
Moreover, young, well-educated Russians were more highly
exposed to pro-American than to pro-Soviet. reactions at the
end of the first, time period. This suggests a substantial
segment of the Soviet elite heard the Western version of
the quarantine story even before they heard their own
country's version of events, an outcome which undoubtedly
reflects the combined impact. of foreign radio and initially-
delayed reporting of Cuban crisis material in Soviet,
domestic media. - The latter factor is also responsible for
the simulation outcome showing that, as long as twenty-six
hours after Kennedy's speech, almost forty per cent of the
most. exposed subgroup and over three-quarters of the least
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exposed group had not heard any pro-Russian mass media
accounts of the crisis.
The duplication of exposure between themes
It would be interesting to simulate the audience
shared by any possible combination of themes in the scenario,
and to observe how this audience breaks down by each of the
population dimensions at, any stage of the scenario. Unfor-
tunately, the machine for which the simulation was pro-
grammed at, the time of the Cuban crisis and Kennedy assassi-
nation runs lacked the storage capacity required to maintain
all of these statistics. As a result, the simulation pro-
grams were designed to compute only a subset of the possible
duplication statistics, viz., the audience duplications
between each of the possible pairs among the first three
themes and between each of the first three themes and any
other theme in the scenario.
We therefore had to decide in advance which audience
duplications were potentially most interesting, and estab-
lish the themes involved in the largest number of these
duplications as the first themes (up to a maximum of three)
in the scenario. Each such theme also had to be identified
as a "trigger theme" so that the simulation would maintain
a record of individual exposure histories for it.. These
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exposure histories then formed the basis for audience
duplication estimates. We also had the option of spe-
cifying changes in individual probabilities of exposure
to other themes in the scenario as a function of indi-
vidual exposure histories for the various trigger themes.
In the Cuban crisis scenario we established one trig-
ger theme (although we did not use it, to specify changes in
individual probabilities as a function of exposure), and
that. was theme 1, "the U.S. 'naval quarantine of Cuba."
Graphs 6.5 through 6.7 show, for the population as a whole
and for the "agd'and "education" dimensions, the buildup
over several days of the random and actual audience dupli-
cations between the trigger theme and each of themes 6 and
7. Each "random" duplication has been computed by the
simulation on the basis of chance expectation, i.e., as
the product of the percentage of the population grouping
exposed at least once to one theme and the percentage ex-
posed at least once to the other theme through the end of
the indicated time period. Each "actual" duplication has
been computed by the simulation on an expected value
basis, i.e., as the expected value of the percentage of the
population grouping exposed at least once to each of the
two themes in question through the end of the indicated
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time period.l
The outcomes pictured in Graphs 6.5 through 6.7
show that,, within the simulated Soviet population as a
whole, and among the Russian people on each level of the
"age" and "education" dimensions, the duplicated audiences
between themes 1 and 6 and themes 1 and 7 were substantially
greater than might have been expected on a random basis at
each stage of the scenario. (The simulation output also
showed this same result among people on each level of the
"sex," "political involvement" and "residence" dimensions.)
These results suggest that the types of persons likely to
have been exposed to the key Cuban crisis theme--reports
on the U.S. naval quarantine--were the same types of per-
sons likely to have been exposed to other important themes,
such as threats passing between the U.S. and USSR, a result
which is not surprising. Earlier, we reviewed simulation
findings which suggested that the audiences of Soviet
media and foreign radio were similarly distributed over
In noncrisis and slow-diffusion situations, where
repeat exposures are required to bring about changes in
information levels and attitudes, a more interesting set of
statistics would be the expected number of persons exposed
to each theme zero times, once, twice, and so on--i.e.,
the joint frequency distribution for each pair of themes.
Although this distribution can easily be calculated, it
could not. be stored in the computer for which the simula-
tion was programmed at the time of the Cuban crisis run.
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various population subgroups. In addition, it. seems
reasonable to assume there was a fair degree of overlap
among the audiences for various media types in the simula-
tion. These structural features of the Soviet media system
lead us to expect greater than chance audience duplications
between all possible pairs of themes in the Cuban crisis
scenario.
Along the dimensions of "age" and "education" we
observe a significant variation in the degree to which
audience duplications depart from randomness (Graphs 6.6
and 6.7). It appears that duplicated exposure to pairs of
Cuban crisis themes was most nonrandom among members of
the Soviet, population with less than four years of educa-
tion and among persons fifty or more years of age. This
finding is perhaps explained by the observation that the
average overlap of the media's audiences is likely to be
greater in less media-immersed population groups than in
more media-immersed groups.
In checking the simulation output, we found this to
be the case not. only for themes 1 and 6 and 1 and 7, but for
theme 1 and each of the other themes as well.
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The role of the media in diffusing themes
Table 6.11 shows the distribution of exposures
over media types for themes in the Cuban crisis scenario.
This distribution varies greatly from theme to theme. The
combination of Soviet newspapers and radio transmissions
beamed to the USSR from abroad was responsible for most of
the simulated Soviet population's exposure to theme 1. For
theme 4, on the other hand, most of the exposures were via
Soviet domestic radio. Incoming foreign radio transmis-
sions accounted for the largest flow of messages for
themes 3, 6, and 7, while Soviet newspapers combined were
the single most important channel for theme 2. An inter-
esting feature of these findings is the importance of
foreign radio, which accounted for from 43 to 88 per cent
of the simulated Soviet population's exposures to four of
the themes. We also note that the two themes propagated
most, heavily by Soviet media were channeled somewhat dif-
ferently. The population's exposure to reports of pro-
Russian or anti-American world reaction appearsto have
been split about equally between Soviet. print and
electronic media, but the latter were by far the most
important channel for disseminating Russian charges of
American hostility towards Cuba. Lastly, we observe that
themes conveyed to the Russian population predominantly
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by foreign radio tended to flow more heavily to the
domestic audience via Soviet electronic media than through
the Russian press. Here we may be observing the impact of
foreign radio in forcing Soviet electronic media to com-
pete for the domestic audience.
Figures in Table 6.12 represent. the proportions of
the total exposures to individual Cuban crisis themes ac-
counted for by the six most. important, media, after seventy-
two hours of the scenario. As with media types, the dis-
tribution of exposures over individual media varies from
theme to theme. All-Union evening radio was clearly the
single most important channel for theme 4, while for theme
1 it; was followed closely by nightime Voice of America
broadcasts. Although Table 6.11 showed Soviet newspapers
as the most important media type for theme 1, we note in
Table 612 that. only one individual Soviet newspaper,
Izvestia, appears among the most important. vehicles for
the quarantine theme, and it. ranks fifth in importance.
This is a consequence of our having established many more
print than radio, television, or foreign radio media in the
simulation with the result that single-issue print audi-
ences are smaller, on the average, than their electronic
counterparts.
Individual newspapers (Pravda and Komsomolskaya
pravda) are also among the important vehicles for theme 2.
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The comparatively greater importance of the Russian press
in reporting both the quarantine story and pro-Soviet or
anti-American aspects of the crisis is perhaps attributable
to the analytical-explanatory character of these two themes,
as compared with the emotional-hortatory nature of theme 4,
for which Soviet electronic media--both individually and in
the aggregate--served as the more important vehicles.
Foreign radio media accounted for the two largest
proportions of exposures to theme 3, and nighttime Voice of
America was the single most important channel for each of
themes 6 and 7. A Soviet medium, all-Union evening radio,
was the second most important source for each of the latter
two themes, however. The average audiences of nighttime
Voice of America and evening all-Union radio (for VOA 20.4
per cent; of the population, for all-Union evening radio
34.3 per cent) indicate that the greater number of expo-
sures to themes 6 and 7 via the foreign radio station than
the Soviet medium cannot be accounted for by the differ-
ences in their audiences. Instead, it must be attributed
to the number of stories carried and the formatting of
these stories in each medium. In other words, foreign
radio media appear to have played a key role during the
Cuban crisis in apprising the Soviet population of threats
(explicit and otherwise) passing between their country and
the United States.
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Graphs 6.8 and 6.9 show the buildup of the simu-
lated Soviet. population's cumulative and repeat exposure
to Cuban crisis themes, over a period of several days,
via each of the media types discussed above. The bottom
portion of these graphs, showing average theme exposures
per person among those exposed at least once, reveals
virtually the same pattern of differences across media
types after three time periods that was observed in
Table 6.11, which listed total theme exposures for the
population as a whole. To summarize, the pattern is:
foreign radio the most. important media type for themes 3,
6, and 7, followed in all but, the case of theme 3 by
Soviet domestic radio; Soviet newspapers the second most
important channel for theme 3 (here again reflecting,
perhaps, the explanatory-analytic character of the theme);
Soviet newspapers the most important source for themes 1
and 2, followed by foreign radio in one case and Soviet
domestic radio in the other; Soviet, domestic radio far and
away the most important single channel for theme 4.
Analysis of the population's cumulative and re-
peat exposure after each of the first two crisis days pro-
vides a different and equally important basis for comparing
the various media types. Simulated exposure outcomes for
these early stages highlight the leading role played by
Soviet domestic radio as the first. source of crisis
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information for most, Russians. During the initial forty-
eight hours of the crisis, Soviet radio accounted for the
largest percentage of the population exposed to all but
themes 3 and 6. In addition, it appears that by the end
of the first; day, while only foreign radio had reached
the Soviet. population with explicit accounts of American
threats directed against: the USSR, at the same time almost
half the population had learned about the quarantine--an
implicit American threat--via Soviet radio. Moreover,
during the first; day fully as many Russians heard accounts
of pro-American world reaction over Soviet domestic radio
as over foreign radio. Graphs 6.14 and 615 also reflect
the difference between the reaction times of electronic and
print media. By the end of the first. crisis day Soviet.
newspapers had accounted for exposures only to theme 4 and
ranked far behind domestic radio and television as a carrier
of this theme.
Another way to compare the diffusion characteristics
of various types of media is to rate each of them with some
kind of "efficiency" measure. Graphs 6.10 through 6.13
show, for two of the Cuban crisis themes, the ratio of
actual to potential exposures via each media type and via
selected groups of media within each type, over several
days of the scenario. For a given media type or group
"actual exposures" is the expected number of exposures of
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the simulation population via that type or group. "Poten-
tial exposures" is the maximum possible number of exposures
that could have occurred, i.e., the number of exposures
that, would have resulted if the entire audience of each
medium within the type or group had been exposed to every
message appearing in that medium. Accordingly, the
value of this "efficiency" ratio can range from 0.0 to 1.0.
Over the first three time periods we observe the following
pattern: Soviet newspapers significantly more efficient,
in their message "throughput," than either Soviet, domestic
electronic media or foreign radio; Soviet. domestic radio
somewhat, more efficient, than foreign radio and the latter
slightly more so than Soviet, television; all-Union news-
papers more efficient than subRepublic papers and the
latter more so than Republic papers; all-Union radio more
efficient. than local radio; all-Union television more
efficient than local television; the British Broadcasting
Corporation slightly more efficient, than Voice of America
and both significantly more so than Radio Liberty. These
patterns probably prevailed across all of the Cuban
crisis themes since they hold, in every case but one
(all-Union, subRepublic, and Republic papers), for the
two most antithetical themes in the scenario: pro-Soviet,
and pro-American reactions.
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The ratio of actual to potential exposures for a
given theme in a given type of medium is a function of
(1) the formatting of messages carrying the theme within
the individual medium of that type, and (2) the ratios of
average exposure probabilities along each dimension level
for that theme and media type.l Bearing this in mind the
simulation outcomes illustrated in Graphs 6.10 through
6.13 are not surprising. They reflect the following
rather well-known facts about the Soviet media system in
the early 1960's: Newspapers were the medium of the
better-educated who, because of theirreading habits, were
more likely to have read newspaper articles to which they
were exposed than the less-educated; radio was the princi-
pal news medium for the Soviet masses while television, for
those who had access to it, served primarily an entertain-
ment function; the better-educated and more media-
immersed segments of Soviet, society were likely to have
read either an all-Union and a subRepublic or a Republic
and subRepublic newspaper, their less educated countrymen
to have read either a Republic or a subRepublic newspaper
(recall the duplication tables specified in Chapter IV);
1The ratiosof average theme-exposure probabilities
influence a given media type's efficiency by influencing
the distribution of the audience of that type of medium
over each population dimension.
696
better-educated and more media-immersed persons in the
USSR were more likely to have listened to all-Union radio
and television stations than to local stations, the re-
verse being the case for the less well-educated; of the
foreign radio stations broadcasting to the USSR, the BBC
enjoyed the best reputation, followed by VOA, while RL
was generally looked on as the least objective source of
outside news. These broad characteristics were reflected
in both the format factors and ratios of average theme-
exposure probabilities specified in Chapter V, and they
are consistent with the simulation outcomes regarding the
relative efficiency of the various media types.
The simulation results pictured in Graphs .10
through .13 suggest that; the Soviet, population's normal
media habits are such that less than one-quarter of the
message-individual pairs for any theme in the mass media
result in an exposure, regardless of the type of medium
involved. This finding indicates that the average
Russian reads less than one-quarter of the material in
any newspaper he picks up and attends to less than twenty-
five per cent of the program content that comes over the
radio or television he turns on, a result consistent with
Western data.
The final set. of exhibits, Graphs 6.14 through 6.23,
show, for the persons on each dimension level of the
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simulated Soviet population, and for each media type, the
buildup of cumulative and repeat exposure to the theme of
the U.S. naval quarantine. There are several interesting
features of these data. First, we observe that the
simplest pattern is on the dimension of "residence."
Urbanites were more heavily exposed than rural residents
to quarantine news by each of the four media types. The
differences were smallest. for newspapers and foreign
radio, somewhat greater for domestic radio, and greatest
for domestic television. These findings reflect the post-
War extension of Soviet literacy, the incompleteness of
the radio reception network in some rural areas of the
USSR during the early 1960's, and the concentration of
the Soviet television diffusion network around urban
centers at that time.
More interesting are the exposure differences by
media type along the dimensions of "age" and "education."
For Soviet. newspapers and foreign radio we observe that
exposure decreases with age and increases with education.
This pattern is especially pronounced in the case of
foreign radio, and it accounts for the differential im-
pact of that, medium in bringing the Western version of
Cuban crisis events to various strata of the Soviet. popu-
lation.
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For Soviet. electronic media the pattern is quite
different. Persons between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-nine were more heavily exposed to the Cuban crisis
theme by Soviet radio than those in the other two age
groups, but, persons fifty years old or more appear to have
been somewhat. more heavily exposed than those in the
thirty to forty-nine age group. The middle-aged group was
more heavily exposed to quarantine news by Soviet television
than their younger countrymen, with those fifty or more
years of age least. exposed via this medium. The two middle
education groups appear to have been more heavily exposed
to this theme by Soviet electronic media than the best-
and least-educated segments of Soviet. society.
When we specified ratios of average exposure prob-
abilities along the "age" dimension for Soviet radio and
television, we made theme exposure increase with age
(Chapter V). Along the "education" dimension we made it.
decrease slightly with education for domestic radio, and
for domestic television we made persons having between
seven and ten years of education most heavily exposed,
persons with more than ten years of education least
exposed, and set, persons in the two lowest education
groupings at an intermediate exposure level. Bearing
these ratios in mind we observe that Graphs 6.16 through
6.19 reflect a disproportionately high representation of
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young people and a disproportionately low representation
of uneducated people in the Soviet radio audience as well
as an underrepresentation of older and uneducated persons
in the Soviet television audience during the Cuban crisis
period. These patterns are consistent with the results
of the studies of Soviet communications behavior that we
reviewed earlier, and they are also in accord with the
findings of Hollander's recent survey.l
Graphs 6.14 and 6.15 reveal that males were more
exposed to quarantine news via newspapers and foreign
radio than females, while the latter were somewhat more
heavily exposed via Soviet electronic media.2 Not sur-
prisingly, Graphs 6.20 and 6.21 indicate that Soviet
newspapers were a more important source of quarantine
news for Party members than for nonParty members. It is
interesting to note, however, that the graphs show Party
members also more heavily exposed via foreign radio than
nonParty members. The latter, on the other hand, were
somewhat more heavily exposed via Soviet radio and
IGayle Durham Hollander, "Communications and
Social Modernization in the Soviet Union" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1968), pp. 179-244.
2These exposure differences also match Hollander's
findings, with one exception: She reports on several
Soviet time budget studies which show women spending less
time viewing television than men (Hollander, Communications
and Social Modernization," p. 224).
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television. For the most part, these exposure differences
along the "sex" and "political involvement" dimensions
reflect. the fact, that males and Party members were better-
educated than females and nonParty members.
The simulation results we have been discussing are
quite plausible. They highlight the important role played
by foreign radio in bringing the American version of the
quarantine story to the Soviet. people, the primacy of
domestic radio as an early source of information about.
the Cuban crisis for most. Russians, the more rapid and
the heavier exposure of the educated, the young, and
urbanites, the functioning of newspapers and foreign radio
as more significant information channels for better-
educated segments of Soviet, society, and of radio (and to
a lesser extent television) as a relatively more important
source of news for the Soviet masses during the Cuban
crisis period. These findings are consistent, with avail-
able data on the dominant features of the Soviet media
system in the early 1960's. We turn in the next. chapter
to the simulation results for the Kennedy assassination to
see whether they are equally plausible and in what re-
spects., if, any, they differ from the simulated pattern
of theme exposures for the Cuban crisis.
CHAPTER VII
SIMULATING SOVIET EXPOSURE TO MASS
MEDIA MESSAGES AFTER THE ASSASSINATION
OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
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CHAPTER VII
SIMULATING SOVIET EXPOSURE TO MASS MEDIA
MESSAGES AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
To explore the implications and consequences of the Comcom
simulation model fully we must assess its postdictive capacity under
a variety of communications scenarios. In Chapter VI we described
the nature and results of one such test for a scenario characterized
by rapid diffusion of news--the Cuban missile crisis. In this Chapter
we report Comcom simulation results for a communications situation
characterized by even more rapid information diffusion--the aftermath
of President Kennedy's assassination.
The Assassination of President Kennedy
On Friday afternoon, November 22, 1963, as his motorcade moved
through cheering crowds in downtown Dallas, Texas, President Kennedy
was fatally wounded by an assassinis bullet. Texas Governor John B.
Connally, who, with his wife, had been accompanying President and Mrs.
Kennedy in an open car, was also wounded but subsequently recovered.
Shortly after President Kennedy had been pronounced dead, Lyndon
Johnson took the oath of office as the 36th President of the United
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States. The accused assassin was 24-year old Lee Harvey Oswald.
On November 24th, while being transferred from the Dallas city jail
to the county jail for greater protection, Oswald was shot and killed
by a Dallas night club owner, Jack Ruby. The following day President
Johnson directed the Justice Department and the FBI to conduct a
thorough investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy and
the murder of his alleged assassin.
President Kennedy was shot at 1:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.
He was pronounced dead approximately one-half hour later and another
half-hour elapsed before news of his death was made public. We
chose to begin the scenario at the latter point and to have it cover
the succeeding ten 24-hour time periods. Due to the time difference
between Washington and Moscow, however, the aftermath of the assassin-
ation actually began for the Soviets on Friday evening, November 22,
1963 at about 9:30 p.m. Moscow Central Time.1
Themes Coded for the Content Analysis
Coded for the content analysis of Soviet media material and
incoming foreign radio transmissions during the aftermath of President
Kennedy's assassination were the following themes:
1For a chronology of the Kennedy assassination, as well as an
outline of significant events preceding the assassination see The
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXI, No. 48 (1962), 2065-67
and 2108.
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1. The assassination of President Kennedy
2. The swearing-in of Johnson as President
3. The assassination of Oswald
4. The establishment of the Warren Commission
We hypothesized that simulated exposures to theme 1, and to a
somewhat lesser extent, to themes 2 and 3, would show the degree of
saturation achieved by Soviet media in giving timely and heavy
coverage to the assassination and the major developments which
followed in its wake. We also assumed that simulated exposures to
theme 4 would (1) provide a "light-exposure" measure against which
to assess the simulated population's exposure to the first three
themes, and (2) indicate the extent to which incoming foreign radio
transmissions effectively supplemented the relatively light Soviet
media coverage of this theme.
Appendix B contains a brief description of each theme in the
content analysis (as it was explained to the coders) and the code
sheets that were used for the various media types content analyzed
(Tables B.1- B.6).
20n November 30th President Johnson appointed a special
commission, headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren, to direct a compre-
hensive investigation of President Kennedy's assassination and Oswald's
murder.
3Again, but for the limiting factors of storage capacity and
run time, several additional themes would have been included in the
scenario. Among the more frequently recurring themes not included
were: (1) President Johnson's remarks at Andrews Air Force Base;
(2) biographies of Kennedy; (3) biographies of Johnson; (4) biographies
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The Reconstructed Pattern of Theme Appearances
Soviet press coverage
Overview
Before we review the Kennedy assassination as reported by
Soviet media, two things need to be said: First, Soviet media treated
the memory of the President with dignity and reported on the sorrow
of his family and his nation with sympathy. Second, reports and
of Oswald; (5) biographies of Ruby; (6) contentions that the
assassination was plotted by right-wing, reactionary, fascist, and
monopoly capital groups in the U.S. who opposed Kennedy's policies,
including contentions that Oswald was neither a Marxist nor a Cuban
sympathizer but rather was a rightist and anti-Soviet, that Ruby and
Oswald were accomplices, that the Dallas police and the Texas oil
establishment were implicated in the plot, that Ruby was a gangster,
that reactionary groups in the U.S. were trying to use the assassina-
tion to stir up anti-Soviet and anti-Cuban hysteria, that Senator
Goldwater, General Walker and Robert Welch represented these groups,
that right-wing media had created an atmosphere of hate in Dallas
which fostered the Stevenson incident and, ultimately, the Kennedy
assassination, that Oswald's assassination was the result of rightists
and gangsters trying to cover up all traces of their plot, that the
Dallas police were being deliberately inept in their investigation
of the assassination, and including cartoons of Lincoln weeping, of
plotters sweeping up their footprints, and of the Reichstag;
(7) stories praising Kennedy, including accounts of his war record,
his broadmindedness and rationality, his efforts to solve U.S.
racial problems, his attempts to deal with international problems
through negotiation, and his role in securing a nuclear test-ban
treaty; (8) accounts of mourning activities in the U.S., including
coverage of the Kennedy funeral ceremonies, other memorial services,
and the processional past Kennedy's coffin; (9) speculations on the
likely degree of continuity between Kennedy's and Johnson's policies,
including accounts of Johnson's staff briefings and his meetings with
Mikoyan and Dobrynin, the emphasis in Johnson's first speech to
Congress on the importance of continuing Kennedy's policies, and
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comments on the assassination in Soviet domestic media tended to
convey a confused and, even at times, a contradictory account of
facts and seeming facts as they unfolded. Moscow propagandists
attempted to convince public opinion of the following phenomena,
in rapid succession:
1. No suspect has been arrested, but the killer is
unquestionably a rabid rightist;
2. Oswald has been arrested, but any effort to link him
with Communism is a rightist "provocation", another
Reichstag "fire frame-up;" the fact that he was
reputedly a self-proclaimed Marxist and Pro-Castroite
was being used by the U.S. news media to villify the
Communist Party, the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and
Castroite Cuba, if not the Soviet Union itself, in a
wild frenzy of rabid war-mongering and rightist racist
propaganda;
3. Oswald was not a Marxist anyway; the publications
found in his room were Trotskyist, and a "Trotskyite," "as
is well known," is the most despicable kind of deviate
from Marxism-Leninism;
4. The President's assassination was the result of a
plot hatched by "war-mongers" and "racists" and
whatever Oswald was, his shooting by Jack Ruby
was part and parcel of these ultra-rightist plotters'
all-out effort to silence him, with police connivance,
thereby sweeping the evidence of the President's
assassination under the rug;
5. Oswald must have had an accomplice;
assessments of the probable effect of Kennedy's death on East-West
relations; (10) condolences sent by Khrushchev, the Soviet govern-
ment, Soviet organizations, the U.N., and foreign governments to
President Johnson, the U.S. government, and Mrs. Kennedy; and
(11) descriptions of the social forces in the U.S.--racism, reaction,
violence, and corruption--which allegedly provoked the tragedy.
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6. Oswald wasn't guilty at all;
7. Oswald was either a rightist or a tool of the rabid
rightists, if not one himself, after his "calumnies"
against the Soviet Union;
8. A conspiracy of hate killed the President...and let's
forget all about Oswald.
Accompanying this campaign was an attempt on the part of Soviet
propagandists to create a larger-than-life image of President
Kennedy, who began to emerge as a kind of latter day Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Soviet propagandists also quickly assigned President
Johnson the task of living up to the late President's folk-image. 4
The first Soviet press report of the assassination appears
to have been in the Saturday edition of'Pravda on November 23rd.
Over the central three columns of the lower half of page one, in
three-eighths inch high capital letters, there appeared the
following headline:
ASSASSINATION OF USA PRESIDENT
JOHN KENNEDY
The report was made up of TASS dispatches, an obituary, and a three
4For a description of how Soviet media in general, and the
Soviet press in particular, covered the Kennedy assassination, we
have relied on an article signed"C.M.", entitled "Kennedy Assasina-
tion--Communist Version," in Communist Affairs, I (Nov.-Dec., 1963),
3-6; John L. Dunning, "The Kennedy Assassination as Viewed by
Communist Media," Journalism Quarterly, LVI (Spring, 1964), 163-9;
translated excerpts from Pravda and Izvestia in Current Digest of
the Soviet Press, vol. XV; the conversation with Finkelstein.
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by four inch full-face portrait, showing head and shoulders, with
the President's name in full, in large bold type.
The first TASS dispatch was the same as the one broadcast by
Moscow Radio's Domestic Service the previous evening; it was based
on an Associated Press story from Dallas. The second TASS item,
from New York and also dated November 22, gave a few more details,
fixed the hour of the President's death at 2:00 p.m. New York time,
reported the conjecture of "commentators" in Dallas that "this crime"
was connected with "the activities of ultra-rightist organizations,"
and stated that the President had in his pocket a speech he was about
to deliver, "condemning his ultra-conservative opponents."
The TASS obituary had been released by that agency at 11:44
p.m. Moscow Central Time on November 22nd. It contained a six-line
summary of the President's biography and extensive material on the
President's peace efforts, first broadcast by Moscow Radio's Domestic
Service in Russian at 4:00 a.m. on Saturday morning, November 23rd.
The Kennedy obituary favorably mentioned his speech at American
University in Washington, D.C., as well as his "stubborn fight"
in the Senate for ratification of the limited test-ban treaty, and
tied in his fight against the "rabid ones" with his trip to Dallas,
which was presented as connected with the 1964 Presidential elections.
In addition, there was a TASS dispatch from Washington which stated
that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had been sworn in as President
of the United States. This dispatch was accompanied by a brief
biography.
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The November 23rd issue of Izvestia carried no news on the
President's assassination. Subsequent editions did carry the story,
however.
Izvestia of Sunday, November 24th, had on its first page a
two-column spread beginning about three-quarters of the way up from
the bottom of the page. Placed below a two-column article on Brezhnev's
visit to Iran was a larger version of the same Kennedy photograph
that had appeared in Pravda the previous day. The article on
Brezhnev had far heavier and larger headlines than the one on
Kennedy--one inch high for "TO BE ALWAYS GOOD NEIGHBORS" in two lines,
as against three-eighths-inch high capital letters for the
"Assassination of USA President John Kennedy." Apparently, the
Soviet Chairman's journey to Iran was considered either more news-
worthy and/or more important politically.
The lead story in the November 24th issue of Izvestia consisted
of the following two lines: "November 22 in the city of Dallas (state
of Texas) USA President John F. Kennedy was mortally wounded. After
thirty minutes the president died." Although Soviet newspapers
invariably used initial capital letters when writing "Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. N. Khrushchev" or "Chairman
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet L. Brezhnev," they did not use
an initial capital in "president" in this story, though they did
in the telegrams of condolence.
The latter appeared after a story on the visit of Khrushchev
and Gromyko to the American Embassy in Moscow to express their
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condolences in person. Then came a brief notice informing readers
that dispatches by Izvestia's own correspondents could be found on
page two. Under this notice were the official communications of
condolence by Khrushchev to President Johnson and Mrs. Jacqueline
Kennedy, by Brezhnev to President Johnson, by Nina Petrovna Khrushchev
to Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy, and by Gromyko to Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. On page two, along with a four by three and one-quarter inch
photograph of President Johnson with Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Kennedy,
were published dispatches by Izvestia's own correspondents under a
two-line headline of one-half inch high capital letters:
USA SHAKEN BY KENNEDY DEATH
with subheads in smaller capital letters--"United States of America
in Mourning;" "Coffin With Body of President Kennedy Placed in White
House;" "New USA President Lyndon Johnson Takes Oath Aboard Plane,"
"Telegrams of Condolence From All Over the World." The first of
these dispatches--occupying twenty-seven and one-half column-inches
in a three-column spread and dated New York, November 23rd--was by
S. Kondrashov. It was, for the most part, a well-written factual
account.
In the next to last paragraph it stated: "Many Americans
connect the assassination of Kennedy with the activity of ultra-right,
fascist elements." It then quoted a New York City woman, "Maurine
Varga," as having told the New York Post that "A man can get killed
in Texas. They spat in Stevenson's face. What have they done to the
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President?" and explained what had happened in Dallas on October 24th,
when the ultra-rightists, calling to put an end to the U.N., spat
in the face and struck with a placard the U.S.A. representative in
the U.N. Stevenson." It recalled that Dallas was "famous" as a
"den of the Birchites" and other "rabid ones." There, for example,
the story continued, "lives the retired major-general, the semi-fascist
Walker, who considers Eisenhower and Kennedy 'Communists' and who
last fall headed up a bloody riot at Mississippi University when the
negro...Meredith was admitted."
The second dispatch, transmitted by telephone by Izvestia's
Washington correspondent, was featured under a one-eighth inch high
headline in initial capital letters: "Washington In Mourning."
Signed by I. Itskov, it was six and three-quarter column-inches in
length, dealt with reactions to the assassination and quoted an
unnamed Negro woman, who, "clenching in her hands the newspaper with
the report of the President's death, exclaimed: 'This is the
handiwork of the racists! They took vengeance on him!"'
Literaturnaya gazeta of November 23rd, in a three-column spread
on the right under the caption of "last minute news," and under the
three-eighths inch high headline:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DEMISE
published two TASS dispatches from New York that covered almost nine
column-inches. One of these dispatches also reported that
"Commentators who were in Dallas connected this crime directly with
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the activities of ultra-rightist organizations."
After Russian television audiences saw with their own eyes
the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald by Jack Ruby on the 24th,
Soviet commentators and journalists had little trouble convincing
most of them that the President's assassination had been the result
of a premeditated plot. This line of thought continued, with
variations and some additions, in all the Soviet mass media through-
out the month following the President's assassination. In the
November 26th issue of Pravda New York correspondent B. Strelnikov,
under the headline "Assassins Sweep Things Under the Rug," noted how
strange it was that the Dallas police announced the exact time when
Oswald would be transferred from one jail to another, made arrange-
ments to have the transfer televised, and showed on television the
plan of the jail corridors through which Oswald would be taken.
Strelnikov recalled that gangster Joe Vallachi had ample police
protection, "yet here in Dallas the police announced well in advance
and in detail the route over which the prisoner would be taken."
Then he described the scene as millions had seen it on television
the world over and characterized the assassination of Oswald by Ruby
as cold-blooded, cynical murder. "Thus the assassins dropped the
curtain over the conspiracy of which President Kennedy was the
victim."
The same issue of Pravda quoted an article by James Reston
in the New York Times of November 25th, as translated by TASS,
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in which Reston, writing from Washington, D.C., told "a tale of two
cities and of two murders. In Dallas--violence and anarchy. In
Washington--sorrow, humiliation, and alarm." The "eye for an eye"
principle had triumphed in Dallas, wrote Reston, as quoted by Pravda,
the country was in revolt against law and order, and the sorrow of
individuals was not enough to expiate the country's guilt. Reston
cited from the memorial address of Chief Justice Warren the charge
that an atmosphere of lawlessness prevails in the United States,
"for we know," he said, "that such terrorist acts and murders 'are
usually stimulated by the forces of hate and darkness, which today
bring demoralization into American life."' Pravda's commentator,
K. Nyepomnyashchii followed Reston with a denunciation of such
"ultras and rightist influences as General Edwin Walker, Robert Welch,
the John Birch Society, Senator Goldwater, The American Mercury,
'John Franklin's Letters,' Dallas, and the South with its ultra-
rightist ideologists and their racial hatreds." Directly below this
article was a photograph of Ruby shooting Oswald.5
The Soviet mass media adduced further evidence for this line
of thought in quotations from such other authoritative American
spokesmen as Walter Lipmann and Ralph McGill. They later attempted
to solidify their case with foreign comments from non-Communist
sources. There was, for example, a photograph from Paris-Match
which appeared in the December 19th issue of Izvestia, showing a man
in broad-brimmed Stetson hat and Western garb examining a show window
displaying guns and stating that in Dallas "a Colt is cheaper than a
pair of shoes." This photograph appeared as an illustration for the
summarized version of a report from Dallas by two correspondents
for the Paris l'Express, which quoted a young Dallas woman as
saying: "No matter how strongly we hated him, we still cried."
Another Texas woman echoed her: "That's right...At the Brook Golf
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Results of the content analysis
We have analyzed the content of seven all-Union and six
Republic level Soviet newspapers, as well as two Soviet magazines,
for the ten-day period following the Kennedy assassination.
Approximately 5,000 different stories were coded for ten different
article formats and for each of the four themes in the scenario. 6
For reasons analogous to those given in Chapter VI, the coding of
themes was limited to fifteen of the thirty-two Soviet print media
conceptualized in the simulation, and, from the pattern of theme
appearances found in these media we inferred a likely pattern of
appearances over the other seventeen media as well. The publication
periodicities and assumptions used in making these inferences are
outlined in Appendix B (Tables B.8 and B.9).
Table 7.1 summarizes the message schedule obtained by content
analyzing all-Union and Republic-level Soviet newspaper editions for
Club I told the people who went to see the presidential cortege,
'be sure to take a good aim!' You know we joked a lot then. Now
I find that my joke was in bad taste." The article drew the follow-
ing conclusion: "Perhaps some day a plot will be discovered, but
the climate we found in Dallas is just as deadly as any plot. If
it was fated that John Fitzgerald Kennedy should be the victim of
an attempt on his life, then it is perfectly natural that it should
have happened only in Dallas. A psychoanalyst would say that in
the dark recesses of its heart Dallas...killed him long ago."
Other non-Communist sources quoted in support of this line of argument,
in the December 21st issue of Literaturnaya gazeta, were the Hamburg
weekly Der Stern and the London weekly Observer.
6The print titles used in the content analysis are listed
in Appendix B (table B.9), and the article formats coded for the
content analysis are identified on the sample press code sheet in
Appendix B (Table B.1).
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the period after President Kennedy's assassination and then spreading
the resulting theme appearances over all thirty-two Soviet print media
in the simulation. It shows an estimated total of 1,030 occurrences
of the four themes in the thirty-two print media. As we hypothesized,
the single most prominent theme was the one entitled "the assassination
of President Kennedy" (theme 1). The fact that over four-fifths of
the press messages in the scenario relate to this theme reflects
the Soviet authorities' undoubted awareness that (1) the domestic
population would be intensely interested in news of the assassination
and (2) large segments of the population could easily satisfy their
curiosity by listening to short-wave radio transmissions from abroad.
Two of the remaining three themes used in the content analysis
were covered relatively lightly by the Soviet press. The comparatively
small number of mentions of "the swearing-in of Johnson as President"
(theme 2) and "the establishment of the Warren Commission" (theme 4)
probably reflects the fact that these themes were of a much less
dramatic nature than stories about Kennedy's assassination or Oswald's
murder. While the latter theme also received significantly greater
press coverage than themes 2 and 4, it occurred only about one-fifth
as often as articles about the President's assassination.
The results of the content analysis performed for the Kennedy
assassination simulation suggest that Soviet print media selectively
propagated or deemphasized themes as a function of their salience.
7For the print titles or types which each of these thirty-two
media encompass, see Appendix B (Table B.9).
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The content analysis results also indicate that the level of Soviet
print media activity was influenced as much by institutional factors
as by the actual unfolding of events. On the 22nd there was no
print coverage of the President's assassination because it took place
after stop-press time. Theme occurrences did begin on the 23rd,
however, and they peaked sharply on the 24th, due mainly to Oswald's
arrest and tQ speculations about his alleged left-wing affiliations.
On the 25th print coverage dipped markedly because, in line with
their regular practice, most Soviet newspapers published no Monday
edition. Press activity picked up again on the 26th and remained
strong on the 27th, reflecting the heavy print coverage of Oswald's
murder, conjecture about its implications, and Kennedy's funeral.
Finally, as in the Cuban crisis scenario, the daily number of Kennedy
assassination theme occurrences gradually declined as the dramatic
impact of the tragedy subsided. 8
Soviet radio and television coverage
President Kennedy's assassination and the subsequent related
events dominated Soviet radio commentary over the weekend and throughout
8In the content analysis of the Soviet press for Kennedy
assassination themes, the same person coded all stories in every
issue of the fifteen publications. Having no reason to doubt the
coder's consistency, we believe the reliability of the results was
relatively high. Supporting the validity of the content analysis
are the same set of reasons set forth in the preceding Chapter.
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the following days to an extent rarely achieved by non-Communist world
events. Moscow radio gave flash treatment to the early reports of
the President's assassination and continued to present comment and
reportage throughout the days which followed. The initial reaction
was one of shocked disbelief and regret. Praise of the assassinated
President was fervent and pervasive, and expressions of condolence
reported the sentiments of world leaders and the world public.
Soviet radio commentators lamented President Kennedy's death, praising
his foreign and domestic policies and particularly his efforts to
achieve an East-West detente. From the beginning-l however, Moscow
interspersed praise of the dead president with references to the
"extreme rightwing elements" alleged to have been responsible for
his assassination.
It was sometime after 10:00 p.m. Moscow Central Time on Friday
evening, November 22nd, when Moscow Radio's Domestic Service inter-
rupted its programs with a brief, solemn announcement of "the sad
9For a description of Soviet radio and television reportage
on the assassination of President Kennedy we have relied on the
F.B.I.S. Daily Report, Nos. 229-32; C.M., "Kennedy Assassination--
Communist Version"; Dunning, "The Kennedy Assassination as Viewed
by Communist Media"; the conversation with Finkelstein.
10It was early evening of November 22nd, Central European
(Warsaw-Prague-Budapest) Time, when the news was flashed that
President Kennedy had died, the victim of an assassin's bullet.
Radio Free Europe records show that the news reached Munich at 7:44
p.m., Central European Time, and went on the air to Eastern Europe
over RFE's transmitter forty seconds later. The first Communist
orbit broadcaster to act was Radio Moscow: some forty minutes after-
ward (10:24, Moscow Central Time) it interrupted its programs with
a brief, solemn announcement (Dunning, "The Kennedy Assassination,"
p. 164).
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news just learned from New York" that President Kennedy had "died
in a hospital...victim of an attack, it is supposed, by ultra-right
elements." The Soviets, of course, were not alone in making this
guess, but since it fit what seemed likely to be their most rewarding
line, they made it with bold assurance. By early the next morning
Radio Moscow was broadcasting a categorical assertion by the U.S.
Communist Party: "The murder is the result of the criminal work of
pro-fascist ultra-rightist forces which do not stop at undermining
the democratic institutions of the country, threatening international
peace and turning back the wheel of history."
On Sunday, November 24th, in an International Observers
Roundtable (beginning at 16:20 Moscow Central Time), Moscow Radio's
Domestic Service discussed the impact and the significance of Presi-
dent Kennedy's assassination. The chairman of the panel, Viktor
Osipovish Shragin, expressed "sorrow", "revulsion", "indignation",
and "outrage" as well as "grief together with the U.S. people," and
observed that President Kennedy's death was not only a great loss in
international affairs; no less important were the measures carried
out by "Kennedy...within his own country which immediately evoked
strong resistance from the most reactionary forces and racist elements."
Another noted Soviet journalist and member of this roundtable,
Vikenty Aleksandrovich Matveyev, pointed out that the late President
had duly recognized "the changed circumstances of the 'sixties...the
growth in the might of the socialist world, "and the shift in the
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balance of power within the international arena in favor of the latter."
Matveyev went on to describe Kennedy as "one of those sober political
figures who understood that former methods of U.S. policy had become
antiquated. He understood that in the atmosphere of nuclear weapons
stockpiling and the danger of nuclear war, the only realistic way to
settle international problems at issue was peaceful talks. It is
of this that Kennedy's breadth of vision consisted. Naturally, he
took his stand on positions that defended his class and his capital-
ist system and he was our idealogical opponent." But, it was added:
"... the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, the growth in the
might of our country, compelled Kennedy to retreat from traditional
canons and to take into consideration the enormous international
authority of the Soviet Union."
Refuting a statement in the Washington Post that "no political
positions or disagreements" as paraphrased by Matveyev, could have
laid the foundation for the President's assassination, the same
speaker said: "Such a statement is nothing but an attempt to distract
the attention of the U.S. public from the real causes of the
President's murder....In the United States there are influential
groups of politicians whose backers are the big monopolies, especially
those connected with the production of arms and oil interests abroad,
who have spoken out as violent defenders of the old, outworn line
of the dead Dulles and his policy of...brinkmanship. The more
distant this course came to be from the change in the balance of
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power in the international arena, the more frantic became the defend-
ers of the old course...the rabid ones. They spoke out violently
against the course of coexistence with the Soviet Union, fought
for a furious arms race, demanded intervention in Cuba. These were
the people represented by Senators like Barry Goldwater, who voted
in the Senate against the Moscow Treaty for a partial ban on nuclear
weapons tests.
"Their wild stubbornness in foreign policy was matched by
their line in domestic policy," Matveyev continued. "It was they who,
foaming at the mouth, opposed the solution of the Negro problem in
the spirit of the twentieth century...became demoniacally enraged
at the mention of progress. In such circumstances...it is not
difficult...to resort to shooting...someone like Kennedy, who under-
stood that the policy of the rabid ones was leading the United States
to catastrophe."
Other speakers at the roundtable recalled the assassination
of other Presidents: "in 1856 [sic] Abraham Lincoln; in 1881,
Garfield; McKinley in 1901;" and cited Jean-Paul Sartre as authority
"that the murder shows the fanaticism to which the racial struggle
in the United States leads." Matveyev, when his turn came again,
stated: "it was far from fortuitous that this foul murder took
place in Dallas. In that city as far back as the thirties the most
extreme fascist circles had made a nest for themselves and furiously
opposed the then President of the United States, Franklin Roosevelt."
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Generously financed by Texas oil millionaires, "the American
extremists became especially active in 1961, when President Kennedy
came to power." One of these "oil kings", Matveyev said, "admitted
openly in 1962 that he subsidized the activities of the fascist
groups to the tune of one million dollars per year," citing Fred
Cook (a writer for the weekly The Nation) concerning the "fraternal
alliance of the fanatics and part of the most important corporations
in America."
The foregoing line of thought continued, with variations and
some additions, in all the Soviet mass media throughout the month
following the President's assassination. With regard to the admin-
istration of President Johnson, the general assessment from Soviet
radio commentators was that little immediate change in American
foreign policy could be expected, but that the new President was in
many respects untried in the international field and that no present
judgement was possible. Cautious Moscow comments indicated hope
that President Kennedy's "peaceful coexistence policy" would be
continued.
The arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald and indications that he had
been associated with Communist causes occasioned a major problem for
Soviet propagandists. Their first recourse was surprisingly weak,
but traditional: they simply suppressed the facts. It was not until
midafternoon Saturday before Radio Moscow mentioned Oswald's name,
and it was early evening before TASS broke the news that Oswald
allegedly had past Communist connections. The manner in which TASS
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introduced this news was as follows: "American news agencies and
television stations have broadcast reports based on statements by
Dallas police officials who make only one thing clear: they are
attempting to link the Communist Party with the murder of the
President."
To a Western observer this distortion is all the more incredible
because it did not take place in a vacuum. Voice of America, the
British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Liberty and other Western
stations had sizeable audiences within the USSR during this period.
Between the extra attention which was undoubtedly paid to Western
radio during the aftermath of the President's assassination, and
word-of-mouth relaying of the news, there can hardly have been a
significant proportion of the Soviet population who did not very
quickly hear non-Communist versions of the events.
Eventually, however, Soviet media succumbed to the necessity
of taking note of reports on Oswald's efforts for "Fair Play for
Cuba" and his past residence in the Soviet Union. Their handling
of this news was rather ingenious. Radio Moscow's star commentator
Valentin Zorin said: "For hours on end, certain American propaganda
organs have been asserting that Oswald is allegedly a Communist and
has some connection with the organization for a sensible policy toward
Cuba." Zorin then countered this allegation with a report that the
U.S. Communist Party had repudiated Oswald and condemned the crime,
and that it had pointed out "...the generally known truth that no
person preaching or practicing terror or violence can be a member
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of the Communist Party."
Before Ruby's attack on Oswald Soviet commentators had agreed
upon the following line: Oswald might be the killer, but any connection
of him or his, deed with Communism could only be a lie and a "provocation;"
somehow, the killing had to be a reactionary plot. The murder of
President Kennedy's assassin raised new issues. Moscow radio was
temporarily cautious, asking why Oswald's transfer was advertised,
how Ruby was admitted to the scene, what his motives might have been,
and so on.
Soviet radio commentators were hardly alone in asking these
questions: Americans were asking the same questions and more. The
difference was in the assurance with which Russian propagandists
immediately and confidently supplied the answers. There began a
steady buildup of purported fact and comment on Texas: the
state was pictured as a nest of lawlessness, gangsterism, rapacious
oil millionaires, and a center of the John Birch movement. The
earlier attack on U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and a variety of
threats against President Kennedy were recalled. The charge that
"extreme rightwing elements" had been responsible for President
Kennedy's assassination was accentuated in the wake of Oswald's murder,
which was said to have been perpetrated by "the same people" who
assassinated the President. -Soviet radio commentators concluded
that Ruby was hired by these reactionaries to silence Oswald before
he could prove that he wasn't really a Communist. The Dallas
authorities' earlier statements about Oswald and his murder were
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claimed to reflect an attempt to hide the fact that reactionaries
incited and engineered the President's death as well as an attempt
to turn the world's indignation against the Communists and to fan
a hysterical, anti-Communist, anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban campaign.
On Tuesday, November 26th, prominently and widely reporting
President Johnson's messages to Khrushchev and other heads of state,
Moscow radio emphasized the new President's expressed determination
"to continue John Kennedy's efforts to dispel East-West tensions and
lessen the danger of a nuclear war." A Moscow commentator observed
that President Johnson's emphasis on the peaceful solution of disputed
problems "can only be welcomed" and was of "particular importance"
after President Kennedy's assassination, when "the most reactionary
and aggressive circles of the United States at once sought to use
this crime to exacerbate international tensions." The commentator
pointed out that the USSR was not removing from its agenda proposals
for a nonaggression pact, the prevention of surprise attacks, and
the reduction of military budgets. The Soviet people heard President
Johnson's statement "with satisfaction," Soviet commentator Zorin
told Moscow radio's domestic audience.
TASS reports on the activities of Anastas Mikoyan noted the
Soviet First Deputy Premier's comment that he was "highly satisfied"
with his meeting with President Johnson, and his remark that "we
have found ways for the continuation of disarmament negotiations."
TASS also reported Mikoyan's exchange with newsmen concerning a
possible Johnson-Khrushchev meeting.
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On the 26th Moscow commentators continued to express the belief
that the shooting of the late President and of the alleged assassin
Oswald were the work of rightist forces, which "abhor international
relaxation and are pressing for world nuclear conflict." In connection
with the investigation of the assassination, domestic service listeners
were told: "The fact that the Dallas tragedy places a stain of shame
on the much-vaunted American democracy worries even the bourgeois
press." Moscow radio impugned the Dallas police handling of the
Oswald case, which they said raised serious doubts about Oswald's
guilt.
Having carefully constructed a role for Oswald as the dupe of
a reactionary plot, Soviet propagandists, in somewhat of a reversal,
began on the 27th to write Oswald out of that plot. Citing the
opinions of Austrian and Italian rifle experts which had been reported
in the Western press, Moscow commentators contended that it would
have taken two men to fire three bullets so quickly. Then they began
to question whether either of this hypothetical pair was Oswald.
Moscow sources continued to circulate extensive reports of conflicting
and "suspicious" evidence regarding the assassination of the President
as "proof" that the rightwing origins of the affair were yet to be
revealed.
Also on November 27th, and again on the 28th, President Johnson's
speech to a joint session of Congress was widely reported in factual,
summary form by the Moscow radio and TASS. A Moscow commentator,
noting the new President's expressed intention to implement President
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Kennedy's ideas and ideals "in a constructive way," said that if the
new President referred to Kennedy's efforts "toward strengthening
peace and solving disputed problems through peaceful means, this
statement is of course worthy of appreciation." He added that the
USSR "heartily desires" that "honest friendship triumph in relations
between all countries)' Moscow radio's Tuchnin told the home audience
that Johnson had again confirmed that he would continue Kennedy's
policies. Scattered Moscow commentaries warned of the spirit of
hatred and violence in the United States encouraged by the forces of
the extreme right, and voiced hope that President Johnson would resist
pressure from the supporters of the cold war.
Finally, on the 28th, TASS cited a Christian Science Monitor
Washington correspondent's observations that perhaps the major ques-
tion in Washington then was "when and where the President would meet
Soviet Premier Khrushchev." TASS said that while many believed a
summit meeting would be "an unwise step until the new President has
had more time to become accustomed to his role," some felt that
"sooner or later President Johnson would have to meet the Soviet Premier
informally, if only to establish personal contact."
Friday, November 29th, brought another distinct turn in the
Soviet propagandists' line. A week after the Dallas tragedy there
was "evidence" that Oswald had in fact been a rightist and even an
anti-Communist U.S. intelligence agent. Moscow radio carried Soviet
press reports of a statement by the stenographer who worked on
Oswald's manuscript about the USSR, including her impression that he
737
was an American spy. Moscow commentators said this new material
"completely exposed the lies and fabrications of the reactionaries
who said he was a Communist." Moscow radio also continued to circulate
reports, mainly from the Western press, casting doubt on the Dallas
police version of Lee Harvey Oswald's role in the assassination of
President Kennedy and his reported Communist sympathies. Soviet
sources maintained that the U.S. and Western public did not believe
that Oswald was solely responsible for the assassination or that he
was inspired by Communism.
Also on November 29th, and again on the 30th, scattered and
brief Moscow radio comments on the President's address to Congress
generally continued to express satisfaction that he indicated he
would continue the policy of seeking international agreement and
unders tanding.
Moscow television began to report President Kennedy's assassin-
ation and its aftermath on Saturday, November 23rd. Twice that day
there were telecasts of visits of Khrushchev and Gromyko to the resi-
dence of Ambassador Foy Kohler, showing the two Soviet officials
signing the visitors' book under President Kennedy's portrait and
observing a minute of silence with solemn faces. Over American
Telephone and Telegraph Company's Telestar satellite, Moscow tele-
vision saw a video recording of President Kennedy's funeral cortege,
saw his flag-draped casket lying in state, and his family and friends
paying their last respects.
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Again and again Moscow television featured Soviet commentaries
on the late President's peace efforts, his espousal of "peaceful
co-existence," and his dedication to the "consolidation of Soviet-
American cooperation." In a special broadcast Moscow television
showed him signing the partial nuclear test-ban treaty. This treaty
was invariably referred to as the "Moscow Treaty" and the claim was
constantly made that it was a product of Soviet initiative, completely
ignoring the fact that in substance it was originally proposed under
the Eisenhower administration in 1958. Moscow television also
featured two documentaries supplied by the American embassy: President
Kennedy's inaugural and his speech at the American University in
Washington, D.C., June 10, 1963, described by the Soviet television
announcer as given at "Washington University" and extolled as in the
spirit of the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence," though not always
consistently so.
Moscow television audiences were also able to view, live on
the 24th, the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald by Jack Ruby. After
seeing this dramatic event with their own eyes, the contours of a
premeditated plot must have seemed perfectly clear to a large segment
of the Soviet population. By and large, Soviet television coverage
of the President's assassination and the events which followed it
closely paralleled domestic press and radio reportage.
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Results of the content analysis
We have content analyzed a sample of the material transmitted
over the Moscow domestic service during the ten-day period following
the assassination of President Kennedy. Approximately thirty
different broadcasts were coded for six different times of day and
for each of the four themes in the scenario. For reasons outlined
in the previous chapter, the coding of themes was limited to broad-
casts carried by the Moscow domestic service and to only a small
sample of the total material disseminated by this source after the
assassination. From the pattern of theme appearances found in the
Moscow domestic service broadcasts we inferred a likely pattern of
appearances over the ten radio media in the simulation. We also
used the results of the radio content analysis to infer a likely
pattern of theme appearances over the four television media in the
simulation. The radio and television broadcast schedules, as well
as the assumptions used in making these inferences, are included in
Appendix B (Tables B.ll-B.14).
Tables 7.2 and 7.3 summarize the message schedules obtained
by content analyzing Moscow domestic service broadcasts and spreading
the resulting theme occurrences over all fourteen Soviet electronic
media in the simulation. They show estimated totals of 736 occurrences
1 1The times of day coded for the content analysis of Soviet
radio broadcasts, and for the content inference of Soviet television
broadcasts, appear on sample code sheets in Appendix B (Tables B.2
and B.3).
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of the four themes in the ten radio media and 837 occurrences of
12
the four themes in the four television media. Two features of the
resulting radio and television message schedules are worth noting.
First, the message schedules obtained for Soviet electronic
media closely resemble the schedule obtained for the domestic press
(Table 7.1) in regard to the relative frequency of each tehem's
appearance over the ten-day period. In each case "the assassination
of President Kennedy" (theme 1) and "the establishment of the Warren
Commission" (theme 4) are the themes that occur with the most and
least frequencies respectively. Each message schedule shows "the
swearing-in-of Johnson as President" (theme 2) and "the assassination
of Oswald" (theme 3) as the two themes receiving an intermediate level
of coverage, with the rank-ordering of their frequencies of occurrence
reversed between print and electronic media.
As in the case of the Cuban crisis simulation, electronic
message schedules for the Kennedy assassination scenario were con-
structed from a much sparser data base than the print message
schedules, and a different definition of individual message occurrences
was used for each of these media types.13 Thus, the ordinal similarity
1 2For the portions of the day which each of these fourteen media
span, see Appendix B (Tables B.12 and B.14).
1 3In addition, content analyses for the print and electronic
message schedules were coded by two different persons. Observations
similar to those made regarding the reliability and validity of the
content analyzed press material (n. , p. ) apply to the content
analyzed radio material as well.
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in theme emphasis between Soviet print and electronic message sched-
ules synthesized for the Kennedy assassination scenario suggests that
these media must have covered the assassination with a substantial
degree of uniformity and coordination.
Foreign radio coverage
Overview
For reasons explained in the preceding chapter we do not have
sufficient source data to describe coverage of the Kennedy assassina-
tion and its aftermath by the BBC and Radio Liberty in their broad-
casts to the USSR. But transcripts of Voice of America broadcasts
obtained from the USIA do enable us to describe this station's
coverage.
Beginning on November 22nd at 11:00 p.m. Moscow Central Time
(only one and one-half hours after news of President Kennedy's death
had been made public), and continuing for the next several days,
virtually every Voice of America broadcast beamed to the USSR was
devoted to news about the assassination of President Kennedy and
related events. Up to this period VOA had been broadcasting seven
hours a day to the Soviet Union, but on the day after the President's
assassination the station added one special half-hour broadcast to
its regular schedule, and on each succeeding day through December 1st,
anywhere from two to four special half-hour broadcasts were added to
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the normal VOA programming.1 4
During the late evening of November 22nd VOA's Russian-
language programs included flash bulletins giving the latest news
about President Kennedy's assassination. There were no Georgian,
Ukrainian, or Armenian broadcasts on the assassination during this
period. On November 23rd VOA's Ukrainian broadcasts included the
report of Kennedy's death and Johnson's swearing-in, a roundup of
domestic U.S. reaction--including statements by Goldwater, Rocke-
feller, Mansfield, Truman, Eisenhower, Stevenson, and a number of
Republican Senators, a review of reactions to the tragedy in Britain,
France, Italy, the Vatican, West Germany, Norway, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Spain, Sweden, the USSR, Greece, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey,
Ghana, and Latin America, biographies of Kennedy and Johnson, a
report on President Johnson's airport statement and his activities
during his first day in office, a roundup of reactions in Portugal,
Finland, the Philippines, Japan, Pakistan, India, and the USSR,
a review of President Kennedy's book "Profiles in Courage", and a news
analysis entitled "Continuity of the American Presidency."
VOA's Georgian and Armenian broadcasts on the 23rd included
an account of the assassination, biographies of Kennedy and Johnson,
a review of U.S. and world reaction, and a news analysis entitled
"Mr. Kennedy's Death: Its Meaning to the Nation."
1 4 For the scheduling of these additional broadcasts see
Appendix B (Table B.16).
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Russian-language broadcasts carried by VOA on the 23rd included
continuing announcements of President Kennedy's death, a report on
Johnson's airport statement, a roundup of U.S. and world reaction,
biographies of Kennedy and Johnson, an account of the memorial
service to be held at a Russian Orthodox Church, reports on Oswald's
arrest and accusation, an account of President Johnson's activities--
including his conferences with top aides, and a report that President
Johnson had designated November 25th a national day of mourning.
On Sunday, November 24th, VOA's Georgian, Armenian, and Ukrainian
broadcasts included a report on funeral arrangements for President
Kennedy, an account of President Johnson's activities and his procla-
mation of a national day of mourning, and a report on the arrival of
world leaders in Washington for Kennedy's funeral. In addition,
Georgian broadcasts included a rebroadcast of the news analysis
entitled "the continuity of the American Presidency," a correspond-
ent's assessment of the likely impact of Kennedy's death on the U.N.,
and a roundup of European reaction to the tragedy. Armenian and
Ukrainian broadcasts included a special feature entitled "John
Fitzgerald Kennedy, the Man and the President" and roundups of U.S.
and world reaction. Ukrainian broadcasts also included a report on
the latest statement by Dallas police regarding the investigation and
a news analysis entitled "Mr. Kennedy's Death: Its Meaning to the
Nation."
VOA's Russian-language broadcasts on the 24th included an
account of the Kennedy funeral arrangements, a report on President
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Johnson's first cabinet meeting and his proclamation of a national
day of mourning, a report on various mourning activities in the U.S.
and on the world dignitaries who were arriving in Washington for
the funeral, an account of Oswald's arrest and of his being charged
with the murder, a eulogy of President Kennedy by Archbishop John
of San Francisco, a review of foreign press comment, a rebroadcast
of the special feature entitled "Profiles in Courage", an account
of the orderly transition of U.S. governmental power, a report of
the Dallas police claim that they had enough evidence to convict
Oswald, a special feature entitled "America's Religious Leaders and
the Death of President Kennedy," a report that Lee Harvey Oswald
was in critical condition as the result of being shot by Jack Ruby
(first broadcast at 10:00 p.m. Moscow Central Time), a report listing
the world leaders to be present at Kennedy's funeral, an account of
the requiem masses to be held at Saint Patrick's Cathedral and the
Russian Orthodox Church of Saint Nicholas, and a report that Oswald
had died after being shot by Jack Ruby (first broadcast at midnight,
Moscow Central Time).
On Monday, November 25th, VOA's Georgian broadcasts included
a report on the crowds which had filed past Kennedy's coffin in the
Capital rotunda and on the eulogies delivered there by Warren,
Mansfield, and MacCormack, a report on the foreign dignitaries who
had arrived in the U.S. for the funeral, a review of President
Johnson's activities, the report that Oswald had been shot, and a
rebroadcast of the special feature "John Fitzgerald Kennedy--the
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Man and the President." Armenian and Ukrainian broadcasts included a
review of activities in the Capital rotunda, a report on preparations
for the funeral, and a special feature entitled "A Country in Mourning."
Ukrainian broadcasts on the 25th also included a review of President
Johnson's activities, a report that Mrs. Kennedy would greet digni-
taries in the White House, a roundup of tributes to Kennedy from
Latin America, Iran, Jordan, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Cyprus, Warsaw,
Singapore, Addis Ababa, Paris, and the Vatican, a report that
Oswald had died, and a news analysis entitled "Kennedy, Johnson,
and U.S.-Soviet Relations."
VOA's Russian-language broadcasts on the 25th included a
report on the crowds filing past Kennedy's coffin, an account of the
arrival of heads of state in Washington for Kennedy's funeral, a
roundup of reaction in European and Asiatic countries, a rebroadcast
of the special feature "John Fitzgerald Kennedy--the Man and the
President," a report that the requiem mass for Kennedy would be read
by Cardinal Cushing, a review of the memorial services that were
being held for Kennedy in various parts of the world, an account
of the funeral procession and the church and graveside services to
be held for President Kennedy, a report on the condolences from Nina
Khrushchev, a report that the NATO Permanent Council had called for
a special meeting to pay tribute to the late President, an account of
President Johnson's letters to Kennedy's children, a review of
Richard Nixon's comments on Oswald's death, a report on Cardinal
Ritter's remarks about the assassination of President Kennedy, a
748
report that the largest television link-up in European history would
bring scenes of the President's funeral to the USSR, and detailed
reportage on the funeral procession and the laying-to-rest ceremony--
including requiem music, drums, the church service, and the Arlington
Cemetary burial.
On Tuesday, November 26th, VOA's Ukranian broadcasts included
a program devoted to President Kennedy's funeral, a review of Presi-
dent Johnson's activities on Monday and Tuesday and a report that he
would address Congress on Wednesday, a TASS report on LBJ's message
to Khrushchev, an account of the U.N. General Assembly session in
memory of JFK, and news analyses entitled "The Compounding of
National Tragedy" and "The New President." Georgian broadcasts
carried by VOA on the 26th included detailed reportage of the Kennedy
funeral, a report on Johnson's meetings with world leaders, his
message to Khrushchev, and his intention to address Congress on
Wednesday, and special features entitled "The Requiem Mass" and
"Burial at Arlington." Armenian broadcasts included a review of
President Johnson's activities the day of the funeral, detailed
reportage on the funeral, a rebroadcast of the news analysis entitled
"The Continuity of the American Presidency," and a special, feature
entitled "Lyndon Baines Johnson."
VOA's Russian-language broadcasts on the 26th included a report
on the mourning day in Washington, accounts of President Johnson's
messages to leaders of sixty countries, an account of the reception
for world dignitaries held at the State Department, a report on the
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expression of condolences from the U.S. Congress to Mrs. Kennedy,
an account of the U.N. General Assembly's special memorial session,
a report that the investigation in Dallas would be continued,
reportage on the funeral procession and graveside ceremony, a report
on President Johnson's message to the U.S. armed forces and on his
planned address to Congress, a report that the bodies of Patrolman
Tippit and Oswald had been buried the previous day, accounts of
tributes to the memory of JFK from American artists and from
various foreign countries, a rebroadcast of the news analysis "The
Compounding of National Tragedy" and the special feature "Lyndon B.
Johnson", an account of President Johnson's statements on U.S.
policies and his meeting with the governors, a news analysis entitled
"Kennedy, Johnson and U.S.-Soviet Relations," a report that President
Johnson would continue to pursue the objectives of President Kennedy's
administration, a report that leading world figures were returning
home, and a news analysis entitled "Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."
On Wednesday, November 27th, VOA's Georgian and Armenian
broadcasts included a report that President Johnson would be addressing
a joint session of Congress that day, an account of Stevenson's
tribute to Kennedy in the U.N., a report that thousands of persons
were visiting Kennedy's grave and that mourning for the late President
was continuing all over the world, a report that Ruby had been
charged with Oswald's murder and that an investigation of both
assassinations was continuing, and a news analysis entitled "The New
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President in Action." Georgian broadcasts also included a rebroad-
cast of the news analysis entitled "The Compounding of National
Tragedy," and Armenian broadcasts included a report that President
Johnson would meet with leaders of Britain, West Germany, and France
early the following year, an account of Johnson's meeting with
Mikoyan, and a special feature entitled "How does the American
Government Work?" In addition to most of the foregoing programs,
VOA's Ukrainian broadcasts on the 27th included news analyses and
special features entitled, respectively, "Continuity Without Con-
fusion," "Another Profile of Courage" (Mrs. Kennedy), "The Feeling
of Humanity" (Europe), and "The 36th President."
Russian-language broadcasts carried by VOA on the 27th
included a recap of President Johnson's meetings with foreign repre-
sentatives, a report that expressions of support for President Johnson
were continuing, a report that a Grand Jury in Dallas had charged
Jack Ruby with the murder of Oswald, an account of tributes to
Kennedy in the U.N. General Assembly and in various European capitals,
news analyses entitled "President Johnson and U.S. Foreign Policy,"
"Another Profile in Courage," "The New President," "Continuity Without
Confusion," and "President Johnson and the Far East," A European
correspondent's report entitled "Europe Views J.F.K.'s Funeral," a
report on the continuing investigation of President Kennedy's
assassination, and an account of President Johnson's address to
Congress.
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On Thursday, November 28th, VOA's Georgian, Armenian, and
Ukrainian broadcasts included a report on the new President's speech
to Congress and the reaction of U Thant and others to the speech, a
report that Mrs. Kennedy would be moving from the White House, an
account of an interview with Governor Connally and his remarks on the
Kennedy assassination, a program describing the sad Thanksgiving in
the U.S., and a report that a Kennedy cultural memorial had been
suggested. VOA Russian-language broadcasts on the 28th included a
report on President Johnson's address and reaction to it in Congress
and around the world, a rebroadcast of the special feature "The 36th
President," a report that Mrs. Kennedy would be moving into Averill
Harriman's home, an account of Governor Connally's remarks about
President Kennedy's assassination, a report that a bill had been
introduced in Congress to name a cultural center for President Kennedy,
a reading of Kennedy's Thanksgiving Day proclamation, a report that
a Peiping delegate had denounced President Kennedy, an account of
how John Jr. had saluted his father, a report on the Kennedy family
gathering at: Hyannisport, and an account of American artists' tribute
to the late President.
On Friday, October 29th, VOA's Georgian, Armenian, and Ukrainian
broadcasts included a report on President Johnson's Thanksgiving
message, a roundup of reactions to the President's address to Congress,
a program about the slain policeman's (Tippit's) family, and a news
analysis entitled "Time for Effective Action." Georgian and Ukrainian
broadcasts also included accounts of how the Johnson's and the
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Kennedy's were spending Thanksgiving, and the American and Ukrainian
broadcasts included a report on how the Chinese Communist delegates
to the Warsaw conference had attempted to block a tribute paid to
Kennedy. Each of the three nationality language broadcasts included
special features entitled, respectively, "West Europe Watches
Transition," "East Europe Welcomes Speech," and "U.S. Press on This
Year's Thanksgiving Day."
VOA's Russian-language broadcasts on the 29th included an
account of President Johnson's Thanksgiving speech, a report on the
new President's conferences with top advisers, a report on the
pilgrimage to Kennedy's grave, a roundup of reaction abroad to
President Johnson's address, a program about the slain policeman's
family, an account of the tributes that were being paid to President
Kennedy all over the world and, a review of American economic
development during the previous three years.
On Saturday, November 30th, VOA's Georgian, Armenian and
Ukrainian broadcasts included a report that President Johnson had
named a special Commission--headed by Chief Justice Warren--to
conduct a full investigation of President Kennedy's assassination,
accounts of continuing world-wide tributes to President Kennedy,
and a special feature entitled "U.S. Government Thanks for Soviet
Expressions of Sympathy." In addition, Georgian broadcasts included
a report on the crowds visiting Kennedy's grave and a special feature
entitled "A Reason for Thanks." Armenian broadcasts also included a
news analysis entitled "The U.S. & Self-Determination," a roundup of
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European editorial reaction to President Johnson's speech, and a
report that Asian nations had been reassured by the speech.
Ukrainian broadcasts included a review of the week's events.
VOA Russian-language broadcasts on the 30th included a report
on President Johnson's establishment of the Warren Commission, a
review of the new President's activities for the day, accounts of
continuing tributes to President Kennedy's memory from around the
world, a report on the U.S. government's official message of thanks
for Soviet condolences, a roundup of American and foreign press
reactions to President Johnson's address to Congress, and a review
of President Kennedy's achievements and the tasks facing LBJ.
On Sunday, December 1st, VOA's Georgian broadcasts included
a report on President Johnson's schedule of activities for the day,
an announcement that the Soviet embassy had turned over Russian files
on Oswald to the U.S. State Department, an account of Dean Rusk's
thanks to Moscow for their expressions of sympathy, a review of the
week's events, a rebroadcast of the special feature "Profile in
Courage," and a special religious feature entitled "John F. Kennedy."
In addition to many of these programs VOA's Armenian broadcasts in-
cluded a report on the continuing investigation of President Kennedy's
assassination, and Ukrainian broadcasts included a rebroadcast of
the news analysis entitled "President Johnson's Foreign Policy."
Russian-language broadcasts carried by VOA on the 1st included
a report that the Soviet embassy had given Oswald's files to the U.S.
State Department, an account of the pilgrimage to Kennedy's grave,
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the news analysis entitled "President Johnson's Foreign Policy," a
review of President Johnson's schedule for Sunday and Monday,
accounts of world-wide tributes to the memory of President Kennedy,
and, lastly, a news analysis entitled "Kennedy as a Man in History."
Results of the content analysis
We have content analyzed transcripts of the material broadcast
by Voice of America and Radio Liberty during the first ten days
after President Kennedy's assassination. As a surrogate for British
Broadcasting Corporation broadcasts we also content analyzed issues
of the London Times published during this period. Approximately 1,000
foreign radio broadcasts and a similar number of newspaper articles
were coded for each of the four themes referred to earlier. VOA
and Radio Liberty broadcasts were also coded for their language or
target area and the hour of day during which they occurred. From
the thematic treatment of the Kennedy assassination in the material
content analyzed we were able to infer a likely pattern of theme
appearances over all broadcasts beamed to the USSR by VOA, Radio
Liberty, and the BBC during this period. The broadcast schedules and
assumptions used in making these inferences are included in Appendix B
(Tables B.16-B.19, B.21, and B.22).
Tables 7.4-7.6 summarize the message schedules obtained by
spreading theme appearances in the content analyzed material over all
nine foreign radio media in the simulation. For the four themes they
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show estimated totals of 754 theme occurrences in three Voice of
America media, 717 theme occurrences in three British Broadcasting
Corporation media, and 5,796 theme occurrences in three Radio Liberty
media.15 As in the case of the Cuban crisis scenario, these differ-
ences reflect, in part, the amount of daily broadcasting by each of
the stations and, in part, the way we defined messages for each of
the stations. It is not surprising to note that in all three foreign
radio message schedules the most important theme in the scenario--
President Kennedy's assassination--appears with the greatest fre-
quency, while a theme of relatively low salience--the Warren Commission's
establishment--appears with the lowest frequency.
More worthy of note, perhaps, is the difference between the
message schedules obtained for VOA and the BBC, on the one hand, and
Radio Liberty on the other. Theme 3, "the assassination of Oswald,"
occurs with a greater relative frequency in the Radio Liberty message
schedule than in the VOA and BBC schedules, and theme 2, "the swearing-
in of Johnson as President," occurs with a lower relative frequency in
the Radio Liberty message schedule than in either of the other two
foreign radio schedules. If we interpret total occurrences of
assassination themes (1 and 3) as an index of dramatic or emotional
coverage, and total occurrences of Johnson themes (2 and 4) as an
index of factual or objective coverage, then these differences suggest
that both VOA and the BBC were significantly less emotional than Radio
1 5For the portions of the day which each of these nine media
span see Appendix B (Tables B.17, B.19, and B.22).
759
Liberty in their Kennedy assassination reportage.
It is also interesting to compare the message schedules obtained
for foreign radio with those obtained for Soviet print and electronic
media. Figure 7.1 shows the total number of occurrences of each
of the four themes in the message schedules synthesized for the
three Soviet media types and the three foreign radio media. It can
be seen that a substantial majority of the theme occurrences in both
the Soviet and foreign radio message schedules are related to the
assassination of President Kennedy (65% and 60%), and that an insig-
nificant proportion of the total theme occurrences in both schedules
pertain to the establishment of the Warren Commission (2% and 4%).
For Johnson's swearing-in and Oswald's assassination, however, the
comparison is more interesting. Soviet media as a whole gave greater
relative emphasis to Johnson's swearing-in and less relative emphasis
to Oswald's killing than did foreign radio media as a whole, but
this difference is somewhat misleading because it reflects the dis-
proportionate influence of Radio Liberty in the foreign radio message
count. It is important to note, however, that the Soviet electronic
media's coverage of themes 2 and 3 resembled that of VOA and the BBC,
while the Russian press appears to have functioned more like Radio
Liberty in this regard. The pattern we have been describing probably
16These conclusions should be regarded as highly tentative
because, for reasons outlined in Chapter VI, coding reliability and
validity probably were somewhat lower in the foreign radio content
analyses than in the content analyses done for Soviet domestic media.
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reflects the fact that it is the authoritative foreign radio stations,
such as VOA and (more especially) the BBC, which exert a competitive
influence on Soviet radio and television programming.
The message schedule
Table 7.7 shows the message schedule used for the Kennedy
assassination simulation. It simply combines the schedules obtained
for the Soviet press, radio, and television, and for Voice of America,
Radio Liberty, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. In summary,
the content analyses from which these schedules were derived covered
a sample of the material that appeared during the aftermath of the
Kennedy assassination in twenty-eight of the fifty-six media concept-
ualized in the simulation. Approximately 7,000 different articles
and broadcasts were coded in all (including the broadcasts duplicated
for the television content inference), resulting in a total of 1,628
occurrences of the four themes in the twenty-eight media. Combining
the content analyses with print periodicities and broadcast schedules
we inferred an additional 8,256 occurrences of the four themes in
these and the other twenty-eight simulated media, resulting in an
estimated total of 9,884 occurrences of the four themes in the fifty-
six simulated media during the first ten days following the Kennedy
assassination.
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Table 7.7--Continued
aNo. of theme occurrences found in the content analyses.
bAdditional no. of theme occurrences inferred.
CEstimated total no. of theme occurrences.
We have assumed that members of the Soviet population who
would have attended oral agitation meetings attended, on the average,
two such meetings during the ten-day period encompassed by the
Kennedy assassination simulation. We have also assumed that the bulk
of Soviet oral agitation meetings during the Cuban crisis period
occurred on November 24th and December 1st, and we have arbitrarily
set the thematic content of these meetings equal to the thematic
content of Pravda on the 27th. As a result, the estimated total
number of occurrences for each of themes 1 and 2 includes,
respectively, 5 and 1 oral agitation occurrences on the 24th, and
for each of themes 3 and 4 it includes, respectively, 7 and 1 oral
agitation occurrences. (Each oral agitation message was arbitrarily
assigned the format factor that had been assigned to short news
items appearing in Pravda, the latter being the most common format
for newspaper stories.)
eThe simulation allows a maximum of 1,800 occurrences of any
single theme in a scenario. For this reason 4,678 of the estimated
9,884 occurrences of the four themes had to be omitted in constructing
the message schedule for the scenario. For themes 1 and 3 the zeives
in parentheses indicate time periods for which the simulation could
not accept messages as a result of this constraint. Even though
the omission of messages was not distributed evenly across individual
themes, it did not affect the validity of the simulation results,
for the following reasons: No messages had to be omitted during
the first three time periods for theme 1 and the first eight time
periods for theme 3; simulation results indicate that by the end
of these intervals the population had been saturated with exposure
to each of these two themes; our analysis of the simulation results
for these themes is confined to the pre-saturation period.
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Changes in Soviet Habits of Media Use and
Message Response'Triggered by the Assassination
In order to account for changing levels of interest in themes
over the period encompassed by a given scenario, the simulation
programs have been designed so that a researcher can superimpose
dynamic potentialities on the computer population's stable habits of
media use and message response. We now proceed to describe how
dynamics of this kind were specified for the simulated Soviet popula-
tion in the Kennedy assassination scenario.
To account for the Soviet population's changing level of
interest in themes related to the assassination of President Kennedy
we modified individual exposure probabilities as a function of time,
i.e., as a function of the stage of the scenario, rather than on the
basis of individual exposure histories. As in the case of the Cuban
crisis simulation, this choice was dictated by convenience. The
available data on changes in Soviet media-consumption and message-
response behavior during the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination
were qualitative in nature and were organized in terms of time elapsed
since the assassination. From the source materials on Soviet media
coverage cited above (n. , p. ), we were able to reconstruct
the following picture: All strata of Soviet society appear to have
learned about the assassination fairly rapidly. The educated elite
and the broad masses alike became active information-seekers as soon
as they heard the news, rushing to their radio and television sets
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to learn more about the assassination. In addition, there was a
spontaneous outpouring of grief within the USSR, and this emotion was
probably sustained and intensified when the population viewed
Kennedy's funeral, broadcast live via satellite TV, on November
25th. According to one observer, Russian streets were virtually
empty during the funeral telecast because nearly everyone was
watching a set. In addition to experiencing a genuine feeling of
grief over the slain President, the Soviet people also felt appre-
hensive about Kennedy's successor and how his policies would affect
relations between their country and the U.S. After the funeral
telecast, interest in assassination themes probably began to subside
among all strata of the population. Patterns of media consumption
and theme response appear to have gradually returned to normal as
the drama of the weekend faded away.
As in the case of the Cuban crisis, there seem to have been two
distinct levels of awareness within the USSR during the aftermath of
the Kennedy assassination. The poorer-educated, less politically
involved segments of the Soviet population apparently exhibited a more
emotional type of reaction, their interest and concern focusing
mainly on the personal dimensions of the tragedy, while the better-
educated, more politically sophisticated probably were more aware of and
interested in the details and complexities of the Dallas investigation
and the implications of Oswald's arrest and subsequent murder.
To reflect the foregoing dynamics in the Kennedy assassination
scenario we specified the probability modifications described in
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Figure 7.2. In Chapter VI we explained the rationale underlying
the specific values given to the various parameters of probability
modification. The only difference in these parameters between the
Cuban crisis and the Kennedy assassination scenarios is in the time
dependence of probability modifications. By specifying November 22nd
as the day on which each probability increase began and November 23rd
as the day on which it reached its full extent, in the Kennedy
assassination scenario, we insured that there would be no probability
increments on the 22nd and that all increments would have their full
effect on the 23rd. Similarly, by specifying November 25th as the
day on which each probability increase began to recede and December 1st
as the day on which it no longer existed, we insured that all probabil-
ity increments would retain their full effects until the 25th and
diminish in six equal steps each day thereafter until, on December 1st,
they would no longer have any effect.
767
Time phasing of all probability modifications
Modification Starts to Take Effect:
Modification Has Its Full Effect:
Modification Starts to Recede:
November 22nd (T=l)
November 23rd (T=2)
November 25th (T=4)
Modification No Longer Has Any Effect: December 1st (T=10)
Modification #1 Modification #2
Direction and
Magnitude
Normal p 0.0 0.5 Normal p 0.0 0.5
New p 0.2 0.6 New p 0.2 0.6
- -.j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Newspapers Television
Types of Media
Affected
Types of Persons
Affected:
Types of
Probabilities
Affected:
Radio Foreign Radio
Oral Agitation
Those with >10 yrs. ed.
Those with >,7, 10 yrs. ed.
Message Exposure
Radio Foreign Radio
Oral Agitation
Those with >,4, <7 yrs. ed.
Those with <4 yrs. ed.
Message Exposure
Fig. 7.2--Changes in Soviet message exposure probabilities hypothesized
for the Kennedy assassination simulation.
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The Simulated Pattern of Theme Exposures
We are now ready to describe and analyze the simulated Soviet
population's exposure to themes in the Kennedy assassination scenario.
As in Chapter VI, we will examine in turn the buildup of exposures
to individual themes, the distribution of theme exposures across
various population subgroups, the duplication of exposures between
pairs of themes, and the relative importance of different types of
media in diffusing themes.
We have tabulated and plotted in various ways the time series
of exposures produced by the simulation, and our analysis will be
organized around the resulting tables and graphs. Most of the back-
ground information required for interpreting these exhibits has already
been set forth in Chapter VI. Before turning to the analysis,
however, we must explain certain features of the tables and graphs
that are specific to the 1963 scenario.
On each graph that we will analyze, the horizontal axis again
indicates the days of the crisis. It covers the period from November
22nd to December 1st, 1963, or some portion of that interval. As in
the Cuban crisis graphs, a given abscissa represents the end of a
period running from 4:00 a.m. Moscow Central Time on the day with
which it is labeled to 3:59 a.m. Moscow Central time on the following
day.
Because of an error in the simulation program which was described
in Chapter VI, our specification that assassination-triggered increases
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be applied to message exposure probabilities (rather than to
probabilities of exposure to a medium or to a message in a medium)
caused the simulation to ignore the effective exposure ceilings
dictated by illiteracy rates and incomplete television and foreign
radio diffusion networks within the USSR. This had the effect of
artificially inflating the rate of buildup and the ultimate level
of theme exposures via each type of medium. We therefore restrict
our comparative analysis to the period before the hypothesized
probability increases were operant.1 7
The final feature of the tables and graphs requiring explana-
tion is the way in which they represent time. News of President
Kennedy's death was made public on Friday afternoon, November 22nd,
1963, at 2:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. In terms of Moscow Central
time the news was therefore released on Friday evening, November 22nd,
at 9:30 p.m. We chose to begin the Kennedy assassination simulation
at 4:00 a.m. Moscow Central time on Friday morning, November 22nd.
As in the case of the Cuban crisis, tabulated and plotted exposure
values represent statistics at the end of the indicated intervals
or days. For example, Graph 7.1 shows that over fifty per cent of
the Soviet population was exposed to some mass media information
7Fortunately, the simulation results indicate that the
Soviet population's cumulative and repeat exposure to two of the four
Kennedy assassination themes reached a significant level before the
point at which we initiated assassination-triggered increases in
message exposure probabilities. Accordingly, the role played by the
mass media in diffusing news of the Kennedy assassination to the Soviet
population is largely observable in the "pre-triggering" portion of
the simulation output.
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about the assassination of President Kennedy at the end of the first
simulation time period, i.e., by 4:00 a.m. Moscow Central Time
on the morning of November 23rd, or six and one-half hours after
news of the President's death had been made public.
Having noted these important features of the data, we are
now ready to analyze the simulated time series of Soviet exposures
to themes about the assassination of President Kennedy.
The buildup of theme exposures
In Table 7.8 we present some of the important input and output
statistics for two of the themes in the Kennedy assassination scenario. 1 8
For each theme the table shows the number of messages in the simulated
media, the number of exposures to those messages within the simulated
population, the average number of exposures per person in the population
as a whole, the average number of exposures per message, the number
of persons exposed at least once to each theme, the number of persons
exposed at least once per message, and the average number of exposures
per person in the exposed population. These statistics are the values
at the end of the first time period (or at the end of a simulated
Not shown are the exposure outcomes for theme 3, "the assassi-
nation of Oswald," which did not begin until time period 3 (November
24th), and theme 4, "the establishment of the Warren Commission,"
which did not begin until time period 9 (November 30th). Exposure
outcomes for these themes were distorted by a programming error in
the probability-triggering routine described in Chapter VI.
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twenty-four hour interval). We choose a one-day "snapshot" of the
population's theme exposure for purposes of analysis because, by the
end of this period, substantial proportions of the population had
been exposed to the two most important themes in the scenario, and
the distortions produced by crisis-triggered probability increases
had not yet. begun to occur.
The number of exposures for the population as a whole at the
end of the first day ranges from 827 exposures to the theme of
Johnson's swearing-in, for which 53 messages appeared, to 2,112
exposures to the theme of Kennedy's assassination, for which there
were 159 messages. The exposure difference between themes 1 and 2
suggests, not surprisingly, that a significantly greater number of
messages carrying the Kennedy assassination theme reached the Russian
population than messages carrying the presidential succession theme.
It is interesting to note that while the number of messages carrying
the first theme during the first time period is exactly three times
the number of messages carrying the second theme, the total and
average number of exposures to the former are only about two and one-
half times the corresponding figures for the latter.
The source of this disparity between coverage and exposure
can be attributed to the fact that the average number of exposures
to a message conveying the Kennedy assassination theme (13.3) is
somewhat less than the average number of exposures to a message
conveying the presidential succession theme (15.6). This average is
just the expected number of exposures for the population divided by
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the number of messages. As we pointed out in Chapter VI, it depends
on the sizes of the average audiences for the media in which the
messages for a theme appear, and on the formatting of those messages.
Therefore, the simulation results indicate, perhaps somewhat surprisingly,
that the audiences for media in which most mentions of the new U.S.
President appeared were slightly larger, on the average, than the
audiences for media in which most mentions of President Kennedy's
assassination appeared, and that the formatting of messages for the
presidential succession theme was probably not much less salient,
on the average, than the formatting of messages for the Kennedy
assassination theme.
In spite of this difference between themes 1 and 2, however,
the most interesting aspect of the simulation output summarized in
Table 7.8 is the rate at which the Soviet population was exposed to
both themes. While the average numbers of exposures to the two
themes are 1.8 and 0.7 respectively, for the population as a whole at
the end of the first time period, we note that over fifty per cent
of the population (625 simulated persons) was exposed at least once
to the Kennedy assassination theme and more than one-third of the
population (403 simulated persons) was exposed at least once to the
theme of Johnson's swearing-in. These figures suggest that substantial
segments of the Soviet population were exposed to news of the principal
consequences of the tragedy within seven hours of Kennedy's death.
Moreover, it seems probable that two or three exposures in this short
a period would have been sufficient to alter the cognition of the
774
average exposed person. Accordingly, the simulation results suggest
that a substantial; segment of the Russian people had learned of
President Kennedy's assassination and his succession by Lyndon Johnson
within a matter of hours after these events occurred. 1 9
It is interesting to compare these outcomes with the Cuban
crisis results. From our discussion in Chapter VI the reader will
recall that it was not until some twenty-six hours after President
Kennedy's quarantine speech that cumulative exposure levels within
the Soviet population reached the 30-60 per cent range (in all but
the case of one theme). The two Kennedy assassination themes, on
the other hand, attained that degree of penetration within six hours
of the President's death. This difference is even more significant
when one recalls that the story of President Kennedy's assassination
broke during the late evening hours, Moscow time, while the Cuban
19 This represents an extraordinarily high penetration rate for
a news event emanating from the non-Communist world. It is difficult
to make a comparison with corresponding figures in the West, however,
because of the way in which the latter are reported. For example,
Sheatsley and Feldman cite the results of a NORC survey showing two-
thirds of the American public reached with news of the event in one
hour, ninety per cent in two hours, and virtually everybody in less
than four hours (Paul B. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, "The
Assassination of President Kennedy: A Preliminary Report on Public
Reactions and Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVIII (Summer,
1964), 189-215). The authors report that about half of the people
in these statistics (47%) first received word of the assassination
by means of radio or television, another forty-nine per cent through
telephone calls or personal messages, and the remaining four per cent
from newspapers or other sources, but they do not indicate (possibly
because the survey did not) what percentages of the population
were reached at least once by the mass media.
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missile crisis erupted during the early part of the morning. Thus,
while both the Cuban crisis and the Kennedy assassination were fast-
breaking, rapidly-diffused international news events, it seems
apparent that the Kennedy assassination themes penetrated the Soviet
population much faster and in far greater depth.
We have been analyzing a simulated record of the Soviet popu-
lation's exposure to Kennedy assassination themes at a given point
in time--seven hours after President Kennedy's death. To put this
analysis in a dynamic perspective we now consider Graph 7.1, which
shows the simulated buildup of cumulative and repeat exposure over
a period of several days.20 As one would expect, the difference in
cumulative exposure to the two themes narrows over time. We also note
that by the end of the second time period, some thirty-one hours after
President Kennedy's death, virtually 100 per cent of the Soviet popula-
tion has been exposed at least once to each of the themes, and that the
average person has been exposed well over twenty times to each theme.
Finally, we observe that, while the difference in cumulative exposure
to the two themes tends to narrow over time, the difference in repeat
exposure apparently broadens somewhat, at least between the first two
time periods. This reflects the fact that after November 22nd each
additional exposure to the Kennedy assassination theme was more likely,
on the average, to involve a person already exposed to that theme than
each additional exposure to the presidential succession theme.
20Exposure outcomes for themes 3 and 4 are not shown for the
reasons discussed in n. on p.
PERCENTAGE OF THE
POPULATION EXPOSED
AT LEAST ONCE
AVERAGE NUMBER OF
EXPOSURES AMONG
PERSONS EXPOSED
AT LEAST ONCE
Graph 7.1.
FREQUENCY BY
NOVEMBER- DECEMBER 1963
-- KENNEDY ASSASSINATION = REACH AND
THEME
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The distribution of theme exposures over
population subgroups
For the simulation population as a whole, and for each level
of the "age" and "education" dimensions, Table 7.9 shows the cumu-
lative percentage of persons exposed to individual Kennedy assassi-
nation themes at least once and the average cumulative number of
exposures per person among those exposed at least once, after one
time period of the scenario. The number of exposures per person
is slightly undercounted for each theme, for reasons discussed in
Chapter VI. By comparing the expected average number of exposures
per exposed person in the simulation population as a whole (Table 7.9)
with the corresponding statistic summed over the various media types
(Table 7.8), we can determine the total amount of undercounting for
each theme. The comparison shows that by the end of the first time
period only 3.0 per cent of the exposures to theme 1 were uncounted
and none of the exposures to theme 2 were uncounted. The reader will
recall from our discussion in Chapter VI that the nature of this
undercounting is such that its magnitude increases with the expected
average number of exposures per person. As a result, those popula-
tion subgroups having the greatest repeat exposure to the Kennedy
assassination theme are probably also the ones for which this
statistic is most underestimated.
The cumulative and repeat exposure figures in Table 7.9 differ
significantly between the two themes, and for each individual theme
the exposure figures also vary within socio-demographic categories.
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In every case, however, we find greater exposure to theme 1 and,
as in the Cuban crisis exposure outcomes, young people more exposed
than older people, educated people more exposed than the less well-
educated. (The simulation results also showed urbanites slightly
more exposed to Kennedy assassination themes than rural persons.
Once again, however, they showed no significant exposure differences
by "sex" or "political involvement.") Persons with more than ten
years of education have 34.7 and 35.8 per cent more cumulative exposure
to themes 1 and 2, respectively, than persons with less than four
years of education. The corresponding ranges on the age dimension
are 9.4 and 7.8 per cent. These simulation outcomes suggest the same
type of conclusion reached on the basis of the Cuban crisis results,
viz., that (1) the "education" dimension accounts for more of the
variation in exposure to Kennedy assassination themes over subgroups
of the Soviet population than either the "sex", "age", "political
involvement", or "residence" dimension, and (2) the "age" dimension
explains more of the residual variation than either the "sex",
"political involvement", or "residence" dimension.
An interesting and important feature of Table 7.9 is the
pattern of exposure differences which it reveals. Seven hours after
President Kennedy's assassination, at least forty per cent, and in
most cases a majority, of the Russians on each dimension level had
been exposed at least once to news of the assassination. At the same
time, however, with the exception of persons having greater than
ten years of education, between two-thirds and three-quarters of the
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Russians on each dimension level had not been exposed to any media
reports that Lyndon Johnson was the new President. This pattern
suggests that as long as seven hours after President Kennedy's death,
the combination of Soviet domestic media and incoming foreign radio
still had not reached a substantial majority of the Soviet population
with the news that Lyndon Johnson was the new American President.
Graphs 7.2 and 7.3 show the buildup of cumulative and repeat
exposure to the two Kennedy assassination themes over a period of
days, on each level of the "age" and "education" dimensions, in the
simulated Soviet population. We note that the general pattern
observed at the end of the first time period (Table 7.9) prevails
at the end of the second and third time periods as well: the better-
educated and the young more rapidly and heavily exposed than those
with less education and older people. (At the end of the second and
third time periods the simulation results also showed urbanites
slightly more exposed than rural dwellers, small and inconsistent
exposure differences by "sex" and "political involvement.") With
regard to the diffusion of the presidential succession theme among
various population subgroups, we observe that cumulative exposure to
21The repeat exposure figures in the lower portions of
these graphs are slightly underestimated, for reasons discussed
in Chapter VI. We mentioned above that the undercounting is
greatest for those themes which have the highest number of exposures
per exposed person. Therefore, in the bottom portions of Graphs 7.3
and 7.4, the repeat exposure figures should be somewhat higher for
each subgroup, the percentage increase rising with a subgroup's
level of exposure and, hence, with succeeding time periods.
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the theme reaches nearly 100 per cent on each dimension level at the
end of the second time period, and that repeat exposure on each
dimension level has almost caught up to the corresponding statistic
for the assassination theme. We therefore conclude that within
thirty-one hours of President Kennedy's death, a combination of Soviet
domestic reportage and foreign radio broadcasts to the USSR had
succeeded in reaching the vast majority of persons in each substratum
of the population.
Finally, some additional features of Graph 7.3 are worthy of
note. For both the Kennedy assassination and the presidential
succession themes the pattern of cumulative exposure differences
over the "education" dimension has a clearly definable structure.
Exposure builds more rapidly and to greater levels among persons
with more than seven years of education, much less rapidly and to lower
levels among persons in the other three education groupings, i.e.,
among persons with ten or less years of education. The reader will
recall that we found a distinctly different pattern in the Cuban
crisis exposure outcomes, viz., a tripartite structure in which the
high, the two middle, and the low education groupings were distinctly
separated. These results may reflect the following quite plausible
set of conditions: In all communications situations the rate and
level of cumulative exposure is distinctly greater among Russians
having more than seven years of education than among the rest of
the population. In a complex communications situation like the
Cuban missile crisis, however, Russians in the two middle education
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groupings have markedly greater rates and levels of cumulative exposure
than those of their countrymen with less than four years of education.
But in a relatively simple human-interest type of communications
situation like the aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination,
Russians in the two education groupings with seven or less years
of schooling do not differ substantially in their rates and levels
of cumulative the e exposure.
For both the Kennedy assassination and the presidential
succession themes the pattern of repeat exposure differences over the
"education" dimension has a dichotomous structure. Exposure builds
more rapidly and to greater levels among persons in the two education
groupings with seven or more years of schooling, much less rapidly
and to lower levels among persons in the lower two education groupings,
i.e., among persons with less than seven years of education. The
reader will recall that we found two different patterns in the Cuban
crisis repeat exposure outcomes. For the pro-Russian theme we found
a tripartite structure in which the high, the two middle, and the low
education groupings were distinctly separate. For the pro-American
theme, however, we found a dichotomous structure in which the high
and the other three education groupings were separate.
These repeat exposure outcomes are almost exactly opposite to
the cumulative exposure outcomes with regard to the penetration of
levels on the "education" dimension. They may therefore reflect an
interesting condition which can be posited as follows: The more
education a Russian has, the more media he is likely to expose himself
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to, and the lower the degree in which the thematic content of these
media is likely to overlap.
For the two Kennedy assassination themes Table 7.10 shows the
most and least exposed subgroups in the simulated Soviet population,
and for each of these subgroups, the cumulative percentage of persons
exposed at least once and the average cumulative number of exposures
among persons exposed at least once, after one time period of the
scenario. There are several interesting features of these data.
First, we observe (as we did for population subgroups defined
by one dimension at a time) that the levels of cumulative and repeat
exposure differ substantially between the two themes and, for each
theme, between the most and least exposed subgroups. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that in both cases the most exposed subgroup
is persons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-nine with more than
ten years of education, and the least exposed subgroup is persons
fifty years of age or older with less than four years of education.
The greater range of exposure is that for theme 2. The per-
centage of persons with more than ten years of education between the
ages of sixteen and twenty-nine who were exposed at least once to
the presidential succession theme after seven hours appears to have
been almost four times the percentage of persons fifty or more years
old with less than four years of education who were exposed at least
once. The corresponding ratio for the Kennedy assassination theme
is 2.4. These ranges undoubtedly represent the overrepresentation
of the young and the well-educated in the audiences both of Soviet
Table 7.10--Most and least exposed subgroups of the simulated Soviet
population, for individual Kennedy assassination themes,
after twenty-four hours of the scenario.a
Most Exposed Least Exposed
Group Exposure Group Exposure
1. The assassination of Age 16-29 9 2 .8b Age 50+ 39.3
President Kennedy >10 yrs. ed. (4 .3)C <4 yrs. ed. (2.3)
2. The swearing-in of
Johnson as Age 16-29 78.6 Age 50+ 21.9
President >10 yrs. ed. (2.8) <4 yrs. ed. (1.4)
aExposure outcomes for themes 3 and 4 are not shown for reasons
discussed in the footnote to Table 7.8. Excluded from the comparison
in Table 7.10 are subgroups of the simulation population containing
less than 15 persons. There were six such groups: Female Party
members (13;); Party members, age 16-29 (11); Party members with less
than 4 years of education (0); Party members with more than 10 years
of education (9); rural dwellers with more than 10 years of education
(7); persons 50 or more years of age with more than 10 years of
education (7). For each theme the data underestimate repeat exposure
(average number of exposures per person among those exposed at least
once), especially in the subgroups with greatest exposure (see
Chapter VII, pp. for details).
bCumulative percentage exposed at least once.
CAverage number of exposures per person among those exposed at
least once.
788
domestic media and foreign radio stations. It is interesting to
note that the ranges in exposure are even greater than the differ-
ences we found on either the "age" or "education" dimension alone.
Thus, the simulation results suggest, as in the case of the Cuban
crisis, that more of the variation in exposure to Kennedy assassina-
tion themes is explained by "age" and "education" together than by
either dimension alone.
Graph 7.4 shows, for the two Kennedy assassination themes,
the buildup of cumulative and repeat exposure over a period of days,
within the most and least exposed two-dimension subgroups of the
simulated Soviet population. We note that the pattern observed at
the end of the first time period (Table 7.10) prevails at the end
of the second and third time periods as well: young, educated
Russians more rapidly and heavily exposed than their older, less
educated countrymen. We also observe that virtually 100 per cent
of the Russians in the least exposed subgroup were exposed at least
once to both themes by the end of the second time period. Moreover,
the average person in this low-exposure group was exposed about
twenty times to each of the themes. This suggests that virtually
everyone within the nonmedia-immersed segment of Soviet society
learned about President Kennedy's assassination and his succession
by- Lyndon Johnson within thirty-one hours of Kennedy's death, an
outcome which undoubtedly reflects the effectiveness of Soviet
domestic radio in reaching these people. The young, educated
media-immersed segment of Soviet society was able to learn of the
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assassination and related events from all three domestic media types
as well as from foreign radio. This situation is reflected in the
simulation outcomes showing a more rapid initial buildup of cumu-
lative exposure, and subsequently, a more rapid growth in repeat
exposure among the high-exposure group.
The duplication of exposures between themes
Graphs 7.5 through 7.7 show, for the population as a whole
and for the "age" and "education" dimensions, the buildup over two
days of the chance and actual audience duplications between the theme
of President Kennedy's assassination and the theme of Johnson's
swearing-in as President. The outcomes pictured in the graphs show
that, within the simulated Soviet population as a whole, and among
the persons on each level of the "age" and "education" dimensions,
the duplicated audience between these two themes was significantly
greater than that which would have been expected, at each stage of
the scenario, on a chance basis. (The simulation output also showed
this result on each level of the "sex", "political involvement", and
"residence" dimensions.) These outcomes suggest that the types of
persons likely to have been exposed to the key Kennedy assassination
theme--reports on the murder of the President--were the same types
of persons likely to have been exposed to other important themes,
such as Johnson's having taken the oath of office as the new
President. This result, which we also found in the Cuban crisis
exposure outcomes, is not at all surprising. It simply reflects a
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feature shared by most developed media systems: a substantial degree
of overlap among the audiences for given media types and subtypes.
The role of the media in diffusing themes
Table 711 shows the distribution of exposures over media
types for the two Kennedy assassination themes. These findings
highlight the leading role played by domestic radio as the first
mass media source of news about the assassination for most Russians.
The distribution differs somewhat between the two themes, but in
both cases Soviet domestic radio accounts for by far the single
largest percentage of exposures. The Russian press does not account
for exposures to either theme because the story broke, as we have
said, after stop-press time. An interesting sidelight on these
findings is the importance of foreign radio, which accounted for a
significant percentage of the simulated Soviet population's exposures
to each theme. We also note that the two themes were channeled
somewhat differently. Foreign radio appears to have played a slightly
more important role in bringing the Russian people news about the new
President than in conveying reports about the assassination. The
reader will recall that the Radio Liberty message schedule gave far
less relative emphasis to the presidential succession theme than either
the BBC or VOA schedule (Figure 7.1). Therefore, the results
summarized in Table 7.11 probably reflect the fact, demonstrated in
Chapter VI, that both VOA and the BBC had greater "throughput" or
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messages/exposures ratios than Radio Liberty during the period
encompassed by the simulation.
The final exhibit, Table 7.12, shows, for each dimension
level of the simulated Soviet population, and for each media type,
the cumulative and repeat exposure to the two themes we have been
discussing, at the end of one time period. There are several inter-
esting aspects to these data. First, we note that the portion
of the table showing cumulative and repeat exposure by media type
for the population as a whole reveals virtually the same pattern of
differences across media types after one time period that was
observed in Table 7.11, which listed total theme exposures by media
type for the population as a whole. The pattern may be summarized
as follows: Soviet domestic radio the most important single channel
for each theme; foreign radio an important second source; Soviet
television a weak third in importance, followed by the domestic press
which carried no related messages at all during the first time
period. These cumulative and repeat exposure outcomes for the end
of the first day also serve to further underline the key role
played by Soviet domestic radio as the first media source of assassi-
nation news for most Russians. During the initial seven hours after
President Kennedy's death, Soviet radio easily accounted for the
largest single percentage of the population exposed at least once to
each of themes 1 and 2. Reflecting the importance of foreign radio
is the fact that, for the theme of Johnson's swearing-in, repeat
exposure is greater via this medium than via domestic radio.
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Table 7.12--Continued
aExposure outcomes for themes 3 and 4 are not shown for
reasons discussed in the footnote to Table 7.8. For each theme, the
data in Table 7.12 underestimate repeat exposure (average number of
exposures per person among those exposed at least once),
especially in the subgroups with greatest exposure (see Chapter VI,
pp. for details). Also not shown are exposure outcomes for
media type 5, the Soviet oral agitation network, because we did
not specify any messages in this media type during the first time
period.
bCumulative percentage exposed at least once.
CAverage number of exposures per person among those exposed
at least once.
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Also worthy of note in Table 7.12 are the patterns of exposure
difference via media type along the "age" and "education" dimensions.
In the case of foreign radio we observe that exposure decreases with
age and increases with education, just as it did in the Cuban crisis
results. This pattern is quite pronounced, and it accounts for the
differential impact~of foreign radio in bringing news of the
Kennedy assassination to various strata of the Soviet population.
For Soviet electronic media, however, the patterns are different.
Radio exposure apparently increased with age, with the medium pri-
marily serving those in the lower three education groupings. Tele-
vision, on the other hand, appears to have been of greater relative
importance to the middle aged and to persons in the middle two
education groupings. These outcomes closely parallel the findings
in Chapter VI and are consistent with the results of studies of
Soviet communications behavior either cited or reviewed earlier in
this thesis.
Table 7.12 reveals that males were slightly more exposed to
news about the Kennedy assassination via foreign radio than females,
while the latter were somewhat more heavily exposed via Soviet
electronic media. It is also interesting to note that Party members
were more heavily exposed to news about the assassination and related
events via foreign radio than were non-Party members. The latter,
on the other hand, were somewhat more heavily exposed via Soviet radio
and television. These are the same exposure differences as observed
in the Cuban crisis outcomes, and they reflect, for the most part,
800
the greater average years of schooling among males and Party members.
Lastly, we observe a rather interesting pattern of variation
along the dimension of "residence." Urbanites appear to have been
more heavily exposed than rural residents to news about the assassi-
nation via foreign radio and domestic television, but rural persons
apparently were somewhat more exposed by domestic radio. In the
Cuban crisis outcomes, however, urbanites were more heavily exposed
than ruralites via all media types. This difference may reflect
the fact that television was growing in importance between 1962 and
1963 far more rapidly in urban than in rural areas, and that growth
may have diminished the urban role of radio somewhat in the time
spanned by our two scenarios.
The simulation results for the Kennedy assassination which we
have been discussing are equally as plausible as the simulation
outcomes for the Cuban crisis. They highlight the important role
played by Soviet domestic radio and also by foreign radio in bringing
the Russian people news about the assassination of President Kennedy
during the first few hours after it had occurred. They also underscore
the primacy of domestic radio as the first source of mass media
information about the assassination for most Russians, and illustrate
the greater rapidity and depth with which assassination themes pene-
trate the youthful, educated, elite strata of Soviet society.
Finally, the simulation results discussed in this chapter also show
that foreign radio functioned as a more significant source of infor-
mation about the President's assassination for young and well-educated
801
Soviet citizens than for the broader masses of the popula-
tion, which were served chiefly by domestic radio and
television during this period. These results and the find-
ings presented in the previous chapter are consistent with
available information on the major characteristics of the
Soviet mass media system in the early part of the past
decade.
Some Concluding Observations
One does research and writes a thesis to learn some-
thing. Accordingly, we close with a brief discussion of
the principal lessons learned from this thesis experience,
commenting in turn upon the mass media data structures
that were mapped into computer storage, the crisis-exposure
outcomes which the model produced, and a challenging aspect
of interdisciplinary research.
As regards the data structures that were mapped into
computer storage, probably the most important lesson to
be drawn is the value of parsimony. In large-scale simula-
tion efforts it is easy to forget this amid the complexities
of the computer model and the details of the behavioral
system on which the model is being tested. This is especially
true when the researcher has participated in the design and
specification of the model, and is eager to play out all of
its implications and consequences. Our own experience has
shown how important it is to represent in the computer only
801a
those features of the real world system which are likely
to affect the simulation outcomes. For example, the greater
the number of media, the broader the scope of the content
analysis required; the more population dimensions, the
greater the number of audience types whose media habits
have to be taken into account, and so forth.
The most interesting and significant simulation results
are those which show foreign radio as having played a major
role in exposing the Russian people to the Western version
of Cuban crisis events and to news of President Kennedy's
assassination. Neither Inkeles' and Bauer's study of Soviet
society, nor Barghoorn's country study, nor any other
standard texts on the USSR of which we are aware, attribute
this much importance to foreign radio in the early 1960's.
To be sure, the average audiences which were estimated for
individual foreign radio media were somewhat inflated, as
explained in the text. Plans are underway to rerun the
simulation with sharply reduced estimates for foreign radio
listening, and the results will provide and important check
on our own findings.
Also of interest are the simulation outcomes which show
very little difference between urban and rural exposure to
foreign radio during the two crisis scenarios. In light
of the heavy urban concentration of radio sets with short
801b
wave reception capability in the early 1960's, this result
adds support to a contention frequently made by foreign
broadcasters, but heretofore unsubstantiated--viz., that
Soviet jamming is much less effective in rural than in
urban areas.
Finally, the design, development and application of
the Comcom simulation model have brought home to us a basic
problem of interdisciplinary research. For this thesis we
relied, at different times, on the expertise of the computer
programmer, the communications theorist, and the Sovietologist.
Frequently, the technical advice and assistance we were able
to obtain from such scholars was extremely helpful; occa-
sionally it was not. Problems arose when the experts disa-
greed. The question might be how best to design a subroutine,
what to regard as a reasonable subscription rate for a news-
paper, how to model an upsurge of interest in the mass media.
In virtually every situation where the experts disagreed, a
high level of uncertainty attached to the issue at hand. The
moral soon became clear. The interdisciplinary social
researcher who is working on a problem of any complexity must
inevitably arrive at the point where a strategic decision is
required for which the eclectic approach provides no answer.
In such cases he has to supply an answer, based perhaps on
his own conceptualization of the problem or on some kind of
statistical estimate, but at other times based on little
801c
more than a working hypothesis or assumption. Part of the
excitement of interdisciplinary social research lies in
exploring the effects and consequences of such judgements.
For this purpose simulation is invaluable.
APPENDIX A
Estimated Format Factors For
Each Simulated Soviet Medium
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Table A. 2--Continued
1These are just the marginals mapped into computer audiences
in Pass I, after the :>7, <10 category had been converted (linearly)
to >7, 10 and = 7.
2These estimates were obtained by taking the sum of products
of the audience education marginals and the estimated average format
factors in the three education categories.
3Each format factor was obtained by solving a quadratic equation
(see p. of the text) to estimate a format factor for the given
medium-Program combination, and then multiplying the result by the
corresponding Program factor (1/11 in the case of regional newscasts).
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Table A.3--Continued
1These are just the marginals mapped into computer audiences in
Pass I, after the >,7, 10 category had been converted (linearly) to
>7, 10 and = 7.
These estimates were obtained by taking the sum of products of
the audience education marginals and the estimated average format
factors in the three education categories.
Each format factor was obtained by solving a quadratic equation
(see p. of the text) to estimate a format factor for the given
medium - time slot - language, medium - time slot - newscast length,
or medium-time slot - target area combination, and then multiplying
the result by (1) the corresponding time slot factor, and (2) the
corresponding language, newscast length, or target area factor.
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APPENDIX B
Themes, Code Sheets, and Methods of Inference Used in the Content
Analyses of Soviet Media and Foreign Radio
Themes in the Cuban Missile Crisis
1. The U.S. Naval Quarantine of Cuba
This theme includes any message which reports on the institution
of the quarantine. The object is to record all mass media messages
which told of the existence of the quarantine during the period en-
compassed by the simulation, no matter how long after the Kennedy
announcement they appeared.. For example, a Pravda editorial published
several days after President Kennedy's speech, commenting on the
illegality of the quarantine, while probably not a source from which
anyone first learned of the quarantine, would be coded for this theme.
2. Reports of Pro-Soviet or Anti-U.S. Reactions
This theme includes all reports of reactions, both foreign and
domestic, favoring Soviet policy or opposing United States actions.
Examples of this theme are quotes of American citizens criticizing
U.S. policy in regard to Cuba, reports from abroad of demonstrations
and rallies or other forms of protest against United States actions,
accounts of intransigence and uncooperativeness among American allies,
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accounts of American-allied, neutral, or Communist countries endors-
ing the Soviet Union's position during the crisis, congratulatory
notes to Khrushchev on his posture during the crisis, opinion polls
abroad showing U.S. citizens in opposition to: their government's
policy, demonstrations within the Soviet Union in support of Soviet
policy or against U.S. actions, and foreign or domestic demonstrations
of support for Cuba and the Cuban people.
3. Reports of Pro-U.S. or Anti-Soviet Reactions
This theme includes all reports of reactions, both foreign
and domestic, opposing Soviet policy or favoring/justifying U.S.
actions. In addition to the converse of the examples cited for
theme 2, it includes statements in support of the United States from
any of the NATO or OAS allies, reports of American claims that the
Soviets had installed offensive missiles in Cuba which were a threat
to U.S. security, and accounts of aerial reconnaissance photographs
taken by the United States of Cuban missile bases.
4. Soviet Allegations of U.S. Hostility Towards Cuba
This theme includes reports of air or sea violations of Cuba's
territorial integrity--either by the United States or by Cuban
emigres, reports of subversion or sabotage inside Cuba, accounts of
"war hysteria" within the United States, reports of inflammatory
Congressional speeches and resolutions, references to provocative
articles in American newspapers, accounts of United States efforts
817
to impose an economic blockade upon Cuba--either alone or in conjunc-
tion with her allies, descriptions of American moves to mobilize her
armed forces, accounts of U.S. naval maneuvers in the Caribbean,
complaints about American interference with the transit rights of
Cuban-bound non-Soviet ships, allegations regarding American attempts
to forge an anti-Cuban bloc among her NATO and OAS allies, and
reports of U.S. efforts to create a Cuban government-in-exile.
5. Soviet Agreement to Remove Their Missiles From Cuba
This theme includes all reports of the Soviet agreement to
withdraw their missiles from Cuba and dismantle their bases on the
island in return for a U.S. no-invasion pledge. It does not include
reports of the earlier Soviet offer to swap this withdrawal for the
removal of U.S. missiles and bases from Turkey.
6. U.S. Threats Directed Against The Soviets
This theme includes all reports of U.S. statements that warn
of possible military action against the Soviets and all reports of
U.S. actions that are seen as a threat to Soviet security. An
example of the former is President Kennedy's statement to the effect
that any missile launched from Cuba against any country in the Western
Hemisphere would be viewed as an attack by the Soviet Union on the
United States that called for a full retaliatory response by the U.S.
against the Soviet Union. An example of the latter is the incident
in which a United States aircraft flew over Siberia.
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7. Soviet Threats Directed Against the U.S.
This theme includes all reports of Soviet statements that warn
of possible military action against the United States and all reports
of Soviet actions that signal impending military action against the
U.S. An example of the former is the Soviet government's statement
that the U.S. would not be allowed to carry out "pirate" actions on
the high seas. An example of the latter is the Soviet cancellation
of all military leaves.
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Themes in the Assassination of President Kennedy
1. The Assassination of President Kennedy
This theme includes any message which refers to the fact
that President Kennedy has been assassinated. The object is to
record all mass media messages which told of the assassination during
the period encompassed by the simulation, no matter how long after
Kennedy's death they appeared. For example, a roundtable discussion
broadcast over Moscow radio several days after President Kennedy's
death, in which the participants allege that violence and corruption
in U.S. society were responsible for the President's assassination,
while probably not a source from which anyone first learned of the
assassination, would be coded for this theme.
2. The Swearing in of Johnson as President
This theme includes all reports making reference, either
directly or indirectly, to the fact that Lyndon Johnson has been sworn
in as President of the United States. An example of an indirect refer-
ence that would be coded for this theme is an Izvestia article, pub-
lished several days after Johnson had taken the oath of office, spec-
ulating on the likely degree of continuity between the policies of
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
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3. The Assassination of Oswald
This theme includes all reports that Lee Harvey Oswald has
been assassinated. As with the first two themes, it includes tangen-
tial as well as direct references, i.e., it includes news items from
which Oswald's assassination can be inferred. Stories about Jack
Ruby, Oswald's funeral, his life, or his widow will generally fall in
the latter category.
4. The Establishment of the Warren Commission
This theme includes all reports that the Warren Commission
has been established for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive
investigation of the assassination.
Code Sheets Used in the Content Analysis
In this section we present the code sheets (Tables B.1-B.5) used
in the content analysis of Soviet media material and foreign radio
transmissions to the Soviet Union during the period of the Cuban
missile crisis. An identical set of code sheets was used in the
content analysis of Soviet media material and radio broadcasts
beamed to the U.S.S.R. from abroad after President Kennedy's assassi-
nation. (On the latter set of code sheets, of course, the "Day"
column ran from November 22nd to December 1st, 1963.)
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Message Schedules and Methods of Inference
Used in Constructing the Scenarios
By combining the message schedules that were in effect for
each simulated medium during the Cuban missile crisis and after
President Kennedy's assassination with content analyzed samples
of material carried by some of the media in the simulation during
these two periods we were able to infer, for each theme of
interest, a likely pattern of message appearances over all of the
media in the simulation. The methods by which these inferences
were made, as well as the message schedules that were in effect,
are summarized below for Soviet print and electronic media
(Tables B.7-B.14) and for radio transmissions to the USSR from
abroad (Tables B.15-B.22).
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Table B. 10--Continued
CConstructed by setting the total number of newscasts equal
to the number found for program IV over an eight day Radio Liberty
monitoring period ("An Eight-Day Analysis," quoted in Durham,
Radio and Television, p. 113), by locating a Fourth Program
newscast three hours earlier (Moscow Central Time) than each First
Program newscast, and by locating the remaining Fourth Program
newscasts at the remaining unfilled hours of the day (Moscow
Central Time).
Constructed by creating, for each newscast on the Second
Program, eleven corresponding local newscasts--one at the same time,
as, one an hour later than, and one in each of the nine hours
preceding the corresponding Second Program newscast (Moscow Central
Time),--in accordance with the eleven meridians or time zones
encompassed by the bulk of the USSR.
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Table B. 12--Continued
aThese methods and assumptions were used for each theme in
the Cuban crisis and the Kennedy assassination.
bObtained, from FBIS monitoring reports, a sample of the
material broadcast by Moscow Domestic Service during the periods
October 23rd-November lst,1962 and November 22nd-December 1st, 1963.
CThe inferential procedure was based on the assumption that
All-Union radio broadcasts formed the basis of radio broadcast
content in the localities (see, e.g., Durham, Radio and Television,
p. 54).
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